At the start of the war, amidst the initial shock, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu attempted to convey the message, "What was, will no longer be." He likely referred to Hamas and Gaza, but it quickly became evident that this clearly applied to domestic matters as well –, at least as much as it did externally.
Only time will tell if Israel will succeed in eliminating Hamas, but one thing is clear now: when the war ends, nothing will be the same in the country. Everything will have changed, including the technology sector and the hi-tech industry.
Countless words have already been uttered about the long-term process of integration between technology and national security. This holds true globally and in Israel. The output and productivity of the technology sector over the past two decades formed the basis for branding Israel as the "Start-Up Nation." This has served as one of the main sources of support for Israel's national security architecture, shaping our national image worldwide. The level of trust in national technological systems – intelligence, cybersecurity, artificial intelligence, tunnel detection, smart fences with endless sensors, and more – neatly dovetails with Israel's defense doctrine, especially on the Gaza border. Like many paradigms that unraveled in the October war, it is worth examining and evaluating whether the advantage of Israeli technology has passed the test of reality.
This assessment should be carried out on three different dimensions:
1. Did technology "deliver the goods" in the months and years leading up to the surprise attack in terms of readiness for war? Did technological intelligence succeed in collecting relevant data, with failures mainly occurring in the analysis and understanding of the enemy's intentions? In other words, could there have been reliance on technological systems that would have helped counter the impact of human misconceptions and raised red flags when facts on the ground don't align with perceived reality? On an operational level, it is imperative to scrutinize why the powerful technological systems that supported the physical barrier – the fence system – failed to identify intrusion attempts and prevent barrier breaches. Were the technologies used up-to-date, and were lessons learned from the Russian invasion of Ukraine and their extensive use of drones in combat there? The footage of the attack and the destruction of surveillance cameras early in the conflict raises serious questions as to whether the IDF was adequately prepared for the threat of drones.
2. Just like in many areas where Israel lacks a national strategy, there is no national technology strategy either. A comprehensive study by the Institute for National Security Studies, set to be published soon, proposes a national technology strategy. This research examined the relationship between Israel's technology industry and national security, identifying significant disparities at all levels. One conclusion is that without a strategy, there's no national compass to guide technology development in Israel and ensure it aligns with the evolving needs of Israeli national security, from the macroeconomic level of the country to the micro-tactical level of using versatile and evolving technologies. Agencies like Rafael and the Directorate of Defense Research & Development (DDR&D) are more in the category of innovation and execution, but it is not their role to aggregate technological needs as a derivative of the national strategy. In the past, Israel's technological innovation in many cases derived from military developments that were civilianized and turned into commercial companies. Nowadays, in many technology domains, innovation flows in the opposite direction: primarily commercial, adapted for military needs. With the lack of a national technology strategy, it's doubtful that such bodies as the DDR&D can efficiently integrate technological development needs.
3. After identifying the tactical and organizational issues that will require a deep investigation at the war's end, it is now essential to assess the most critical and crucial aspect: Israel's technological standing after the conflict. At this moment, we might technically still be in a localized war, albeit one with different fronts involved at varying levels of intensity. There is a risk that a regional conflict could escalate into an even larger conflagration. The American efforts to contain the situation leave no doubt about the threat of the war expanding on the one hand and President Joe Biden's desire, perhaps similar to Henry Kissinger's in 1973, to leverage the situation toward a new strategic architecture in the post-hostilities era that could eventually serve as a basis for a diplomatic process.
It is impossible to detach the United States' actions in this war from its larger global context and the struggle between it and China for control over technological resources. The immense military power projected into the region and the world through aircraft carriers, President Biden's visit, and the substantial aid package he is requesting from Congress are all meant to influence the Middle East, the Russia-Ukraine conflict, and the potential future Chinese invasion into Taiwan. Israel, traditionally, has tried to tread carefully between all those elements and benefit economically from the Chinese technology market without antagonizing the Americans too much. However, Israel has been aware for some time, that the United States expects it to choose a side in the global technology war and to curb its technological-economic cooperation with China. Netanyahu, in his own way, tried to have it both ways with China and the United States. It should be noted that Netanyahu was supposed to visit China in the coming weeks, among other things, presumably thinking he could pressure the Americans by waving the Chinese alternative to the US. However, Israel has been reminded over the past two weeks that China is not its friend. Despite appearances and statements of neutrality, and even very belated recognition of Israel's right to self-defense, in practice, China is high on the list of countries that condemn Israel and support the Palestinians, including Hamas.
And, as in any war, as soon as the guns fall silent, the economic guns that jump at the opportunity for massive economic opportunities will immediately start to rumble. In the Gulf War, for example, oil companies were just waiting to pounce on contracts for the reconstruction of the oil wells. In our era, technology companies are the ones who will identify the biggest economic opportunities. It can be assumed that the Israeli technology market will redirect its aspirations towards the United States in light of China's stance. And if, for some reason, the Israeli government continues to try and play between the two superpowers, the United States will remind Israel in a much more explicit manner of its demand for Israeli alignment alongside it in the technological battle against China.
The Israeli high-tech industry has proved its strength in the past year by being among the first to identify government attempts to infringe on democracy. A massive mobilization of the sector, the human capital, and the economic capital that the sector has accumulated has made a significant contribution to thwarting the judicial revolution and making the United States see Israel as a strategic ally and partner. If the industry was made up of people like MK Nissim Vaturi and their view of the United States, it is easy to imagine that Biden's attitude toward us at the most difficult hour would have been a little less warm and supportive. In conclusion, just as the high-tech sector knew how to unite and work vigorously to prevent Israel from turning into a dictatorship, so too will it know how to help direct the Israeli government to explicitly align itself with the United States in its technological war against China.
