The Arab Spring now feels like a distant memory, a fleeting moment in the complex narrative of Middle Eastern politics. Just 13 years ago, masses stormed capital cities, demanding regime changes with a fervor that occasionally bore fruit. For Turkey, this period was not a seismic event but a pivotal moment of strategic recalibration – transitioning from a friendly foreign policy to an aggressive foreign policy that some would characterize as neo-Ottoman, with the Syrian civil war serving as the catalyst for this fundamental shift.
Prior to the civil war, Ankara embraced a "zero friction" diplomatic strategy, seeking reconciliation with neighboring states, including Syria, and cultivating a reputation for regional diplomacy. The underlying motivation was clear: Turkey aspired to European Union membership, believing that resolving border tensions and maintaining cordial relationships would accelerate its path to full integration.
The Syrian conflict dramatically altered this calculus. Turkey's stance transformed from a potential ally of Assad to a vocal critic calling for regime change. The country began supporting rebel groups, many of which comprised radical jihadi organizations. Only recently has Ankara signaled a willingness to normalize relations with Assad, primarily to facilitate the return of Syrian refugees who sought shelter within Turkish borders. Now, Turkey will no longer have to swallow the bitter pill of normalizing the Assad regime.
Analysts offer varied interpretations of this strategic pivot. Some argue it stems from Turkey's disillusionment with EU membership prospects, prompting a reevaluation of its regional engagement. Others perceive a deeper ideological motivation: Erdogan's recognition of a fundamental transformation in Middle Eastern geopolitics, where political Islam was supplanting the secular, Western-aligned regimes that had dominated the region for decades.
Assad's fall presents a complex landscape of opportunities and challenges for Turkey. On the positive side, it delivers a significant blow to Russia and Iran, at least in the short to medium term. The Russian military withdrawal from Syria and Iran's loss of a critical strategic node in its resistance axis represent substantial geopolitical shifts. Turkey's southern border will be freed from Russian military presence, and Moscow's global power projection capabilities will be considerably diminished.
The potential weakening of the Iranian axis could open new strategic avenues for Turkey in Iraq and Lebanon. With established relationships with Kurdish groups in northern Iraq and occasional strategic interests in Lebanon, Turkey could leverage this changing dynamic to expand its regional influence. The potential empowerment of Sunni actors could provide Turkey with additional leverage against pro-Shiite militias and organizations like Hezbollah.
However, Turkey must navigate this fluid landscape with exceptional strategic nuance. The rebels' victory is not exclusively a Turkish achievement. Ankara's control over rebel factions remains limited, particularly beyond the Syrian National Army in northern Syria. The relationship with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, the group that seized Damascus under Abu Mohammad al-Julani's leadership, remains ambiguous and potentially volatile.
Ankara finds itself in a highly fluid situation. The rebels have gained strength, the Assad regime has collapsed, and traditional regional powers like Russia and Iran have retreated. The established order has disintegrated, leaving a complex power vacuum. While this previous order may not have optimally served Turkish interests, it at least provided a measure of predictability.
Erdogan is unlikely to adopt a passive stance. He will almost certainly seek to actively shape Syria's future, potentially through a military operation in the north designed to push Kurdish forces away from the Turkish border or by bolstering the Syrian National Army to secure Turkey's strategic interests.
