Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is advancing the "Middle Corridor" - the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR) - as an overland alternative to the Suez Canal, while leveraging Yemen's Houthis to undermine Bab al-Mandeb security. Ankara built channels to the Houthis through a regional network with Iran, Qatar, and allied Yemeni factions.
In 2014, his government shut down a high-level probe into Quds Force activity in Turkey, removed investigators, and freed suspected IRGC operatives. These operatives later established Istanbul-based fronts that became key arteries for covert finance and arms transfers to Yemen.
In 2015, Erdogan still stood with the Saudi-led coalition, but the 2017 Gulf crisis - when Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, and Cairo cut ties with Doha over terror-financing - triggered a decisive realignment with Qatar. By 2019, in coordination with Doha, Ankara was openly backing al-Islah (Yemen's Muslim Brotherhood) and maintaining direct, discreet channels to the Houthis. According to Yemeni sources, secret meetings in Doha and Ankara produced "field understandings" enabling coordinated withdrawals and front-line handovers without a shot fired.
Istanbul, under Ankara's tacit consent, served as a transit hub for Iranian funds through front companies. The U.S. Treasury sanctioned the Al Aman network in 2022 and its branch Al Aman Kargo in 2023 for moving Quds Force millions to Houthi networks.
In April 2025, the U.S. Treasury named Iran-based money launderer Hossein Jafari, operating from Turkey, as a key facilitator of multimillion-dollar transactions - from stolen Ukrainian grain to Russian arms routed via Turkish intermediaries. At least 10,000 rifles were smuggled over the past decade from Turkey to the Houthis, concealed in sugar and plastic shipments - without a single prosecution. UN reports revealed a procurement chain: German-made sensors were routed via Turkish companies and ports to Iranian factories, then smuggled into Yemen; they were later found in Houthi missiles used in the September 2019 attack on Saudi Arabia's Abqaiq oil facilities, in strikes on the UAE, and in rockets fired toward Israel. Ankara hasn't merely tolerated the Houthis' rise - it has enabled it, including tolerance of terror financing, notably Hamas.
The alignment took shape in action: the Houthis attacked Abu Dhabi in January 2022 just as Erdogan was launching his charm offensive toward the UAE, followed a month later by a high-profile visit, even as Abu Dhabi knew Ankara kept cordial ties with the attackers. From November 2023, Houthi activity in the Red Sea surged past 100 attacks - sinking two ships, seizing another, killing crew, and blockading "Israel-linked" vessels, and condemning U.S.-UK strikes as "turning the Red Sea into a sea of blood". In January 2024, Erdogan publicly praised the Houthis for their "successful defense". with Al Jazeera - Qatar's state-owned outlet, whose editorial line mirrors Doha's alignment with Ankara - providing favorable coverage as arms transfers continued. In November 2024, the Turkish vessel Anadolu S was struck, and soon after, Houthi leader Mohammed Ali al-Houthi declared, "Turkey is not an enemy; it is a partner in the struggle against the Zionists", citing missile launches and threats toward Eilat and Israeli-linked shipping as actions to "defend Gaza".
Senior Gulf and Western security officials describe this as a sustained, deliberate policy - not a byproduct of regional complexity.
Turkey's gains from this strategy span three interconnected spheres. On the security front, instability in the Red Sea deters shipping, raises insurance premiums, and pressures maritime trade. Politically, it backs an Iranian proxy that harms Israel while eroding the regional position of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt, strengthening its ally Qatar, refusing to join the U.S.-led maritime coalition, and - according to Yemeni officials - widening rifts within the anti-Houthi camp. Economically, it advances the Middle Corridor linking China through Central Asia, the Caspian Sea, and Azerbaijan to Turkey, soon to be joined by the Zangezur Corridor - the "Corridor of Peace" named by President Trump - linking Azerbaijan to its Nakhchivan exclave via Armenia, alongside Iraq's Development Road from al-Faw to Turkey, casting it as a complement or alternative to China's Belt and Road. By leveraging Red Sea instability, Ankara markets these overland routes as safer alternatives for Chinese, European, and U.S. stakeholders.
Ankara applies this strategy through footholds at the Red Sea's gates: leasing Sudan's Suakin port since 2017 and maintaining a base in Somalia, both positioned to constrain shipping. It reflects a deliberate "controlled crisis" doctrine - using allied non-state actors to create managed friction at Bab al-Mandeb, the chokepoint for most Asia–Europe trade - to divert traffic toward Turkey's overland routes, with the Houthis as its unofficial navy. Ankara's muted response to Iran's January 2024 seizure of an Iraq-Turkey oil tanker, which raised fears over energy supply, underscores its preference for contained, low-intensity disruption.
Turkey's direct and indirect support for the Houthis violates UN Security Council Resolution 2216 (banning arms and assistance), the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (freedom of navigation), and the 1999 Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism - a triple breach justifying sanctions, trade restrictions, suspension from alliances, and exclusion from tenders. It poses a blunt question: can a NATO member aid forces attacking fellow members' partners and shipping lanes without consequence? This front is now a strategic priority; delay raises costs from Eilat to Egypt and across the Mediterranean, forcing Europe to reroute trade. For Erdogan, the Houthis are both a proxy abroad and a symbol at home - proof that Turkey can defy the West and its Arab rivals.
Shay Gal is an expert in international politics, crisis management, and strategic communications. He operates globally, focusing on power relations, geopolitical strategy, and public diplomacy and their impact on policymaking and decision-making.
