The war against Hamas has now reached a strategic turning point. It can continue as a long-term war of attrition to weaken Hamas or it can also provide the platform for a far-reaching regional change. The difference between the two hinges entirely on us.

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The IDF's tactical military gain, even though it has not yet been completed, is creating a strategic opportunity that could pave the way towards an overall regional accord. Heavy hints that have been bandied about recently appear to indicate that a broad regional US initiative is to be proposed to Israel in the near future.

Such an initiative will probably incorporate the following components: a hostage release deal in return for a ceasefire and the release of Palestinian prisoners; Saudi consent to establish diplomatic relations with Israel as part of a peace accord (or normalization); Israeli agreement to the return of the PA (Palestinian Authority) to the Gaza Strip – in some or other format and as a replacement for the current Hamas rule there – and Washington's consent to a US-Saudi defense pact that also includes agreement to a uranium enrichment plant for civilian purposes on Saudi Arabian soil, as well as a large arms package deal.

This, entirely possible deal, poses a severe threat to Iran. A US-Saudi defense pact in tandem with cutting-edge weapon systems for Saudi Arabia, not to mention a Saudi nuclear program, really do constitute a severe threat to Iran. This overall move would also reduce China's influence in the Middle East and renew the US infrastructure alliance initiative from India to the port of Haifa.

For Israel, this in effect represents the end of the Arab–Israeli conflict, gift-wrapped with tremendous economic potential. This also clearly goes beyond the more important fact that all the objectives of the current war would be achieved (a precondition for any such deal is the return of the hostages, that Hamas would cease to rule over the Gaza Strip, while the military threat posed by Hamas will already have been neutralized by the ongoing IDF combat effort there).

The dilemma: a deal or the return of Hamas

One of the most volatile components inherent in such a US initiative, as far as Israel is concerned, is the return of the PA to Gaza and the commitment, however vague, to a two-state solution.

It is important to point out that this goes well beyond a pure political problem. The Israeli public, regardless of its political views, is now extremely bitter and enraged. These feelings have not dissipated despite all the successes on the battlefield and the heavy price that Gaza itself has paid to date. This anger has materialized, among others, in the recently published Channel 12 news outlet opinion poll, in which a large majority of the public is opposed to the continued flow of humanitarian aid into Gaza as long as the Israeli hostages remain captive with Hamas. This is in addition to the extremely uneasy feeling among many in apprehension of a deal that could well include the release of 'heavy' prisoners (those sentenced for murder of Israeli citizens along with figureheads of the Palestinian armed struggle). In summary, there is a clear and understandable lack of desire to gift the Palestinians any such achievement.

After all is said and done, the dilemma still remains between the various options. The current chaos in the Gaza Strip (and avoiding reaching a decision on the above options) will lead to only one outcome – the return of Hamas. As this is an untenable situation and we are not prepared to continue living alongside a Hamas-led government, we must put forward an alternative civilian governmental option in Gaza. Moreover, after it has completed dismantling the remaining Hamas battalions, the IDF will in any event pull out of the Gaza Strip, certainly if a hostage release deal is implemented. A hostage release deal without a regional framework backing it up will leave a Hamas government in place and might even bolster it. This is so as Hamas will be perceived on the Palestinian street as the one organization that has succeeded in embarrassing Israel militarily, it is Hamas that is responsible for distributing food to the Gaza population, and it is Hamas that will have brought about "the restoration of Arab pride" by emptying the prisons in Israel of its Palestinian prisoners.

In summary, in the absence of any viable alternatives, we will effectively be leaving Hamas in power and will be left with the sour taste of frustration at the release of 'heavy' prisoners. Thus, the US initiative is a much better option than a limited deal whose cons far outweigh its pros.

 A war of attrition against Hamas

If so, what can we do with the all-too-familiar Palestinian Authority, an entity that is riddled with problems? The PA is not a pro-Israeli Zionist entity, it suffers from severe problems and it is engaged in an ongoing diplomatic and legal struggle against Israel.  Having said that, it does enable Israel to take responsibility for the security situation in the area. This is the same PA that the Minister of Defense recently defined as an important asset to Israel's national security. Though the minister did say this in the context of Judea and Samaria, it will still be the same authority (potentially an improved one after undergoing certain reforms) that will operate in the Gaza Strip. If it is good enough for Judea and Samaria then it is apparently preferable to having Hamas rule in Gaza.

If Israel decides to turn down the US initiative and to continue with the military effort as its singular course of action, then it would have to opt for imposing military rule in the Gaza Strip. This is a much more favorable situation than the chaos that would ensue following the return of Hamas to rule the roost in the Gaza Strip.

The clear implication of martial law in the Gaza Strip is the permanent presence of IDF brigades there. This would require a tremendous number of forces to maintain military rule over a long period of time. It has underlying disadvantages in terms of the international community and ramifications on the degree of US support for the war effort. It will have a substantial impact on the Israeli economy as a result of the extended recruitment of reservists, while the constant friction with the local Palestinian population will also have an effect.

This situation is clearly not desirable and it goes against the Israeli government's policy to date. But if this alternative is to be seriously considered, the debate on the "day after" is now more pressing than ever, as such an eventuality would require adaptations to be made to the new situation right now.

If military rule is out of the question, and we do not agree to the US initiative, then in practice we will be responsible for leading the country towards a diplomatic defeat. Though we might continue to win tactical battles, it won't take long for us to become bogged down in a never-ending war of attrition against Hamas. The US initiative will begin to fade once summer arrives, as the US presidential campaign moves into top gear, and if another US president is then elected and the new administration enters office, there will be no guarantee of the initiative's future feasibility or of turning the clock back.

We are now at a critical juncture for making diplomatic decisions with potentially historic consequences. Delaying and procrastinating will only result in us missing what might have been a golden opportunity. It is worthwhile trying to identify that elusive point in time when the military strategy alone reaches the 'point of diminishing returns', and any attempt to extend this effort without an additional supporting framework would lead to failure. Let's hope that our leaders have the sense to identify that tipping point, as it approaches at great speed and will pass us by at great speed too.

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These are difficult days, some of the darkest we have ever known. The coming days will require patience and perseverance – as we bury hundreds of our dead, hear the stories of the Israelis taken captive to Gaza, and deal with the pain of the families, we will have to press on with the fighting, which unfortunately will also exact heavy costs from us.

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The Israeli public needs to understand that we are at the beginning of the event, not at its end; although the opening blow dealt by Hamas, which caught Israel completely by surprise at an intolerable and unimaginable price, another, hard battle lies ahead. We will hit Hamas mercilessly, its leaders, commanders, and operatives are all legitimate targets and deserve to die.

The longstanding perception that Hamas prefers to undermine Judea and Samaria but to keep Gaza quiet has collapsed painfully and tragically. Israel's intelligence failed in a way that will require a thorough investigation in the future, but we do not have the luxury to stop and do this now, there is no such possibility – the continuation of war depends on strong and robust intelligence. I know the commanders; I trust them and I am sure that they will raise their heads and hurt the enemy as only they know how.

All options are on the table

Right now, our blood is boiling. The images of families slaughtered in cold blood, of innocent children, the elderly, women, of dozens of captives, enrage every single one of us. The anger and fury that we feel is felt by our military as well. This rage must now be channeled into exacting an unprecedented price from Hamas.
At the strategic level, three components are required to achieve Israel's goals: bringing an end to and replacing Hamas rule in the Gaza Strip; the destruction of Hamas' military capabilities, which enabled its operation; and creating the conditions to allow the release of the hostages.

The operational alternatives available to achieve these goals slide along a scale that sits between two undesirable options: At one extreme is an operation that ends with a ceasefire with Hamas (which has until now always been the alternative adopted by Israel), but this will not lead to the goal of ending Hamas rule; at the other end – the full occupation and demilitarization of the Gaza Strip – no matter how long it takes – until the destruction of Hamas' military wing. This second option will take a long time and will come with very heavy costs.

Between the two extreme alternatives, there are two intermediate options: a long and massive operation to erode Hamas' capabilities, or a limited ground operation (raids throughout Gaza or an operation to defeat and capture part of the Strip). To be clear, the intermediate alternatives are equally belligerent and aggressive; which method has been adopted should be left purposely vague.

One of Israel's goals in this war is to avoid being dragged into a multi-front war, which could split Israel's focus and attention and weaken its operation against Gaza. Therefore, we need to think about what will happen in the north. Forecasts and assessments are always difficult, and in this war they are impossible because our basic assumptions about Hamas have collapsed, and as a result, we must question all our perceptions.

A few weeks ago, at a conference held by the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) marking the 50th anniversary of the Yom Kippur War, I tried to describe possible misconceptions. One of the examples I presented was the perception that a multi-front war would not develop from a Palestinian conflict, or in other words, that Hezbollah would not sacrifice itself for the Palestinians. What we learned on Saturday was that we need to rethink everything.

Creating a deterrent presence

This war is a Hamas-Palestinian initiative, not an Iranian move. Therefore, it can be assessed (cautiously of course) that Hezbollah will not want to be dragged into the war from a position of disadvantage (without the element of surprise), but there are several factors that could lead it to do so:

Solidarity with Hamas is expressed by symbolic fire by Hezbollah without the intention of entering the campaign, but which may lead to a dynamic of escalation; Israeli fire against Hezbollah in response to Palestinian fire from Lebanon, an event that which is likely to happen; a revenge attack by an Israeli citizen at a holy site, with an emphasis on the Temple Mount; a very unusual Israeli move in Gaza, such as a massive ground maneuver, extraordinary images, etc.

Negative Israeli momentum such as an Israeli failure that weakens our deterrence could also whet the enemy's appetite. We cannot react hysterically to any fire from the north as a multi-front war. Fire from the north is to be expected and we must prepare for this by shoring up our defense massively and creating a constant deterrent presence in the area.

A war for our home

Israel will win this war. It is amazing to see the solidarity shown by Israeli society, the solidarity that we have been missing so much lately. What a pity that we needed a national disaster to recall once again this manifest miracle called the people's army.

Our eyes well up with tears of emotion when we hear about attempts by Israelis stranded abroad to catch the first flight to Israel and volunteer for reserve duty when we see the rush to Magen David Adom stations to donate blood and more.

Much will be said about what we have done to ourselves in recent months, but maybe, just maybe, these terrible days will provide us with a reminder that we have no other army, we have no other people, our enemies are external and not within, and only together will we win.

This is a war for our home, in the full sense of the term, it is a battle for the home front. We will achieve victory only thanks to the very special nature of Israeli society.

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Operation Shield and Arrow was an extremely impressive success from a tactical military point of view. The Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) was dealt a severe drubbing, its senior commanders were taken out, its assets damaged and Israel was not made to pay any diplomatic price in return for the eventual cease-fire. The curtain-raiser to the operation was a precision strike involving a focused targeting effort to eliminate three senior PIJ figures, following a decision not to take immediate 'hot-blooded' action but to wait and then exact a much more painful price, based on precision intelligence information. The ability to successfully target an additional three senior PIJ terrorists later on during the operation was an even more impressive achievement, especially as once they realize they are on the 'wanted list' they evidently tend to go to ground.

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This is down to the remarkable professionalism of the IDF, the Israel Security Agency, better known as Shin Bet and IDF Military Intelligence. Israel also demonstrated tremendous resilience in terms of its defensive capabilities, and the Israeli civilian population displayed notable cohesion throughout the entire period of hostilities. In view of the extremely limited objectives of the operation defined by the defense establishment, this was undoubtedly a great military success. The fire has ceased and peace and quiet have returned, at least temporarily. Though the PIJ's image might have been enhanced among all the various organizations violently opposed to Israel, as is the case with anybody to decides to take up arms against the Jewish state, and the PIJ did succeed in disrupting the life of numerous Israelis, these "achievements" were effectively canceled out by the heavy blows it suffered.

Having said that, nobody should be under any illusions. For years now, the State of Israel has been operating without any clear strategy and vision in relation to the Palestinian theater – in view of the familiar challenges and those waiting on the horizon. It is also important to explain to the public, without mincing words, that in all honesty, this limited round of violence that has just ended will not be the last one. The Gaza issue is far from being solved, Hamas continues to bolster its arsenal, and next time we might well have to confront them rather than their smaller sister organization so that the calm that we have obtained is clearly only a temporary one. During this operation, Israel fought against the weaker terrorist organization among the members of the 'Palestinian resistance front', and Hamas incurred no damage by sitting on the fence, on the contrary, it actually gained in strength as a result of this. In practice, on the strategic level, Operation Shield and Arrow has changed absolutely nothing.

Israel continues to operate without any master plan relating to the Palestinian theater as it refrains from making any clear decision as to where it is headed. One option is to decide that we seek separation from the Palestinian entity. In this case, the Palestinian Authority (PA) and Fatah, despite their numerous drawbacks, are clearly a much preferable option to Hamas (an organization with whom there is absolutely no hope of ever engaging in any diplomatic peace process). On the other hand, another option, which on occasions the policymakers in Israel appear to be proponents of, is that of sitting idly by. This approach involves Israel's continued role as a spectator watching from the sidelines the complete dismantling of the PA (whose great weakness was clearly demonstrated in the current operation as it proved to be completely irrelevant) along with de-facto recognition of Hamas as the sovereign power in the Gaza Strip. Selection of the second option leads to that uneasy feeling among large parts of the Israeli public after each round of violence in the Gaza Strip – if Hamas is a partner, then there is only a limited extent of damage that it can be made to incur, and the desire to preserve it as some form of "go-to" entity to address issues is clear.

The decision not to embroil Hamas in this last round of violence was the correct decision, both tactically and strategically. On the tactical level – Israel focused its opening strike on the PIJ and by doing so it succeeded in attaining its objective. Having Hamas enter the fray would only have considerably extended the fighting for no reason, and without the advantage of taking the initiative, the outcome of the whole effort would most probably have been extremely disappointing. On the strategic level – if Israel seeks to effect a genuine, fundamental change in the Palestinian theater, then it is necessary to plan another operation with a completely different objective, and not to expand a limited operation in the middle of an ongoing military campaign, as a result of being drawn in following either tactical achievements or failures. This could well lead to a dangerous tailspin that could easily get out of control.

The tension is expected to accompany us during the days ahead too, and especially this Thursday, Jerusalem Day. The good news is that the operation has released some of the air out of the balloon on the other side, and there doesn't appear to be a strong desire there for any further destruction or additional targeting of its leaders. On the other hand, Jerusalem Day does tend to serve as one of the most volatile and incendiary catalysts in the Middle East – the religious Palestinian narrative, Jerusalem, the Temple Mount, and the ensuing option of all Israel's enemy theaters joining forces. The policymakers in Israel are charged with the heavy responsibility of acting prudently and with great sensitivity on and around this special day.

It is imperative to prevent any provocations in those locations that are known to be volatile, to avoid, as far as possible, any problematic, inflammatory pictures emerging from the Temple Mount, to bolster the police force, and to carefully coordinate the events with the Jordanian-appointed Waqf (responsible for administration of the Muslim holy sites on the Temple Mount). It's not that we cannot deal with any renewed escalation or a multi-theater incident, but we really have no interest in doing so. Above all – Israel must take the initiative and the pro-active approach and shift it from the tactical military level to the strategic diplomatic plane, so that it will be able to dictate its own fate, from a position of strength rather than merely treading water and being sucked in after a string of random incidents.

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When discussing the best plans of action for dealing with the wave of terrorism, a clear distinction must be made between the method of operation and the goal. In dealing with Palestinian terrorism, we are facing a serious strategic challenge and three major tactical challenges that typify the terrorism that Israel has been experiencing recently. The discussion on a wide-scale military operation obviously deals with tactical challenges, as everyone knows that the political-strategic confrontation cannot be solved by a military operation, like that proposed in northern Samaria.

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The tactical challenges include the targeting of Hamas attacks from abroad and Gaza; youth terrorism (the "Lion's Den" and the like) from frustrated and leaderless Palestinian youngsters, who are fed up with the Palestinian Authority's formal leadership and are looking for a new and violent way to fulfill their nationalism; and the loss of the Palestinian Authority's security control in northern Samaria, with the weakening of its institutions.

An extensive military operation in northern Samaria will not provide a solution to all these challenges. It will not deal with Hamas' meddling from abroad and Gaza. On the contrary, it might worsen the Palestinian Authority's situation by further weakening its security systems (which will improve Hamas' chances of expanding its grip in Samaria).

We must plan the next military operation, and not the previous one; deal with current problems, not those from last year. This means using common sense to make decisions, based on the current situation and guiding the security forces accordingly – even when our blood is boiling after severe terrorist attacks. The attacks should not be directed at those who are the easiest and most convenient targets, but the painful damage should be focused on the major centers of gravity; the perpetrators of the attacks.

Israel must now take the following steps:

1. Continuing activities to counter terror and harming the perpetrators of terrorism – based on pinpointed intelligence, with resolve and while constantly trying to avoid collateral damage.
2. Close cooperation, as much as possible, with the Palestinian Authority against Hamas. Israel is clearly interested in the Palestinian Authority not collapsing – as the alternative is much worse.
3. Regarding Hamas in Gaza – continue exacting a heavy price from terrorist organizations for every breach of sovereignty and the use of steep-trajectory projectiles.
4. Faced with Hamas activity in Lebanon and Syria – Israel must think "out of the box" and maintain confidentiality.
5. In dealing with Hezbollah and Nasrallah who are trying to connect the theaters – Israel must act in a way that will surpass their expectations and surprise them. This was not done after the last round of firing from Lebanon, which apparently Hezbollah is not responsible for, but it most likely approved the settings that made it possible.

Faced with external challenges that have not lessened in recent months, Israeli society requires sophistication, responsibility, and a broad consensus. The basic condition for all of this, before all others, is the restoration of social unity and the cessation of self-inflicted wounds that we are perpetuating with the continuation of the endless focus on judicial reform. Now is the time for compromise and the fusion of rifts that will allow us to focus on our enemies, who are currently watching from the sidelines and rubbing their hands together with glee.

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For the first time since the Institute for National Security Studies started publishing its annual INSS 2022 Strategic Survey, the special and strategic relationship with the US features as the most critical challenge for Israel.

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This relationship is key for Israel's security doctrine. Some voices want to cast doubt as to Israel's dependency on its ties with America, suggesting it should explore various alternatives. But the INSS has made it clear: There is no substitute for the US, not in terms of security nor in diplomatic backing. Likewise, no one can replace the US when it comes to the shared values of the two countries. 

However, the increased radicalization on both sides of the divide in the US has resulted in the erosion of the constellation that supports Israel. The progressive camp's grip on the younger generation – through its delegitimization of Israel and Zionism – and rising antisemitism and racism threaten Israel's status. 

Moreover, moves carried out by Israel's government in a way that would come off as threatening the country's democratic character, or altering Israel's relations with the Palestinians and lack of solidarity with the  US and the West in the competition with China and Russia, could further hurt Israel's position.

Israel begins 2023 as a strong military power with a robust international standing, but many of the security challenges are expected to become even more pronounced as the year progresses. Iran is only a small step away from becoming a nuclear threshold state and its nuclear program has reached its most advanced and dangerous state ever. Iran is also accumulating massive amounts of conventional weapons, and its stand alongside Russia in Ukraine has given it a safety net of sorts against Western sanctions. 

Meanwhile, in the Palestinian theater, Israel appears to be headed toward a perfect storm. The volatile nature of this arena has been highest in recent months compared to other locations. The internal strife within the Palestinians will only exacerbate as both sides gear up for the post-Mahmoud Abbas era. 

The threat of a flare-up in response to Israeli action and internal discontent still exists and is getting more pronounced. We have already seen this play out in the aftermath of recent Israeli action in Jenin and Nablus, where every counterterrorism operation is like a scene from a war. 

The Palestinian efforts to hurt Israel on the world stage will get worse as the PA tries to delegitimize Israel's activity and its right to self-defense. On the northern arena, Israel should reevaluate whether its original goals of the "war between wars" are relevant to the changing dynamics. 

The strategic survey submitted by INSS to the president does not ignore the fact that the worsening internal polarization within Israel could impact overall security. This polarization threatens to undermine Israeli stamina, which is critical for national security. This issue will likely cause heads of Israel's defense establishment to lose sleep. The IDF, after all, is a reflection of Israeli society – any controversy within civilian life is bound to seep into the military as well. The minister of defense and the chief of staff will have to ensure the military remains isolated from politics, but this will not be an easy feat. 

The way to deal with those threats is through an alliance with the US. It doesn't mean that Israel will not be able to go solo when there is a need to do so, but this special relationship amplifies Israel's strengths manyfold. 

Israel needs its most important friend, just like in the past, and perhaps even more so now.

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The world is now at a crossroads that will determine whether Iran becomes a nuclear state. 

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Just last week I wrote that the 2015 nuclear deal is all but dead. It is still in purgatory because as far as Europe is concerned, it is still in force despite the US pulling out in 2018 under then-President Donald Trump, and despite Iran subsequently breaching its clauses. 

The 2023 intelligence estimate recently produced by IDF Intelligence Directorate, which was revealed in Israel Hayom last week, shows that there is great concern over Iran's progress toward a bomb – and rightly so.

Iran is a nuclear-threshold state for all intents and purposes and currently, there is no enforcement mechanism that would be able to stop it from reaching the status of a nuclear state. Thus, inaction is the worst course of action 

But what are the options at hand? There are three possible paths one could pursue to stop Iran's nuclear program. The first – forcing Iran to halt its progress by having it face massive economic pressure and the threat of a military strike. Such a scenario is unlikely because Iran has long realized that giving up capabilities comes with a risky price, as Ukraine and Libya realized after they forfeited their nuclear know-how or arsenal. For Iran, this steep price is something it wants to avoid. 

The second option is launching an attack on Iran. While such a move is feasible and would likely be successful, it could also ignite a regional war and could result in Iran shifting its strategy from that of a threshold state to a country with nuclear deterrence. In other words, this option would only make Iran's nuclear program pick up pace. 

Finally, the third option is to try to reach a new nuclear deal after the current one is declared officially dead. Such a deal would have to impose verifiable restrictions on Iran in a way that would deny it a military nuclear program in exchange for sanction relief. 

The question we have to ask is whether such a deal is viable and whether would it serve Israel's security interests. This, of course, rests on the condition that the current one would be officially discarded and Iran would be willing to sign off on the harsher terms under the new arrangement. 

The biggest downside of a new deal is that it would give legitimacy to the ayatollah regime and bolster its economic standing, thus indirectly helping it fend off domestic challenges. This stamp of approval, especially against the backdrop of Iran's military assistance to Russia in the Ukraine war, would make the West look weak. As such, it is likely that this would run against the US interests.

The current limbo helps Iran

The biggest upside of a new pact with Iran would be its lack of sunset clauses, i.e. ensuring that the restrictions on Iran's enrichment and other nuclear-related capabilities (such as developing fusing and arming mechanisms) would never expire and that it would not be able to become a nuclear state, averting a Middle East nuclear arms race. On top of that, this advantage would mean that Israel would not have to contend with an existential threat. In the grand scheme of things, despite facing only bad options, denying Iran nuclear weapons outweighs the concern over granting legitimacy to its regime. 

That said, Israel's main problem is not in choosing among those options, because the likelihood that Iran would enter into such a long-term and more restrictive deal is slim. The most concerning issue is that Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei might not want any deal. 

Perhaps he prefers the current limbo where Iran is close to projecting ambiguous nuclear capabilities without being at the mercy of the West to prop up its economy. It has also enjoyed the backing of a superpower, Russia. This support, which extends to diplomatic forums, will eventually translate into great shifts in Iran's military prowess, as well. 

If this is the current state of affairs, perhaps we have to ask ourselves the following: How can we change the current  Iran-West dynamics and ratchet up the pressure on Tehran?

Any alternative is better than what is currently unfolding because of inaction. We are duty-bound to look with scrutiny at the strategy that brought us to where we are right now.

Maj. Gen. (res.) Tamir Hayman is the Managing Director of the Institute for National Security Studies.

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With the 2015 nuclear deal all but dead, it is clear that Tehran is the big winner: It continues to move forward on uranium enrichment and will soon be a nuclear threshold state. The US has toughened its stance because the regime has refused to compromise on the ongoing investigations into the uranium traces found in undeclared sites, insisting that the West force the International Atomic Energy Agency to close the open cases.

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Moreover, Iran has become a key component of the contemporary Axis of Evil because of the proactive support it has provided the Russian war machine in Ukraine. Likewise, the US has been less keen on restarting the nuclear talks in the wake of the brutal crackdown against protesters all across Iran. The Europeans, meanwhile, have been expressing the importance of returning to the deal in recent days. 

Iran has seen a quantum leap in its nuclear program in recent months, rendering it impossible to return to the terms of the original deal. I supported a mutual return of both sides to the 2015 deal, seeing it as the lesser evil, but circumstances have since dramatically changed. 

The preferred option is to kill what's left of the deal and pronounce its death. The current state in which it is perpetual purgatory only helps Iran: It keeps upgrading its nuclear capabilities without having to pay a price. Right after the deal breathes its final breaths – and while the military contingencies continue to be drawn – the US and the world powers must put on the table a better, longer and stronger deal. Pursuing such a deal is the preferred option in order to prevent an Iranian bomb. 

So why hasn't this happened yet? With the US already out of the JCPOA, the only way to sign its death certificate is by having the European countries leave as well. This could be done with one of them stating that it has obtained information showing that Iran had breached the deal. Finding such information is like shooting fish in a barrel: Iran has been violating practically every clause of the 2015 text in the five years since the US left – in enrichment, in research and development, in installing advanced centrifuges, and so forth. Declaring Iran's breach is just a function of whether one of the parties wants to publicly say so.

As soon as one of the European countries makes this statement, the snapback mechanism will be activated, resulting in United Nations Security Council sanctions being reinstated; China and Russia would not be able to exercise the veto power they normally wield. But the Europeans have resisted taking this step so far, in part because they have a different approach than the US. 

What does Israel need to do now? First, we must acknowledge that doing nothing is the worst of all options. Dithering on this will only usher in a more dangerous nuclear Iran when the sunset clauses expire and the remaining restrictions are lifted. Israel must make sure the deal is officially dead before the "sunset" begins – meaning before 2025. That means Israel must wage a large-scale diplomatic campaign and it will need marshal support from the Europeans for this. 

Third, Israel must prepare a readily available military contingency plan. It will need continued US support so that the IDF would continue to get more capabilities. That's why cooperation with the Biden administration is crucial. In light of the reports on certain elements in the administration expressing concern over the emerging government, much of this collaboration depends on Prime Minister-elect Benjamin Netanyahu. Fourth, to prepare for the eventuality that Israel would have to use a military option as a last resort, Israel must gear up for a wide-scale regional conflagration that would include Hezbollah. Although it is not certain that such large-scale hostilities would break out, Israel should prepare for the worst. 

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Recent developments suggest that Iran and the world powers are moving toward a nuclear deal. This is the phase in which every side wants to shape the over-arching narrative: The US has claimed that Iran dropped most of the outstanding demands while the Iranians have made it clear that they have not made any substantive concessions. The nuclear deal presents a calculated and more responsible risk than the current danger we face from Iran. What's important to keep in mind is that a nuclear deal does not mean a green light for Iran's development of nuclear weapons. It means the exact opposite: It is designed to prevent Iran from acquiring such means. 

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If a deal is reached, it is safe to assume with a high level of certainty that Iran would not violate it until its main provisions expire in 2030, as it would gain nothing from such a breach. If it decides to break toward a nuclear weapon, the deal will have let Israel prepare in a more thorough way for a strike on its facilities. 

One of the key outstanding issues includes the ongoing IAEA investigations into the undeclared nuclear activity in Iran where traces of uranium were located. Iran needs to provide explanations that would satisfy the nuclear watchdog, otherwise, it risks being punished by sanctions for not its incompliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Resolving this issue is crucial for Iran because if the IAEA doesn't accept its explanations, Iran might be subject to crippling sanctions regardless of whether a nuclear deal is announced since the IAEA would not be bound by itand it has sole discretion in determining the fate of such investigations. 

Iran also wanted that the US commit to taking the Revolutionary Guards from the State Department's list of terrorist organizations. Iran has apparently dropped this demand. Iran has insisted that a new deal would have provisions that would prevent future US administrations from leaving it. Such a commitment cannot be incorporated into the text of the law since it is legally impossible to pass such a measure in the US. 

Iran also wants an automatic mechanism that would make it a nuclear threshold state. This would essentially serve as a guarantee should the US leave the deal. Inserting such a provision in the deal would allow Iran to mothball its capabilities so that if needed, its enrichment levels would spike again shortly after a US departure from the deal. Such a provision is the most concerning element of the deal as far as Israel is concerned. 

If a deal is finalized, Israel must prepare for a scenario in which Iran's uranium enrichment program moves full swing ahead as early as 2030.  This means Israel must prioritize its operational capabilities so that it has the capacity to take out Iran's nuclear program without causing a flare-up on its northern border. More importantly, it must shore up international support for a potential strike, primarily by courting the US 

Yes, Iran would rake in windfall profits from the economic benefits of the deal once it is implemented, but we must keep in mind that the current sanctions have not been able to keep Iran's military buildup in check. Iran may use the deal to bolster its regional presence but Israel has proved to be a worthy adversary in confronting such a threat. In the grand scheme of things, the deal would be inferior to the 2015 agreement, but it won't be a calamity for Israel. 

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Within a span of 48 hours, Israel wiped out Palestinian Islamic Jihad's entire senior military command in Gaza.

On Saturday evening, the IDF killed Khaled Mansour, the commander of PIJ's southern region, in a pinpoint strike, following the opening salvo on Friday that eliminated Tayseer Jabari, the group's northern region commander. Other field commanders and terrorist cells were also eliminated.

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As head of the IDF's Military Intelligence Directorate, I became familiar with these two bloodthirsty terrorists who planned murderous attacks against Israelis. The world is truly a better place now that they are gone. In many ways, Mansour's removal is even more significant than Jabari's, being one of the organization's most important and senior commanders. Over the course of his terrorist career, he helped spearhead PIJ's rocket capabilities, was responsible for its operations, and was the dominant figure behind the attack that was planned along the Gaza border in recent days.

The ability to amplify pressure and to take the enemy by surprise every day, even when he knows you are coming, is the key to building deterrence. Beyond the impressive tactical accomplishment, it is worth examining the broader aspects of the operation. First, however, we must keep things in tight perspective – this was a limited operation against a relatively weak organization, likely the weakest among our enemies. The operation was not intended to fundamentally change the reality in Gaza, which will continue to pose a challenge in the future.

The recent series of events began when PIJ responded to the arrest of a senior member in Jenin by preparing to fire anti-tank missiles at Israelis in Gaza-area communities. The initial and necessary Israeli response of imposing limits on civilian transportation in the area encouraged PIJ to up its demands to the point of establishing a new equation, whereby the  IDF's activities in Judea and Samaria would lead to a response from Gaza.

This sin of arrogance is what led to the offensive against PIJ, because such an equation is unacceptable and intolerable from Israel's point of view. It appears that Israel's objectives in Operation Breaking dawn were foiling the planned attack, fundamentally preventing an equation that links Judea and Samaria to Gaza, and enhancing deterrence against PIJ. Aside from the first goal – which was clearly achieved by ravaging PIJ's chain of command, anti-tank array, and other military targets – the success of the other two will be judged in the future. In light of the severe blow suffered by PIJ, it's safe to assume they were achieved.

The coming days will test the preservation of Israel's accomplishments. We must bear in mind, amid the backdrop of the ceasefire as well, that nothing is over until it's over and then some. One mistake, either on defense or offense, is enough to change the balance of success. This was ample reason from the perspective of Israel's decision-makers to conclude the operation as quickly as possible.

Either way, the Israeli public must now manage its expectations: The Gaza problem isn't going anywhere and will continue being a thorn in our side for years to come. Nothing that happened here over the past few days brings us any closer to a strategic resolution on this front.

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US President Joe Biden's declaration that Iran will never have a nuclear weapon is important. Although it isn't without historic precedent, the declaration is significant for two reasons: First, it was said during ongoing nuclear talks, and therefore impacts those negotiations with Iran. Second, the most meaningful word he used was "never." President Trump emphasized that he could only commit to what happened on his watch. In this case, President Biden vowed indefinitely on behalf of the United States.

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Although such a promise isn't legally grounded in any way and doesn't obligate future administrations, it can't be erased from the annals of Israeli-US strategic relations and grants support to another player (i.e. Israel) if the US doesn't fulfill its commitment in crunch time.

And now, after that optimistic introduction – a little realism for balance. The Middle East is not a top US priority. Its problems at home demand the administration's full attention. Meanwhile, America's biggest foreign policy challenge is the struggle between world powers over control of the global agenda. The US arrived late to this competition, which has already revived Cold War winds. This has put it at a disadvantage, which stems, in the eyes of many in the US, from American involvement in endless Middle Eastern wars.

Although the US isn't abandoning the Middle East, it isn't eager to start a new war there either – certainly not a war that can be avoided with a nuclear deal. Let's assume, however, that the supreme leader in Iran won't agree to renew the nuclear deal and won't agree to drink from the same poisonous cup a second time, in his view, just to suffer another humiliation in another two years. By that time, the ayatollah perhaps thinks, the ruling administration might withdraw from the deal again and reimpose sanctions.

This state of limbo, in which there is no deal and Iran's nuclear project is moving forward, is dangerous. Iran can become a nuclear threshold state. A threshold state has nuclear deterrence power because crossing that line is merely a matter of choice, which is why such countries are treated as if they are already a nuclear power. In theory, such a reality wouldn't contradict Biden's promise, as a threshold state does not possess nuclear capabilities. Yet in such a scenario, despite having fulfilled his historic commitment, Israel's national security position will have changed for the worse.

Another even more extreme scenario is that Iran will openly break out toward a nuclear bomb. Can we expect America to take immediate action to stop it? This is entirely uncertain. We already see there is a view in the US (not negligible, but still in the minority) that a nuclear Iran will enhance stability in the Middle East because it will minimize the odds of escalation toward war. Supporters of this approach infer that it will resemble the Cold War and the nuclear arms race between the US and the Soviet Union, and believe that just as that competition led to stability because those nuclear weapons weren't meant to be used but rather just to project power – the same will apply to the Middle East.

Israelis who read this will know inherently that such a reality would be intolerable. A Middle East mired in a nuclear arms race where some of the regimes rely on theological signals for their strategic decisions is far more dangerous than the one we live in. This clarity in Israel, however, doesn't assure clarity in the US. Israel must develop independent capabilities for removing the nuclear threat, but it needs American backing. To be sure, an Israeli attack inside Iran could very well spark a regional conflagration. In such a scenario, Israel must have international backing and legitimacy.

To summarize, the president's visit is important from the perceptual perspective of sharing a historic destiny, and additional American support for Israeli defense projects might also improve Israel's military capabilities. The memorandum of understandings signed by the countries' leaders is extremely important. General declarations such as these, however, lack the practical aspects to ease Israel's fears. It knows it will still have to fight its own battles.

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