Iran 1.
The die appears to have been cast. That assessment stems not only from leaks by associates of President Donald Trump but also from the hard data. As The Wall Street Journal reported, the largest concentration of US force in the Middle East since the 2003 Gulf War is now in place. It is doubtful that such vast resources would be deployed halfway across the globe merely for deterrence.
Details that trickled out, albeit belatedly, from the negotiations held in Geneva in midweek suggest that what transpired was far from the excessive optimism projected by the foreign ministers of Iran and Oman, which is mediating between the sides. The "yes" uttered by the Iranians was largely a polite "no." Their consent on nuclear issues was only partial, and on other matters such as ballistic missiles, support for proxies and the massacre of protest participants, they refused to engage seriously.
Iran experts, including within Western intelligence agencies, are divided over why Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is choosing to dig in. Is he detached from events in his own country and the region, or is he truly an extremist unwilling to compromise? His predecessor, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, was prepared to "drink the poisoned chalice" to remove an existential threat at the end of the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War. Based on that precedent, Khamenei might have been expected to act similarly to save the Islamic Republic.
Instead, he is pursuing a path that endangers the future of the ayatollahs' regime. Explicit statements heard in the US and in Israel indicate that the objective of a potential war would be regime change. That is an extraordinarily ambitious goal whose chances of success depend on several components: the intensity and duration of the strikes; the diplomatic, economic and especially internal pressure they generate inside Iran; the existence of forces capable of taking the reins in Tehran; and internal political pressures in the US, the West and regional states, which entered the Muslim holy month of Ramadan this week and are highly attuned to public opinion that does not want war.
Many of these questions lack clear answers. Trump is unpredictable. He can reverse decisions in an instant without feeling compelled to explain. Even the concept of "victory" is more elastic for him than for others. That was evident when he declared the campaign against the Houthis over without their defeat; when he announced that Iran's nuclear program had been eliminated; and in Venezuela, where beyond a change of presidents little truly shifted.
Trump, as we have known him, is a sprinter, a president of short races and rapid results. In Iran, absent some surprising silver bullet, this would be a marathon that could last days, weeks or even months before its objectives are achieved. Much has been said in recent days about previous US efforts to topple regimes in the region, in Afghanistan and Iraq. In both cases, the air campaign was accompanied by a ground maneuver, which the Americans are currently avoiding. In both cases, the US physically seized control and handed power to its protégés. In Afghanistan that worked for a time before collapsing with the US withdrawal and the Taliban's return. In Iraq it fared somewhat better, though the country remains fractured, volatile and vulnerable to malign actors, from Shiite Iran to Sunni global jihadist organizations.
The possibility of replicating such a model in Iran has occupied leading minds in Israel's defense establishment and academia since the end of the first Iran war last June. Something fundamental seemed to break then, not only in the stripping away of key physical capabilities from the Iranian regime, especially its air defense array, but in the realization that Iran was weaker than assumed. That assessment stemmed from several factors, from the severe blows dealt to its proxies, above all Hezbollah, the Lebanese Shiite terrorist organization, to the internal destabilization caused by deep economic distress. The bottom line is that the regime's external enemies and domestic opponents alike sense a window of opportunity unlike any before, one that may not return.
Iran 2.
In Israel, officials toyed with the idea of pursuing regime change already toward the end of last June's war. The ease and speed with which the Israeli Air Force reached Tehran surprised many and whetted appetites. It is doubtful that, if war erupts again, Israel would agree to return home with only a partial achievement. From its perspective, what occurred then was only half a job; the time has come to complete the second half.
Broadly speaking, Israel has three primary concerns regarding Iran: the nuclear program, missiles and support for proxies. The Americans have a fourth concern underpinning their current drive toward war: the regime's ongoing repression of its own citizens, manifested last month in the killing of tens of thousands of protest participants amid demonstrations sparked by severe economic hardship and collapsing infrastructure, particularly in Tehran.
The first issue, the nuclear program, is shared by Jerusalem and Washington. At the end of the previous war, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, like Trump, declared that Iran's nuclear program had been destroyed. That was true at the time. Iran has since been careful not to resume uranium enrichment, but it has carried out various steps, chiefly infrastructure and development work, intended to enable it to do so when it decides, and from a more secure position than before. Its refusal to hand over uranium enriched to 60% also underscores the gap between victory declarations and reality. Tehran claims it is now willing to do so as part of an agreement, yet simultaneously refuses to close its nuclear facilities or halt research activities.
The second issue, troubling primarily to Jerusalem, is missiles. Iran concluded in the previous campaign that this is Israel's soft underbelly. In the absence of effective Iranian air defenses capable of disrupting the Israeli Air Force's freedom of action, Tehran also understood that missiles are its sole deterrent against Israel. It has therefore been engaged in an intensive effort to amass a large missile stockpile for the next confrontation. Israel is monitoring that effort closely and with growing concern, and has informed the Americans that it may have to act before Iran reaches a critical mass that Israel's air defenses would struggle to counter. Reports to that effect appeared in several newspapers last month. Some were exaggerated regarding quantities and procurement rates, but the thrust was accurate.
The third issue is the proxies. Iran continues to invest in them despite economic distress and domestic protests, though less effectively than before. The fall of Bashar Assad's regime has deprived Tehran of Syria as a smuggling corridor into Lebanon, forcing it to seek alternative routes. The cold shoulder from Lebanon's government, combined with ongoing Israel Defense Forces activity, has also hampered Hezbollah's rehabilitation efforts. The organization again faces the familiar dilemma of whether its primary loyalty lies with Lebanon or Iran. The answer will determine whether Hezbollah joins a looming campaign against Iran, knowing it would face a harsh response. Last June it refrained; now, with its patron backed into a corner, it may choose differently.
The Houthis in Yemen are certain to join the fray. They halted missile launches at Israel following the Gaza ceasefire, but although they have partially distanced themselves from the Iranian teat, they do not want the regime to collapse for fear the focus would shift to them. Past experience suggests their ability to inflict significant damage on Israel is limited, though it is reasonable to assume that, like Iran, they have studied lessons and sought to improve the effectiveness of their missiles and drones.
The fourth issue is repression at home. Iran responded with unprecedented aggression to the January protests and followed up with thousands of arrests intended to deter and prevent further unrest. Trump urged the protesters at the time to hold on, promising help was on the way. The delay enabled the crackdown; the anticipated arrival of assistance now is meant to breathe new life into the protests, in hopes they will generate change from within.
Iran 3.
There does not appear to be a single Archimedean point whose destruction would collapse the regime in Tehran. Not even the elimination of the supreme leader, given the multiple other power centers with much to lose. This includes not only the religious leadership but especially the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which has recovered relatively quickly from the heavy blows inflicted on its senior ranks in the first Iran war.
A broad, systematic campaign against Iran's religious, political and security elite is likely to be an inherent component of war objectives. So too would strikes on infrastructure serving them, particularly Revolutionary Guard and Basij facilities, the internal security force that symbolizes repression. Their simultaneous fall across wide swaths of Iran could partially dissipate public fear and return people to the streets. Such mass dynamics, if they materialize, are meant to underpin the change sought in Washington, reminiscent of the Arab Spring revolutions in Egypt, Libya and elsewhere a decade and a half ago.
The great question mark is Iran's army. From the regime's standpoint, it is the third most important force after the Revolutionary Guard and the Basij. It is therefore third in importance for the West and Israel, as it has no direct influence over the four aforementioned issues: the nuclear program, missiles, proxies and repression. The question is whether it can serve as any kind of engine for change and whether elements within it could seize power and be acceptable simultaneously to the Trump administration and the Iranian public. Washington is likely searching hard for such figures. The recent experience in Venezuela suggests that behind the scenes there are efforts to cultivate credible alternatives. Still, Iran is not Venezuela, and for now the regime's internal deterrence remains strong. It will require action to weaken it.
Israel's role in such a campaign has yet to be clarified. One can assume it has been coordinated between Jerusalem and Washington, chiefly between Israel's Kirya defense headquarters in Tel Aviv and US Central Command, to prevent operational friction. An air-centric campaign of this kind requires complex coordination, particularly if reports are accurate that US strikes on regime targets would be accompanied by Israeli attacks on missile arrays to reduce potential damage to Israel's home front.
The Israeli Air Force has undertaken significant upgrades to air defense systems in the six months since the June war to improve effectiveness against the Iranian missile threat. Nevertheless, experience shows that air defense alone is insufficient and that robust civil defense measures are essential to minimize casualties. It is regrettable and concerning that civilian systems have done little in that time to advance measures under their responsibility, from neighborhood fortification to streamlining evacuation and compensation mechanisms.
As reported in US media earlier this week, Israel may join an American strike. It could face a dilemma if Iran decides to attack first. There was concern last month that Tehran might do so, prompting heightened readiness in Israel's defensive and offensive arrays. Iran's exercise this week, which included closing the Strait of Hormuz and launching missiles, likely raised anxiety levels in Israel. The perennial question is whether to act pre-emptively when a clear Iranian intent to strike is identified. On the surface the answer seems obvious: yes, if only as a lesson drawn from October 7. In practice it is more complex, because a strike would almost certainly mean war, one that would inevitably draw in the US. Israel currently appears intent on allowing Washington to lead the move, at least at the outset, and not to be seen as having forced Trump's hand.
Still, impatience is growing in Israel as it awaits the opening of hostilities. The persistent concern is that Trump might reverse course at the last moment, for whatever reason, delaying or canceling the attack. At present it seems less a question of if than of when, but with Trump nothing is certain until the final act.
The fall of Iran's regime is a strategic interest for Israel, with far-reaching implications for the entire region. Yet the war itself, particularly if prolonged, could carry significant negative consequences for the economy, aviation, sports and more. It took nearly two years for Israel's economy to begin to straighten its back, and even then only partially, with tourists, for example, yet to return in significant numbers. Another campaign against Iran would set all that back for an indeterminate period.
There is also the political dimension. War postpones everything: legislation on military draft exemptions, budget debates, a state commission of inquiry, even the prime minister's trial. It elevates the prime minister and diminishes his rivals. In Israel's fraught circumstances, close scrutiny will be required to ensure that national interests do not become entangled with personal ones, and that security considerations do not merge with politics.
Gaza.
For those seeking respite from tensions over Iran, distraction may be found on Netflix or in Washington, where President Trump's peace council convened this week. The initiative is accompanied by many intentions and plans, though its prospects appear slim. The Americans say Gaza would be demilitarized, Hamas, the Palestinian Islamist terrorist organization, would be disarmed and removed from power, Israel would withdraw and the Strip would be rebuilt. One would have to be Shimon Peres on steroids to believe it will unfold that way.
Even so, Israel is wise to cooperate, not only tactically to avoid clashing with Trump. Jerusalem has a duty to genuinely test the possibility of a new direction in Gaza, especially when the alternative is renewed war. The death this week of Staff Sgt. Ofri Yafe, a soldier in the Paratroopers Brigade's elite reconnaissance unit, was a painful reminder of that reality.
