For years, Saad topped Israel's target list, evading numerous assassination attempts until Saturday's successful strike. Together with Izz al-Din Haddad, who now leads Hamas' military apparatus in Gaza, he stood as the sole survivor among the organization's pre-war senior leadership and among the handful who knew the intimate details of Hamas' assault blueprint, which Israel designated "Wall of Jericho" (Hamas's operational code for the October 7 attack).

Israel justified Saad's elimination by pointing to his ongoing efforts to reconstitute Hamas' capabilities and an explosive device that injured two reserve soldiers near the southern Strip on Friday. Yet these explanations appear tailored for Washington's consumption: The authentic motivation boils down to a score Israel had to settle with him – or stated plainly, vengeance.

By Saturday evening, Hamas had yet to acknowledge Saad's death. The silence might reflect internal disarray, though questions remain whether the organization retains meaningful retaliatory capacity. Hamas has hemorrhaged most of its military strength alongside its military and civilian leadership throughout the war, leaving it organizationally shattered. Currently it channels its remaining resources toward consolidating control over the Strip's western sector, which stays under its authority. Israel presumably factored this weakness into its assassination calculus, which earned unanimous backing from the diplomatic-security establishment's uppermost echelons.

The singular gamble Israel appears to have accepted concerns the Washington administration. Saad's elimination provides Israel an opportunity to gauge President Donald Trump's temperature, for whom the Gaza accord stands as his first presidential term's marquee diplomatic accomplishment. Trump recently pressed Israel to throttle back its Gaza operations, affording space for the agreement's advancement; if he refrains from erupting now, Israel can interpret his silence as tacit authorization to persist in eliminating Gaza's senior hierarchy, mirroring its Lebanon approach.

Hamas will naturally strive to derail this trajectory, mobilizing its Qatari and Turkish sponsors hoping they'll persuade Trump to muzzle Israel. This contest for the president's attention – and by extension his policy direction – will dictate Gaza's near-term landscape. Israel seeks maximum postponement of transitioning to Phase 2, apprehensive it will mandate further withdrawals absent fundamental shifts in Gaza's circumstances. It partially attributes delays to Hamas' failure to return fallen hostage Ran Gvili, with Hamas contending that Israeli intelligence leads proved fruitless in pinpointing his location.

Three unpalatable paths

Meanwhile, Americans wrestle with assembling a multinational contingent to shoulder Gaza's security burden and execute its demilitarization. Simultaneously, mobilizing the billions required for the Strip's reconstruction proceeds at glacial speed: precisely as before, a chasm yawns between verbal pledges and written commitments. Trump must deploy his full leverage extracting promised funding – including from prosperous nations, principally Saudi Arabia – lest he grow tempted to embrace Qatari financing once more.

This tangle poses difficulties for Israel by generating three unpalatable paths. First, the grandiose promises yield nothing and Hamas continues governing overtly. Second, Americans declare victory prematurely, accepting a phantom governing structure masking Hamas' continued dominance. Third, the accord disintegrates entirely, forcing Israel back into comprehensive Gaza combat – bearing its physical, economic and diplomatic toll.

Israel will likely endeavor provisionally, at least publicly, to afford the agreement implementation opportunities as Trump desires. The assassination will be rationalized, as noted, through immediate operational necessity, simultaneously insisting Hamas cease its ongoing violations. Meanwhile, deliberately avoiding excessive administration irritation and projecting restraint, Israel shelved plans Friday to strike Hezbollah installations in Lebanon.

Israel maintained the scheduled operation was aborted because the Lebanese Armed Forces requested (and obtained) the intended target and pledged to address it independently. This signals encouragingly that threats of escalating military pressure toward renewed warfare are producing results, propelling the Lebanese Armed Forces toward action. Prudence nevertheless counsels withholding definitive conclusions: presently the probability of another Hezbollah confrontation remains elevated, merely deferred temporarily.

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Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) officially announced Monday evening the discovery of a deceased hostage. The Qatari Al-Jazeera channel reported the deceased Israeli hostage was located in rubble in northern Nuseirat in the Gaza Strip. According to the report, the deceased hostage was held by the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. According to assessments within the security establishment, the discovery involves remains rather than a complete body, but official confirmation has not yet been received.

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Israel Hayom has learned that Azerbaijan – an ally of Israel that considered joining the force several weeks ago – conveyed in recent days the message that it will not agree to endanger the lives of its soldiers in Gaza. In Baku, as in other countries, officials are currently discussing participation in the ISF as part of reconstruction processes and maintaining calm, but not at the stage currently required of disarming Hamas and demilitarizing the Strip.

During Thursday's cabinet session, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu disclosed to ministers a fundamental agreement exists between him and President Donald Trump's representatives: if no alternative actor emerges to eliminate Hamas, and if the organization refuses voluntary disarmament, Israel assumes the mission. Both Netanyahu and IDF representatives at the Kiryat Gat international headquarters hear explicit American commitments to Gaza demilitarization, as Trump's plan stipulates.

"Hamas growing stronger"

During Thursday's Diplomatic-Security Cabinet session, IDF and Shin Bet representatives briefed ministers that Hamas has not only failed to surrender weapons as pledged, but actively exploits the period for renewed armament and force building. The Shin Bet representative stated, "Hamas is exploiting the ceasefire to strengthen its power to prepare against us, in case we enter to operate in the red side of Gaza, and also to appoint officials in the organization."

The intelligence assessment stressed the organization exploits dual-use materials entering Gaza through international supply channels to rearm. The terrorists additionally gather IDF ordnance fragments, converting them for their purposes, including explosive device production. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu noted in this context, "every day the Americans search for who will demilitarize Gaza, they (Hamas) grow stronger."

Netanyahu added, "it's clear from all contacts that if there's no external force, we're demilitarizing." Netanyahu also disclosed he demanded Americans postpone Gaza rehabilitation until demilitarization implementation. "I told the Americans that they must ensure demilitarization on the ground of Hamas, before any rehabilitation," he stated.

According to him, "The Americans agree that there won't be rehabilitation in the green side (held by the IDF) as long as there's no rehabilitation in the red side (held by Hamas)." It should be noted that according to sources close to the White House, this principle is accepted by Jared Kushner and he currently doesn't expect Gaza rehabilitation to begin before the military threat posed by Hamas is removed.

Israel Hayom has learned that Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Eyal Zamir detailed at the previous cabinet meeting, last Thursday ten days ago, from which points in the Gaza Strip the IDF must not withdraw under any circumstances. According to the chief of staff, even if the unexpected occurs and Hamas lays down its weapons, the IDF must show presence in the area. Zamir's position is also that reconstruction of Gaza should not be agreed to in any part of the Strip without demilitarization being carried out.

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Abu Nasira served a lengthy prison term in the 1980s for terrorist operations. He fled from Nafha Prison and was recaptured after roughly a week and a half. After his release, he functioned as an official in the Palestinian Authority security apparatus following the Oslo Accords, ascending to a senior rank before retiring. Throughout the war, his son was reportedly killed, and Abu Nasira himself lately received threats from Hamas intelligence and internal security mechanisms.

In video footage distributed on social media, Abu Nasira spoke to a formation of approximately 20 armed combatants standing in line, stating, "Your dirtiest shoe is more honorable than the biggest fake in Hamas. I am Shawqi Abu Nasira, I don't want to talk about myself. Whoever catches a collaborator can kiss my ass. From the most senior in Hamas – Khalil al-Hayya – to the smallest operative."

Video: The anti-Hamas faction in the Gaza Strip / Credit: Social media

He then directed the combatants to shout aloud, "The dogs' barks don't frighten the lions. Death to Hamas! Death to Hamas!" Abu Nasira continued, "We left our families and homes to liberate the families and our people from Hamas, Persian Iran. Enemies of Islam and the Sunnis. Clear? You are not collaborators, you are the best of the people. Whoever told Hamas 'no' is a hero. It doesn't matter if it's me or someone else." In his words, "We, all the people, in Hamas' eyes are considered spies. Whoever says 'no' is a lion."

This constitutes another militia functioning in the Khan Younis region opposing Hamas. Additionally, the force of Husam al-Astal, a former Palestinian Authority intelligence official, functions there. Beyond this, at least three additional armed factions exist from northern Gaza to its south, the most prominent being Yasser Abu Shabab's Popular Forces in eastern Rafah.

Since the ceasefire in October, Hamas circles disseminated rumors asserting some militia members surrendered to them or were killed in firefights. Nevertheless, the rumors were refuted, including by Abu Shabab's faction.

In recent days, Yasser Abu Shabab's faction announced they are sustaining direct cooperation with the Peace Council as part of President Donald Trump's plan. Abu Shabab's deputy, Rasan al-Duhaini, proclaimed they would execute missions in Rafah against "illegal armed elements," apparently referring to Hamas, "in certain areas of Rafah."

Meanwhile, a Hamas source informed the Saudi channel Asharq on Sunday morning that a delegation from the terror organization is in Cairo to discuss arrangements for forming a management committee for the Gaza Strip. Per the source, discussions in Cairo are being conducted between senior Hamas officials and senior Egyptians, including other Palestinian organizations. Simultaneously, sources informed the Saudi channel Al-Hadath that a Hamas delegation reached Cairo to discuss details of the transition to the second phase of the ceasefire agreement.

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At the conference, Cohen revealed cases where the Mossad during his tenure shared life-saving intelligence, including with Australia. "We gave the Australians probably one of the most critical intelligence items, which saved hundreds of lives, when a bomb was en route to an Etihad aircraft scheduled to depart Sydney for Dubai or Abu Dhabi. This was our intelligence, and what do we receive back from Australia?" Cohen asked, referring to Canberra's recognition of a Palestinian state.

Cohen indicated Israel provides life-saving intelligence to other Western intelligence agencies, primarily the American CIA and British MI6. Cohen emphasized Israel shouldn't stop intelligence sharing, explaining, "We need to trade this coordinated intelligence, which ultimately saves lives, for improved support. I'm not proposing the Mossad or Israel's intelligence forces cease collecting or sharing intelligence with our global partners to protect other people's lives [meaning non-Israelis], but I am proposing we trade it differently."

Earlier this week, the Mossad exposed an Iranian operative who planned attacks in Australia, Germany and Greece. Cohen officially stated at the conference he won't run in the upcoming elections. However, he didn't rule out entering political life later. When asked about running for office in elections a year away, Cohen responded, "The answer is no. Not now. We'll see what develops."

Cohen revealed Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu previously told him he considered him his successor. "When I served as Mossad chief, Prime Minister Netanyahu suggested I was his successor. One day I approached him and asked if he genuinely said this, and he confirmed it, explaining his reasoning. This occurred in 2018 or 2019 I believe, and then my wife responded, 'No, absolutely not. We're not entering this.' But I believe everything shifted dramatically after October 7, and there's a need for fresh leadership. So the possibility can't be completely ruled out. I'm weighing everything, but my decision now is no."

Video: Yossi Cohen at the Shurat Hadin conference with Ariel Kahana / Credit : Ohad Kab

Regarding the war-ending agreement, Cohen stated, "This isn't the perfect agreement, but currently it's time for a ceasefire and this was a price worth accepting for freeing the hostages. I don't believe the US or other parties will block Israel from combating terror going forward. Israel should decide whether to cut all ties with Qatar once all deceased hostages return. We lack genuine relations with them, we merely used them as intermediaries for channeling funds to Gaza, ostensibly for the population's welfare, but actually they reached Hamas. This was an error, designed for humanitarian assistance, but concluded with the money financing terror."

Attorney Nitzana Darshan-Leitner, president of the Shurat HaDin organization and conference organizer, concluded, "The war isn't over yet. The policy threats to create a Palestinian state combined with The Hague court's hostility lead to an unprecedented surge in Israel hatred and antisemitism. We must consolidate all forces addressing this issue to push back. Let the entire world understand it's unacceptable to allow terror to gain strength. We must combat it on the battlefield, in courtrooms and also in the global public opinion sphere. If we work together, we can secure the future of the Jewish people in the Land and throughout the Diaspora."

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One can reasonably estimate that its primary preoccupation will involve coordinating civilian aid entry into the Strip and preventing escalations that threaten the ceasefire. In both domains, Israel will probably be the principal address for pressure. Conversely, it's challenging to envision this headquarters accomplishing anything beyond declarations concerning the more crucial areas for Israel: stripping Hamas of weaponry, preventing smuggling operations, and demilitarizing the Strip.

During a weekend interview with Al-Jazeera, Khalil al-Hayya, the Hamas leader, referenced the international forces' role as providing separation and border supervision, along with managing ceasefire monitoring. He indicated his organization seeks elections leading to unified government, and presently doesn't dismiss transferring "administrative control" to a mutually agreed committee and managing the Strip through "a national figure residing in Gaza." One needn't be an expert to comprehend which options this criterion eliminated.

Al-Hayya proceeded to lament Gaza's humanitarian conditions and stressed it requires 6,000 aid trucks each day, plus entry of specific materials Israel currently prohibits. One can anticipate this message will reach mediating nations and every international actor. Winter's approach will likely bring an accompanying "Gaza is freezing to death" campaign.

Hamas refuses to disarm

Concerning Hamas disarmament? Al-Hayya responds diplomatically, "The matter remains under discussion with factions and mediators," and lest we harbor false expectations he clarifies, "Hamas' weapons are connected to occupation and aggression's existence. Should the occupation conclude, the weapons will transfer to the (Palestinian) state."

Similar statements have been audible throughout recent periods from the organization's spokespeople and senior officials. They've consistently emphasized: Our weapons are legitimate, we won't disarm . Admittedly, in formal announcements they carefully stress their commitment to the agreement and avoid provocative declarations that might antagonize President Trump and his administration or mediating nations, but regarding the disarmament provision they leave no ambiguity about their stance.

While the Kiryat Gat headquarters continues taking shape and determining its functions and operational approaches, Hamas in Gaza has regained its footing. It operates efficient command and control systems, is restoring order throughout Gaza's devastated streets, suppressing opposition, deterring and dominating. It allows everyone to debate agreement details' interpretation and drafters' intentions while concentrating on fundamentals: strengthening its position, replenishing forces, securing supplies, planning reconstruction.

It presumes Gaza remains lodged like a bone in Trump's and other regional leaders' throats, who seek to dispose of it as swiftly as possible to advance implementing major regional initiatives. Its expectation is that under these conditions they'll accept a formula offering the semblance of resolution and permit it to capitalize on the "gaps" within it and the exhaustion from interminable debates regarding its interpretations.

Despite the intense desire to advance peace visions, we cannot compromise on critical matters for us in the Gaza Strip. We must eliminate the vagueness concerning headquarters and mediation and coordination entities, and also explain to the public what these will ultimately contribute toward accomplishing Israel's objectives.

The rearming issue under humanitarian aid and reconstruction means' cover demands particular Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee oversight and public reporting, preventing us from burying our heads in the sand and exploiting the secrecy veil typically covering this activity.

MK Amit Halevi's public announcement about intensifying rules of engagement for IDF forces regarding Strip suspects requires IDF response and clarifications. It's completely inappropriate to heighten risks merely from ceasefire collapse fears. Even those concerned about this should recognize that harming our soldiers could similarly cause that, beyond the immediate price paid.

Furthermore, rather than awaiting agreements and mechanisms, we should shape reality. Hamas tunnels should face attack not solely responding to harm against us. If avoiding casualties is desired, we can provide advance warning. We must leverage Hamas' weakened position and all living hostages already being in Israel. Such an approach could enhance Israel's and mediators' negotiating position regarding weapons disarmament.

Concerning the international headquarters for the Gaza Strip, we must acknowledge this mechanism's risks and also that participating in it might constrain the IDF and direct it toward preferring dialogue channels as default over operational activity. We need to establish what Israel gains from this mechanism, and concurrently determine rules now for our conduct within it, in ways that diminish its risks.

Meir Ben Shabbat is head of the Misgav Institute for National Security & Zionist Strategy, in Jerusalem. He served as Israel's national security advisor and head of the National Security Council between 2017 and 2021, and prior to that for 30 years in the General Security Service (the Shin Bet security agency or "Shabak").

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The difficulty, naturally, resides in the following phases of the agreement – a flawed accord whose execution timeline and methodology remain completely ambiguous. Pressure can undoubtedly persist on Israel in subsequent stages – to retreat from further sections of the Strip and allow entry of Turkish or Qatari military forces, but anyone expecting Hamas will willingly disarm or that an Arab force will be prepared to force its disarmament dwells in fantasy.

Nevertheless Trump seeks to convert through empty rhetoric a temporary and fragile ceasefire arrangement into a peace-on-earth agreement between Israel and the complete Arab and Muslim world. If only he proves right.

Yet it appears the troublesome element of the agreement from Israel's standpoint is not the engagement with Hamas in the Strip, but rather the concealed American obligation to establish a Palestinian state, which Washington may impose upon Israel.

Did President Trump found the Palestinian state in Washington? On its surface, that represents the agreement's goal, but it's questionable whether the American president genuinely intends this, and what's definite is that irrespective of what the Americans desire, and especially the Europeans – a Palestinian state will not emerge, and any initiative attempting to impose it will merely stimulate violence and bloodshed, not exclusively between Palestinians and Israelis but also among the Palestinians themselves.

Trump's relationship toward Israel, and essentially that of all preceding American administrations, demonstrates profound commitment and emotional alignment with the Zionist enterprise. Conversely, concerning the Palestinians, no alignment or commitment is evident, neither in the agreement's wording nor in Trump's own statements, and he articulated this effectively when stressing that all he pursues is an arrangement everyone will accept, and from his standpoint it makes no distinction whether there will be two states – Israeli and Palestinian – or one state, Israel. His comments about corruption, violence and terror as the defining characteristic of the Palestinian Authority and Hamas disclose his assessment of the Palestinians' lacking capacity to establish and sustain a state.

One should recall that the fixation with establishing a Palestinian state among numerous world nations originates – beside the impulse to strike at Israel (in the manner of "beat the Jews") – also from the fantasy that a Palestinian state would resolve not merely the Israeli-Palestinian conflict but all the Middle East's difficulties, and alongside this, from the fantasy that exclusively Israel prevents the establishment of such a state.

All this is untrue. For 19 years from the War of Independence until the Six-Day War, Egypt and Jordan governed Gaza and the West Bank and never considered establishing a Palestinian state. Furthermore, the Oslo Accords opened the opportunity for Palestinians to establish a state entity that would administer and manage their existence. But this entity swiftly became a corrupt dictatorship dedicated to dreams and delusions, for instance about "return to Palestine." Meanwhile, the alternative that emerged to this entity is Hamas, a radical Islamic movement dedicated to religious fanaticism, violence and terror.

A trial-and-error approach of state establishment can be pursued in Libya or Somalia, where nobody genuinely cares what occurs there. But here we're addressing Israel's future and security – and these cannot be compromised.

Moreover, contrary to our pattern, Israel must not depend on the Palestinians to destroy Trump's show and undermine any effort to advance peace, as they have done previously. It must depend exclusively on itself and proactively advance policy alternatives that eliminate the threatening shadow of a corrupt dictatorship functioning as an incubator for religious fanaticism, violence and terror, which some attempt to establish in our vicinity and at our expense.

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On Wednesday it became known that Eitan Horn, David Cunio, and Nimrod Cohen were together in the same tunnel in the period leading up to the signing of the deal. On the night between Wednesday and Thursday last week, when the deal that led to the end of the war was signed, the terrorists woke them up with screams and announced that a deal had been signed and they were going home. One of the family members said the terrorists were happy to end their period of guarding the hostages.

The group consisted of the three of them, as mentioned, and they were in a tunnel in an isolated location and were not exposed at all to media reports. Eight months ago, during the previous deal, Ariel Cunio and Iair Horn, Eitan Horn's brother, were also with them. The farewell video of Iair Horn and Eitan Horn was published by Hamas, while the rest of the hostages who appeared in the video had blurred faces.

Hamas terrorists decided at this point in time to leave the three together and not to connect them with other hostages. One of the hostages told his relatives that in order to maintain minimal fitness, they walked back and forth many times inside the tunnel.

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Based on current assessments, the Israeli hostages are held in at least three separate locations across the Gaza Strip, and uncertainty persists over whether Hamas will gather them for a unified release or transfer them to the Red Cross at multiple sites.​

Security sources indicate Hamas has not yet transmitted to Israel the names of the deceased captives it intends to return.​ Simultaneously, Israeli security officials are tracking closely the enforcement mechanism American negotiators are presently formulating. On Friday, Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner addressed the matter with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and on Saturday the subject arose during discussions between the two senior American envoys and IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Eyal Zamir.​

Israel's goal is for the developing mechanism to mirror the framework established in Lebanon, though substantial differences between the two theaters may hinder this objective.​

Who becomes the enforcer?

First, Lebanon functions as a sovereign state, allowing Israeli grievances relayed through the Americans to reach the Lebanese government and Lebanese Armed Forces, which bear enforcement responsibility. In Gaza, however, no governing authority exists apart from Hamas, leaving unclear whether and how Israeli complaints will be addressed and enforced.​

Second, Israel successfully imposed an on-the-ground enforcement doctrine in Lebanon against every breach – targeting not merely immediate dangers but also weapons accumulation. In Gaza, Israel may lack this capability given the commitments it made in the agreement, particularly as the deployment of foreign personnel from nations including the United Arab Emirates, Indonesia, Turkey and others may restrict Israeli actions.​

In the interim, until tomorrow morning, Israeli Air Force operational guidelines remain exceptionally stringent, as avoiding any risk to the hostage release remains paramount throughout Israel.​

Following their release and return to Israel, the nation will transition into a phase of establishing security arrangements with Hamas. Israel's fundamental priority is Gaza demilitarization and operations against any weapons buildup, regardless of scale. An additional unresolved matter will inevitably be determining Gaza's future governance.​

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However, beyond a pompous concluding statement that forcefully condemned the acts of terror and called for international cooperation to eradicate this violent and grave threat to Israel's security and regional stability, the wave of Hamas terror renewed with all its might and cruelty, sowing murder and destruction in Israel. Thus, the dream of the meeting's architects to cultivate a more reconciled and terror-free regional environment solely through rhetorical and declarative means vanished in fire and smoke.

Nearly three decades since that stinging and resounding failure, it brings up from the abyss of oblivion and forgetfulness the pathetic and naive attempt by Britain and France in 1928 to outlaw the use of war through a toothless document and enforcement mechanisms (the Kellogg-Briand Pact).

Sharm el-Sheikh once again became the focus of mediation efforts, designed to end the fighting in Gaza and ensure, with the help of tools and mechanisms to be established later on, that the same violent and extremist Hamas would be removed and excluded from the centers of control, influence, and the military infrastructure it established. And this time, it would be done effectively and long-term, unlike the failed initiative of 1996.

Indeed, while the 1996 Sharm el-Sheikh conference featured colorful scenery but yielded no results, this time the quiet contacts held in Sharm el-Sheikh produced a dramatic agreement for a ceasefire and the release of all the hostages (Phase A of President Donald Trump's settlement plan), which was signed on October 9, 2025, between Israel and Hamas, brokered by the US, Egypt, Turkey, and Qatar.

The uniqueness of the agreement (even though it does not include agreements regarding all the patterns and details of the implementation of the next phases of the president's plan), which succeeded in bringing about a cessation of fire after two years of a difficult campaign, is rooted in the conduct and behavioral patterns of the American super-mediator, who demonstrated creative and resolute leadership, out-of-the-box thinking beyond traditional diplomatic frameworks, and a readiness to make optimal use, at the right time, of all the levers of pressure and influence at his disposal.

While the diplomatic virtuoso, Henry Kissinger, preferred to obscure or blur the final goal of his mediation efforts, and instead proceed using a slow and gradual method toward realizing his settlement vision, the 47th president Donald Trump presented the goal of ending the war (and not just achieving a ceasefire agreement) as his central objective from the outset.

Furthermore, in his diplomatic activity in the arena, the 47th president created a completely new model of a super-mediator, overshadowing even the legendary Henry Kissinger in his level of sophistication and originality. While the former US Secretary of State acted not only as an effective mediator but also as a factor that rewarded the parties during the mediation he led on the way to the interim agreement he achieved between Israel and Egypt in September 1975, Donald Trump demonstrated his full prowess last week by not settling for traditional and direct mediation, but by granting a package of incentives and perks to the sub-mediators.

Pressures on Hamas

He did not, therefore, limit himself to promising compensation (or issuing warnings, implied or explicit) to the warring parties themselves. This was to strengthen the motivation of these sub-mediators (mainly Turkey and Qatar) to exert heavy pressures on Hamas so that it would agree to soften its rigid positions.

Regarding Turkey, the American compensation appears particularly far-reaching. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was promised the supply of F-35 aircraft, which he so coveted to receive, and he is slated to become a legitimate player in the agreement's implementation process.

Thus, the White House managed to create a two-layered web of heavy-weight levers of influence on Hamas. The cumulative weight of these levers made it hard for the terror organization, at the current time, to reject his plan. (Regarding Israel, Donald Trump directly applied these levers, but with a completely different dosage). This created the necessary infrastructure for the entire deal, in which carrots and sticks were integrated based on the business principle of "give and take" from Donald Trump's business background.

Hamas' dependence on Turkey

Although Qatar has long been known for dancing not only with the US but also with the devil, the fact that Doha had not succeeded in its mediation efforts until now (especially following the failed Israeli attack against senior Hamas officials in Qatar) is what led the president to his unprecedented decision to turn to Ankara, to shower Recep Tayyip Erdoğan with words of praise and flattery, and exploited the Hamas movement's great dependence on Turkey to turn it into a central executive contractor for his plan.

In this way, he also upgraded Turkey's security and political ties with Washington (in the hope that the price for strengthening Turkey and bringing it into the arena would not be too high for Israel, and that the American partner would provide Israel with appropriate security compensation for this).

Furthermore, in his activity as a super-mediator, Donald Trump revealed a deep understanding of the timing of his powerful entry onto the stage. The level of support for Israel around the world, and especially among the American public (including among the party's youth), has recently fallen to an unprecedented low (and also reflected on the status of the American superpower, Israel's loyal ally).

The fact that the Israeli action in Doha threatened to unravel the loose seams of the Abraham Accords and steer the Middle East down a path of chaos and instability, led the president to increase his activity. This was also in light of the growing criticism from wide sectors in Israeli society regarding what appeared to be a futile bogging down in the sands and alleys of Gaza.

Frustration in the White House

The growing frustration in the White House with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's promises of Hamas' total collapse, which did not materialize, and its sensitivity to the worsening condition of the hostages and the humanitarian distress in the strip, contributed to his decision that the time was ripe to throw his full weight into an increased effort to immediately bring about a cessation of the fighting (while also being ready to apply pressure on Israel not to resort to tactics of delay and postponement).

Thus, a window of opportunity was created by the president for the establishment of a ceasefire between Israel, isolated in the international arena and where growing signs of domestic fatigue and frustration are intensifying, and the terror organization, which has been significantly weakened and has lost most of its strongholds and centers of control. This was, of course, with the assistance of the sub-mediators, primarily Ankara, who mobilized for the mission of applying increased pressure on the terror organization.

If Europe was not mentioned at all in all the above, it is no coincidence. Apart from impractical plans that left no discernible mark, no trace remains of the unilateral and preposterous initiatives of French President (as of October 11) Emmanuel Macron, the European Union and the UN institutions. Is there a need for further proof of the leading status of the US as the sole superpower in the Donald Trump era, and the absolute marginality of Europe, which, apart from the background noise it created, contributed nothing to the advancement of the ceasefire?

And finally, the question of the Nobel Peace Prize, which was not awarded to the president on Friday. After the rumor already emerged from Oslo's halls that the win is contingent on a contribution to the establishment of a sustainable peace settlement, and not just the achievement of a ceasefire agreement, one can only hope and believe that if the process that Donald Trump created from scratch is indeed realized in practice and also leads to the expansion and upgrading of the Abraham Accords and the establishment of a new, more reconciled, and stable regional order, it will be difficult for the committee to object to his selection next year as the Nobel Peace Prize laureate.

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