Last week marked one year since the ceasefire agreement with Hezbollah that ended the campaign on the northern border, the one the Lebanese Shiite terrorist organization launched against Israel on Oct. 8, 2023, a day after Hamas' murderous terrorist assault began.
During the war in Israel's north, and especially toward its end once Israel recovered and regained its footing, the IDF inflicted heavy blows on Hezbollah, eliminating its senior leaders and commanders and neutralizing much of its military capabilities. The fear of the 180,000 rockets the organization possessed – which Israelis believed could paralyze daily life and cause thousands of deaths – faded as if it had never existed.
Yet a year after the agreement was reached and the fighting ended, it is clear that in Lebanon, as in Lebanon, nothing has changed. Hezbollah still stands firmly on its feet; despite the blows it absorbed, it retains its standing among Lebanon's Shiite population and is working determinedly to rebuild its capabilities while refusing to give up its weapons.
The original sin, of course, was Israel's willingness to sign a dubious agreement that anyone with eyes in their head – though apparently not in Israel's political or military leadership – could see Hezbollah never intended to honor, and that the Lebanese government had neither the ability nor the will to enforce on the Shiite terrorist organization.
But a year has now passed, and although the IDF has carried out impressive covert operations targeting the group's field operatives, it is becoming clear that these are not enough to prevent Hezbollah from rebuilding or to eliminate what remains of its military strength. In this sense, last week's killing of Hezbollah's chief of staff, Tabatabai, in the heart of Beirut is the exception that proves the rule – not evidence that Israel has truly decided to take off the gloves and escalate its campaign against Hezbollah.
The same reality exists in Gaza. After two years of a difficult war and numerous operational achievements, a ceasefire has been imposed on Israel that allows Hamas to rebuild its power and its political position under American protection. Anyone who believes that an Arab or Muslim force will emerge willing to confront the organization and disarm it is deluding himself – just as anyone who believes the US will allow Israel to resume fire in Gaza and thereby topple the one foreign-policy achievement the Trump administration can claim.
Finally, it is worth recalling Iran. Israel dealt it severe blows, yet barely a hundred days have passed and already talk has resumed of another round, Iranian threats of revenge, and Tehran's determination to renew its march toward nuclear capability.
Israel also tends to boast that it succeeded in toppling Bashar Assad's regime, but the past year has dragged Israel into futile involvement in Syria's quagmire. It is ending with a deadlock in the talks Syria initiated with Israel in an attempt to reach understandings that would secure stability on the border. And here too, everyone is waiting for instructions from Washington to halt Israel's activity and military presence in Syria.
From all this emerges a familiar pattern: Israel excels at achieving victories on the battlefield but fails to complete the task, or even loses those gains, in the diplomatic campaign that follows. After all, war is never a goal in itself. It is always meant to serve diplomatic aims, a lesson Israel has not learned or has forgotten.
Israel's refusal to formulate a political vision for Gaza's future brought upon it a forced agreement that allows Hamas to retain its strength in the territory. The decision to halt fire in Lebanon five minutes to midnight enables Hezbollah to rebuild. And the absence of any political initiative alongside military action has collapsed the Arab-Israeli front against Iran.
The late Ariel Sharon, who subdued the waves of terrorism during the Second Intifada (2000–2005), had a guiding principle: speak softly and calmly, but hold a stick in your hand and do not hesitate to use it when necessary – a blend of political wisdom and military power. It is unfortunate that instead, some in Israel are preoccupied with who tweeted last and how to bring down the IDF chief of staff, as if he were the country's last enemy.
