The 2025 Turkish Cypriot leadership election delivered a decisive outcome: opposition leader Tufan Erhürman defeated incumbent Ersin Tatar in a landslide. Erhürman secured roughly 62.8% of the vote against Tatar's 35.8%, according to official figures. This result unseated a hardline, Ankara-aligned incumbent and installed a moderate, pro-reunification figure as president of the self-declared TRNC.
With voter turnout around 65% of 218,000 registered voters, the mandate signals broad Turkish Cypriot support for reviving peace negotiations with Greek Cypriots Erhürman campaigned on reinvigorating stalled talks and pursuing a bi-zonal, bi-communal federal solution to Cyprus's decades-long division. In contrast, Tatar had staunchly advocated a two-state policy, in line with Turkey's recent stance, seeking international recognition of the north as a separate sovereign state – an approach firmly rejected by the Greek Cypriot south. Erhürman's victory is therefore widely viewed as a pivotal turning point that could reopen the door to UN-backed reunification efforts after an eight-year stalemate.
Prospects for Reunification Talks
Erhürman's win raises cautious optimism for the resumption of Cyprus peace talks under the long-established UN framework of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation. The new Turkish Cypriot leader has pledged to explore a federal reunification deal, aligning with the solution model favored by the United Nations and the Republic of Cyprus. Greek Cypriot President Nikos Christodoulides promptly welcomed Erhürman's victory and reiterated readiness to meet "as soon as possible" to restart negotiations. The return of a pro-federation partner in the north stands in stark contrast to Tatar's term, during which formal peace talks languished. Erhürman sharply criticized his predecessor's refusal to engage in negotiations over the past five years as a "costly loss of time" that left Turkish Cypriots isolated from the European Union and on the international periphery.
However, significant hurdles remain. Any new talks will revisit core disputes that derailed the last major reunification effort in 2017. Questions of political equality and security guarantees loom large. Erhürman insists that Turkish Cypriots must enjoy political equality in a new federation – a principle agreeable in theory but contentious in practice (earlier talks stumbled over the extent of Turkish Cypriot veto power in federal decisions).
Likewise, the issue of Turkey's military presence and guarantor rights will test the negotiations. Ankara maintains over 35,000 troops in Northern Cyprus and claims an intervention right as the Turkish Cypriot community's protector. Greek Cypriots view those troops and any unilateral intervention rights as threats to their security and sovereignty, a key reason the 2017 Crans-Montana talks collapsed. Erhürman has already reassured that he does not intend to eliminate Turkey's guarantor role outright, reflecting a pragmatic recognition that any deal must assuage Turkish security concerns.
From a realpolitik perspective, the success of renewed negotiations will depend on hard bargaining and trade-offs: each side must secure its vital interests – for Greek Cypriots, a reunified state free of perpetual foreign military control, and for Turkish Cypriots (and Turkey), sufficient power-sharing and security guarantees to protect their community's rights.
Turkey's Influence and Calculations
Turkey, as the only country that recognizes the TRNC, remains the decisive external actor in Northern Cyprus. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan publicly praised the Turkish Cypriot election as a sign of democratic maturity and congratulated Erhürman, affirming Turkey will "continue to defend the sovereign rights and interests" of Turkish Cypriots on all platforms. Despite this cordial message, Ankara's strategic posture bears watching. As recently as September, Erdoğan told the UN General Assembly that Turkey "backs a two-state deal" on Cyprus.
Erhürman's ascent could thus test whether Turkey is willing to recalibrate that stance. The new TRNC leader has promised to coordinate closely with Ankara – "in consultation with the Republic of Türkiye" – on all foreign policy steps, a clear acknowledgement of Turkey's leverage. Indeed, Northern Cyprus is economically and politically dependent on Ankara's support, meaning Erhürman has limited room to maneuver without Turkey's consent.
Ankara's acceptance of federation talks will likely be driven by pragmatic interest. Former Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat suggested Turkey could yet adapt its approach "depending on what Turkey can get out of a solution". In realpolitik terms, Erdoğan's government may calculate that re-engaging in UN negotiations could yield benefits – for example, improved relations with the EU (where Cyprus wields veto power over Turkey's stalled accession bid) or a share in Eastern Mediterranean energy development.
If these gains outweigh the advantages of the status quo, Turkey might support Erhürman's outreach. Conversely, should Ankara judge that a federal compromise endangers its strategic foothold on the island, it may quietly rein in the Turkish Cypriot leader's ambitions. Erhürman's challenge will be balancing his voters' mandate for a settlement against Turkey's determination to safeguard its regional influence and security red lines.
Southern Cyprus' and regional reactions
In the Republic of Cyprus (the internationally recognized Greek Cypriot south), Erhürman's victory has been met with cautious hope. President Christodoulides hailed the election result and signaled readiness to resume talks immediately. For the Greek Cypriot leadership, a partner in the north who embraces a federation is a welcome change after years of impasse under Tatar. It potentially opens the way to restart negotiations from where they left off in 2017. Nonetheless, Nicosia will approach talks pragmatically. Greek Cypriot officials insist any deal remain within the agreed UN parameters – no outright partition or two-state arrangement – and they will be mindful of domestic constituencies wary of excessive concessions.
Issues like rotating presidency in a federation, power-sharing ratios, and the withdrawal of Turkish troops will be politically delicate to sell internally. The south also retains a powerful card: as an EU member, it can influence Turkey's European ambitions. The prospect of unlocking EU benefits could be used to encourage Ankara's cooperation in a Cyprus deal. At the same time, Greek Cypriots know that if this new round of talks fails, the island's de facto partition may deepen. Thus, while expressing optimism, the south's strategy will be grounded in hard-nosed calculations of security and diplomatic leverage. Any compromise will likely be incremental and contingent on tangible guarantees that Turkish Cypriot intentions – and Turkey's – align with a reunified, EU-member Cyprus that protects the interests of both communities.
East mediterranean energy and Israel's stake
Erhürman's win also reverberates in the context of Eastern Mediterranean energy diplomacy. A reunified or more cooperative Cyprus could significantly alter regional energy plans. The island sits near substantial natural gas deposits under the seabed off its southern coast. These resources have been a source of tension – with the Republic of Cyprus licensing exploration in its exclusive economic zone, and Turkey (on behalf of Turkish Cypriots) contesting some areas. From a realpolitik standpoint, a Cyprus settlement might unlock joint exploitation of these gas fields, benefiting all parties. In fact, observers note that peace "could expedite the exploitation of sizable natural gas deposits" off Cyprus, supplying markets in Egypt and Europe Cooperation between Greek and Turkish Cypriots would remove a major obstacle to developing these resources and could attract international investment currently deterred by the dispute.
Beyond hydrocarbons, regional infrastructure projects could gain momentum. One example is the planned electricity interconnector linking Israel, Cyprus, and Greece. Ankara has objected to portions of this project, which aims to tie Cypriot and Greek power grids to each other and possibly to Israel. A political resolution might lift Turkish objections to an undersea cable connecting Cyprus with Greece, and Israel is reportedly keen on extending that link to its own grid. Israel's broader interest lies in a stable Eastern Mediterranean where energy cooperation is maximized.
For the past decade, Israel, Cyprus, and Greece have bolstered ties – forming an energy partnership and even a regional forum excluding Turkey – partly as a response to Turkish assertiveness. If Cyprus reunification talks progress, it could ease regional frictions and potentially bring Turkey into a more collaborative framework. For instance, a settlement could revive consideration of an Israel-Turkey gas pipeline, a project that was politically unthinkable amid the Cyprus impasse.
In short, Erhürman's presidency introduces a new variable in East Med energy calculus: the possibility of redirecting competition into cooperation. Still, much depends on whether Turkey moderates its approach. Israel will pragmatically assess whether any Cyprus deal leads to a more predictable environment for its energy exports and whether Turkey's posture shifts from zero-sum rivalry to pragmatic engagement. Until concrete changes materialize, Israel is likely to continue its close energy partnership with Cyprus (South) and Greece, while remaining open to opportunities a Cyprus peace might create.
Geopolitical alignments and outlook
Regionally, the change in Northern Cyprus could influence the East Mediterranean's geopolitical alignment. Turkey's decade-long estrangement from Greece, Cyprus, and at times Israel has produced competing blocs. The Greek Cypriot south has entrenched itself in a strategic partnership with Greece, Israel, and Egypt, partly to counterbalance Turkey's claims in regional waters.
A breakthrough on Cyprus would be a game-changer: it might soften the Greece-Turkey rivalry and reduce one flashpoint in Turkish-EU relations. In turn, that could shift Ankara's calculus in the wider region, potentially easing tensions with Israel and others. Indeed, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan's recent diplomacy hints at interest in mending ties with the West, and a solution in Cyprus could be one element of a broader realignment.
On the other hand, if reunification efforts falter despite Erhürman's good intentions, the likely outcome is a continuation – or even acceleration – of existing trends. Turkey may double down on integrating Northern Cyprus economically and militarily, cementing the "two-state" reality on the groun. The Turkish Cypriot community, if left without a peace prospect, could drift further into Ankara's orbit, deepening the island's division. That scenario could in turn harden the Greece-Cyprus-Israel alignment, as unresolved Cyprus tensions often spill over into broader regional disputes.
Uncertainties and scenarios ahead
Erhürman's triumph in the 2025 TRNC election opens a window for diplomacy, but the trajectory of Cyprus's future is far from predetermined. Several uncertainties will shape what comes next. First, Turkey's true intentions remain a wildcard – whether Erdoğan will allow a pivot back to federation talks or quietly insist on his two-state red lines will determine the scope of what Erhürman can achieve. Secondly, the Greek Cypriot side must be willing to strike a balance between safeguarding its national interests and accommodating Turkish Cypriot equality; without mutual compromise, even a well-intentioned dialogue could stall. The role of external players is another factor: the European Union's appetite to facilitate a deal (perhaps by offering incentives to Turkey), and the United States' or United Nations' engagement, could bolster momentum or leave the parties to their own devices.
In the energy arena, a lot hinges on whether stability on Cyprus materializes – a deal could herald new energy corridors and cooperation, whereas a breakdown may keep the Eastern Med in a competitive posture over gas and infrastructure. From a realpolitik viewpoint, each actor will pursue its perceived national interest: Turkey will seek strategic advantage or concessions, the Cypriot sides will maneuver for security and legitimacy, and regional states like Israel will watch for opportunities to secure energy and alliances.
The coming months may see confidence-building steps and renewed negotiations, but also potential spoilers if trust falters. In sum, the 2025 Northern Cyprus election has reset the board in a longstanding conflict; whether this leads to a historic settlement or a return to deadlock will depend on how pragmatically the leaders navigate the intricate balance of power, interests, and diplomacy in the Eastern Mediterranean
