The international trade system of free trade with the efficient flow of capital, people, and goods wasn't created to improve its efficiency. Countries didn't wake up one morning and decide to implement free trade principles expecting economic benefits. If anything, the default in every country is imposing trade restrictions. The reason is simple – free trade benefits consumers but harms producers. And producers not only vote in elections but also pay lobbyists. They have a clear interest in restricting free trade.

So how did we still arrive at a world where free trade led to deep integration between countries and sectors, where your smartphone is produced in about half a dozen countries, and the coffee you drink in the morning comes from West Africa or Brazil? The answer is simple – it was a strategic decision by the US.

At the end of World War II, Americans faced two problems: a strong rival in the Soviet Union and countries too weak to limit its influence (West Germany, France, Britain, and Japan). To try to contain the Soviets at a bearable cost to the US, Washington decided to consolidate Western European countries and Japan into a new economic and security bloc that could, over time, contain and perhaps even defeat the Soviets.

One foundation of this bloc was an extensive defense alliance system connecting the US to Western Europe and East Asia. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was established in 1949. Japan and the US signed a defense alliance in 1951. This was the first time in history that the US entered into a defense alliance not during wartime, and with numerous countries. We can also add the defense alliances signed with Central and South America and with Southeast Asian countries.

Another foundation of the American bloc was a free trade system. Americans correctly identified that severe tariffs had harmed trade in the period between the world wars. To ensure the prosperity of the "free world," mutual tariff reduction and encouragement of free trade that would benefit all bloc members were necessary.

But there was one problem with the plan. The US and its allies were in very different economic positions. Western European countries and Japan were at the beginning of a long recovery from World War II. Most Japanese cities were destroyed. London was scarred by Hitler. France was under occupation for four years. In contrast, the US was in excellent condition – its cities knew no occupation, and its industry grew during the war. Free trade between such a prosperous country and such devastated countries would only bring further economic damage to these countries. How was a Japanese manufacturer supposed to compete with an American one when he had no access to raw materials, and high inflation eroded his income?

So, the vision of free trade was modified. Instead of demanding reciprocity, the US opened its huge consumer market while accepting high tariffs and restrictions on American exports from its trading partners. Over time, the situation improved, and Western European countries and Japan grew, but the leading logic remained the same – prioritizing national security and the fight against communism over economic considerations. That is, if an economic issue threatened to harm security or diplomatic cooperation, it was pushed aside, sometimes to the protest of American manufacturers and workers.

This was the case with Japan. In the 1970s, Japanese chip manufacturers flooded the US and took over a growing share of the domestic market. American manufacturers put enormous pressure on Congress and the White House to address the Japanese threat. The Defense Department and State Department opposed it because they believed the strategic consideration should lead – Japan was too important a military base in East Asia, and a trade dispute in the chip sector would damage relations. Fortunately for chip manufacturers, and unfortunately for Japan, tensions between the US and Soviet Union decreased in the 1980s. The pressure that built up in Congress influenced the White House, and Japan was forced to open its market and limit exports to the US.

Trump's moves stem from a different vision for the international trade system. At the top of the priority list is the economic interest of the American worker, and partner countries are required to treat American exporters fairly, even at the cost of reducing cheap imports into the US. Fairness and economic welfare are the name of the game, not appeasing allies and free trade for the sake of free trade.

This means that even allies will be required to treat American exporters fairly, or they'll face tariffs. Trump sees tariffs as a simple and effective tool for changing US trade relations and compensating for any unfair practice against American manufacturers. And how does Trump know there's an unfair practice? Simple – he checks if the US has a trade deficit with the partner country.

For Israel, the immediate implication is that it needs to examine which tariffs and other regulations are applied to imports to the US and contribute to our trade surplus with the Americans. Goodwill gestures, especially in the field of vehicle imports and agricultural produce, can put Israel on the right side of the American trade war.

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Here's something strange – despite all the drama in the Middle East, oil prices haven't crossed the $90 per barrel threshold.

Strange, isn't it? Logically, when the region supplying about a third of global oil is in turmoil, prices should surge. Yet here we are in early 2025, with oil prices lazily hovering around $65-70 per barrel. Behind this phenomenon stands a triangle of forces reshaping the energy market in a completely different way than we've known before.

At the first vertex is Saudi Arabia. The kingdom that ruled the global oil market with an iron hand for decades finds itself in a complex position. The economic data isn't good – the budget deficit reached 3% of GDP in 2024 (about $30.8 billion), following a 1.2% deficit in 2023 (and after an exceptional budget surplus of 2.5% in 2022 – a year of particularly high oil prices). Expectations for the next decade are that the deficit will remain around the same level, about 3% annually.

The chronic deficit isn't accidental. Saudi Arabia is in the midst of Mohammed bin Salman's ambitious Vision 2030, designed to reduce the kingdom's dependence on oil. But the many projects included in the vision require high oil prices to finance themselves. All the innovative cities and real estate ventures require funding in the hundreds of billions of dollars. According to International Monetary Fund estimates, the Saudis need to sell their oil at a price of $80-88 per barrel to balance their budget – some estimates are even higher, up to $96.2 per barrel. The Saudis would be happy to raise the price. But they have a problem – the redhead in the White House.

At the second vertex stands the United States under Donald Trump's leadership. American policy is clear – "America First" in energy, with aspirations for global dominance in the field. But a deeper look reveals an interesting paradox. On one hand, Trump declares support for the American energy industry, but on the other hand, he consistently works to lower oil prices – for example by pressuring OPEC to increase production.

Energy Secretary Chris Wright has articulated the approach well – "More energy at lower prices." However, the American industry, particularly shale producers, needs prices higher than $60 per barrel to operate profitably. Below $50, production is expected to shrink sharply. The administration is also taking steps that further challenge the industry – 25% tariffs on steel imports, which is an essential raw material for drilling, and cuts in federal personnel responsible for approving new drilling.

At the third, most surprising vertex, stands Iran. Despite international sanctions, Iran continues to export oil, mainly to China. It does so at a significant discount of $10-15 per barrel relative to market prices. This is not an ideal compromise for the Iranians – to balance their budget they need a price of $124 per barrel, an imaginary level in the current reality. Nevertheless, this arrangement allows Iran to remain relevant in the market and channel revenue into the state budget.

Around the Triangle

The implication of this triangle is the creation of a "cage" for oil prices – they can fall or rise within a relatively limited range, unless there is a dramatic change – for example, an Iranian attack against Saudi Arabia, or a collapse of the shale oil industry in the US. Trump's pressure to lower prices, along with the cheaper Iranian option and a slowdown in Chinese demand growth, offset the geopolitical pressures to raise prices.

On the periphery of the triangle is China, the world's largest energy consumer. China is suffering from an economic slowdown, leading to more moderate energy demand, and lower demand means lower prices. China also leverages its position to pressure its suppliers – it buys Iranian oil at a discount, negotiates with the Saudis, and responds to American tariffs by imposing counter-tariffs on American natural gas.

What does this mean for Israel? As an energy importer that also has gas export potential, Israel is affected by both trends. On one hand, low energy prices hurt the profitability of Israeli gas fields and the viability of export agreements. On the other hand, industry and consumers benefit from energy at a low price. Perhaps it's time for the Israeli government to also invest in a blue-and-white energy industry by removing regulatory barriers?

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For us, America is like a "friendly giant", a large, distant nation that has always come to Israel's aid. "Always" is, of course, a relative term. In Israel's early years, Washington was cool, even hostile, toward us, going so far as to impose an arms embargo. The special relationship between the two countries did not emerge in 1948.

Nevertheless, the US today is undoubtedly seen as a friendly superpower, perhaps Israel's only true ally in the world. But that positive impression could quickly fade if the US were to become our new neighbor. Just ask Mexico, Colombia, Cuba, or Panama: for them, the giant remains a giant, but a far less friendly one. In its own backyard, the US has often been aggressive, heavy-handed, and willing to redraw the borders of neighboring states to serve its own interests. The US-Mexico War, the invasion of Panama, and Panama's separation from Colombia are all examples of American behavior toward its close neighbors.

Is this just a coincidence? A shared border inevitably leads to friction. Issues such as resource management, migration, crime, trade, air pollution, and, of course, military build-up all become points of contention between neighboring states. Special frameworks and initiatives are needed to minimize the unavoidable friction. The European Union is one such attempt; the federal structure of the US itself is another example. Without mechanisms like these, states frequently clash, often resorting to force to resolve disputes on their own terms. Today, we see how the Trump administration uses tariffs as leverage against Canada and Mexico to shape border policies.

When reconstruction fails

Given this, enthusiasm for US control over Gaza, or the dismissive attitude of "what's the worst that could happen?", is misguided. If the US were to become our neighbor, we would suddenly be sharing a border with the world's most powerful nation. Issues that currently do not concern us at all would become major challenges, and the US would leverage its power to pressure Israel into compliance.

Take a simple example: imagine that the US does take control of Gaza. Does that control extend to the territorial and economic waters off the Strip? Trump is well aware that the eastern Mediterranean is home to vast gas fields. What will the Israeli government do when a US president wants to negotiate the maritime boundary between Gaza and Israel?

Or consider another entirely plausible scenario: Gaza's reconstruction stalls due to a lack of funding. The US, stuck with a devastated territory, decides to sell it. Instead of continuing to manage the area, it looks for a Middle Eastern country to take responsibility. Who would compete for the opportunity? Three likely candidates come to mind: Qatar, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia. Israel would certainly protest if the Strip were handed over to Qatari or Turkish control, but it would have no power to prevent such a move.

Gaza could also become a new weak point along Israel's southern border. Imagine that four or eight years from now, a Democratic administration takes office in Washington. The new leadership decides to loosen border controls between Gaza and Egypt, arguing that those seeking entry are primarily Palestinians returning to their homes. Soon, terrorists, criminals, and migrants start pouring into the Strip, looking for ways to bypass the fence and enter Israel. Jerusalem, of course, would protest, but the White House would gently remind us that this is an "internal American matter" and that Israel has no place interfering. In any case, domestic politics (Congress) would prevent the White House from adopting a stricter policy. Then what?

Despite Trump's good intentions to resolve the conflict, the only entity that should control Gaza is Israel. One could debate the possibility of Israel maintaining security control over the Strip while a local body, perhaps with international support, manages civilian affairs. That, is a discussion worth having. But relinquishing control over a strategically vital region, even to our closest ally across the ocean? That would be a mistake.

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Every day, undersea communication cables carry approximately $10 trillion worth of financial transactions worldwide. Every video call with family abroad, every bank transfer, and every streaming session depends on this extensive network of cables lying on the ocean floor. Damage to this network could cripple entire nations. In Lithuania, for example, internet capacity dropped by about one-third after the cables were sabotaged.

These undersea systems aren't just about data. The Baltic seabed hosts a complex network of energy infrastructure, including the Balticconnector gas pipeline between Finland and Estonia, the Baltic Pipe transporting gas from the North Sea via Denmark to Poland, and the NordBalt and Estlink power cables connecting Sweden and Finland to the Baltic states. These systems are critical to European efforts to reduce reliance on Russian energy, enabling Finland to link to the European power grid and allowing Norway's natural gas to flow to the continent. Any damage to this infrastructure would send shockwaves across Europe.

The threats to undersea systems are varied and sophisticated. In 2022, explosions destroyed the Nord Stream gas pipelines between Germany and Russia, with evidence pointing to deliberate sabotage, including traces of explosives. Other methods include anchor dragging, as seen in the recent Baltic incident, or deploying divers from submarines for sabotage missions — a notable threat from Russia. Even nature poses risks: in 2006, an earthquake in Taiwan damaged several communication cables, significantly reducing internet capacity across East Asia. Repairs took nearly two months.

An increasing number of nations view the undersea domain as both a battlefield and a critical area requiring protection. Yet safeguarding these systems presents unprecedented technological challenges. How can infrastructure located kilometers beneath the sea be monitored continuously? And when threats are detected, how can they be addressed swiftly and effectively?

Countries are exploring various solutions to these challenges. The UK recently invested in a specialized vessel equipped with advanced monitoring systems, including autonomous tools to oversee its communication, gas, and oil pipelines. NATO is driving innovation in sensor technology and unmanned vessels to enhance the detection of suspicious activity. Meanwhile, the US is developing solar-powered unmanned submarines to patrol strategic areas in East Asia and other key regions.

As time goes on, the importance of the undersea will only grow. Ambitious plans for intercontinental power cables, underwater mining, and the expansion of the global communication network will make protecting this infrastructure even more crucial. Israel, for example, is eyeing a connection to Europe through a submarine power cable.

The struggle for dominance in under the sea will remain one of the great challenges of this century, even if much of the public remains unaware of the battle unfolding beneath the waves.

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The Assad regime's collapse signifies more than the fall of another Middle Eastern dictator – it reveals the limits of Russian military capability in the wake of the Ukraine invasion. Assad's devastating failure stems from his greatest former asset: Russian support. During the civil war, Assad grew entirely dependent on Russian military backing. While Russia's 2015 intervention saved his regime, it also created an unsustainable reliance. When Russia began withdrawing forces from Syria in 2022 to support its Ukraine campaign, Assad's vulnerability became apparent.

Aleppo's fall perfectly demonstrates this shift. Once a symbol of Assad's triumph after its 2016 recapture with Russian air support, the city fell to rebels in mere days. With Russian forces largely redeployed to Ukraine, the crucial air and intelligence support that once protected the city vanished. Furthermore, Syria's military, despite Russian-led modernization efforts, proved unable to operate effectively without Russian backing.

For Moscow, the Syrian intervention represented more than supporting an ally – it demonstrated Russia's return to great power status. The ability to intervene successfully far beyond its borders and maintain an ally's regime exemplified this power. Russian bases in Syria provided strategic Mediterranean assets, enabling regional influence and crisis intervention. The campaign also showcased Russian military technology, boosting arms exports.

The Ukraine conflict, however, revealed Russian military limitations. Maintaining simultaneous operations in Syria and Ukraine – first in eastern Ukraine in 2015, then in the full-scale invasion of 2022 – proved beyond Moscow's capabilities. Transferring air assets, defense systems, and special forces to Ukraine significantly reduced Russia's presence in Syria. Moscow's strategists apparently miscalculated, expecting Syria to remain a low-intensity conflict requiring minimal forces.

This new reality forces Russia to reassess its strategy. The priority now is negotiating with rebels to maintain strategic assets, particularly the Khmeimim Air Base and Tartus Naval Base. This necessitates establishing diplomatic channels with Syria's new power brokers.

A new chapter? 

Could Assad's fall mark the end of Russian influence in Syria? Not necessarily. Despite bombing rebels for nine years, Russia might adapt to new realities. With Hayat Tahrir al-Sham controlling Damascus and seeking governmental legitimacy, Russia could offer three key benefits: international recognition, counterbalance to Turkish influence, and military support – using the same assets previously deployed against them.

While Russia's global influence has diminished, its permanent Security Council seat and diplomatic leverage across Central Asia, the Middle East, and Africa remain valuable. For Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, seeking international legitimacy and facing potential challenges from rival groups, Russian recognition could prove crucial.

A Russian partnership could also help balance Hayat Tahrir al-Sham's relationship with Turkey. Rather than depending on a single foreign supporter, they could leverage both powers' interests. Russia's demands might prove lighter than Turkey's, focusing primarily on maintaining influence rather than broader regional objectives.

Moreover, Russia retains significant military assets in Syria. It can provide air support, special forces expertise, military training, and intelligence capabilities. For Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, rebuilding military forces to counter other rebel groups, Russian support could prove invaluable – with Moscow asking only to maintain its Syrian bases in return. Thus, despite visible evacuations from Russian facilities in Latakia, Moscow's role in Syria may be evolving rather than ending.

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The Arab Spring now feels like a distant memory, a fleeting moment in the complex narrative of Middle Eastern politics. Just 13 years ago, masses stormed capital cities, demanding regime changes with a fervor that occasionally bore fruit. For Turkey, this period was not a seismic event but a pivotal moment of strategic recalibration – transitioning from a friendly foreign policy to an aggressive foreign policy that some would characterize as neo-Ottoman, with the Syrian civil war serving as the catalyst for this fundamental shift.

Prior to the civil war, Ankara embraced a "zero friction" diplomatic strategy, seeking reconciliation with neighboring states, including Syria, and cultivating a reputation for regional diplomacy. The underlying motivation was clear: Turkey aspired to European Union membership, believing that resolving border tensions and maintaining cordial relationships would accelerate its path to full integration.

The Syrian conflict dramatically altered this calculus. Turkey's stance transformed from a potential ally of Assad to a vocal critic calling for regime change. The country began supporting rebel groups, many of which comprised radical jihadi organizations. Only recently has Ankara signaled a willingness to normalize relations with Assad, primarily to facilitate the return of Syrian refugees who sought shelter within Turkish borders. Now, Turkey will no longer have to swallow the bitter pill of normalizing the Assad regime.

Analysts offer varied interpretations of this strategic pivot. Some argue it stems from Turkey's disillusionment with EU membership prospects, prompting a reevaluation of its regional engagement. Others perceive a deeper ideological motivation: Erdogan's recognition of a fundamental transformation in Middle Eastern geopolitics, where political Islam was supplanting the secular, Western-aligned regimes that had dominated the region for decades.

Assad's fall presents a complex landscape of opportunities and challenges for Turkey. On the positive side, it delivers a significant blow to Russia and Iran, at least in the short to medium term. The Russian military withdrawal from Syria and Iran's loss of a critical strategic node in its resistance axis represent substantial geopolitical shifts. Turkey's southern border will be freed from Russian military presence, and Moscow's global power projection capabilities will be considerably diminished.

The potential weakening of the Iranian axis could open new strategic avenues for Turkey in Iraq and Lebanon. With established relationships with Kurdish groups in northern Iraq and occasional strategic interests in Lebanon, Turkey could leverage this changing dynamic to expand its regional influence. The potential empowerment of Sunni actors could provide Turkey with additional leverage against pro-Shiite militias and organizations like Hezbollah.

However, Turkey must navigate this fluid landscape with exceptional strategic nuance. The rebels' victory is not exclusively a Turkish achievement. Ankara's control over rebel factions remains limited, particularly beyond the Syrian National Army in northern Syria. The relationship with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, the group that seized Damascus under Abu Mohammad al-Julani's leadership, remains ambiguous and potentially volatile.

Ankara finds itself in a highly fluid situation. The rebels have gained strength, the Assad regime has collapsed, and traditional regional powers like Russia and Iran have retreated. The established order has disintegrated, leaving a complex power vacuum. While this previous order may not have optimally served Turkish interests, it at least provided a measure of predictability.

Erdogan is unlikely to adopt a passive stance. He will almost certainly seek to actively shape Syria's future, potentially through a military operation in the north designed to push Kurdish forces away from the Turkish border or by bolstering the Syrian National Army to secure Turkey's strategic interests.

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The biblical notion that Israel is "a nation that dwells alone" neither reflects reality nor serves as an ideal for the Jewish state. As Israel faces mounting international pressure and political challenges, it's worth highlighting our allies around the world. These leaders and groups support Israel and the Jewish people not merely out of aligned interests, but primarily due to shared fundamental values. Here's a selective overview of Israel's key supporters.

Prime Minister of Hungary Viktor Orban

While the Israeli-Hungarian relationship draws criticism both domestically and internationally, Orban's leadership presents a unique dynamic. He positions himself as an illiberal conservative leader, defining Hungary as an "illiberal Christian democratic state." Though his efforts to strengthen his political position often face accusations of being anti-democratic, his party has consistently secured more than two-thirds of parliamentary seats since 2010. Orban stands out as one of Israel's strongest European allies, viewing it as a conservative nation that successfully balances modernization with tradition.

Like other right-wing world leaders, Orban's position is expected to strengthen in the coming months with President-elect Donald Trump's return to the White House. He might become a key asset for the European Union: Brussels fears not only Trump's potential NATO withdrawal or ending military aid to Ukraine but also a new US-Europe trade war. This suggests his influence in Europe will likely grow in the coming years.

Dutch Coalition leader Geert Wilders

A staunch Israel supporter and committed Zionist, Wilders leads the largest parliamentary party and heads the coalition in the Netherlands (though not as prime minister). After years of warning about unchecked Islamic immigration, the Netherlands under his leadership now focuses on ensuring proper immigrant integration while stopping illegal entry. Despite not holding the highest office, Wilders remains a pivotal voice in European conservative politics.

The Evangelicals

Evangelical support for Israel represents a unique phenomenon in international relations. This global movement encompasses hundreds of millions of Christian believers, primarily Protestants, with its strongest presence in North and South America and growing influence in Africa. These believers consider their support for Israel and the Jewish people in their ancestral homeland both a religious obligation and moral imperative. Many view Israel's establishment and growth as the fulfillment of biblical prophecy. In the USA, evangelical organizations maintain powerful lobbying efforts in Washington, generating substantial political and public backing for Israel.

Their political influence in American politics cannot be overstated. Tens of millions of evangelical Americans form a crucial component of the Republican Party's base, directly influencing US foreign policy through their unwavering support for Israel. Their above-average political engagement further amplifies their impact. The movement's expansion into sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America represents a significant strategic advantage for Israel.

Czech Republic

The Czech Republic stands among Israel's most reliable European allies, with ties extending far beyond conventional diplomacy. This support runs deep in Czech history, from its first President Tomáš Masaryk's era, through its crucial support during Israel's War of Independence, and continuing to the present day. Current Prime Minister Petr Fiala maintains this tradition, recently condemning the International Criminal Court's decision to issue arrest warrants for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, and rejecting comparisons between democratically elected leaders and Hamas terrorists.

Today, the Czech Republic spearheads European support for Ukraine, largely through its sophisticated arms industry, maintained even during the post-Soviet era. As Europe increasingly seeks military independence from the USA – both by choice and necessity – the Czech Republic's role grows more crucial. With its ongoing military modernization and focus on technological innovation for economic growth, the Czech Republic offers potential not just as an ideological ally but as a strategic partner.

President of Argentina Javier Milei

Milei's support for Israel and appreciation of Jewish culture has become remarkable. Beyond mere political backing, he demonstrates genuine enthusiasm for Judaism, regularly citing biblical passages. At his foreign minister's recent swearing-in ceremony, he discussed the weekly Torah portion of Lech Lecha ("Go Forth", Genesis 12:1)  – a level of engagement with Jewish tradition that surpasses many Israeli leaders. Notably, Milei maintains close ties with Trump.

As an economics professor leading Argentina, Milei is steadily stabilizing the nation's economy, opening new possibilities for the South American powerhouse. Argentina's abundant natural resources, fertile lands, and developing shale oil industry are attracting investment under the more stable economic environment he's creating. A resurgent Argentina as a major South American economic hub appears increasingly possible. For Israel, this presents opportunities for industrial collaboration and potential access to vital resources including wheat, grains, and possibly oil.

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Bashar al-Assad is a mass murderer who was willing to kill his own people to cling to power. Now, it seems that such brutality is paying off. Assad, and Syria in general, have undergone a process of normalization in recent years, returning to the fold of Arab nations. This effort is being led by key Arab states such as the UAE and Saudi Arabia, which once condemned Assad for massacring Sunni populations. But in the Middle East, even genocide doesn't stand in the way of self-interest.

Who are the parties looking to renew relations with Syria? And where does Israel fit into this web of interests?

The UAE

For half a decade, the UAE has been working to rehabilitate Assad's regime. Its decision to normalize relations with Syria stems from pragmatic calculations, primarily the recognition that Assad is not going anywhere. The UAE understands that while the civil war has subsided—if not fully ended—Assad remains Syria's ruler for the foreseeable future. Consequently, it is pursuing deeper economic and political ties with Damascus.

Iran

Iran has supported Assad since the beginning of the civil war, deploying countless volunteers, including Hezbollah fighters from Lebanon, to help him fight off rebels. Iran has also heavily invested in Syria's civilian and military infrastructure, aiming to increase Syria's dependence on Tehran and expand its military influence in the region.

Syria is a crucial link in the Iran-Iraq-Syria-Lebanon axis, which gives Tehran a foothold on Israel's border. If Syria were to leave Iran's sphere of influence, it would hinder Iran's ability to support Hezbollah in Lebanon and reduce its threat to Jordan. Iran's early support for Assad has earned his loyalty: Assad knows no one else helped him during his darkest moments. While much of the region sought to bury him, Iran came to his rescue.

Saudi Arabia

During the civil war, Saudi Arabia backed the rebels. But today, the kingdom is willing to normalize ties with Assad for a surprising reason: the rampant drug trade plaguing its territory. Syria is a major source of Captagon, an addictive and harmful drug flooding the Gulf states.

Saudi Arabia recognizes that combating this crisis requires cooperation from the Assad regime, which it may incentivize with investments in Syria's infrastructure and economy. Additionally, Saudi Arabia has a strategic interest in distancing Syria from Iran, which would weaken Tehran's influence in the region.

Russia

From the outset, Russian President Vladimir Putin supported Assad to preserve Russia's military assets in Syria, including its only Mediterranean naval base. This intervention also served as a way to bolster Russia's regional influence.

Today, Russia continues to view its relationship with Assad through the lens of strategic advantage. For example, reports suggest that Israel wants Russia involved in any settlement in Lebanon, highlighting how Moscow's support for Assad opens new channels of influence.

For Israel, this dynamic predates the Lebanon conflict. Russia's involvement in Syria's civil war forced Israel to maintain dialogue with Moscow to secure operational freedom against Iranian activities in Syria.

Israel

Israel faces a strategic dilemma regarding Assad. On one hand, the border with Syria is arguably quieter than ever in Israel's history. On the other, Syria is a key conduit for Iranian arms transfers to Hezbollah. Israel wants to weaken the Syria-Iran connection or, at the very least, push Assad to halt these weapons shipments.

Achieving this would require military pressure on Syria, which risks escalating into a broader conflict and could even lead to a direct confrontation between Israel and Russia.

What is more important—maintaining calm along the Syrian border, or inflicting long-term damage on Hezbollah? Israel seems to be trying to resolve this dilemma by leveraging Russia to pressure Assad to stop the arms transfers while applying military pressure below the escalation threshold.

But how realistic is it to expect Russia or Syria to curb the flow of weapons? Would Russia strike Iranian arms convoys? Would Assad's army confront its Iranian allies? It's unlikely. Without a willingness to escalate on the Syrian front, Israel's ability to disrupt arms smuggling remains limited.

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Biological systems respond to stress through overcompensation. Take muscle building, for example: intense effort damages the muscle, but afterward it rebuilds itself. The muscle doesn't just return to its original strength – it grows even stronger. It "assumes" that the stress it endured wasn't the maximum it will face in the future, so it "prepares" by growing larger. Our bones respond similarly.

Israel's dependence on the United States has grown increasingly severe this year, to the point where it undermines our autonomy. The Swords of Iron War isn't the first time Israel has relied on American support, but this time the dependency was so profound that every Israeli move required prior approval from the White House.

It felt as if the War Cabinet wasn't the only one managing the campaign – Secretary of State Antony Blinken and President Joe Biden were too. This isn't a criticism of the administration: it's only natural for a country to leverage its influence over both adversaries and allies alike. The Biden administration was actually relatively "gentle" in wielding its leverage compared to what it could have done.

Now Israel might get some relief. Many expect the incoming Trump administration to be very supportive of Israel, certainly more so than a Harris administration might have been. At the very least, we can expect pressure to be applied to Iran and the Palestinians, not just to us. There's hope that the new administration will also be willing to use force in response to threats to American interests, such as the Houthi threat in the Red Sea or Iranian attacks against Israel.

But Israel must not forget these "lean years" because of the four potentially prosperous years ahead – if they indeed turn out to be prosperous. The military and diplomatic dependence on the US that has developed is unconscionable. It's almost an existential threat. Israel cannot secure its future without strategic autonomy, even from its closest ally. David Ben-Gurion knew this, and we must return to implementing his principle: Israel will defend itself by itself.

Israel needs a strategy to maximize the Trump period in a way that will better prepare it for the next president. The next president might be pro-Israel, or not. But we cannot afford to wait passively until then. Israel needs a strategy similar to that of Joseph in Egypt: using the years of plenty to prepare for the years of famine. It must create, renew, and strengthen power sources under its control to reduce dependence on the US. This isn't a call to "disconnect" from Washington, but to balance the relationship. Israel will regain its autonomy.

How do we achieve this? Several ideas come to mind. For example, preparing the IDF and defense establishment for the end of American military aid. Israel should work to stop receiving aid grants and instead transition to joint development of combat systems and weapons, similar to the Iron Dome and Arrow missile projects. This way both sides benefit, but the dependency becomes mutual rather than one-sided.

The same trend of reducing Israeli dependence on America can be achieved by strengthening ties with similar countries – democracies under real threats that need to build their military capabilities, like Israel. Ukraine, Taiwan, Poland, South Korea, Japan – all face threats, some nuclear. Israel should focus on developing strategic alliances with threatened nations through weapons development projects, ammunition production, investments, coordination, and mutual support in international forums.

The Trump administration will likely view these steps positively, as they would reduce the foreign aid Washington distributes globally. It might even help Israel forge these new alliances. Israel must take advantage of this. The years of plenty have arrived: now is the time to prepare.

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Welcome, President Harris. You have a full agenda, but the Middle East might demand your immediate focus.

Here's a key piece of advice: don't listen to your advisors. It's likely that at the top of your shortlist for National Security Advisor is Philip Gordon, your current advisor. Gordon is an experienced, practical figure with a PhD in international relations and over a decade of Middle East involvement. He has proven experience in strategizing, coordinating, and executing policy. The problem is, Dr. Gordon might end up destabilizing the Middle East.

The Iranians want a new nuclear deal, much like the one Dr. Gordon helped craft in 2015. At first glance, such an agreement seems like just what the region needs: it would halt Iran's march towards a nuclear bomb and allow the U.S. to pivot towards East Asia and China. However, this kind of deal could actually worsen the situation, for two main reasons.

The first reason is that easing sanctions on Iran would give it new resources to bolster its proxy organizations across the Middle East. An Iranian proxy, Hamas, triggered the current crisis. There's no guarantee that Iran would exercise better control over other proxies, like the Houthis or even Hezbollah. If you ease the pressure on Tehran, sooner or later the region will ignite again.

The second reason is Israel's response to such an agreement. It's no secret that the Israeli right-wing isn't thrilled about your election. In government corridors, they likely view you as a strategic challenge, if not a disaster. A new nuclear deal might push Israel to conclude that they're out of options and have no choice but to strike Iran's nuclear facilities to prevent it from obtaining a bomb. If the Israeli government expects hostility from you, it might assume it has nothing to lose and that time is not on its side.

What should you do? The fact that the Iranians want a nuclear deal indicates that sanctions are affecting them. Allowing Iran to maintain its status as a nuclear threshold state while granting sanctions relief would not only enable it to further enhance its nuclear capabilities but also grant it more resources to do so. Dr. Gordon and many within the Democratic establishment will argue that this is the only way to prevent an Iranian bomb and stabilize the Middle East. When Israel responds militarily and Iran destabilizes the region, these same advisors will recommend trying to prevent escalation, continuing the very failed strategy tried thus far. The end result would be that your administration could face four years of regional war in the Middle East.

Instead, it's better to increase economic pressure on Iran and restore Israel's confidence. Accelerate the supply of essential weapons to Israel, while clarifying to Tehran that any deal must include a significant reduction in its nuclear capabilities. A firm approach is the only way to avoid further deterioration.

Welcome back, President Trump. I know, you don't really want to deal with the Middle East. But it seems you don't have a choice.

The Middle East isn't just hanging by a thread—it's teetering on the edge. Iran and Israel are openly trading blows, and a regional conflict is underway, even if the previous Biden administration hasn't yet acknowledged it as such. The question is how you can stop or contain the descent into chaos. To succeed, you should understand what each of the main players in this drama—Iran and Israel—want from you.

Here's how it breaks down: The Iranians are actually the simpler side to understand. They can be divided into two camps. The first camp, led by Iranian President Massoud Pazhekian, wants a nuclear deal. He wants sanctions relief and is willing to limit Iran's nuclear activity to achieve it. He won't fully give up Iran's nuclear program, but why not see how far he's willing to go for some sanctions relief?

The second camp, composed of Revolutionary Guard members and radical conservatives, wants the U.S. out of the region and is prepared to use military force to make it happen—not directly, of course, but through proxies in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. We know that you don't think the U.S. should remain in these countries, but if American troops are there, you certainly don't want them under fire.

The two camps aren't necessarily at odds with each other. The Iranians might believe that escalating military pressure will lead you to be more flexible in negotiating a new deal. They're shrewd negotiators, and they won't enter talks without trying to apply leverage on you. You can expect their proxy activity to increase in 2025, even as they pursue a diplomatic track to secure an agreement. The question is, what will you do?

One approach is to ramp up sanctions as much as possible and force the Iranians to concede more and more until they satisfy your demands. But economic pressure will lead Iran to escalate militarily, just as they did in the summer of 2019. In that scenario, you'll need to decide whether to divert expensive military resources to the Middle East, instead of Europe or East Asia. If you're not careful, you might get drawn into a war in the region.

Here, Israel could be useful, but you'll need to clarify a few things to the Israelis. Prime Minister Netanyahu and his cabinet will likely want the U.S. to act directly against Iran. You don't want that, and you have no interest in being drawn into yet another endless war in the Middle East. It would be wise to be honest with the Israelis from the start: there won't be an American strike on Iran. But there will be strong American backing for Israel to act against Iran and its proxies.

What you'll want to do is flood America's allies in the region with American-made weaponry: bunker-busting bombs for Israel, advanced jets for the Emirates, and precision weaponry for the Saudis. This would enable them to deter Tehran and, if necessary, confront it themselves. Coupled with economic pressure on Iran, you'd have a strategy: pressure Iran into concessions while trying to maintain stability in the Middle East. And remember, stability in this region is always a relative concept.

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