US envoy Steve Witkoff has prepared a plan B in case there is no agreement on the US plan to end the war in Gaza: a declaration accepting most of the plan, while opening talks on all remaining points.
Witkoff hopes this will kick-start a process to begin releasing the hostages and to reduce tensions in Gaza, enabling productive negotiations. For now, however, the primary proposal on the table remains the so-called 21-points plan, even though it contains more than 21 points.
This is not the first plan presented to end the war in Gaza, but it is certainly the most comprehensive so far, and, as published in Israel Hayom, it ambitiously aims to make major progress on addressing the root causes of the wider Israeli–Palestinian conflict.
The chances of success are unclear, but several elements of the plan, and above all the war's duration and the exhaustion of all sides, especially of the terrorist organization Hamas, could lead to its acceptance and at least the start of implementation. From the start, Hamas has been the main spoiler of previous proposals for ceasefires and an end to the war, presenting demands that would leave Israel exposed to continued security risks in both the short and long term. Israel also bears responsibility for some of the failure to move forward, whether for security or political reasons, but every time a deal seemed possible, it was Hamas that prevented closure.
Now Hamas faces a real dilemma. Its forces on the ground are exhausted; every day the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) eliminates scores of militants, including commanders of various ranks, and in some cases family members are also killed. Its operatives try to ambush IDF soldiers and record rare tactical successes, but these do not affect the overall advance of forces in Gaza City.
Domestic pressure against Hamas is rising. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu revealed that not only the al-Shaib clan is fighting Hamas but also other groups, and Israel is encouraging this.
Hamas's external leadership is also in hiding after an assassination attempt in Doha. Even if that attempt failed, it has had a significant effect on the leadership's conduct; they do not appear publicly and are primarily focused on survival. They too face harsh criticism inside Gaza and across the Arab world for their responsibility for the territory's destruction and the deaths of tens of thousands of Gazans, and they are looking for an end that will at least allow them to present a semblance of victory.
In Israel the single most important barometer is the redhead in the White House. The patience of the US president who has been most supportive of Israel is limited, and the preference is to reach an agreement in coordination with him before his patience runs out entirely and he imposes tougher conditions on Israel.
The plan itself, which in practice contains more than 21 points, is meant first and foremost to meet Israeli needs, since the current administration, unlike most Western leaders, understands the implications of October 7 for Israel, its citizens and its security. But there are certainly points intended to address Hamas's demands.
The plan is divided into two parts: ceasefire conditions and post-war Gaza. Under the ceasefire framework, Israel is to receive all the hostages — both alive and dead — at the outset, despite Hamas's demand for a phased release; in return Israel would pause the fighting, begin a gradual withdrawal process and allow unfettered delivery of aid. Contrary to some reports, there is no agreement to shut down the GHF aid fund, which distributes very large amounts of food effectively. The disagreements concern the pace of the withdrawal and the disarmament of Hamas.
Israel demands a long-term presence along the Philadelphi Corridor and in the perimeter, where it has already established permanent positions. Hamas, together with Qatar, demands setting a near date for full withdrawal and only then the release of all the hostages. There is no practical solution yet for Hamas's weapons. The latest wording speaks of demilitarizing the strip, but at least until yesterday there was no agreement on explicit language requiring Hamas to surrender all its arms. Here, as we reported, Saudi Arabia and the Emirates, as well as the Palestinian Authority, support the Israeli position that Hamas must hand over "all" its weapons.
The second part of the plan is a substantial expansion of reconstruction: Gaza would be administered by a multinational body led by Saudi Arabia, the Emirates and Egypt, although the Palestinian Authority would have at least a symbolic role. According to international law the Palestinian Authority remains the sovereign authority responsible for Gaza and would be the party to "invite" the multinational forces and grant them control and reconstruction powers.
The reconstruction plan itself was published in Israel Hayom a few weeks ago. It is to be managed by international bodies, where Tony Blair and Jared Kushner enter the picture. Funds have already begun to be collected and the formal establishment of an aid fund will be announced soon. In practice, pilot projects in education and health have already been implemented in Gaza, mainly in areas not under Hamas control but also in the humanitarian zone in Mawasi.
On the education front the pilot includes Saudi religious curricula that are relatively tolerant, along with a clear de-radicalization and acceptance-of-the-other line led by participants from the Emirates. If you ask me, that is another factor that strengthens the plan's chances.
Why might the plan fail? Encouraged by Iran, Hamas is trying to buy time, as it has done repeatedly during the war. Its hope is that Israel will eventually give up, internal disputes will deepen (and Hamas is working hard on propaganda to that end), the government will fall and, above all, that President Donald Trump will stop backing it and will force Netanyahu to end the war on any terms. Practically speaking, the key disputed point is the disarming of Hamas, and the implication is that without that disarmament multinational forces will not enter, in a vicious cycle.
The only force apparently ready to enter is a Palestinian force reportedly not affiliated with the Palestinian Authority and trained by Egypt under US supervision. But anyone who thinks such a force will prevent Hamas from acting against Israel, or will try to enforce the strip's demilitarization, is plainly dreaming.
In that scenario, Witkoff has prepared the alternative plan described above — a declaration accepting the noncontroversial points and starting negotiations on the remainder. Israel, however, will not be prepared to stop combat operations even while negotiations continue.
