This typical conduct by the continent's heads of state, most of whom identify with the left side of the political spectrum, was expressed in their rush to recognize a Palestinian state. Such a move is a reward for Hamas, which carried out the October 7 massacre and dragged the Middle East, then on the verge of expanding the Abraham Accords, with an Israeli-Saudi normalization deal on the horizon, into a war that brought justified destruction upon the Gaza Strip.

The detachment of Europe's leaders from the basic understanding of the Middle East, combined with their continued efforts to appease radicals, was illustrated in the words of British Prime Minister and Labour Party leader Keir Starmer. He explained why His Majesty's Government decided to recognize a Palestinian state. His main argument: recognition is essential for reconciliation and normalization in the Middle East and represents a rejection of extremists who oppose peace.

In response to criticism from Britain's opposition parties, the Reform Party and the Conservative Party, that recognition at this time is a reward for Hamas terrorism, Starmer replied that the step is the exact opposite of Hamas' vision. He further pledged that the Palestinian state under Mahmoud Abbas would be demilitarized and reformed, and that Hamas would play no part in its future leadership.

Despite Starmer's firm stance on Hamas, which reflects the prevailing view among many European leaders, particularly on the left, it is important to note that the Palestinian public thinks differently. In May 2025, the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR), led by Prof. Khalil Shikaki, who has conducted quarterly opinion polls in the West Bank and Gaza since 1993, found that the Palestinian public clearly wants Hamas in power.

In a presidential election, a Hamas candidate would win by a sweeping 73% compared with just 27% for Abbas. In the Palestinian Legislative Council, Hamas would secure 43% compared with Fatah's 29%. The survey also highlighted widespread rejection of Abbas himself: only 15% of Palestinians are satisfied with his performance, while 80% believe he should resign.

Additional findings strengthen the claim that most Palestinians support the destruction of Israel and the killing of Jews. A majority justified the October 7 massacre (50% versus 40%), 57% opposed a two-state solution, and 41% believe armed struggle is the correct path against Israel, compared with 31% who favor negotiations. Moreover, 77% oppose disarming Hamas in exchange for ending the war. In short, the data clearly shows a complete disconnect between European naivety and Palestinian public opinion.

I would not be surprised if Starmer's declaration that no party would be permitted to participate in Palestinian elections unless it embraced nonviolent politics, signals a future effort to rehabilitate Hamas' image. By this definition, if Hamas were to claim that it accepts a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders without ending the conflict, as Khaled Mashal already declared in the "Document of General Principles and Policies" in 2017, Europe's left could well argue that Hamas is a legitimate representative of the Palestinian people with whom Israel must negotiate. European naivety regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict reinvents itself time and again. The Jewish state must therefore prepare for the day when voices will say that Palestinian democracy, even if it chooses terror and violence, is something Israel must respect.

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Public fatigue with the Conservatives was so overwhelming that the party collapsed from 365 seats in the 2019 election to just 121 in 2024, their worst result since 1906. It's worth noting that the UK electoral system is similar to that of the US: each member of Parliament is elected in a winner-takes-all contest in their district. In fact, even though Labour won 63% of the seats, it secured only 34% of the popular vote, compared to the Conservatives' 24%.

Despite expectations that Labour leader Keir Starmer, seen as having purged the party of antisemitism during the tenure of his predecessor Jeremy Corbyn -who had praised Hamas and Hezbollah - would restore public trust, the party has managed to lose it in just one year. The main reason: illegal immigration. Prime Minister Starmer presented a plan to deter migrants, proposing that rejected asylum seekers be sent to third countries, a move meant to discourage illegal entry.

Yet despite these promises, which many saw as a response to growing concerns over England's changing character, some 50,000 illegal migrants entered the UK in the past year. They joined hundreds of thousands who had crossed in previous years, most of them young men from Muslim-majority countries. For British taxpayers, the cost is steep, nearly £10 billion per year.

While the UK's National Health Service is struggling, these migrants receive substantial state-funded benefits, including hotel accommodations and free healthcare. Criticism of Labour has become so fierce that some claim its failure to stop illegal immigration, especially from Muslim nations, is eroding Britain's national identity.

Although some hoped that the crisis would pave the way for a Conservative rebound, the British public appears to have lost faith in the party and does not see it as a viable alternative to Labour. Into this political vacuum has stepped the Reform UK party, led by Nigel Farage, which has made the fight against illegal immigration and the defense of British identity its flagship cause.

In the 2024 election, Reform UK won 14% of the popular vote but only secured five parliamentary seats. However, a poll conducted last week shows the party now leading with 28%, compared to 22% for Labour and 17% for the Conservatives.

But when looking at projected parliamentary seats, the numbers are even more striking: Reform UK is forecast to win 290 seats, compared to Labour's 126 and the Conservatives' 81. Other polls predict an outright parliamentary majority for Reform UK, underscoring the dramatic shift in British public opinion and growing resistance to Labour's perceived failure to defend the kingdom's borders.

In conclusion, the numbers reveal that the British public firmly rejects the leftist policies of Labour and Keir Starmer, who long ago lost control of illegal immigration into the country. Alongside the economic burden, there is growing fear among Britons of losing their national identity. With four years to go until the next general election, Britain is in for a turbulent ride.

Dr. Ori Wertman is a research fellow at the University of South Wales, UK, and a research fellow at The Israel Centre for Grand Strategy - ICGS.

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The main candidates facing him in the November elections will be incumbent Mayor Eric Adams, who won 67% of the vote as the Democratic Party representative in the previous election and is now running as an independent, and Curtis Sliwa, the Republican candidate from the 2021 elections, who won only 28%.

New York is considered a blue state, meaning victory for the Democratic Party is considered guaranteed. However, while Democrats have been winning US presidential elections in New York since 1988, with an average of 60% of the vote, in mayoral elections, the story is different. Democratic Party candidates have won only the last three election cycles. Previously, Republican Party candidates won.

In some election cycles, Republican candidates won with nearly 60% of the vote (Giuliani in 1997 and Bloomberg in 2005). In presidential elections held the year before mayoral elections, the ratio between Democratic and Republican results was reversed, with 60% of the vote going to the Democratic presidential candidate.

The conclusion is that a Democratic victory in the New York City mayoral election is not automatic, and this time, an exciting election campaign is anticipated.

Despite Mamdani's major victory in the primaries, this achievement may be a pyrrhic victory for the Democratic Party, which continues to shift leftward, and his candidacy could lead to a bitter defeat in the November mayoral elections. While mayors in the past 40 years from the Democratic Party (and also Republican) were considered pro-Israeli, Mamdani is perceived as distinctly anti-Israeli – a fact that will not help him in the city's Jewish community. Additionally, the situation where incumbent Mayor Adams, who was elected as the Democratic representative in 2021, is now an independent candidate, is expected to steal many votes from Democrats, whom Mamdani is likely to repel. It's quite possible that many Republicans will prefer strategic voting to strengthen Adams over the hopeless Republican candidate Sliwa, who, in certain scenarios, is even expected to withdraw his candidacy and support Adams, in order to prevent Mamdani from winning.

In conclusion, New York City, where about one million Jews live, comprising about 12% of the population, is considered the central stronghold of diaspora Jews. Its fall into the hands of an anti-Israeli Muslim mayor who supports BDS would be a generational tragedy and a severe blow to the city's Jews.

The difficult scenes we saw in New York following the October 7 terror attack are well burned into consciousness. The anti-Israeli demonstrations and support for the Hamas terror organization, alongside riots where pro-Palestinians attacked Jewish students and even prevented their entry to campuses, shocked many and recalled scenes from Nazi Germany. While Mamdani enjoys support from New York Jews identified with the extreme left, who have long lost all connection with reality, we all hope that the Big Apple will not fall into the hands of Hamas supporters.

Dr. Uri Wartman is a lecturer and research fellow at the University of South Wales in Britain and a research fellow at the Israel Center for Grand Strategy (ICGS). Author of the book "Crash: The Labor Party 1992-2024"

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As of April 2025, it seems that once again Naftali Bennett is emerging as the only one who can challenge Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's leadership.

Polls show that if Bennett establishes a party under his leadership, it would be the largest in the Knesset and change the balance of power between the blocs – and if he doesn't enter the political system, Netanyahu's bloc is expected to receive 52 seats, compared to 57 for the anti-Netanyahu bloc (not including Arab parties that together receive 10 seats). Bennett's entry shuffles the deck.

Bennett's virtual party is expected to win 23 seats, compared to 22 for Netanyahu and Likud. In the inter-bloc balance, Netanyahu's bloc is expected to drop by three seats to just 49, giving the anti-Netanyahu bloc a majority of 61 seats together with Bennett.

However, these figures point to an interesting pattern that has repeated itself time and again in recent years, with Bennett portrayed as the great hope for those working to bring down Netanyahu's rule. History has twice proven that Bennett cannot maintain the position of governmental alternative to Netanyahu for long. Back in 2014, it briefly appeared that Bennett was gaining momentum after Operation Protective Edge, when The Jewish Home under his leadership was the second-largest party in polls. Bennett, who was perceived as the chief critic of Netanyahu's policy during the operation, received 16 seats in polls in September that year – four fewer than Likud. But ultimately, Netanyahu managed to drain Bennett's votes, with Likud winning 30 seats in the March 2015 elections, compared to only 8 for The Jewish Home.

Similarly, beginning in summer 2020, Bennett temporarily appeared as an alternative to Netanyahu's rule, against the backdrop of the COVID-19 pandemic and rising infection rates. In October 2020, Yamina, led by Bennett, received 23 seats in polls, three fewer than Likud. But in this case too, despite Bennett managing to significantly strengthen at Netanyahu's expense (Bennett climbed by 15 seats within four months, while Netanyahu dropped by 14 with the bloc balance remaining identical), Gideon Sa'ar's return to the political system and the establishment of his "New Hope" party hurt Bennett electorally, who ultimately led his Yamina party to a disappointing result of 7 seats in the 2021 elections, compared to Netanyahu and Likud who won 30 seats. Bennett, as mentioned, formed the government after the elections based on a controversial political deal with the anti-Netanyahu bloc, a move that essentially left him permanently outside the right-wing camp led by Netanyahu.

Unlike when Bennett relied on Netanyahu bloc voters, this time, support for him comes from anti-Netanyahu bloc voters. Bennett may receive 23 seats in polls, but only three come from the Netanyahu bloc parties. In fact, following the October 7 events, Bennett was not perceived as an alternative to Netanyahu at all, with polls showing a party under Bennett's leadership might win around 10 seats only.

During that period, it was Benny Gantz who was perceived as the only politician who could replace Netanyahu, with his State Camp party receiving 35 seats in polls. However, toward the end of 2024, a shift occurred within the anti-Netanyahu bloc, which began to see Bennett as an alternative, a situation that remains as of this writing.

In conclusion, unlike past cases where Bennett failed to remain relevant in public opinion, mainly relying on right-wing voters, this time he appears to be receiving stable support over time. This is thanks to voters from the anti-Netanyahu bloc, which has failed to produce a leadership alternative from within. Will Bennett manage to maintain the lead until the 2026 elections and succeed in forming the next government on his own merit? Only time will tell.

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Hamas' terror attack and the massacre it committed on Oct. 7 are a defining event that will forever be etched in Jewish and Israeli consciousness. Investigations into the events of that cursed day clearly demonstrate the systemic collapse experienced by the IDF that day. With them, there are growing claims that if the IDF had been prepared and ready during routine days, and not just during emergencies, for a Hamas terror attack – as befitting a defensive army, which must be prepared for a situation where a terror organization sitting on the country's border might attack one day – the attack would have been thwarted, or perhaps not even launched. These claims are supported by testimonies indicating that on the morning of the attack, Mohammed Deif even considered canceling it for fear that the IDF was preparing an ambush for him.

Beyond the IDF and Shin Bet failure preceding the attack, the fundamental question about Israel's strategic doctrine and accommodation policy toward Hamas continues to resurface. Under this policy, Israel believed the Palestinian terror organization would institutionalize and prefer improving economic reality and the welfare of its citizens, and would therefore be restrained in exchange for a series of civic and economic measures toward the Gaza Strip, and would be deterred by fear of losing those assets.

Moreover, the question of Qatari money transferred to Hamas reemerges, which undoubtedly aided in building the terror army that was ultimately deployed against Israel on Oct. 7. In this context – the Israeli strategy was clear, given the desire to focus on existential threats such as the Iranian nuclear program and Hezbollah's precision missile project, while keeping the Hamas threat under control. The assumption and organizing logic were that preventing a humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip and improving economic reality, in the shadow of Hamas' institutionalization process, would ensure the preservation of deterrence against the organization, the establishment and deepening of accommodation, and thereby effectively neutralizing this arena in a way that allows necessary intelligence and operational focus on other threatening arenas.

The preoccupation and focus on the concept of Hamas' institutionalization, accommodation, and deterrence diverted attention from the reasonable possibility of thwarting the attack, or preventing it, through proper operational preparation of the IDF on the Gaza Strip border. But at the same time, the importance of the unasked question becomes clearer: Even if the IDF had been properly prepared and either thwarted the Oct. 7 attack or deterred Hamas from launching it altogether, would Israel's strategic doctrine of managing Hamas through arrangements and deterrence have ever been fundamentally questioned?

It is not unlikely that the answer to the unasked question is negative, especially in light of Israel's accumulated historical experience with Hamas since it took over the Gaza Strip. After all, since its takeover of the Gaza Strip in the summer of 2007, and after every violent round with Hamas (2008, 2012, 2014, the fence events in 2018–2021), Israel returned to the path of "dialogue" with the organization and attempts to reach arragment with it.

Therefore, it is not unlikely that if the Oct. 7 attack had been thwarted by the IDF, or if it had been prevented due to better preparation by the IDF – Israel would have continued the same policy toward Hamas, as part of the concept that effectively led to the "containment" of the Palestinian terror organization and the terror army it built on Israel's border. Indeed, if the attack had not been launched – the recognition of Hamas being deterred would have strengthened, hence the validity of deterrence. Had the attack been thwarted – it would have been categorized as just another escalation cycle with Hamas – similar to the previous confrontations we've experienced in the past – none of which were significant enough to prompt Israel to reconsider its strategic doctrine toward Hamas.

Tragically and painfully, this concept led to a stinging and humiliating failure that exacted a very heavy price from Israeli society. On the other hand, it is frightening to think that if the attack had been thwarted or prevented – this concept would likely have deepened its roots, and we might have received the Oct. 7 attack in an even more intense and dangerous format, in a more coordinated multi-arena manner, and at a much more problematic and dangerous timing.

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The Oct. 7 massacre, in which 1,200 people were murdered and 250 Israelis were kidnapped by Hamas terrorists, has been deeply etched into the collective memory of the Jewish public in Israel. While the country deals with hostage negotiations and the possibility that fighting against Hamas will resume alongside continued IDF operations in the West Bank – an interesting development has occurred beneath the surface in how the Jewish public in Israel perceives the conflict with the Palestinians.

In the three decades since the Oslo process began until today, Jewish-Israeli society has undergone a dual disillusionment regarding Palestinians. Analysis of public opinion polls conducted since the 1990s at Tel Aviv University, as part of the "Peace Index," clearly illustrates the change that Jewish society in Israel has undergone during this period.

The first disillusionment occurred in the early 2000s, with the outbreak of the Second Intifada, when it became clear that the Oslo process had not brought the hoped-for peace. The Palestinian refusal at the Camp David summit to accept Israeli proposals that promised Palestinians a state in almost all areas of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and of course the outbreak of the violent campaign that Palestinians launched against the Jewish state, made it clear to Jewish society in Israel that peace would not come.

While polls indicate that before the Second Intifada, most Israelis supported the Oslo process but were divided in their opinion about its ability to bring peace between the peoples – after it, the Oslo process lost the support of the Israeli public, which no longer believed this formula would lead to peace.

The continued negotiations with the Palestinian Authority were complex. On one hand, the Jewish public in Israel still expressed support for a diplomatic process with the PA (60% in 2001 and 66% in 2012 on average). On the other hand, it did not believe that negotiations would lead to a peace agreement (64% in 2001 and 73% in 2012 on average).

The second disillusionment came following the Oct. 7, 2023 massacre, when it became clear to the Jewish public in Israel that the conflict with the Palestinians could no longer be managed and that they could not be allowed to establish a semi-state terrorist entity.

Following Hamas' barbaric massacre, which received unprecedented support among Palestinian society, a reversal occurred in the public opinion of Jewish-Israeli society, which was already skeptical about negotiations. As of late 2024, only 35% of Jews in Israel express support for a diplomatic process with the PA, while 88% do not believe negotiations will lead to a peace agreement.

The Oct. 7 attack greatly influenced how the Jewish public in Israel views the type of possible solution to the conflict. In this context, the two-state idea, which would establish a Palestinian state alongside Israel and which in the past enjoyed the support of the majority of the Jewish public in Israel (68% in 2010 and 53% in 2016) – is no longer an option: only 25% support it as of late 2024.

It is important to note that even before the October attack, a reversal had occurred in public opinion in Israel regarding the two-state idea (only 38% supported it in September 2023), but there is no doubt that the massacre intensified the opposition of Jewish society in Israel to the establishment of a Palestinian state.

Regarding two additional solutions to the conflict – the idea of a binational state on one hand and annexation of territories with minimal rights for Palestinians on the other – it appears that the Hamas attack did not affect the opinion of the Jewish public in Israel, which as of late 2024 continues to largely oppose both these options (83% versus 9% for a binational state and 52% versus 37% for annexation).

In conclusion, it appears that the Jewish public in Israel has become disillusioned with peace with the Palestinians and with the illusion that the conflict can be managed. I hope that the collective memory in the people of Israel will be deeply rooted, so that we will not be tempted in the future to take dangerous steps that will threaten the Zionist enterprise.

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Crucial elections scheduled for February 23 in Germany will shape the future of Europe's most influential nation and the European Union. The early elections were triggered by the collapse of the "traffic light" coalition (named after the party colors) between the Social Democrats (SPD), Free Democratic Party (FDP), and the Greens, following disputes over government economic policy.

While the left-wing parties – the Social Democrats and the Greens – demanded the government increase its budget deficit, Finance Minister and center-right FDP leader Christian Lindner refused to deviate from the "black zero" policy, which requires the government to maintain a nearly balanced budget. Chancellor Olaf Scholz, leader of the Social Democratic Party, ultimately dismissed Lindner from the government.

Unlike the September 2021 elections, where climate change dominated the campaign following floods that claimed about 200 lives two months earlier, immigration and Islamic terror threats have become the central issues this time. Two recent attacks carried out by Muslim immigrants – a December attack at a Christmas market in Magdeburg that left six dead and 300 injured, and last week's attack in Munich that injured dozens – have intensified public criticism of immigration policies.

Many Germans now recognize that former Chancellor Angela Merkel's decision to open the country's borders to millions of Middle Eastern refugees in the summer of 2015 was devastating. Merkel, who led the center-right Christian Democratic Union (CDU/CSU) and governed Germany from 2005 to 2021, initiated a refugee policy that continues to generate controversy. The refugee issue intersects with economic concerns, another key campaign focus. Many Germans are frustrated with the rising cost of living and question why the state continues to fund the massive refugee project that began under Merkel and continued under the traffic light coalition.

While the left maintains illusions that immigration is part of the solution for Germany's aging population, the right calls for clear measures against it. The Christian Democratic Union (CDU/CSU) led by Friedrich Merz, who according to all predictions is expected to become the next chancellor, advocates for significant immigration reduction. The Alternative for Germany (AfD), led by Alice Weidel, demands an immediate halt to immigration and deportation of illegal immigrants. This hardline stance has made AfD the second-largest party in Germany according to polls, with 22% support, while CDU/CSU leads with 30%. Together, these parties command 52% of public support, up from their combined 34% in 2021 (24% for CDU/CSU and 10% for AfD).

In contrast, the traffic light coalition, which won 52% in 2021 (26% for SPD, 15% for Greens, and 11% for FDP), is expected to collapse in the upcoming election. Polls show SPD likely dropping to 16%, the Greens weakening slightly, and FDP at risk of not clearing the 5% threshold. The far left, which ran as a united list in 2021 and received 5%, has split into two parties that barely poll above the threshold, with at least one expected to enter parliament.

Polls indicate that forming a coalition will be complex, challenging, or nearly impossible. The natural move would be to form a full right-wing government led by the Christian Democrats and Alternative for Germany, but AfD faces a boycott over allegations it resembles a certain party that ruled Germany from 1933 to 1945.

Interestingly, regarding support for Israel, antisemitism and anti-Israel sentiment actually come from the German left, which holds negative views toward Israel and supports the Palestinian struggle against the Jewish state, while the German right sees Israel as the last bastion of Western civilization in the Middle East. One thing is certain – a political crisis due to internal boycotts would be devastating for Germany.

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In the shadow of the Israel-Hamas ceasefire, a significant drama unfolds in Judea and Samaria, where Israel and the Palestinian Authority maintain a complex security coordination against terror organizations.

In early December 2024, after Mahmoud Abbas' authority faced severe challenges in northern Samaria from Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, PA security forces launched a military operation against armed operatives in an attempt to restore governance in the Jenin refugee camp. Ramallah views Tehran as the primary instigator of regional escalation, with Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps members working to transfer destabilizing weapons to Palestinian terror organizations in Judea and Samaria.

The collapse of Bashar Assad's regime in Syria prompted Abbas to act against those seeking to overthrow PA rule. Despite his advanced age of 89, the PA chairman's memory remains sharp. He certainly hasn't forgotten how the PA under his leadership was forcefully expelled from Gaza in the summer of 2007. Abbas shows no hesitation in his methods: when his rule's survival hung in the balance, he temporarily shut down Al Jazeera broadcasts in Judea and Samaria, a network consistently promoting pro-Hamas narratives.

Despite hopes for a "renewed Palestinian Authority" – an illusion embraced by experts in Israel and worldwide who called for giving Abbas control of Gaza after Hamas' defeat – the ceasefire agreement between the PA and terror organizations in Jenin clearly demonstrated reality.

The bitter truth is that since its establishment in 1994 under the Oslo Accords, nothing has changed in the PA's unwillingness and inability to combat Palestinian terror organizations. The PA leadership has no desire to appear as an Israeli collaborator in the eyes of the Palestinian public, which views Abbas' rule as long-delegitimized.

Recent Palestinian opinion polls, conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR) in Ramallah under Professor Khalil Shikaki, starkly illustrate that in Judea and Samaria, which is de jura under PA control, support for the Palestinian Authority and its leader has reached unprecedented lows. About 94% of Palestinians in Judea and Samaria want Abbas to resign, while 73% consider the PA a burden on the Palestinian people – meanwhile, Hamas enjoys overwhelming support over Fatah (48% versus 21%). Unsurprisingly, a Hamas candidate would decisively defeat Abbas (86% versus 10%).

Conversely, the Abbas-led PA primarily focuses on survival. The PA chairman understands that failure to act against Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad infrastructure in Judea and Samaria could lead to a fate similar to Assad's flight from Syria, or worse – like Muammar Gaddafi's assassination in Libya by opponents.

Jerusalem comprehends that Abbas and the PA cannot be relied upon for security matters. Operation Iron Wall, essentially a continuation of IDF and Shin Bet activities since Oct. 7 against Palestinian terror infrastructure in Judea and Samaria, proves definitively that only Israel can effectively combat Palestinian terrorism.

In conclusion, without Israeli presence in there, Abbas' PA rule would likely collapse like a house of cards. Reality repeatedly demonstrates that Palestinian security mechanisms cannot enforce law and order in their controlled territories and show no enthusiasm for confronting Hamas and other Palestinian terror organizations.

Israel, interested in the PA's survival as an effective administrative authority for Palestinian life in Jueda and Samaria and concerned about Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad attempting an Oct. 7-style massacre in these territories, must act independently against Palestinian terror infrastructure.

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The eruption of the uprising caused Yassin and his men to fear losing the support of the Palestinian street to the PLO and other organizations if they did not join the struggle against Israel. Therefore, they decided to establish Hamas and concentrate on the armed struggle, and in fact they conducted open competition mainly with the PLO for leadership of the intifada. The status of Yassin, who became, among other things, an arbitrator after the intifada undermined the local judicial system in the Gaza Strip that was established with Israeli assistance, has been significantly strengthened. And under his leadership, Hamas became the largest organization in the Gaza Strip, mainly at the expense of Fatah.

Israel was quick to act against Hamas when over a hundred of its members were arrested during 1988. However, then-Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin decided not to arrest Sheikh Yassin. The fear was that Yassin's arrest would be interpreted as an indication that Israel was acting against Islam and persecuting religious figures, a move that would lead to escalation. Only in May 1989, after it became clear that Yassin had ordered the continuation of the armed struggle and terrorist activities, was it decided to arrest him along with over 500 of his men, including Mahmoud al-Zahar. Following the arrest operation, the involvement of Yahya Sinwar, who was first arrested in 1988 after preparing a homemade bomb with the aim of harming IDF soldiers, became apparent. During his interrogation, Sinwar admitted that he was the commander of the Al-Majd forces, Hamas' internal security apparatus, and that he personally murdered 12 Palestinians suspected of collaborating with Israel.

The May 1989 arrest operation carried out by the IDF and Shin Bet against Hamas was the first time the Israeli public became aware of the existence of the murderous Palestinian terrorist organization. The background was the kidnapping and murder of two IDF soldiers, Avi Sasportas and Ilan Saadon, by Hamas terrorists. During his interrogation, it turned out that Yassin was ordered to kidnap soldiers and he was sentenced to life imprisonment and 15 years in an Israeli prison. The arrest of Yassin and members of the movement severely damaged Hamas. In order to rebuild Hamas' organizational infrastructure, the organization's political bureau chief, Mousa Abu Marzook, arrived in Gaza in June 1989. Abu Marzook brought with him hundreds of thousands of dollars to finance the organization, which led to Hamas' center of gravity shifting the Gaza Strip to abroad. At the end of September 1989, Israel took another step against Hamas when it decided to outlaw the organization in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. This was also the first time the Israeli public was exposed to the Hamas charter, which, as stated, called for the destruction of Israel.

In conclusion, it was only in mid-1989 that Israel began to realize that a murderous Islamic organization had arisen in Judea and Samaria. Unlike the PLO, Hamas gives the Israeli-Palestinian conflict a religious aspect and calls in the name of Islam for the end of the Jewish state in the Middle East. However, it seemed that not everyone in Israel had perceived the danger inherent in Hamas. In practice, Israel missed an opportunity to imprison for many years most of those who later executed terrorist attacks against Jews. At the time, the prosecution made ridiculous plea deals with senior Hamas figures, including Emad Akel, who became Hamas' military wing chief in the early 1990s. After his release, Akel was responsible for the murder of 11 IDF soldiers and an Israeli civilian. Another terrorist that every Israeli knows is Muhammed Deif, the mastermind behind the October 7 massacre. Either way, the struggle against Hamas continues to accompany the State of Israel to this day, with no end in sight.

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The Israeli public has long understood that the left is ideologically and morally bankrupt. Calls to refuse reserve service, assassination threats against Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and more recently, mafia-style statements against elected officials like Police Commissioner Danny Levy, have already become commonplace vocabulary among the radical left.

However, the left has recently returned to marking a known target for itself, with the arrows now being directed at the number one citizen, President Isaac Herzog.

The brutal attack from the left-wing camp on Herzog, who is considered to represent the mainstream of Israeli society, is not a new phenomenon. Back in 2016, Herzog was chairman of the Labor Party and worked to establish a national unity government led by Netanyahu, which aimed to create a historic breakthrough in relations between Israel and the Arab world. In return, Herzog received brutal criticism from his friends in the left-wing camp, who to this day perceive Netanyahu as an enemy of the state.

In response, Herzog harshly criticized his opponents on the left. Claiming that those people preach day and night to talk to the Palestinian Authority and Hamas, Herzog said that the leftists have prevented a real opportunity for national unity and progress in the Israeli-Arab peace process. 

Following the pursuit of national unity, members of the Labor Party chose to punish Herzog. And despite leading the Labor Party in the 2015 elections to an impressive achievement of 24 seats, Herzog was not elected to another term as party chairman in the elections held in the summer of 2017.

The left continued to attack Herzog even after his election as president in the summer of 2021, when he received the support of 87 MKs (the greatest achievement by a president ever). This time it was about Herzog's visit to Hebron as president, during which he lit the first candle of Hanukkah in the Tomb of the Patriarchs. President Herzog's visit to the site undoubtedly symbolized the State of Israel's recognition of Hebron's important and historical place for the Jewish people. 

However, the extreme left chose to attack Herzog because he was lighting a candle in the stronghold of Kahanism, as if the Tomb of the Patriarchs was a party branch of the extreme right and not the site where the fathers and mothers of Judaism are buried.

The attack on Herzog also prevailed during the period of the judicial reform, when he worked to bring about a compromise between the parties. One can, of course, debate Herzog's positions on the coalition's legislative proposal. However, there is no doubt that the compromise outline Herzog proposed has constituted an excellent basis for dialogue between the parties.

Herzog's call to stop the legislation was met with harsh criticism from the right. However, today there are those on the left who claim that Herzog did not act to stop the legislation. Either way, some will argue that it is a great pity that the outline proposed by Herzog was not adopted by the Knesset. It is reasonable to assume that Herzog's outline would have brought an end to the controversy among the nation. Thus, a judicial reform would have been adopted, one that would restore the balance between the three branches of government, which has been disrupted since the judicial revolution three decades ago.

Even when the left began calling to refuse to report to reserve duty (or in their pathetic definition "a cessation of volunteering"), Herzog strongly warned against this dangerous phenomenon, fearing that Israel's security would be in danger. However, Herzog's call to leave the army out of the debate on judicial reform was criticized by elements on the left camp. The "Brothers in Arms" (Achim Laneshek) organization, which is identified with refusing to serve more than any other body, chose to attack Herzog, who once again expressed what most of the Israeli mainstream thinks.

Recently, the left continued its attacks on President Herzog. This time they accuse Herzog of not doing enough to secure the return of the hostages, while he calls day and night for a deal on every possible platform. Contrary to Netanyahu's position, Herzog calls for the establishment of a state committee to investigate the security and intelligence failures surrounding Oct. 7. Yet the left is now accusing Herzog of being in fact the prime minister's political partner.

In conclusion, it is sad to see the left's wild attack on President Herzog. This is a continuation of the systematic and undemocratic pattern of that camp that has not only lost all restraint but also the support of the mainstream of Israeli society.

Dr. Ori Wertman is a research fellow at the University of South Wales, UK, and a research fellow at The Israel Centre for Grand Strategy- ICGS.

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