Despite the current escalation, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has instructed for the Jerusalem Day flag march to proceed as planned – that is along its traditional route through the Old City's Muslim Quarter – and even asked for the information to be known as quickly as possible for the purpose of clarity, Israel Hayom has learned. 

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In a document that will be discussed at the upcoming Diplomatic-Security Cabinet meeting, Netanyahu wrote, "This is not a dramatic decision, but a continuation of the norm in a sovereign country. Just as the sun rises every morning, so the parade will continue in its usual format."

Security and political officials estimate that the march will indeed proceed as planned, despite the IDF's Operation Shield and Arrow in the Gaza Strip, and assessed on Wednesday evening that the campaign was nearing its end. 

A source familiar with the matter said that Netanyahu gave "an unequivocal directive to hold the parade as planned. Hamas will not tell us whether or how to march in Jerusalem." 

The police have been instructed to report on the necessary security arrangements to ensure the safety of the participants, and the prevailing assumption is that terror groups will not connect the current escalation with the Jerusalem Day celebrations next week. 

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Israel must either authorize the transfer of $8 million in funds for the payment of the terrorist organization's employees or face an escalation, Hamas has warned according to reports.

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The Qatari envoy to the Gaza Strip Mohammed Al-Emadi is set to arrive in the region this week in an attempt to find a solution to Hamas' demand for cash to pay its officials, Israel Hayom has learned. Al-Emadi, who visited Israel and Gaza just last week, announced a framework had been reached to allow the transfer of employee salaries, however, senior Hamas officials said the funds had not been transferred.

"Gaza has reached boiling point," they said, "and all of the pressure will be directed at Israel."

Palestinian media outlets quoted close associates of Hamas leader in Gaza Yahya Sinwar as saying, "Hamas is done being patient. Now, all options are on the table."

Another cause for concern is the lack of progress in negotiations in Cairo on the rehabilitation of Gaza and efforts to cement the ceasefire reached following May's Operation Guardian of the Walls, as well as reports talks to negotiate a prisoner-exchange deal had reached a dead end.

According to reports coming out of Gaza, Hamas has denied Egyptian reports in which senior Cairo officials said significant progress had been made in indirect talks between Israel and Hamas on these issues. This in addition to a deal between Israel and Hamas within the framework of which Israel would release Hamas prisoners, including those with blood on their hands, in return for the return of the bodies of Oron Shaul and Lt. Hadar Goldin, who were killed in the Gaza Strip during Operation Protective Edge in the summer of 2014, and information on the fate of the Israeli captives being held alive in Hamas captivity, Avera Mengistu and Hisham al-Sayed.

A Hamas official said, "We have informed our Egyptian brothers that our patience has run out," senior Hamas politburo official Izzat al-Risheq told Voice of Palestine Radio. "Israel is creating difficulties, not allowing the transfer of funds to Gaza, and we are being asked to grit our teeth. We won't agree to that."

Next week will be critical for the coastal enclave, a senior Hamas official told Israel Hayom.

"If Israel continues to procrastinate and doesn't allow the transfer of salary payments, the escalation will come. All the easing of restrictions on the Gaza Strip are a joke. The Egyptians are on Israel's side for the meantime, but they also understand who is guilty here. Hamas is interested in a deal, and Israel is only making things difficult. This will blow up in Israel's face," the official warned.

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In a special interview with Israel Hayom, Shalom says, "We are seeing a much more chilling picture recently. … The past year and a half, I've raised the volume about how volatile things are. We're in a much more complex reality than we were in the past, and it's only getting worse."

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Shalom is talking about all the fronts Israel faces, but first and foremost – Iran.

"At the end of the day, it's all about Iran," he says.

"We're in a dangerous round against Iran, and we need to keep a tight grip on the wheel," he warns.

When it comes to Iran's nuclear program, Shalom envisions three possible scenarios:
First, the US reaches a new nuclear deal with Iran, which might not entail everything Israel wants; second, that the military escalation in the Persian Gulf continues until the US is forced to respond to Iran's activity, which could also force Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah to get involved, possibly against Israel; and third, that Iran continues to violate the 2015 nuclear deal while remaining short of nuclear weapons capability.

Q: In other words?

"Raising the level of [uranium] enrichment to over 3.5%, holding more than 130 kg (290 pounds) of enriched uranium, using the heavy water reactor at Arak to hold over 300 kg (660 pounds), and mostly moving ahead in research and development – gathering knowledge and experience that will allow them to progress more quickly in the future."

Q: From the moment they decide to, how long will it take them to build a nuclear bomb?

"I haven't changed my basic assessment, which is two years for a bomb and a year to reach enough fissile material, but the processes that are underway right now allow them to build up their muscle, so when they do decide [to build a nuclear bomb], it will be fast and easy for them."

Q: Are you sure you'll be able to identify those events?

"The destabilizing of the nuclear deal demands that we divert some of our resources to this issue because I'm definitely a lot less easy today. We've gotten into a gray area in which they're moving ahead without, which requires us to be a lot more sensitive. Will we know? The Iranians are a very sophisticated enemy, and it bothers me."

Q: What are the chances that there are [Iranian] sites you don't know about or haven't located?

"My working assumption is always that there are things I don't know, so we have a very well-organized effort to tackle the nuclear issue, not only in Iran but throughout the entire region. We leave no stone unturned to avoid being surprised. As someone who was a partner in the [attack on] the Syrian reactor I'm not at all easy about Iran, and that's a change for the worse that poses a real challenge unless a new nuclear deal is reached that also serves us [Israel]."

'Soleimani is upgrading his capabilities'

In the past few years, Israel has been very active in Syria. The IDF's superior intelligence and airpower allowed it to carry out thousands of actions, at first against Hezbollah's attempts to arm itself and then against Iranian attempts to entrench itself militarily in Syria.

"We've moved from lopping off branches to chopping down trees – from attacking shipments to attacking the core," Shalom says, referring to activity that combines both military and diplomatic aspects.

"We identified the tensions that exist in the Putin-Assad-Iran triad and were able to maneuver within it so that all our actions correspond to all three of those points. The idea is to remain below the level of war. We've managed to stop a lot of things – we've had major successes," he says.

Q: What was stopped?

"A lot fewer weapons are coming in [to Syria and Lebanon]. The Shiite militias bases they wanted to build aren't being built. Iran's monetary investment has declined."

Q: That came at the price of a direct conflict with Iran.

"That was planned. We didn't want to kill Iranians, but we took into account that there was a chance that these actions could result in casualties because Iran is willing to sacrifice Arab Shiites but not Persian Shiites."

Q: Does Tehran know about the results of these attacks, or is Quds Force commander Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani hiding them?

"Not everything goes through an official approval process, and not everything is reported. Soleimani is a very serious guy. He learns, he's very determined, he has faith, and he is always improving. Now he has started setting up military capabilities there that are designed to attack us without fighting an actual war."

Q: How well do you know him?

"I know him well. I don't like to personify or glorify our enemies, and I think we need to handle him through other channels."

Q: Even so?

"He's very close to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, like a son, and that's important because it biases the way the Iranian leader sees things. Soleimani believes in the Islamic Revolution with all his heart, and he is the main one who is executing it, who translates the ideology of Khamenei and Ayatollah Khomeini into practice and influence on the region as a whole."

Q: If he were taken out of the game, would it change anything?

"I don't talk about specific people. Soleimani is a key figure who is spearheading moves against Israel."

At the start of 2018, the IDF's Military Intelligence Division pointed to two processes it expected to see. The first was that as a result of continued pressure on Iran in Syria, Iran could try to gain a foothold in Iraq. The second was that Iran was transferring advanced weaponry to Syria to attack Israel, which could make the "between war" period even more volatile.

Q: What kind of capabilities are we talking about?

"From [manpower] frameworks that include both Sunnis and Shiites and militias that come in from other areas to weapons that include missiles, rockets, drones, and possibly even more complex things."

Q: Like cruise missiles?

"Yes. There is also cruise missile activity."

Q: What is happening in Iraq?

"Soleimani put a lot of time into Iraq, from a geopolitical perspective. He is very busy with that and he is using it as a base for Iranian military capabilities, with militias and allies. He is also using all that to influence Iraqi politics as well as to create another area of military activity, not only against us but also against Saudi Arabia and the Gulf."

Q: Do you see any possibility that he might shoot at us from Iraq?

"I think it's very likely."

Q: What will he shoot?

"It could be surface-to-surface missiles, cruise missiles, or long-range UAVs. He has UAVs that can fly 1,000-1,200 kilometers (600-700 miles) which he has used in the Persian Gulf."

Q: What would make him decide to fire at Israel?

"In the end, when he takes a hit to the nose, he wants to hit back, and he has taken some blows recently. So my working assumption is that it's only a matter of time until he tries."

Q: Any time he has tried to attack Israel from Syria, he hasn't really succeeded.

"He is humiliated. He took some serious blows and discovered that not everything he wants to do works out. But he's active, he isn't giving up, and he isn't saying 'uncle.' He is upgrading his capabilities, and what didn't work out for him last time could succeed next time."

'The tie in Syria has been upset'

Despite the prevailing belief in Israel, Syrian President Bashar Assad isn't thrilled about the Iranian military activity in his country.

"He'll have to understand that Soleimani is playing with him," Shalom says.

"The bases Iran is trying to build in eastern Syria are definitely not what Assad wants, and he is also disturbed by the Iranians spreading radical Shiite ideology. But in the end, his hands are tied. The Russians also understand the complexity of what the Iranians are doing."

Q: How much freedom of action do we have with the Russians after their jet was shot down last year?

"We are holding a very delicate dialogue with the Russians. We don't want to clash with them, but they also understand how much damage we can do. They know we aren't suckers. Still, we're being very careful and walking on tiptoe – but as far as I understand, we have some freedom of action to some degree."

Q: Is it possible that the "non-war" is starting to approach the level of war?

"Yes. I think we're starting to approach the level of war. And yet, as intelligence, our job is to see what can be done without a full-scale war and point to places that could lead us out of that. For now … things are more volatile, and there is more potential for them to devolve."

Q: You said the Iranians are trying to move "advanced capabilities" to Syria. What are we talking about?

"Iran is transferring specialized missile capabilities to Syria and is organizing its militias there - tens of thousands of fighters in Syria, not all of whom are going to be fighting against us in real-time. Some are meant to seize territory or bolster the capabilities of Hezbollah in its war against us in Lebanon."

Q: So your working assumption is that if we fight a war with Hezbollah, it will receive help from the Shiite militias?

"My working assumption is that in the next war in Lebanon, we will need to prevent reinforcements from being moved to Lebanon from Syria, and also expect to be challenged from Syria in the form of rockets and missiles, possibly more."

'Hezbollah was hoping not to kill'

Hezbollah's project to manufacture precision-guided missiles made headlines a few weeks ago after a drone attack on its main development site in Beirut, attributed to Israel, shut it down.

"It's a serious project that's defined as a 'major strategic threat,' which I think is accurate. It needs to be stopped, even though right now missiles are not being manufactured in Lebanon," Shalom says.

Q: Did the incident in Beirut do much to stop those efforts?

"I think that what was blown up there will delay the project by a few months at least."

Q: What did Nasrallah conclude from that strike?

"I think he's playing with fire. Still, it wasn't an incident that he would start a war over. I think he can be made to stop the precision missile project."

Q: How?

"In his risk assessment so far, he has lived with the sense of immunity in Lebanon, that there is an 'equation' that says he doesn't take action on our side and we don't take action on his – that he doesn't kill our people and we don't kill his. He thinks we can do what we want in Syria as long as we don't kill Hezbollah operatives. … The day of the strike, Nasrallah was embarrassed twice: when supposed Hezbollah members from Lebanon were killed in Syria, and by the Beirut incident. So he was committed to a response, but he is slowly realizing what he got himself into. If you ask me, I think he hoped his response would not result in any Israeli soldiers being killed."

Q: In the Avivim incident, was he trying not to kill anyone?

"Nasrallah is a jihadist, a defender of Lebanon. He is no lover of Israel. He gave instructions to carry out a retaliation. Some of our soldiers could have been killed, and if they had, there would be a response, and we might have found ourselves fighting battles in Lebanon."

Q: You said he could be made to give up the missile project. How?

"Through a combination of secret activity … and a broad diplomatic offense. The last incident gave the whole story a boost of energy."

Q: What is Nasrallah's top priority?

"Economics, economics, economics. How he can make cuts here or there because he's in very tough financial circumstances that are partly the result of US sanctions on Iran. He is also busy with the organization's image among the Shiite population and with other domestic matters. A lot of his operatives deal drugs, for example. He has families who lost relatives who fought in Syria, and the wounded [from the Syrian war]. He runs a large, long-standing organization that has to be rehabilitated."

Q: Is he afraid of war?

"He is very put off by the thought of war. Nasrallah understands our capabilities. In the Research Division, I have an entire branch that has spent years identifying targets in Lebanon, and he is very familiar with what our air force can deliver."

Q: In Operation Northern Shield, he lost a major project – the tunnels.

"He was really surprised, but I'm not sure that's behind us. We need to remember that his plans to attack us didn't depend on the tunnels alone. He has a massive plan that we've been practicing for."

Q: Has he given up the underground front?

"My assumption is no."

'Islam doesn't put food on the table'

At the other end of the country, the Gaza Strip has been on the brink of war for the past year and a half. It's always on the verge of blowing up, even though neither Israel nor Hamas wants that to happen.
Shalom says it took time for Israel to realize that Yahyah Sinwar was a different kind of leader, one who wasn't aspiring to terrorism alone.

"His strategy is more challenging. He didn't pop out of a tunnel. He wears suits and leads the masses to the border, and we hand suitcases of money over to Gaza."

Q: How long can we keep a lid on things in Gaza?

"In Gaza, we're sitting on powder kegs. But the main problem there is the economic, civil, and humanitarian situation. Even Hamas understands that – it might say that Islam is the solution, but Islam can't feed the masses or pay the electricity bill. So it's starting to look for other ways.

Q: A peace deal?

"Yes. Hamas wants a deal, but one that doesn't recognize Israel even though it's unclear to me how that could stop it from getting stronger. So we are recommending an arrangement that will include easements, improve the civil situation and promote long-term projects so they can get out of the sewage they're swimming in. Still, the question about Israel's strategy in the Palestinian context remains open."

Q: Is Sinwar willing to put jihad aside to rebuild the Gaza Strip?

"No, but Hamas is now willing to agree to long-term ceasefires."

Q: A hudna (truce)?

"Yes. We in intelligence have identified an opportunity for an agreement. To those who think our only role is to identify targets, I say, 'what is a target?" Because I don't think we'd be stronger after another escalation or war."

Q: Explain that.

"There are two scenarios. One is that we make major military progress but suffer heavy losses, and then reach the same deal Hamas is willing to make now. The other is that Hamas would fall apart during a war."

Q: Would that give us a Somalia situation in Gaza?

"I think it would. Hamas' governability is already facing challenges in Gaza, and given what we are planning to do to it in the next war – and this isn't propaganda – it's not certain it would survive, even if we aren't the ones who decide to bring it down. It could fall apart on its own."

Q: Would Hamas be willing to pay any price in a deal, including returning Israel's captive citizens and fallen soldiers?

"I think so, although that depends to a large extent on us."

Q: Will the Palestinian Islamic Jihad thwart a move like that?

"The Islamic Jihad has no responsibility. They get up in the morning and want to carry out jihad, to provoke wherever possible. We are doing risk management with Gaza, and it could all blow up at any moment."

Q: Would a war in Gaza drag us into escalation in the north?

"Not necessarily. I think that it's much more likely that the northern front would drag in Gaza."

The Arab Spring continues

The delicate situation in the north and in Gaza obscures the fact that most recent terror attacks, and victims of terrorism, have been in Judea and Samaria. Still, that area remains relatively quiet, due to Israel's efforts to thwart terrorist activity; effective security coordination with the Palestinian Authority; and attempts to improve the economic situation of Palestinians there and protect their daily routine.

"All of that depends greatly on PA President Mahmoud Abbas," Shalom says. A lot of people in Israel see him as an inciter, but he is key to the quiet that has been in effect since 2006. That doesn't mean he loves Israel – he isn't a member of Likud or Blue and White, but it's in his interest."

Q: And yet you talk about 'strategic deterrence' in Judea and Samaria.

"Because the situation is unstable and could get worse. Strategic deterrence isn't to prevent an intifada. That's the easy part, and we were almost engulfed in one with all the lone-wolf terrorist attacks. But in the past year or two, we've seen incidents in which the Palestinians tried to damage security coordination, and with a younger generation that barely remembers the last intifada and the unknown factor of Hamas, everything could crumble."

Q: Could someone replace Abbas?

"I find it hard to imagine anyone who would present more moderate or pragmatic positions than Abbas. We need to take that into consideration."

Q: How stable are the moderate regimes in the region?

"The upset in the Arab street continues. Regime stability is in question throughout the Middle East. Even in places that supposedly made it through the rocky time, there is still instability and they don't have well-balanced systems. Tyranny still exists, but in different forms and the economic development that's underway won't lead to any major change."

Remembering Sadat in 2019

The 1973 Yom Kippur War is an open wound for the Research Division and a constant reminder of the limits of intelligence.

"It's always in our mind. That generation wasn't any less intelligent, and they got it wrong. It forces us to be humble," Shalom says.

Q: Is the Research Division as important as it was, or is it less central in our cyber world?

"It's true we've gone to a technological world, but the Research Division has a very prominent status. … At the end of the day, the core of the IDF's and the government's activity comes from intelligence the Research Division supplies, and as a result, we have a great amount of responsibility on our shoulders."

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Anyone who nevertheless managed to see beyond the ongoing, mostly operative and tactical activity, couldn't miss the strategic significance of the events that have taken place here these past few days. They marked the peak of a process that has been in the works for years and could wind up changing the face of the Middle East. Israel insisted, and not for the first time, on its own red lines, and made it clear that it was prepared to take far-reaching risks now to avoid finding itself facing threats that it cannot live with in the future.

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That's true throughout the entire region, from Iran to Lebanon, including Syria and Iraq. Not all the reports are always accurate, but the big picture is clear. It is made up of lots of small details, from missiles and rockets to drones and Shiite militia fighters. All these make up a battle in which Israel is fighting the "Big Satan" (Iran) and the "Little Satan," (Hezbollah), as well as plenty of other threats.

"These days are critical to shaping the future of the region," a security official who is familiar with all the details said this week.

"For one brief moment, everything came together here: Iran's efforts to entrench itself in the area; Hezbollah's precision missile project; the far-reaching effects of American sanctions on the Iranian economy and as a result of that on its protégées; and Israel's open and secret activity," the official said.

This activity, which has been underway in various forms for years, used to be conditional on one thing – not to get dragged into a full-scale war. It has been so successful that for extended periods of time, Israel managed to avoid responses from the other side. This week, Israel appears to have taken its "intra-war activity" one step further, to a point where it could lead to a major escalation and possibly even an actual war. Most likely, this won't happen, but still, anyone who took part in one of the many defense and security meetings held this week could understand the potential ramifications of the actions undertaken, as well as the heavy price Israel would have paid for not taking them.

Nasrallah is losing his mind

The two most dramatic events this week – killing Shiite militia operatives using drones in Syria and using drones to attack Hezbollah's precision missile project in Lebanon, which was attributed to Israel – happened only a few hours apart on Saturday night, but were unrelated. But both were characterized by high-quality intelligence capabilities, which were translated into operations using different methods.

In general, intelligence is the name of the game. One cannot but wonder at the depth of Israel's intelligence coverage (or the other side's ability to stage incursions). The precision missile project, for example, was being kept heavily under wraps by Hezbollah – only a few were involved, and even fewer in its critical aspects. The strike on those facilities – just like the tunnel that the organization dug into Israeli territory and was discovered and destroyed at the start of this year – not only removes one of Hezbollah's major, unique capabilities – it also embarrassed it, in front of its own people and its partners in Lebanon and beyond.

That embarrassment, which reached unusual levels this week, led Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah to make a hysterical speech on Sunday. Looking back, it's doubtful that Nasrallah would use the same phrasing again; he made so many promises that he is now forced to choose whether to come out as a liar who doesn't keep his commitments to make Israel pay, or "be a man" and put his entire organization, as well as Lebanon as a whole, at risk in a war that he doesn't want.

Based on Hezbollah's past decision-making, it is likely that the organization has spent the past several days feverishly talking about what to do. Supposedly, Nasrallah is seeking open retaliation – an eye for an eye for the deaths of two Shiite militia members in the drone attack on the Syrian Golan Heights. It could come in the form of an anti-tank missile at IDF forces, like the one that killed two Givati soldiers on Mount Dov in January 2015, or possibly sniper fire like what claimed the lives of two other IDF soldiers at the Nurit outpost in July 2014, or a bomb. But one move is unlikely – an abduction. In 2006, Israel showed Nasrallah that abducting its people means war, and he is trying to avoid war.

But the real response Nasrallah wants to dish out is not for the events in Syria, but for what took place in secret, in Beirut. According to foreign media reports, the fact that Israel took action in the heart of the Dahiyeh neighborhood for the first time since 2006 caused Nasrallah to lose his mind. It wasn't just the loss of a strategic asset, it's that now he fears that Israel is unilaterally changing the balance of mutual deterrence that Israel and Hezbollah have so carefully maintained.

Nasrallah, like Lebanon itself, will find it hard to accept that change. In the past, he has declared that any attack in Beirut would lead to an attack on Tel Aviv, but it's unlikely he'll go so far. He might be considering shooting some projectile weapon or another into Israel, but only to send a signal. Hezbollah, all experts agree, does not want a war.

It's disinclination to fight a war with Israel stems not only from the heavy price that the organization paid fighting in Syria but also because it is afraid to bring disaster on Lebanon that would extend beyond the fighting itself. In other words, Nasrallah is afraid of turning from Lebanon's defender to its destroyer.

A knockout for Israel

Hats are off to Iran for its determination to be active in the area. Despite all the blows they have taken, the Iranians keep on keeping on. After its smuggling of precision missiles to Lebanon was thwarted through hundreds of airstrikes attributed to Israel, they moved on to a project that would allow Hezbollah to modify its existing missiles, and now they are trying to manufacture missiles in Lebanon. After the series of strikes attributed to Israel disrupted the air smuggling route used for weapons, the Iranians began using a land corridor that is long and dangerous, passing through Iraq. After their attempts to build permanent bases for their militias in Syria were torpedoed, they undertook covert actions, under the radar of the Russians and the Syrians. After they failed to attack Israel from Syria, they are now working on setting up other options that will allow them to stage actions from Iraq.

If a stranger were to judge, they might conclude that Israel has won the battle in a knockout. It's not that there are no weapons in Lebanon or in the hands of militias in Syria, but the grandiose plans of the commander of Iran's Quds Force Qassem Soleimani have fallen far short of being fully implemented. Vast amounts of effort, money, operatives, weapons, and technology have gone up in smoke. And still, in Iran, Soleimani is a hero, a man with hands of gold. He sells himself to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei as the only one to stand up to Israel without blinking. But Iran has attacked Israel four times in the past 18 months – in February and May 2018, and in January and August of this year – and all the attacks were failures.

The war between Israel and Iran is not the result of any Iranian decision – it was Israel who made the call. It was former IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. (ret.) Gadi Eizenkot who was mostly responsible for making the Quds Force a major target. His successor, Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Aviv Kochavi, has taken the fight forward, and not only raised the risk threshold, but also expanded the area of and character of Israel's actions. The Mossad under director Yossi Cohen is a key partner; Cohen, like Kochavi and Eizenkot, believes that if Israel wants to strike Iran, it must look Tehran in the eyes, take a chance, and act.

The terrorist attack that was thwarted on Saturday was the next stage of that policy. For some time, Israel had been tracking the Shiite operatives who wanted to launch the explosives-laden drones. They belong to the Imam Hossein Division, a Shiite militia that is also known as the International Brigade because its members come from many different nations who were looking for a new home after fighting the radical Sunni Islamic State.

The decision to have these militia members carry out a terrorist attack came after the strikes that Israel was reported to have carried out against Iranian interests in Iraq. Soleimeni was looking for a rapid response, and the formula seemed to work: Israel, according to foreign reports, used drones in an attack, and it would be attacked in the same manner.

Tehran might be weighing the possibility of an attack against an Israeli or Jewish target abroad. Some Israeli embassies and consulates are on a higher level of alert, but it looks like Iran has chosen not to go that route because it would mix it up not only with Israel but with other countries as well. Terrorism is not seen as a legitimate tool, and Iran probably doesn't want to undermine its strategic interest of throwing off the American sanctions, especially when it's possible that US President Donald Trump and Iranian President Hassan Rouhani might be about to meet.

The drones themselves came from Iran. The operatives, who were trained to fly them in Iran, were Lebanese, former Hezbollah members who were living in Syria. Last Thursday, they tried to launch two drones on the slopes of the Syrian Golan, but the IDF intercepted them. The operatives returned to the structure in the village of Aqraba that they had used to organize and store weapons. On Saturday, Israel attacked that building.

That particular attack was thwarted, but Soleimani's motivation is still sky-high. He will act again, no matter who stands in his way – not even Russia, which this week was embarrassed to find that Iran and its proxies were operating within an 80-kilometer (50-mile) zone that Moscow promised would remain free from terrorist activity. Russia was informed of this via various diplomatic conduits and warned that if it did not take action to restrain the Iranians, they could drag the entire region into a war that would damage Russia's interests in the ongoing quiet that would allow Syria to be rehabilitated. The same messages also went out to Syria and Lebanon. Israel was operating in their territory this week, but both kept quiet. The Syrian government said nothing about yet another Iranian attempt to open up a terror front against Israel from within its border, and the Lebanese government said nothing about Hezbollah trying to build a precision missile factory on its territory either.

This reality demands that Israel change its tactics, and not only when it comes to security and defense. A central aspect of its current activity is to make Syria and Lebanon take responsibility for what is happening inside their borders, whether it means confronting Iran (in the case of Syria) or Hezbollah (in the case of Lebanon) and laying down firm red lines. There is very little chance of this happening. Iran doesn't control Syria, but does what it wants there, and Hezbollah does de facto control Lebanon. Anyone who dares raise their head will find it shot off.

A question of how and when

In the past few days, the IDF has been on high alert. It still isn't beefing up its forces, the idea is to play down its signature moves and not offer Hezbollah any available targets, but preparations have taken on a very different character. Some units and equipment that had been moved to Judea and Samaria on Friday to help locate the killers of Rina Shnerb, were redeployed to the North to handle the terrorist attack that Hezbollah was planning. It's complicated management of resources, not only because it's taking place at the end of August when the IDF is supposed to be at a standstill, but because the Gaza Strip – with its own endless problems – is always simmering away in the background. This week, it became clearer that Hamas does not want a military confrontation – not only has it not been involved in any of the recent terrorist attacks, it even took action against those who did perpetrate them and paid a heavy price when three of its policemen were killed in an attack by Salafi terrorists in Gaza.

For now, Israel is allowing Hamas to run things in Gaza. Like in the North, this demands strong defenses to avoid suffering an attack that would demand a change in policy and an unwanted war. The main challenge is to maintain those defenses in the face of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, which unlike Hamas – wants quiet – seeks chaos, a battle, and outright war, whether because that's what its Iranian patron wants, or because it is unfettered by concerns about the ongoing governance of Gaza.

Many officials in Israel have long been campaigning for Israel to handle the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Prominent among them is the head of the Shin Bet security agency Nadav Argaman, who for over a year has been pointing out the growing threat the organization presents.

After the last round of escalation in the violence between Israel and Hamas in May of this year, Hamas reined in the PIJ, but they seem to have loosened the screws, and the group is back to its old tricks. At some point, Israel will have to take action against the PIJ, but for now, Israel wants to calm things on the southern front so that it can focus on the North. To residents of the western Negev, that doubtlessly seems unfair – no one would want to trade places with the participants of a festival in Sderot that is interrupted by a Color Red alert, or with the people taking a nighttime dip in the pool at Moshav Netiv Ha'asara, who had to run for shelter from incoming rockets. But in this case, the current situation in the North meets two basic criteria for priority – it is more urgent and more important.

The northern front is urgent because the threat of a Hezbollah response is immediate. In the past, the group took a few days from the time it was attacked to the time it would respond, meaning we're right in the window of time for the promised retaliation. It's likely that any delay in that response will be the result of either the IDF making successful preparations to counter it; or Hezbollah's problem that too "successful" an attack could prompt Israel to respond even more harshly, leading to war. But there will certainly be a response.

The northern front is more important because of the type of threat that was eradicated. Hezbollah has 150,000 missiles and rockets that can do serious damage to Israel, but precision missiles are something completely different: Hezbollah could use them to attack any point in Israel. It could do more than blanket-bomb the country – it could wipe out specific targets, including key defense infrastructure and facilities. Israel could either mortgage itself to pay for defense systems that would never be sufficient or take a risk of suffering unprecedented damage.

From that perspective, the strikes attributed to Israel on a facility designed to allow Hezbollah to manufacture precision missiles in Lebanon was a strategic event on the scale of an attack on an Iranian nuclear facility. It cannot be evaluated in terms of the here and now; but rather by looking ahead for the long term. If it hadn't been done, people here would be asking 20 years from now, and rightly, who was so irresponsible as to allow a new, dangerous version of Hezbollah to set up camp in the Golan Heights.

The decision was made based on realistic considerations, and despite the risks. One might wonder what would have happened if similar steps had been taken a decade ago or more to prevent Hezbollah from arming itself with its current stock of rockets and missiles. But the challenge now is to prevent such mistakes from happening again while minimizing the risk of a full-scale war while also being willing to pay the price should such a war erupt.

For now, it seems that Israel is taking the right approach: the other side is now faced with a dilemma. Nasrallah is being forced to take responsibility for an incident in Syria in which he was uninvolved so that he can avenge what he could not admit happened in Lebanon. Too weak a response on his part could unleash Israel for more actions in Lebanon, while too harsh a response could lead Israel to an even harsher retaliation, which might include Lebanese infrastructure and spark an exchange of blows that will lead to a war that Hezbollah doesn't want.

This equation will lie heavy on our heads for the next few days until Hezbollah makes its move. But it will still exist after the response. The northern front is closer to real escalation than it has been since 2006, but assuming that it doesn't develop into a war that upsets everything, nothing fundamental will change. Iran and Hezbollah will continue their constant attempts to undermine the balance of power with Israel, and Israel will continue to take action, both openly and in secret, on the axis between Beirut and Tehran, to remove ever-bigger threats.

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Since the US withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal last year, there has been an increasing tempo of attacks and alleged threats, notably this weekend, from unmanned aircraft flown by Tehran's and Washington's allies in the region.

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The appeal of the aircraft – they risk no pilots and can be small enough to evade air-defense systems – fueled their rapid use amid the maximum pressure campaigns of Iran and the US. As these strikes become more frequent, the risk of unwanted escalation becomes greater.

The US military nearly launched airstrikes against Iran after a US military surveillance drone was shot down in June. Meanwhile, strikes attributed to Israel are carried out on targets in Syria on an almost weekly basis, including on Saturday night. Israel's reason for the latest bombing: To thwart what it called a planned Iranian drone strike.

Israeli aircraft then buzzed over Beirut on Sunday after allegedly losing two drones only hours earlier, raising the risk of a wider conflict between it and Hezbollah. On Sunday evening, another drone strike hit an Iran-backed paramilitary force in Iraq, killing one commander and wounding another, members of the group said. It was not immediately clear who carried out the strike.

Amid the escalation, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif made a surprise trip Sunday to the G-7 summit in France, at the invitation of the French president.

The mounting tensions are rooted in the US withdrawal in May 2018 from Iran's nuclear deal with world powers. Under the deal, Tehran limited its enrichment of uranium in exchange for sanctions relief. In response to Washington's withdrawal, Iran initially sought diplomatic support from European partners still in the accord, but ever-increasing US sanctions choked off its sale of crude oil in the international market.

This May, the US sent nuclear-capable B-52 bombers, fighter jets, an aircraft carrier, and additional troops to the region over what it described as threats from Iran. Mysterious explosions struck oil tankers near the Strait of Hormuz.

Coordinated drone attacks followed, first from the Iranian-backed Houthi rebels of Yemen. Major attacks targeted the kingdom's oil infrastructure – one on a crucial East-West Pipeline, the other in a major facility deep in the desert of Arabian Peninsula's Empty Quarter.

Saudi Arabia immediately tied the attacks to Iran, its longtime Middle East rival. While Iran denies arming the Houthis, the West and United Nations experts say that drones used by the rebels mirror models used by the Islamic Republic.

Meanwhile, a suspected Israeli strike in Iraq last month targeted a base of Shiite militias allied to Iran – in what would be the first attack to be carried out by Israel in Iraq since 1981. Israel remained mum, and US officials who linked the strike to Israel did not say if drones were involved.

Israel, meanwhile, acknowledged striking Syria on Saturday night, in what it described as a pre-emptive attack. The military said that it prevented an effort by Iran to position so-called killer drones ahead of an attack on Israel.

Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah disputed the Israeli version in a speech later Sunday, saying that Israeli strikes hit a Hezbollah rest house and killed two of the group's members. He said that going forward, any Israeli drones that enter Lebanon would be shot down.

The drones Israel says it was targeting in Syria are known to experts as loitering munitions and are similar to the ones being used by the Houthis. The bomb-carrying drone flies to a destination, likely programmed before its flight, and either explodes in the air over the target or on impact against it.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who is seeking re-election in September, paraphrased a Talmudic passage on self-defense after the attack: "If someone rises up to kill you, kill him first."

Israel's military released a map Sunday of what it said were the Iranian supply routes to deliver the planes to Syria. This included what Israel described as the planned drone launch site in the Syrian village of Aqraba, as well as another location in the village of Arneh where a previous launch attempt was allegedly thwarted last Thursday.

IDF Spokesman Lt. Col. Jonathan Conricus said that Israel had been monitoring the activity for weeks and struck when it became clear that Iran's Revolutionary Guards planned to launch the aircraft. He said it is easier to destroy the drones, which are agile and hard to detect once airborne, while they are still on the ground.

"We know the Quds Force spent a lot of effort and time trying to execute this plan," he said. The Quds, or Jerusalem, Force is the Guard's expeditionary unit.

Iran denied Israel's strikes in Syria did any damage to its forces.

"It is a lie," Guard Gen. Mohsen Rezaei said, according to Iran's semi-official ILNA news agency. However, Rezaei added that the "defenders of Syria and Iraq will soon give an answer," without elaborating.

Rezaei's response shows the escalatory danger of drone strikes. Overnight in Lebanon, one alleged Israeli drone crashed in Beirut while another exploded, authorities there said, calling it an Israeli act of aggression and a violation of Lebanese sovereignty.

In his speech, Nasrallah said that one of the drones had been flying low among buildings.

Israel did not acknowledge the incident.

Hezbollah was quick to say that it did not fire on any of the drones, underscoring the group's keenness to avoid further escalation with its southern neighbor.

The developments, however, present a direct challenge to the group, which is still recovering from a bruising years-long conflict in neighboring Syria that saw thousands of its fighters killed and wounded while fighting alongside President Bashar Assad's forces.

Hezbollah, which is part of a fragile national unity government already struggling to deal with a serious economic and financial crisis, does not wish to be seen as dragging the country into another ruinous war with Israel, but may be feeling pressured to respond to perceived Israeli provocations.

In the overnight incident, the first drone, apparently unarmed, crashed onto the roof of a Beirut building where Hezbollah's media office is located and caused damage to the group's offices.

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"The way things look right now, the chances of us bringing about a ceasefire in the next few hours are slim. Right now, there is no contact between the sides and there is real fear that the escalation will increase and develop into another round of war in the Gaza Strip," the official said.

"The fact that delegations from Hamas and the Islamic Jihad are still in Cairo is because of the concern that Israel will try to carry out targeted killings of senior Palestinian officials in Gaza.

"We have asked Israel to guarantee that they will not attack the Palestinian officials on their way back to Gaza, and we haven't gotten a response," the official added.

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