This has been one of the quietest years Israel has known in terms of security. With the exception of the events in the Gaza Strip, which posed far smaller a threat than they appeared, Israelis enjoyed almost total calm in all sectors. The number of casualties, damage and security events was significantly lower this year than in previous years, leading to an increased sense of security in Israel, and rightfully so.
Paradoxically, this happened despite, and perhaps because of, the mass deployment of forces. The public has been mostly unaware of the majority of the way in which the defense establishment exercised its capabilities, as most activities took place in remote places and therefore remain clandestine.
In fact, over the past year the IDF has maintained two campaigns: The first, the overt one, took place along the borders and was headed by the IDF's respective commands; and the second, the covert one, was conducted in the virtual sphere as part of the "campaign between the wars," a strategic concept that encompasses a host of covert and low-intensity military and intelligence efforts to prevent enemy states and terrorist organizations from becoming stronger and thwart their offensive activity.
In this world, which exists mainly between Military Intelligence and the Israeli Air Force, Israel has done wonders, and the recent revelation that the IDF has targeted over 200 Iranian assets in Syria since 2017 was only part of the covert activities that facilitated the peace and quiet on the ground.
The scope of this activity also revealed much about the new reality with which Israel contends. If in the past it was customary to relate to the different sectors geographically and usually deal with them separately, today the security scope requires a systemic, cross-border outlook. We mostly have Iran to thank for that, as the Islamic republic currently comprises Israel's main hostile front, even in the absence of a physical border between the two nations.
This virtual border with Iran requires special attention, considerable financial, technological and manpower resources, and an unusual willingness to take risks far beyond those taken with respect to current security missions. For the most part, this involves not the prevention of an imminent attack but rather investing in thwarting medium- and long-term threats. This is not about a potential stabbing attack in Jerusalem or rocket fire on Sderot, but about the precision missile that may be heading to the center of Tel Aviv in the next war.
Iran will remain the focus of the Israeli defense establishment in the coming year. Despite the United States' exit from the nuclear agreement and the economic woes plaguing it ever since, there are currently no signs that the regime in Tehran plans to change its aspirations for tightening its grip on the Middle East. Israel has already declared that it will spare no effort to prevent this from happening, which means a continued conflict, at the end of which lies the real danger of a direct danger, which has so far been averted, of a war between Israel and Iran, certainly if the strikes against Iranian assets in Syria continue on their current scope.
But Iran is not the only one to cross borders. The Islamic State group did this between Syria and the Sinai Peninsula, Hamas does it between Judea and Samaria and Gaza, with the occasional touch on Lebanon, and Hezbollah is intensively engaged in establishing its infrastructure on the Golan Heights.
This requires Israel not only to adopt a systematic view and to understand that what transpires in one arena affects others which, in turn, demands more precise and tightly coordinated activity – ranging from the allocation of forces to intelligence sharing, both within the IDF and between the military and the Shin Bet security agency and the Mossad.
Those who seek to curb the financing of terrorism, an operation that, in and of itself, crosses borders and organizations, cannot act sectorially. Israel is waging a borderless campaign and this requires diplomatic, economic and media activity.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu admitted recently that Israel has benefited from the Arab Spring. Middle East regimes crumbled, threats were removed and above all – the regional players were preoccupied with themselves and were far too busy to focus on Israel.
On the upside, this both bolstered Israel's regional position as well as presented it with opportunities, namely developing unprecedented ties – albeit mostly clandestine – with the moderate Sunni states. With a little vision and courage, these ties will break onto the surface and dramatically change the reality in the region.
On the downside, this brought about new threats, or rather old threats of a new magnitude: Iran, which until now has been the biggest beneficiary of the upheavals plaguing the Middle East, and the Salafist challenge – from al-Qaida to Islamic State. The latter may occasionally change names but is not expected to disappear anytime soon. All this is compounded by Russia, which may not be an enemy but is certainly a dramatic force to be reckoned with in the region. Russia is here to stay and its presence clouds every decision Israel makes with regard to potential operations.
So far, Israel has been able to maneuver all of these aspects impressively, not just in terms of using its forces and maintaining the security calm but mostly on a strategic level. Jerusalem's ties with Washington and Moscow are phenomenal and it is a major component in Israel's ability to generate deterrence. Many of the region's leaders talk with Jerusalem in hopes of reaching Trump or Putin through it, affording Israel unusual leverage.
While all this puts Israel at an advantage, one must remember that the Middle East has a fickle temperament. Regimes rise and fall, alliances change and centers of power are often turned on their heads unexpectedly. Today's calm could turn into tomorrow's war in a matter of minutes, regardless of the one rocket or lone-wolf terrorist that has the power to ignite an entire sector in seconds.
This means that even with a perfectly solid strategic position and well-honed deterrence, Israel is under threat and it must maintain endless – and costly – defense and security activities.
The plans revealed over the past few weeks for a multimillion-dollar investment in defense spending indicated that Israel plans to safeguard itself to within an inch of its life with anti-missile defense systems, sophisticated fences and an extensive array of other advanced measures meant to counter every threat imaginable. Unlike the activities that are part of the campaign between wars, these measures are meant to both be seen and felt on the ground, and they will go a long way toward determining Israelis' sense of security in the coming year.
Old regime, new reality
The Syrian civil war has not been officially decided but its end – and its results – are near and clear. As far as Israel is concerned, the Golan Heights border has reverted to its 2011 state, with the Syrian army in control and calm on the border fence. Even at the height of the fighting life on the Israeli side of the border went on as usual and the border-vicinity communities' routine was rarely interrupted.
Still, the IDF's Northern Command is bracing for this reality to change. Hezbollah is trying to gain a foothold in the Golan sector, driving up recruitment and establishing infrastructure, which are currently focused in intelligence gathering. Odds are the calm on this front will be preserved, not only because Syrian President Bashar Assad is focused on rehabilitating his regime and his country and has little time to pursue a conflict with Israel, but also because the presence of Russian officers in eight positions along the border seems to have a restraining effect. The Russians have proven to be an effective – and deterring – element that prevents friction and together with the U.N. peacekeeping forces that will soon return to the buffer zone, there are plenty of restraining elements on the ground.
The danger in Syria lies not on the front lines but deeper inland. Iran's intensive efforts to gain a solid foothold in the war-torn country by setting up permanent bases and facilities and deploying forces on the ground is a threat Israel has no intention of tolerating, and it will continue in its efforts to thwart it both near and far.
Potentially, any such incident could lead to a wider escalation opposite Iran or Syria, or even vis-a-vis Russia, should it feel its interests in the region are being compromised.
At this point in time, the likelihood of these scenarios becoming reality is very low. Russia and Syria both want to maintain the calm, while Iran would like to stir things up – just not now – as Tehran's forces need time to establish themselves in Syria before they make their move.
The Israeli challenge will be to continue with the activities taking place as part of the campaign between the wars in this new Syrian reality without compromising the calm along the border. This stands to be a top priority for the defense establishment in the coming year and any actions taken with this respect are bound to affect other sectors.
Another brick in the wall
Twelve years after the Second Lebanon War, Israel's other northern border is totally quiet.
Despite his belligerent rhetoric, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah remains deterred and wary of another confrontation with Israel. His organization may have racked up impressive achievements in the fighting in Syria, but it has also suffered a significant number of casualties – some 1,800 dead operatives and thousands of others wounded, which requires a prolonged process of rehabilitation. With its resources diminished due to the difficult economic situation of its patron, Iran, it is doubtful Nasrallah has the energy to provoke a new war.
Hezbollah is also deeply involved in Lebanese politics. The natural Israeli inclination to see the Shiite terrorist group as an Iranian proxy was perhaps correct in previous times but it is far from the current reality: Nasrallah is first and foremost a Lebanese patriot, and he will give serious thought to any action that might see a foreign entity rain fire and fury on his country. This does not mean that he does not consider Iran's interests – Tehran, after all, supplies his funding and weapons – but Hezbollah's interests are mainly Lebanon-focused. Nasrallah understands the extent of Israel's military might and it is doubtful whether he will try to challenge Israel for no real reason.
But make no mistake: Israel is also deterred. The IDF's focus on operations targeting weapon convoys traveling through Syria to Hezbollah in Lebanon is not coincidental: In recent years, Syria has been something of a no-man's land where various powers could operate uninterrupted, but in Lebanon, Hezbollah has already made it clear that any act of aggression will meet a forceful response, which could lead to a chain of events that will result in war.
The quiet on the border is not misleading, but behind it, intensive preparations are made for a continued escalation. Hezbollah remains the IDF's primary focus in terms of potential fighting scenarios, but the border itself is changing its character. The IDF is busy building a new, 80-mile barrier along the Israel-Lebanon border, 7 miles of which have been completed so far.
Most of the barrier will comprise a 30-foot high concrete wall topped by steel mesh and lined with a grid of sophisticated sensors and advanced surveillance systems, and steel fencing replaces the concrete wall in especially rugged areas. The $450 million project is slated for completion in two years.
This wall, designed to make it difficult for Hezbollah to target IDF troops or carry out cross-border raids in the next war, is a source of friction with Lebanon because there is a disagreement over its route at several locations. Israel has so far refrained from building in the disputed areas in an attempt to reach a compromise with Lebanon with UNIFIL mediation, but unless a compromise is devised in the very near future, construction will begin anyway, spelling potential friction with Hezbollah, which has declared itself the "defender of Lebanon."
Much like in the Golan Heights, chances of another war on the Lebanese border are very low. Hezbollah is preoccupied with its own troubles and another conflict will achieve nothing for it. Israel is also interested in peace, but may be required to change its policy. If this happens, Hezbollah will begin assembling its precision projectiles on Lebanese soil, and Israel will then have to decide whether to act not only clandestinely, which by implication will significantly increase the chances of war.
Always on the brink
After five highly volatile months, it seems calm has returned to the Israel-Gaza border. Israel has opened the border crossings and expanded the fishing zone off the Gaza Strip's shores from six to nine nautical miles, and Hamas has stopped nearly all unrest, including the arson terrorism campaign that has wreaked havoc on the Israeli communities near the border. This does not mean the threat of escalation has passed, and a senior defense official hedged this week that chances of an escalation are greater than the chances of reaching an agreement in Gaza.
Contrary to public perception, Israel has not been observing these developments from the sidelines. The months of fighting in the south has seen the IDF use significant force to deter and mainly to prevent the Palestinians' attempts to rush the border fence.
Many believe that Israel should have exercised even more force, even at the risk of embarking on a broader campaign. This is a legitimate opinion, although it runs contrary to the clear directive the government gave the military, namely to act to restore calm without further escalation.
This is expected to be the Israeli policy in the coming year as well, but reality, as usual, will create various difficulties. The humanitarian situation in Gaza will not improve on its own, with the Palestinian Authority continuing to be a negative factor by thwarting any solution, and the United States' decision to end its funding for the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, which indirectly supports 1.2 million Gazans and employs some 17,000 people.
Even if UNRWA does perpetuate the Palestinian refugeedom, in the absence of a solution, the humanitarian crisis in Gaza will only grow worse and the Palestinians' wrath will be directed mainly at Israel.
The Israeli interest, therefore, is to find an arrangement that will improve the situation in the Gaza Strip. Many efforts are directed toward this in Egyptian-led talks in Cairo, which also include various international, Western and Arab elements, and at the same time the IDF is also focusing on completing its security deployment in case of an escalation on the border.
Israel is expected to complete the construction of the new Gaza security fence – a 37-mile barrier some 820 feet from the border – later this year. At 31 inches wide, the barrier, which seeks to eliminate the threat of Hamas' grid of terror tunnels, has a system of advanced sensor and monitoring devices to detect tunnels, while above ground there will be a fence 20 feet high, similar to the one which runs along the Israeli-Egyptian border. The expected cost of construction is over $830 million.
Given the progress made in the fence's construction, Hamas understands that in terms of exploiting the tunnels for terrorist attacks and abductions, it is on borrowed time. This will pose a dilemma for Gaza's rulers in the coming months, which will coincide with the progress made in the Cairo talks.
If Hamas recognizes an opportunity to increase Gazans' welfare it is unlikely to risk a war, but if it feels backed into a corner again and begins to fear that Gazans will turn against it, it may choose to go down the familiar road of hostilities, hoping that a new opportunity will emerge from the ruins of war.
A love-hate relationship
Judea and Samaria is perhaps the biggest enigma among Israel's various security sectors. Sporadic terrorist attacks aside, strategically speaking, this sector is mostly quiet. Contrary to Israeli concerns, no event – from the relocation of the American Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem to the number of casualties in the Gaza border riots – has made the Palestinians in the West Bank take to the streets. The Palestinians remained largely indifferent, and terrorist activity is constantly thwarted.
But this calm is misleading. The situation on the ground is highly volatile. Jerusalem is a constant source of friction, as is the issue of the Palestinian prisoners and the cuts to UNRWA. Above all, the situation is clouded by the question of what will happen when Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas is no longer in power, regardless of the reason.
Despite growing opposition and his own failing health, Abbas consistently refuses to name a successor, so a heated – perhaps even violent – power struggle is expected and the only common denominator between those vying to replace him will be their animosity toward Israel.
Meanwhile, Israel maintains a love-hate relationship with the Palestinian Authority: "love" with respect to the exceptional collaboration with skilled Palestinian forces that operate not to serve Israeli interest but rather in self-defense; and "hate" with respect to the diplomatic sphere, where it is doubtful that anything productive happens in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process in the near future.
This means that Israel will have to continue to invest tremendous effort in thwarting terrorism even in the foreseeable future. The public may take this for granted but behind the scenes lies tireless, round-the-clock work that constantly erodes terrorist infrastructures. The main threat in this regard lies with Hamas, which challenges not only Israel but also the Palestinian Authority as a political alternative.
The Shin Bet and the IDF manage to maintain a high level of prevention and with it security, yet with hundreds of thousands of Jews living among millions of Palestinians, and with hundreds of kilometers of continuous and daily interface with Israel, the challenge in Judea and Samaria is constant, and will continue to be so in the coming year.
Southern exposure
The calm in the Sinai Peninsula is deceptive. The terrorist infrastructure in Sinai is alive and kicking and many of the groups operating there have transferred their loyalty from al-Qaida to Islamic State while also maintaining close ties with the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and their Hamas proxy in Gaza.
These groups focus their activities mostly against Egyptian security forces in the northern part of the peninsula, and the Egyptian military is gaining ground against them. This battle, however, is likely to take years.
The foreign media has linked Israel to this war, with reports of airstrikes against terrorist targets. This indicates a two-pronged Israeli interest: first to ensure that terrorist infrastructure remains far from the border, thus reducing the threat of terrorist attacks; and second to bolster the Egyptian government and military.
Based on these reports, we can also learn about the depth of the behind-the-scenes ties between the two nations, in total contrast with the cold peace that prevails between them.
But Israel has another interest, which may seem distant at the moment but is very troubling to the political echelon. The fence on the Egyptian border, which foils attacks and serves as a model for borders built in recent years in the other sectors, was originally set up to stop infiltrators. Equally helpful was the Egyptian government's decision to stop them far from Sinai.
Israel fears that the masses of refugees trying to get to Europe's shores will renew efforts to reach it, too. Egypt has a critical role in stopping them before they reach Israel, which is another reason for tightening the partnership with Cairo.
A steadfast partner
As with Egypt, the relationship between Israel and Jordan seems very cold on the surface but behind the scenes, things are much warmer and bilateral visits by senior political and security officials are a matter of routine.
Jordan needs Israel in a variety of areas, mainly security. It faces a wide array of external security threats, from Islamist state Iran to the Syrian army's resurgence on its border, as well as a variety of domestic difficulties, which are compounded by a refugee crisis. More than a million refugees – Shiites from Iraq and Sunnis from Syria – have fled to Jordan and have changed its economy and its streets, making Jordan poorer and far more polarized.
Israel, according to foreign reports, provides Jordan with intelligence and weapons, while Jordan provides it with security calm along the two's shared border, which stretches hundreds of kilometers. The IDF has already completed plans to build a new border fence along the eastern front as well, and initial work is underway.
There is no reason why the security harmony between Israel and Jordan cannot be preserved. It has weathered severe crises and should be able to successfully deal with potential confrontations in the West Bank or the Gaza Strip.
The main Israeli concern in the Jordanian context is not terrorism, but rather in the larger aspects of government. Jordan is Israel's strategic homefront to the east. Any change in the regime in Amman, heaven forbid, would be dramatic for both Jordan and Israel's national security.
