The Nazi war criminal the Arab world protected from justice

Stored in a protected Belgrade basement, among the tens of thousands of dusty files comprising Yugoslavia's national archives, sits a slim investigation folder documenting the crimes of Mohammed Amin al-Husseini, known throughout the region as Jerusalem's Grand Mufti. Though thin, the file's brevity reflects not a lack of evidence but rather the political forces that prevented full investigation. The Mufti's legacy includes rivers of blood flowing not only through the Land of Israel – where he orchestrated anti-Jewish pogroms throughout the 1920s and 1930s in a manner chillingly similar to the October 7 massacre – but across Nazi-occupied Europe as well.

Nazi-occupied Yugoslavia provided another stage for his lethal operations. Al-Husseini refused to limit himself to desk work – managing German propaganda, drafting pamphlets, broadcasting to the Muslim world, or developing strategies to mobilize Muslim minorities across the Soviet Union and Balkans for the Third Reich. The craving for direct action – the kind of Jewish bloodshed he had directed in the Land of Israel – compelled the Mufti to take his operations into the field, which he actively pursued.

His "field" operations centered on occupied Yugoslavia, specifically Bosnia and Herzegovina, home to a substantial Muslim population. The Mufti's efforts resulted in the formation of three Waffen-SS divisions composed entirely of local Muslims. These units perpetrated horrific war crimes – massacring Serbs and Jews, incinerating entire villages with their inhabitants still inside, carrying out systematic rape, torture, and pillage.

When World War II concluded in summer 1945, Yugoslavia's liberated government moved to investigate the Mufti's role in Nazi atrocities, formally listing him as a war criminal and petitioning a United Nations special committee for his extradition. The investigation folder apparently originated during this period, though it tragically never advanced to substantive inquiry or trial. Al-Husseini's allies throughout the Arab world unleashed tremendous pressure and threats that forced Yugoslav authorities to retreat from extradition demands. Some sources maintain that Yugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito himself yielded to Arab requests, striking al-Husseini's name from the wanted list – whether from concern about global Muslim backlash or fear of retaliatory violence from Yugoslavia's own Muslim population.

Either way, although justice was not done with the Mufti, the file's documents, which were collected by Yugoslav investigators before they were ordered to stop, shed some light on the harmonious connection between the German Nazis and the Muslim Nazi, who is considered the father of the Palestinian nationalist movement, and on the way they collaborated.

In Hitler's service

One of the most intriguing documents bears the date July 28, 1944 and was composed by Professor Gerhard von Mende, a senior and enthusiastic Nazi who was considered in the Third Reich's hierarchy an expert on Muslim minority affairs. After the German invasion of the Soviet Union, he was appointed director of the Caucasus Department of the Ministry for Occupied Eastern Territories. In practice, von Mende and al-Husseini aimed for the same goal – to recruit the Muslim world for the Reich's war effort, and it is no wonder they had much to discuss.

According to the memo, "encouraging Islam appears useful" for Nazi Germany. "The Muslim peoples are natural allies of the German Reich in the struggle against Bolshevism," von Mende quoted the Mufti, and described in detail the practical steps he proposed. Among other things, "the Grand Mufti pointed to the urgent need to strengthen general propaganda through the employment of imams and mullahs within the military units themselves." Al-Husseini went even further and proposed establishing a school for mullahs that would serve both the Wehrmacht and the Waffen-SS.

To this school, according to al-Husseini's vision, candidates from various nationalities were to be recruited and trained, through integrated propaganda, to advance two totalitarian doctrines – political Islam and National Socialism. The Mufti did not just talk – a similar school had already been established by him in the Muslim region of Bosnia, and its graduates had already brought the gospel of Islam and Nazism to the occupied peoples of the Balkans.

To him it was only natural to continue and deepen the alliance, not only in the field of education. He warmly recommended to von Mende establishing a Muslim religious council that would highlight Germany's friendly policy toward Islam and lead counter-propaganda efforts against the Allies. "Generally speaking, the conversation showed that the Grand Mufti is prepared to place at the Germans' disposal his influence for strengthening the fighting power of Muslim units in the Wehrmacht – provided that Muslim education is carried out in a logical and purposeful manner," von Mende summarized the conversation in a message to his superiors in the Reich capital.

Al-Husseini found common ground not only with von Mende, explains in a conversation with Israel Hayom Dr. Matthias Küntzel, a world-renowned expert on the relationship between Nazi ideology and antisemitism in the Arab world. "It is known that he was a friend of Heinrich Himmler, head of the SS, head of the Gestapo, and Interior Minister of the German Reich. He had good relations with Himmler. The Mufti met Hitler only once, but with other figures in the Nazi leadership he had significant and important relationship networks."

A bottomless pit

Reviewing the Mufti's file uncovers another facet of his character. Though his hatred toward Jews – and toward anyone he perceived as obstructing his path – was authentic and deeply felt, al-Husseini refused to serve the cause without compensation, however malicious and malevolent that cause might be. He demanded money, substantial amounts of it. Yugoslav investigators assembled invoices documenting his various expenditures (some involving trivially small, even laughable sums). He insisted the Germans reimburse every single expense, major and minor alike. His penny-pinching behavior inadvertently created a paper trail tracking his influence into territories far beyond traditional Muslim regions. One receipt documents a 2,000-mark payment covering "the Mufti's expenses in Vilnius." Another invoice from the Harem Hotel in Oybin, a German resort town, confirms that during late July 1944 the Mufti entertained numerous guests there – German Nazis and Muslim Nazis alike. Von Mende's name appears on that roster as well, the matching dates corroborating their meeting.

Available records indicate the Mufti collected from the Germans a monthly stipend of no less than 50,000 marks, supplemented by an additional 25,000 marks in foreign currency. These reimbursements swelled those already substantial sums, filling his coffers so generously that certain Nazis likened their Arab ally to a "bottomless pit." The Germans furnished al-Husseini with young women as well. Moral integrity never numbered among the Mufti's virtues.

Al-Husseini wasn't unique in this arrangement. Former Iraqi Prime Minister Rashid Ali al-Kilani, an ardent antisemite, secured even greater compensation from the Nazis – 75,000 marks monthly, plus an additional 25,000 marks in foreign currency. The Germans possibly calculated that al-Kilani delivered superior value. In April 1941 he orchestrated a revolt in Iraq, temporarily establishing a pro-Nazi government that ultimately triggered the Farhud pogrom and massacred numerous Baghdad Jews.

Al-Husseini and al-Kilani demonstrated capacity both for cooperation toward shared objectives (in 1942 they jointly authored correspondence expressing German support, driven by ambitions to destroy the emerging Jewish homeland in Palestine; roughly a year later they journeyed together to Italy's king seeking his backing for Arab causes) and for bitter disputes – primarily concerning precedence, prestige, and finances. Operating alongside them, financed by and serving the Nazis, were additional Arab leaders and influencers including Shakib Arslan, Kamil Marwa, Mansour Daoud, and Sherif Sharaf. Understanding this network's activities requires knowing merely that Kamil Marwa received the "distinction" during the 1930s of translating "Mein Kampf" into Arabic for serialized publication in a Lebanese newspaper.

Nevertheless, al-Husseini distinguished himself from all others. Where al-Kilani bore the designation 'Iraqi representative', al-Husseini claimed to embody the pan-Islamic movement itself – to such degree that Himmler regarded him as something resembling a 'Muslim pope'. From this elevated position, offering the Nazis his services for Muslim recruitment became straightforward. Recruitment campaigns commenced with establishing propaganda machinery and broadcasting Nazi radio programming in Arabic, then advanced toward more practical and brutal undertakings.

Al-Husseini and al-Kilani sought to formalize their Nazi alliance through official documentation, refusing to rely solely on actions. They drafted a joint German-Italian declaration intended to secure from the Third Reich formal commitment for establishing an Arab state spanning the entire Middle Eastern region. Within Article 7 of this declaration they indulged their obsession – shared enthusiastically by their German partners – stipulating that Palestine's Jewish problem would be resolved "by the same methods being implemented to solve the Jewish problem in Axis nations." In 1942, responding to their explicit request, both Arab leaders received permission to tour the Sachsenhausen concentration and extermination camp outside Berlin, personally observing the "Jewish problem's" resolution. They approved of everything they witnessed, enthusiastically preparing to execute their portion wherever across the globe opportunity presented itself. The Mufti, incidentally, never attempted concealing his familiarity with Nazi methods and objectives. In memoirs composed during his final years at his Damascus residence, he disclosed that his friend Himmler informed him around mid-1943 that "by that point approximately 3 million Jews had been exterminated."

From Jerusalem to Jerusalem

Was the Mufti-Nazi alliance founded solely upon their mutual hatred of Jews? Evidence suggests the common ground between these two murderous ideologies extended considerably further. "The Mufti personally catalogued what he identified as the most significant convergence points between political Islam and Nazi doctrine," explains Dr. Küntzel. "He enumerated seven elements – primarily, unified leadership and the leader's elevated status, present in both systems; secondly, the culture of obedience and discipline; thirdly, the veneration accorded to battlefield martyrs; fourth, communitarian values and collective primacy over individual rights; fifth, motherhood glorification and absolute abortion prohibition; sixth, work ethic reverence and productivity worship; and seventh, their shared posture toward Jews and warfare against Judaism."

Q: Did the Nazis reciprocate al-Husseini's enthusiasm for Nazism with equal fervor?

"I'm far from certain. Nazi ranks contained divergent perspectives and disputes regarding the Mufti. Certain officials expressed bewilderment at his demands and voracious appetite – he constantly sought additional funds, more residences, expanded household staff, and increasingly extravagant material provisions. Conversely, his Himmler friendship bolstered his standing considerably. Whether al-Husseini actually met Adolf Eichmann remains unclear. Nazi leadership assigned personnel to manage the Mufti, though their responsibilities proved challenging. Al-Husseini demonstrated difficult temperament, repeatedly disappointing his German supervisors through his conduct. He envisioned himself commanding the entire Muslim world and broadcast arrogance indiscriminately."

Q: Didn't Nazi racial doctrine render him inferior and unacceptable by German standards?

"Hitler quotations exist suggesting the Mufti didn't appear Semitic. He possesses light hair and undoubtedly Aryan blood courses through his veins. Such rationales constructed the framework permitting him as an ally. This represented obvious nonsense, though admittedly the entire racial theory constituted accumulated nonsense."

Q: How would you evaluate his Yugoslav achievements? Did he successfully mobilize significant Balkan Muslim populations under Nazi banners?

"He enjoyed substantial fame throughout the Muslim world, amplified through his Nazi radio addresses broadcasting from Berlin. Consequently, his undertaking the mission of persuading Yugoslav Muslims to enlist in the SS represented tremendous development from the Nazi perspective. Naturally, answering the theoretical question whether Muslim unit formation would have occurred without him proves impossible, yet his role throughout this process carried undeniable importance. He journeyed to Bosnia, delivered speeches, exercised persuasion, while simultaneously guaranteeing Muslim recruits received halal-certified provisions and distinctly Muslim uniforms. He micromanaged every detail ensuring Muslims experienced comfort as SS soldiers.

"Simultaneously, he incited recruits toward ruthless violence against opponents and enemies. He orchestrated mass murder. Brutality and lethal violence served as his defining characteristics consistently – originating in 1930s Palestine. These traits never evolved. Middle Eastern populations lived in terror of the Mufti's gang operatives during the 1930s. Yugoslav populations experienced terror from his SS forces throughout World War II. And Palestinian populations confronted identical brutality and murderousness post-1945 through Israel's establishment. Extensive documentation confirms this pattern."

The Mufti's life trajectory and criminal activities spanned three continents – across all of which he left rivers of blood. Throughout the Balkans, Serbian blood flowed primarily, though Jews and Roma numbered among victims as well. Muslim-Nazi collaboration's success in occupied Yugoslavia spawned proposals replicating this model elsewhere.

"The Mufti alongside additional Muslim Nazi collaborators attempted orchestrating major initiatives connecting with Muslim populations throughout Soviet territories," Dr. Küntzel corroborates von Mende's memo details. "However, that aspect doesn't constitute the essential point – nor his encounters with senior Nazis during his German residence. My research uncovered that the period preceding his German arrival, and the period following his German stay, carried greater significance. Why? Because throughout his German phase, spanning 1941 through 1945, he operated under Nazi directives. He lacked complete autonomy. He naturally sought maximizing financial compensation, prestige, and similar benefits, yet couldn't execute everything he genuinely desired. Contrastingly, during earlier periods – specifically 1936 through 1939 – he executed a pivotal Middle Eastern role; then resumed that role from 1945 through 1948. Throughout those periods he worked preventing Jewish state establishment – and succeeded. Throughout those periods he inflicted greater damage than during his German phase."

These testimonies represent merely a fraction of available evidence. The Mufti-Nazi alliance functioned and produced results even without requiring direct action. Al-Husseini's reputation and imagery preceded him everywhere. On January 30, 1942, Nazi Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels documented in his diary how propaganda units distributed the Mufti's photograph throughout the Crimean Peninsula to recruit Muslim volunteers for Germany's military campaigns. This image depicting his Hitler meeting underwent duplication into tens of thousands of copies, distributed across Muslim population centers throughout Wehrmacht-conquered territories.