Attempts to interpret and understand the policy gaps between the current US administration and Israel have produced sharply differing assessments. Some argue that there is barely room for a pin between Netanyahu and Trump, while others warn of significant and troubling differences. As is often the case, the reality lies somewhere in the middle, with a tendency for gaps to narrow following direct meetings between Netanyahu and Trump.
There have been two notable instances in which this pattern was evident. The first was the meeting ahead of the Rising Lion war against Iran, when Trump was not convinced of the necessity of an Israeli strike. The outcome is well known. The US not only backed Israel and mobilized its allies to assist in Israel's defense, but also took part directly in the strike on the Fordow nuclear facility.
The second instance came ahead of the announcement of the Trump plan. Following Netanyahu's meeting with the president, the plan was revised. Netanyahu did not succeed in removing the clause calling for the establishment of a Palestinian state, but a provision was added requiring reforms as a condition for the Palestinian Authority's entry into Gaza.
In the current situation, and amid considerable ambiguity surrounding negotiations between Iran and the US, the main points of contention appear to be between Netanyahu and Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, rather than with the rest of the president's team. At the same time, there are also numerous areas of agreement.
The Iran issue will occupy only part of Netanyahu's schedule in Washington, as discussions will also address how the war in Gaza should end. Here too, there are areas of both agreement and disagreement between Israel and the US. The stagnation in advancing to Phase Two of the Trump plan stems primarily from Hamas' refusal to disarm. Despite US statements stressing the need to dismantle Hamas, there are still certain differences that will need to be clarified during Netanyahu's visit and his meetings with Trump and senior administration officials.
Points of Agreement
There is broad agreement that the Iranian regime is the root of instability in the Middle East and therefore requires decisive treatment, ranging from significant weakening to its overthrow. To that end, maximum pressure must be applied to Tehran, both economically and militarily.
The 2015 nuclear agreement, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, is widely seen as a failure, having funneled funds to Iran that accelerated terrorism and missile development without resolving the nuclear issue.
There is consensus that Iran must not be allowed to enrich uranium on its own soil, and that strict, comprehensive and open-ended international oversight must be imposed on all nuclear facilities.
There is also agreement on the need to limit Iran's missile program, particularly medium- and long-range capabilities, to curb Iranian support for terrorist organizations in the region, and to assist Iranian citizens protesting against the regime.
Points of Disagreement
The first dispute concerns whether negotiations with the Iranian regime should take place at all. Another disagreement centers on the time frame for such talks. Israel favors a short, clearly defined ultimatum, while the Americans are more flexible.
There are also gaps regarding ballistic missiles and Iran's backing of proxy groups, with Israel demanding the complete removal of these threats.
In addition, Israel views the overthrow of the Iranian regime as a central strategic objective, while Washington may be satisfied with weakening it. Another point of contention involves the role of Gulf states and Turkey. Israel sees their involvement as a threat, whereas the Americans take their positions into account.
