Across all theaters, Israel has achieved significant gains following the blow it suffered on October 7. It has struck its enemies hard and, with American assistance, succeeded in forcing Hamas and Hezbollah into moves they had refused to take – releasing hostages while the IDF maintains its presence in the Strip, and ceasing fire from Lebanon as an expression of solidarity with Hamas, despite Israel's continued freedom of operation in Lebanon and ground presence at five points along the border.

However significant these achievements are, they do not guarantee sustained and strategically meaningful long-term change in the regional landscape. To achieve this goal – which means victory in the war – Hamas must be fully disarmed, and Hezbollah must either be disarmed or at minimum prevented from strengthening and returning to southern Lebanon.

Realizing these objectives is far more difficult than achieving the goals reached so far, because for Hamas and Hezbollah, this is no longer about paying a heavy price to ensure survival and protect strategic assets, but rather about making concessions of existential significance. This is because they require Hamas and Hezbollah to relinquish a central component of their identity and control over territory, and because such a move would amount to Hamas admitting that the October 7 attack was a mistake and accepting that, in Palestinian national memory, the attack that galvanized the Palestinian public will be recorded as a disaster and grave error.

The impression is that the American administration has not yet decided whether to back powerful Israeli force moves that would enable completing the collapse of Hamas, or to prefer, as it currently leans, to begin implementing phase two of the plan (perhaps even without waiting for the return of Ran Gvili's body), at least in the area under IDF control, without disarming Hamas. Each path faces numerous obstacles due to the plan's ambiguity, which requires agreement on small details, the parties' differing interpretations of the plan's intent, the multiplicity of parties meant to be involved, and above all – President Trump's eagerness to demonstrate progress and strengthen the message that the war has ended, even when conditions on the ground actually indicate difficulty in advancing the plan.

To avoid having to make a strategic decision between completing the war objectives and leveraging achievements so far to shape a better security reality for the coming years, versus avoiding an undesired confrontation with an especially friendly American president who operates from his own motivations – Israel must make every effort to convince Trump that backing Israel to complete the mission is also in his interest. Among other reasons, it could help expand the Abraham Accords. One way to do this is to create a broad internal Israeli front on this issue, beyond the government. After all, the hostage dispute is already behind us.

The writer is the head of the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security.

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A decisive victory in the complex campaign against Iran and its proxies requires a clear outcome in Gaza, as well as Israeli unity. The multi-front war – with Iran and its proxies, chiefly Hamas, backed by the Muslim Brotherhood (Qatar, Turkey, and their supporters worldwide) on the one hand, and Israel, the US, and parts of Western support on the other hand – has been going on for close to three months now. Each front has its own unique characteristics, derived from how the war began, the considerations of the actors involved, and their capabilities.

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According to Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, Israel is fighting on seven fronts (Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, Judea and Samaria, Yemen, Iraq, and Iran), but in practice, the world stage forms another arena, and this is where Israel is fighting to maintain American backing as well as for the legitimacy of its actions and existence, and against antisemitism.

This is not a war of choice; it has been forced upon Israel, and which began under extremely difficult opening conditions. And for that very reason, both Israel and the US must end it in victory. Achieving this requires several conditions. The first and most important is a clear defeat of Hamas in Gaza and the release of the captives. This means Israeli control at the end of high-intensity fighting over the entire area, including Rafah and the Philadelphi Route (excluding perhaps international management of displaced persons in secured areas designated to ensure the safety of the population during the mopping-up stage, which will likely last several months).

Ending the major combat operations before this goal is achieved just because we've reached a predetermined point in time (end of January?) will allow Hamas to claim that it forced Israel to effectively change its war goals in practice, and will encourage supporters of the terrorist organization who set themselves the goal of ensuring Hamas' survival in Gaza, even if only in a small part of its territory. As long as Hamas controls the Gazan side of the Rafah crossing and is perceived by the population as a governing entity, it would be able to claim it had managed to survive, and by implication – won.

It is also important to drive home the message – in talks with the US – that defeating Hamas requires creating a reality in the strip that will not allow terrorists to rear their heads. Therefore, not only Hamas but also the weak and corrupt Palestinian Authority is unsuitable to take over responsibility for Gaza post-war: It remains committed to the armed conflict against Israel, encourages terror (through incitement and payment of salaries to imprisoned terrorists), and sees Hamas as a legitimate organization that should be part of the leadership.

Gaining control over the entire area will also give Israel the necessary leverage to release the captives. As long as Hamas is not convinced that Israel is determined to eliminate its presence in Gaza, it has no interest in giving up its main asset, other than in return for an Israeli commitment to refrain from completing the takeover of the strip.

The second condition is reaching an understanding with the American administration that this is the US war almost to the same extent as it is Israel's: Continuation of the current state of affairs on all fronts will damage its standing in the region and globally, and exacerbate threats to the security of American citizens and Washington's interests. The Americans understand the importance of Israel's victory over Hamas in Gaza, but their stated desire to avoid getting dragged into a regional war and have Israel end major combat operations even before completing the takeover of the entire strip encourages Iran and its proxies to continue gradually escalating their use of force, in the hope that the administration will stop Israel.

Defeating Hamas and convincing the US that this is also a war over the regional and global order – and translating this into a willingness to win – are key in the effort to exert diplomatic pressure on Iran, Hezbollah, the Houthis, and the pro-Iranian militias, and for effective military force against them if necessary.

This is the condition to create a new security reality along the northern border that will give residents a sense of security and allow them to return home; this is the condition to secure shipping through the Bab al-Mandeb strait; this is the condition to curb Iran's nuclear program, which has again accelerated during the war; and this is the condition to promote efforts to establish a pragmatic regional center of gravity with normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia at its core. Israel and the US need each other in these arenas, and Israel must dive home this interdependence and mutual benefit to ensure Washington's commitment to achieving common goals.

Israel's ability to meet the two conditions for victory will be greatly impacted by its ability to shake off the self-induced blindness that characterized its attitude towards its enemies' intentions and display internal unity. This is not only the clear message communicated by the troops and the fallen, but also a strategic imperative. The greater and clearer the unity, the easier it will be for Israel to harness its capabilities and American support in order to achieve its war aims.

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Such a ceasefire has operational and tactical importance for Hamas, as the pressure on Israel increases. However, its main significance lies in the strategic arena. Hamas hopes a ceasefire will compel Israel to change its war objectives and revert to the softer approach that Hamas initially believed Israel would follow right after the Oct. 7 massacre. 

I believe that Hamas leaders, despite the severe blow inflicted on Israel, were convinced that the Israeli response would focus on targeted airstrikes that would extract a significant price from the Palestinians and perhaps even a limited ground maneuver – but they never anticipated that Israel would launch an all-out undertaking to eliminate the terrorist organization and deprive it of its military-terrorist capabilities along with retaking the strip. 

Hamas likely believed that had Israel subscribed to a small-scale approach, they could build on the success of October 7 and effect a change that would result in a new "equation" between the organization and the Jewish state. Meaning, the release of the imprisoned terrorists, lifting the blockade, and stopping the normalization process between Israel and Saudi Arabia.

Hamas assessed that Israel's weakness and its problematic relations with the United States, coupled with its inherent reluctance to pay the high price involved in a broad military operation to remove Hamas from Gaza, would ultimately prevent it from completely defeating Hamas, just like in previous flare-ups. 

In previous rounds, whenever the fighting ended, both sides licked their wounds, but Hamas would then quickly recover and posed a threat to the Gaza area and Israel as a whole. 

This time Israel adopted, to the surprise of Hamas, a different approach that could strategically weaken the organization without precedent, thereby also affecting both radical factions associated with the organization: the radical axis led by Iran on the one hand, and the Muslim Brotherhood axis, which includes Qatar and Turkey, on the other. 

All actions by Hamas, Iran, and its proxies (Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Shiite militias in Iraq), Qatar, and Turkey should be seen in the context of the attempt to persuade President Joe Biden to pressure Israel to stop the fighting and eventually adopt an alternative approach.

This effort motivates them to create the impression that there is a severe humanitarian crisis in Gaza. It is what made Hamas play a cynical game with the captives, and this is also what has prompted the  Shiite militias in Iraq to step up their actions. Likewise, this explains the gradual escalation by Hezbollah in the north and the missile launches from the Houthis, and the potential expansion of the conflict by Iran and its allies

This is also the context through which we must treat the numerous protests in Western capitals calling for a ceasefire. Even Jordan and Egypt are joining the chorus for various reasons, primarily due to the concern about a flow of Palestinian refugees into their territories. The Palestinian Authority seemingly calls for a ceasefire, but it is unclear if it is genuinely interested in one.

So far, Hamas and its allies' efforts have been unsuccessful. Biden is under pressure, along with most Western leaders. They understand the importance of Israel's success in undermining Hamas and the moral justification for it. Israel's recent moves, such as advancing on the ground, exposing the illicit Hamas activity at the Rantisi Hospital, and continued close coordination with the US. regarding the management of the conflict against Hezbollah, contribute to President Biden's ability to withstand pressure. 

As the fighting continues, Israel will need to remind Western leaders, led by Biden, that letting Hamas stay in power would be beyond the pale and that Israel can bring about its demise within a reasonable time without causing a humanitarian disaster in Gaza or leading to actions that would escalate the conflict into a regional war. This is how Israel would be able to get room for action and the time needed to achieve its strategic goals, even if it agrees to short ceasefires/pauses to release the captives.

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Recent steps taken by the new Israeli government in retaliation for the Palestinian Authority's appeal to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) represent the first indication that a much-needed change is underway.

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Traditionally, Israeli governments avoided confronting the PA over its breaches of the Oslo Accords, such as supporting terrorism, ongoing incitement, and unilateral activities in international fora.

This reluctance was based on the fear that such retaliation would have inconvenient political consequences. So, the can has been repeatedly kicked down the road in hopes of containing the repercussions. The PA is bad, previous Israeli governments thought, but what's the alternative?

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One of the first decisions made by the new Diplomatic-Security Cabinet was to impose a series of sanctions on the PA, signaling that the Israeli government will no longer look the other way when the PA unilaterally breaches its signed commitments and continues to fund, incentivize and praise terrorism.

First, $40 million taken from PA tax revenue collected by Israel was used to compensate families of terror victims per a pending court order against the PA Next, the cabinet decided to implement the Terror Funds Freezing Law, which deducts the amount of money the PA pays to terrorists and their families from funds designated for the PA

Finally, steps were taken on the ground: VIP permits requested for PA officials who are leading the "lawfare" campaign against Israel were denied. Unjustified and unauthorized Palestinian construction plans for Area C of Judea and Samaria – which Oslo designated as under full Israeli control – were frozen. A series of NGOs operating under the guise of humanitarian aid organizations that served as shell companies for terror groups will be more closely scrutinized. These decisions are important initial steps toward a complete policy change regarding the PA.

The PA has long been a strategic threat to Israel's security and continues to be one. It has been involved in terrorism since it was established, while Israel continues to view it as a force for stability. In fact, due to its unprecedented lack of popularity and legitimacy on the Palestinian "street," the PA is moving towards destabilizing actions, such as suing Israel in the ICC, taking the lead on UN resolutions targeting Israel, and asking the ICJ to investigate the situation in Judea and Samaria, a clear violation of its Oslo commitments.

Most important are the aforementioned PA payments to terrorists. Such payments have been official PA policy for decades. The PA offers stipends of between $400 to $3,500 monthly for every Palestinian terrorist who murders or attempts to murder innocent Israelis. Payments are promised in advance and wired to the terrorist in Israeli prison or the family of a terrorist killed in the course of his attack. These salaries are lifelong, and even terrorists released from Israeli prisons continue to receive them. The PA also guarantees released terrorists a safe position in the PA infrastructure, whether as a ghost employee or an actual one, alongside free healthcare and education.

For the average Palestinian, this is like winning the lottery. A lifetime monthly salary of $3,500 is four times the average Palestinian wage and eight times higher than the minimum wage. A convicted terrorist makes five times more than teachers and engineers, as much as a Palestinian supreme court judge. The security threat this presents is clear.

The PA also engages in blatant antisemitic incitement in its schools. Its textbooks encourage young Palestinians to think of Jihad as a praiseworthy way of life. It names squares and streets after terrorists and openly praises terrorist attacks on its social media pages.

Finally, the PA works to radicalize Israeli Arabs, encouraging them to engage in terrorism by paying them stipends as well. As we speak, Israeli Arab citizens are receiving monthly paychecks from the PA for murdering or attempting to murder their Jewish fellow citizens. This situation is now being scrutinized by a pending bill that would strip these persons of their Israeli citizenship.

Openly praising Israeli Arabs for committing violence is also part of the PA's strategy. Senior Palestinian officials arrived in Israel just last week to participate in a "welcome-home festival" for a released Israeli Arab terrorist, Karim Yunes, who participated in the brutal murder of Israeli soldier Avraham Brumberg in 1980. In response, Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Galant denied them further entry to Israeli territory.

The truth is, the PA is a terror-promoting entity that has long since proven its commitment to the final objective of Israel's annihilation. Its daily actions and well-calculated policy, anchored in law and endorsed in outspoken fashion by its senior leaders, have destroyed its credibility as a peace partner.

It is time for the new Israeli government to reconsider Israel's long-standing policy of containment and preservation of the status quo, and pursue new, creative methods of governing the Palestinians in case the PA fails to change its ways.

Reprinted with permission from JNS.org.

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Recent events on the Temple Mount and the Al-Aqsa mosque, with the growing tension between Israel and the Palestinians, largely reflect the completely different ways the two sides view the reality around the Mount, particularly Israel's actions there. That disparity stems from different perceptual frameworks.

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In the Israeli perceptual framework, Israel is a state that seeks stability and is committed to the status quo on the Temple Mount, the freedom of worship for all religions in Jerusalem, and maintaining public order. However, the status quo is challenged by extremist groups from both sides, and Israel is taking the necessary measures to prevent them from undermining stability, including the use of reasonable force. It is thereby exercising its sovereignty and the responsibility entailed by it.

However, many Palestinians, along with many Israeli Arabs and Muslims worldwide, plus international actors mainly on the left, see the existence of the nation-state of the Jewish people in the Land of Israel as lacking all justification. In their view, Israel's presence in eastern Jerusalem is illegal, and Israel as a state – not just the marginal messianic groups within it – seeks to alter the status quo on the Temple Mount.

This is not a worldview unique to radical political Islam, spearheaded by Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood. The Palestinian Authority is convinced that this Israeli threat to the Al-Aqsa compound reflects the actual state of affairs, along with Jordan and many other actors in the Arab and Islamic world. Not long ago, Jordan convened a gathering of Arab foreign ministers, including representatives of the United Arab Emirates and Morocco – which, a month earlier, had taken part in the "Negev Summit" in Israel – to discuss Israel's actions.

A look at the resolutions of this conference indicates that all these actors are thoroughly convinced of the justice of their claims – that Israel is curtailing Muslims' and Christians' freedom of worship; seeks to apportion the prayer times on the Temple Mount just as in the Cave of the Patriarchs in Hebron; is using force against Palestinian worshippers and youth far beyond what is necessary, including acts of dangerous, unjustified, and violent forced entry to the Al-Aqsa mosque; and is likely to spark a conflagration.

Some of these actors, particularly Hamas, the Northern Branch of the Islamic Movement in Israel, Qatar and Iran, see the threat of escalation as a means to counteract Israel and also to boost their own political status. Others see it as a way of damaging Israel's international and regional status while also preventing a slide into a high-intensity violent confrontation that could jeopardize their own uncertain status as well.

Is it possible to contend with years of incitement?

Much has been said lately about the impotence of Israeli public diplomacy in contending with lies aimed at puncturing Israel's international status and inflaming passions. Indeed, Israel's public diplomacy is far from adequately fighting back against these lies. The problem, however, is much worse: The perceptual framework by which Israel's enemies and adversaries internalize reality is a product of long years of indoctrination and incitement based on religious beliefs and core values of Arab and Palestinian nationalism that portray the Jews in general, the Zionists in particular, and the settlers all the more, as the ultimate evil.

For many Palestinians, the claim that Al-Aqsa is in danger is not just an incendiary slogan, but a deep-seated belief. Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud Abbas sometimes explains that it was the Jews' nature and their spheres of activity that caused their persecution in Europe. As Israel was observing Yom Hashoah (Holocaust Remembrance Day), more than 200,000 Palestinian Muslims gathered on the Temple Mount to mark "Laylat al-Qadr" (the night on which the Koran was given to Muhammad), and they proclaimed: "In blood and spirit we will redeem you, O Al-Aqsa!" Some of them added: "Khaybar, Khaybar, O Jews, the army of Muhammad will return!" (referring to the Prophet Muhammad's killing of the Jews of the oasis of Khaybar). As Einstein put it, "It is harder to crack prejudice than an atom."

In an interview with Christiane Amanpour on CNN, Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett strongly objected to the claim of symmetry regarding terror. There is no symmetry, either, regarding incitement and education for hatred. In contrast to Israel, in the territories controlled by the Palestinian Authority and Hamas, education denying Israel's right to exist and inculcating contempt for Zionists is a fundamental, institutionalized plank, both domestically and in public diplomacy. By leveraging the image of their victimhood, the Palestinians aim to infuse the international discourse with a narrative that denies the existence of the Jewish people and their right to a nation-state – not even on one grain of the soil of the Land of Israel. The Zionist endeavor is portrayed as colonialist activity and Israel as an apartheid state, accompanied by declarations that the Zionists are utterly evil and all disadvantaged groups must unite in the struggle against them. The claim that Hamas is behind this effort is only partially correct; the Palestinian Authority is leading it in the international sphere.

Benefits will not help

As part of this indoctrination, the Palestinians deny the existence of the Jewish Temple on the Temple Mount. They have been able to advance resolutions in UNESCO, the United Nations General Assembly and even the UN Security Council that ignore the site's holiness to Jews and the Jewish connection to Jerusalem. The most important of these is UN Security Council Resolution 2334, which the Obama administration promoted toward the end of its tenure.

Moreover, the Palestinians make sure to use the name "Beit al-Maqdis al-Mazum" – a temple whose existence they falsely claim – whenever alluding to the Jewish Temple, asserting that despite its efforts, Israel has not managed to find archeological evidence of the Temple's existence. Several years ago, I spoke with a senior Palestinian official well-versed in Jewish history, and I expressed bafflement about the insistence on denying a historical fact. He told me that he too had personally expressed perplexity on that score to the late PLO leader Yasser Arafat and was answered with the question, "What pension are you supposed to receive?" After that, he stopped asking hard questions.

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Israel regards the Palestinian issue as a nuisance. With no possibility of reaching a permanent solution and seeking to ensure stability in the short term, it has decided to strengthen the Palestinian Authority and pacify the Gaza Strip with material benefits. It prefers to avoid a confrontation with the P.A. and Hamas on the issue of implementing sovereignty in Jerusalem and Arab population concentrations, and likewise around its international image. This approach indeed has certain advantages in the short term. However, it is likely to exact substantial costs in the medium and the long term because it creates a sense of achievement among our enemies, raises their hopes of further achievements in the conflict over who is right and erodes Israeli deterrence.

Featured on JNS.org, this article was first published by the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs.

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The plausible outcome by which Iran and the United States will reach a new nuclear agreement is a matter of great concern, and rightly so, among Israeli and US lawmakers, as well as for Gulf states' officials.

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This agreement is dangerous because it paves the way for Iran, in nine years, to secure the ability to produce a large arsenal of nuclear weapons without fear of having to cross a dangerous threshold, where it may be exposed to power moves that prevent it from doing so, and without the prospect of crippling economic sanctions.

The agreement does not guarantee IAEA supervision anywhere and anytime; it has sunset clauses; it fails to deal with ballistic missiles – the means by which nuclear bombs are launched; it does not oblige Iran to reveal the truth about the progress of the military dimension of its nuclear program ahead of finalizing the deal with world powers; and the restrictions it details are to be gradually lifted - some have already been removed and others are due to be lifted soon.

Reviving the nuclear deal at this time would be even more dangerous, as it takes place after Iran has already marked significant achievements in the field of enrichment technology, which according to the agreement were to take place only a few years from now, and in its weapons program.

This means that it is virtually impossible to return to the original nuclear agreement. Moreover, a significant portion of the restrictions placed on Iran are slated be removed anyway in early 2024 and early 2026.

Worse – all of this is taking place when it is clear that any hope that a new deal would lead to a change in Iran's subversive policies is baseless; and all while Iran still refuses to provide details on four facilities exposed due to the nuclear archives exposed by Israel.

All this amounts to dangerous irresponsibility, especially as Iran grows stronger. It is clear that the tens of billions of dollars that will be made available to Iran will be used to continue arming Iran's proxies and paying for Tehran's efforts to expand its influence in the region – as well as increase its ability to threaten Israel directly or through its offshoots. This cash infusion will also alleviate the severe economic crisis in Iran, thus dousing the any threat destabilizing regime.

Resuming an agreement under the current circumstances will be a huge boon for the extremist Islamic regime in Tehran, which it will undoubtedly present as evidence of its morality and the weakness of the West and Israel.

The US is aware of all these dangers and yet it is determined to advance the agreement, simply to delay the end and avoid the need for a confrontation with Iran.

First. The Biden administration tried to justify this policy by saying that reviving the deal would be the first step in negotiations with Iran that would lead to an improved accord, but this faint and illogical excuse has already been abandoned.

Israel's problem is that the US, which is showing a hesitant attitude towards Iran and in other contexts, is our most important ally. While efforts should be made to prevent negative repercussions on the Abrahamic Accords and to prepare for independently taking action to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear state – such an undertaking will be much more difficult without American support.

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Some are claiming that in recent years, the IDF has become "overly legalistic," in other words, that the specter of prosecution and trial hampers the freedom of action of the military's top brass, the commanders in the field, and the soldiers themselves, as well as their ability to function when they face complex operational challenges. This claim is mainly voiced in the context of the IDF's war on terrorist organizations, who themselves flagrantly violate the rules of war, intentionally attacking civilians and hiding behind human shields.

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The truth is that fighting armed terrorist organizations is much more complicated – legally, as well – than fighting other armies, and that applying international law's rules of war to this kind of battle demands some creative thinking. This is mostly because the other side does not see itself as obligated to international law and tries to leverage the asymmetry of the two sides' commitment to it to improve its ability of achieving its goals.

However the reasoning behind laws of war applies to clashes with terrorist entities, as well. Therefore, the IDF uses their four main principle in its operations: the principle of necessity, which means that military force is exercised only when there is a military purpose in doing so whose focus is protecting the security of the country and its citizens and defeating the enemy; the principle of humanity, which requires that unnecessary suffering be avoided; the principle of distinction, under which an assault distinguishes between military targets and soldiers and civilians and civilian objects; and the principle of proportionality, which acknowledges that assaults on military targets could cause collateral damage to civilians and civilian objects but seeks to ensure that the collateral damage is not excessive in relation to the military advantage resulting from the action.

Unlike the incorrect way in which some critics of international law perceive it, the laws of war acknowledge the needs of countries to fight and defend themselves – against terrorist organizations, too – and seek to prevent or reduce damage that is unnecessary from a military standpoint.

Moral advantage is also a weapon

The IDF is careful to uphold the principles laid out above, not only because doing so anchors its ability to defend itself against lawsuits in the International Criminal Court and other foreign courts, but not only because of the need for international legitimacy to use force, which directly affects the country's ability to import appropriate weapons. The IDF upholds them, first and foremost, because the laws of war align with our own moral codes, which obligate the IDF, as an army in a democratic state, to the rule of law.

It could be argued that in a specific situation, not adhering to the laws of war could lead to greater success in the war on terrorism and in securing deterrence, and reduce the danger to Israel in the short term, but the cost of doing so would be insufferably high. It would harm uninvolved persons, as well as our ability as a people to face ourselves. The moral advantage actually increases Israel's power in the long run.

Mistakes happen, and will continue to happen

In fighting Palestinian terrorism, especially in the rounds of violence with the Gaza Strip, the IDF is shown to implement moral principles and the rules of law in an impressive manner, certainly to no lesser degree than other western armies. Relatively few uninvolved civilians are harmed, and the vast majority who are functioned, knowingly or unknowingly, as human shields.

The head of UNRWA in the Gaza Strip infuriated Hamas and was forced to resign after remarking at the IDF's precision during Operation Guardian of the Walls in May. In fighting Hezbollah in Lebanon, after the group turned countless civilian buildings into military targets (using them as missile warehouses, outlooks, or headquarters), the law allows the IDF to treat them as military targets, accordingly. The number of civilian casualties could be a lot bigger here, but that's because the fighting can be expected to be on an unprecedented scale. The ways of reducing collateral damage that work in Gaza are unfeasible in Lebanon. And that in and of itself is not a violation of international law.

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Upholding the laws of war in each and every case is a humane action that needs to be carried out anew each time, depending on the context. If there is any suspicion that the law was intentionally ignored, the instance must be investigated honestly. However, during war there can be mistakes and errors, some of which might cause unintentional harm to civilians on the other side. Sometimes mistakes are the result of combat requirements being underestimated and too much caution. For example, in the incident in which Border Police Staff Sgt. Barel Hadaria Shmueli was killed, it's possible that the orders did not correctly assess the demands of the situation.

In any case, there is nothing new in applying the laws of war to the war on terrorist organizations. Legal advisors have been taking part in Israel's war on terrorism for decades, and even if the nature of their involvement changes over time, ultimately they were and still should be part of the process, and advise. That is accepted practice in all western armies, and it should be. The final decision lies with the commanders, and it should take into account the legal counsel they receive.

Too easy

In this context, in recent years we have faced two massive challenges. One is the enemy's increasingly sophisticated methods. Among other things, this includes activating groups that portray themselves as human rights organizations, but actually are branches of terrorist organizations (for example, some of the groups Israel recently declared to be terrorist entities with links to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine). Others operate with blatantly anti-Israel motives.

The second goal is the ease with which the enemy is able to enlist new media and some of the media establishment to promote its goals – primarily, slandering Israel and chipping away at its legitimacy. For years, radical left-wing entities throughout the world have been investing considerable means in slandering Israel, able to do so in part by taking advantage of the new reality in which areas of conflict are replete with tools of documentation that can be used to manipulate.

The international system, motivated by political considerations, mostly accepts the double standard of morality that this asymmetry expresses. While Israel is required to meet stringent standards and the former chief prosecutor of the ICC decided to open an investigation against it, no one truly expects the Palestinians to follow their laws of war, even though the ICC investigation is supposedly looking to Hamas' war crimes, as well. Moreover, according to the Palestinian narrative, the battle against Zionism justifies any form of war, including terrorism. And although the Palestinian Authority pays fat salaries to terrorists, it is seen as a legitimate partner in negotiations.

The IDF should continue to operate according to the law, but Israel must also recognize how vital it is for its to improve its abilities in the fights for western public opinion through an emphasis on our morality and our strong commitment to the law. The goal should be to increase the IDF's freedom of operation and restrict our enemies' freedom to operate.

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The recent uptick in terrorist attacks in Jerusalem and Judea and Samaria requires us to distinguish between two parallel phenomena underpinning the violence. One is the ongoing incitement, intended to create a consciousness of struggle in the general public, particularly among Palestinian youth. The second is Hamas's interest in increasing terrorism within and emanating from Jerusalem and Judea and Samaria. The connection between the tangible expressions of these two trends has ignited a multitude of attacks, sparking fear that Israel is facing another terror wave.

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The first element, incitement and the preaching of hatred aimed at creating a consciousness of struggle against Zionism, takes place on an ongoing basis. It is intended to instill in the Palestinian public that:

There is no Jewish people, so Jews have no right to self-determination and a state of their own.

The Jews had no sovereign history in the Land of Israel/Palestine, unlike the Palestinians, who claim to be the indigenous people of this region, as descendants of the Canaanites. In this context, the Palestinians must believe that there was no Jewish Temple on the Temple Mount. The Palestinians also promote this message in the international system through international institutions such as the UN General Assembly, UNESCO, and others.

The Jews, especially the Zionist ones and, more specifically, the settlers, are intolerable by definition. The European colonialists, who sought to get rid of the Jews and prevent the spread of Islam, imposed Zionism on the Jews and established the State of Israel, ignoring the rights of the Arab inhabitants over the entire territory.

The Palestinian identity is based primarily on a commitment to fighting Zionism until its disappearance. All types of "struggle" toward this end are     legitimate (thus the Palestinian Authority pays comfortable salaries to all terrorists serving time in Israeli prisons, seeing them, under Palestinian law, as the fighting cadre of the Palestinian people).

However, the PA believes that due to "cost-benefit" considerations, the struggle, beyond the political, economic and cultural arenas, should be focused on "popular resistance" (sometimes adding the term "peaceful"), which means avoiding the use of firearms and explosives. Instead, they focus on demonstrations, stone-throwing, firebombs and sometimes stabbings and vehicular attacks.

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Hamas and other terrorist organizations, of course, believe that it is also appropriate to use firearms and explosives in attacks emanating from Jerusalem and Judea and Samaria, including from  areas controlled by the PA.

The Palestinians are the only victims of the conflict. As such, they must perpetuate and leverage their victimhood until the cause is eliminated, i.e., Israel ceases to exist as a nation-state of the Jewish people. As victims of the occupation, Palestinians have the right to exercise all types of "resistance," and those responsible for their situation, especially Israel and the West, have no right to criticize them.

The Palestinian struggle is nationalist and Islamic at the same time. The defense of al-Aqsa Mosque in the face of Israel's alleged attempts to harm it is the ultimate justification for this dual campaign.

The Palestinian commitment to all of Palestine is indisputable, even if, according to the PLO's "Phased Plan" (1974), a hiatus on the way to the final destination is allowed. Therefore, it is unthinkable to agree to the existence of a Jewish nation-state, even if it is democratic and guarantees the civil rights of all its residents, or to concede even a single grain of soil to Israel.

The consciousness of the struggle is embedded in various ways, including statements by senior Palestinian figures, study materials, religious messages and social media, the latter of which is particular effective among Palestinian youth.

From the time this consciousness is set, there will always be some Palestinians, especially young ones, who feel they are required to act. Their sense is that they are fulfilling what is required of them by Palestinian society. They believe that even if they lose their lives, it is no disaster since they will become heroic martyrs, with all the benefits promised to the "shahid." After all, according to the Quran (Sura 3, verse 169): "Do not think that those who are killed for Allah are dead; they live with Allah's grace." If they surrender, are taken alive and imprisoned, they and their family will receive great respect and a generous salary.

When the Palestinian leadership explicitly or implicitly calls on the public to carry out attacks, the number of Palestinians responding increases significantly, to the point of creating a "wave of terrorism" (for example, in the wave of attacks of October 2015 to March 2016). Even when there is no such explicit call, there will always be Palestinians who will take it upon themselves to act. Most will be satisfied with participating in riots, demonstrations, stonings and firebombings. Indeed, scores of such events take place throughout Judea and Samaria every week, and are not mentioned even in the Israeli media.

There are always a few Palestinians who will want to go further (especially if they are affiliated with Hamas, like Fadi Abu Shkhaydam).

In parallel with the ongoing phenomenon of incitement and the creation of the consciousness of the struggle, which translates into individual attacks, we are also witnessing efforts by PIJ and Hamas to establish organized terrorist cells capable of carrying out mass-casualty attacks. Four such cells, some of them extensive, have been uncovered and broken up recently. One such cadre ambushed an Israeli car in Samaria on Dec. 16, 2021, killing a yeshiva student and wounding two others. The squad was captured two days later, and the IDF reported they are members of PIJ.

This effort is also not new, being a permanent element of Hamas's and PIJ's policy, which is aimed at harming as many Israelis as possible, undermining national resilience in Israel and demonstrating these movements' adherence to the path of struggle, unlike Fatah.

This is despite Israel's (and the PA's) efforts to degrade Hamas in the areas controlled by the PA. In fact, these steps act to strengthen Hamas's position on the Palestinian street as the leader of the struggle against Israel and for Jerusalem and al-Aqsa, thereby embarrassing and weakening the PA. Given the sense of Hamas's achievement in the May conflict and against the background of the PA's growing weakness, Hamas has stepped up its efforts.

Although the PA works to limit Hamas's freedom of action, it is being dragged by the competition into increasing incitement, heaping praise on the perpetrators of the attacks, and accusing Israel of "executing" them. Thus, the PA itself is guilty of fanning the flames.

Beyond strengthening the intelligence-security response, the way to address the problem is not only to ensure the quality of life of Palestinians in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, but also to create deterrence mechanisms and weaken the ideological and economic incentives that drive the attacks. Israel's decision to loan the PA a sum offsetting the tax revenues the country is withholding over the PA's salary payments to terrorist is the opposite of what is required. Not only did it make a mockery of Israeli law, but it presented Israel as being under duress. The loan achieved precisely the opposite of its goal; terrorism did not diminish but increased.

It should also be made clear to the Palestinians and their supporters that the incitement must stop. The United States may cooperate in such an effort, and even the European Union and some of its members have recently shown a willingness to move in this direction, for example, by stopping funding for inflammatory PA textbook. The phenomenon will not disappear in the blink of an eye, but the more the Palestinians realize that it harms them, the greater their ability to restrain it.

Reprinted with permission from JNS.org.

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In his first interview as Secretary of State, Antony Blinken told Wolf Blitzer on CNN on Feb. 8, 2021, that President Biden strongly supports the two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. "It is the only way to ensure Israel's future as a Jewish and democratic state, and the only way to give the Palestinians a state to which they're entitled," he said.

This mantra is repeatedly articulated by leaders and opinion-shapers around the world and especially in the United States, Europe and the Israeli left. If Israel refuses to accept the two-state solution, more or less as promoted by the Palestinians and their supporters, it will have to choose between being Jewish and being democratic.

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This line of argument first appeared in a 1977 essay by the late US Undersecretary of State George Ball, titled "How to Save Israel in Spite of Itself." It was prominent in President Carter's bestselling book "Palestine – Peace not Apartheid," and has been adopted by policy-makers and pundits since then as an unrefuted motif.

According to this argument, if Israel does not accept a Palestinian state and sticks to the status quo, it will inevitably have to either integrate the Palestinian population as part of a one-state solution and thus lose its Jewish majority and Jewish identity or, alternatively, deprive Palestinians of full citizenship and full rights and thus lose its democratic nature and transform into an apartheid regime.

Secretary Blinken and many of those who parrot this message do so out of concern for and friendship with Israel, and also out of their conviction that, as Blinken emphasized to his Israeli counterpart, "Israelis and Palestinians should enjoy equal measures of freedom, security, prosperity, and democracy."

They may well be convinced that this is a correct and true forecast – or at least a highly plausible assessment – and thus feel obliged to save Israel from such a problematic fate. Some are worried that Israel might not understand the danger by itself because, in their opinion, it is under the influence of messianic extremists at home or powerful political forces in the United States. They feel obliged to urge Israel to adopt these policies to save itself, and some think that if it does not, pressure must be applied.

Some, especially among left-leaning Israeli groups, think that Israel should act unilaterally and not link withdrawals to an agreement with the Palestinians. That even if it has to maintain some military presence there for security reasons, Israel should uproot the Jewish communities in the West Bank as soon as possible.

Other proponents of this message are less friendly to Israel, being motivated more by their commitment to the Palestinian cause and their belief that such a solution to the conflict is required because it is in line with what they believe to be international law. Others, including some who consider themselves Israel's friends, see the Palestinian cause and the United Nations resolutions supporting it, such as UNSCR 2334 that was promoted by the Obama administration, as just reasons for why Israel should heed their advice.

The 'Save Israel' message's wobbly legs

Two weak arguments are proffered by those who seek to convince the "stubborn and self-destructive Israelis" to save their state.

According to the first opinion, this doomsday scenario is inevitable because, in their view, the status quo is unsustainable. They are convinced that there is no way that Israel will be able to "control" the Palestinians forever, not even for a short period, without facing the need to choose between Israel's Jewish character and its democratic identity.

The second argument states that, regardless of how long it might take before this choice becomes realistic, the current situation in which Israel rules over the Palestinians is corrupting Israeli soldiers. Therefore, the proponents of this view feel that it is in Israel's best interest to end the Israeli presence with alacrity.

These arguments are based on several unfounded assumptions. First, they assume that the relevant areas Israel took under its control in 1967 are "Palestinian" or, as the United Nations and many others look upon them, "OPT" – an acronym for "Occupied Palestinian Territory." This supposition is based on a plethora of annual, legally flawed, politically-generated, non-binding U.N. resolutions adopted by an automatic majority that arbitrarily determined that the territories are Palestinian. There is no legal or historical basis to back up such a claim. This postulate is also built on the claim that the population of these areas in June 1967 was Palestinian, as if the history of these lands began only then.

Another assumption is that because Israel is the stronger party in the conflict, it can afford to take security risks and should be the side that makes the first move. Moreover, the proponents of these arguments claim that Israeli security concerns can be met from within the vulnerable and exposed 1967 lines, with some minor modifications.

A more extreme version of this logic claims that Israel has already crossed the point where it had to decide between its Jewish character and its democratic nature and has, in fact, already become an apartheid state. This approach is adopted by Israel's enemies and those who delegitimize it, such as the BDS movement, groups like Jewish Voice for Peace and radical groups in Israel who ostensibly claim to be human rights NGOs, and even by some members of the left-leaning group Commanders for Israel's Security.

The remedy proposed by these groups is unilateral separation, namely, uprooting most of the Israeli communities from "the OPT," even without an agreed settlement of the dispute. Some self-proclaimed pundits believe that this is not going to be enough, since Israel ostensibly lost its democratic nature within the 1948 boundaries, and especially in light of the way it treats its Arab citizens. These sophomoric "thinkers" see the only option as Israel ceasing to exist as the nation-state of the Jewish people and becoming the state of all its citizens.

The reaction of most Israelis

Most Israelis consider these warnings about the inevitable need to choose between being Jewish or being democratic, and the urgent warnings that Israel must save itself, as misguided, dangerous, patronizing, condescending and undemocratic, as well as indicative of gross ignorance of the situation in Israel and disregard for the rights of the Jewish people.

The messages of the more radical groups are seen by most Israelis as offensive, hostile, anti-Zionist and even anti-Semitic. Most Israeli voters lean more and more toward parties that reject these exhortations.

This does not mean that Israelis prefer the status quo. Most would gladly change it by reaching an agreement with the Palestinians – but via an agreement that would guarantee a different outcome than the one demanded by the Palestinians and their supporters. The people of Israel insist on an agreement that includes Palestinian recognition of Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people, as well as one that really addresses Israel's security concerns.

Others prefer to change the status quo with Israel becoming the sovereign authority over much of Judea, Samaria and the Jordan Valley, more or less along the principles enunciated in President Trump's vision for peace and prosperity. Specifically, those areas are necessary for Israel's security, including the Israeli communities in these areas.

Despite all of the above, virtually no one in Israel envisages a situation where Israel takes complete control and extends its sovereignty over the towns and other densely populated Palestinian areas, namely Areas A and B in Judea and Samaria and Gaza, thus turning the Palestinians living there into Israeli citizens in a way that threatens the Jewish and democratic nature of Israel.

This reduces to absurd and irrelevant the entire demographic calculus often used by those concerned about Israel losing its Jewish majority. It also renders irrational and immaterial the entire debate of how many Palestinians live between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea and how many live in the areas taken from Jordan in 1967 (2-3 million?) or Gaza (more than 2 million?).

Get the facts straight

Most of the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza already live under Palestinian rule, and no one intends to dismantle the two entities that govern them. Namely the Palestinian Authority, that functions as the ruling entity for the Palestinians living in the areas Israel took from Jordan in a war initiated by Jordan in 1967, and Hamas, which controls the Gaza Strip that Israel had taken from Egyptian military control in 1967, and which Israel evacuated entirely in 2005 after transferring rule over the Palestinian population to the PA in 1994.

In these areas, the PA and Hamas, respectively, make all the political decisions, carry out elections at their own will, issue their own laws, and care for the needs of the population, with the exception of decisions that may affect Israel's security. As a matter of fact, they are preparing to conduct elections for their independently elected governing bodies in the coming months – if they decide to proceed with the election process they have embarked on, which is still uncertain.

This renders wrong and misleading the argument often used by Israel's opponents, as well as occasionally by its friendly critics, that Israel employs two different legal systems in Judea and Samaria – one for Israeli citizens and one for Palestinians. The law in the area retained by Israel pursuant to the Oslo Accords (specifically Area C, in which there are no sizeable Palestinian population centers) is based on already existing Jordanian and British mandatory laws, with additional orders issued by the Israeli military commander, who is considered by both international and Israeli law to be the legal authority controlling the area.

Israeli citizens present in the area are subject, on a personal basis, to Israeli law, and Palestinians living there are subject to Palestinian laws issued by the PA, with the exception of regulations that pertain to Israel's security, which is under Israeli responsibility according to the Oslo accords.

The number of Palestinians living in Area C under direct Israeli control is negligible, and if Israel were to extend its sovereignty over parts of that area, they would likely prefer to adopt the same arrangement that applies to the Arab population of eastern Jerusalem, namely, to become Israeli residents enjoying full rights of social security, freedom of movement inside Israel and all the other advantages Israel has to offer, while at the same time remaining citizens of the Palestinian entity.

Secondly, if a permanent-status agreement cannot be reached between Israel and the Palestinians, the existing status quo is far more stable and sustainable than the doomsday prophecy of Israel having to choose between its Jewish and democratic characters. In fact, this status quo solves ongoing day-to-day tensions between the two parties. While Palestinians may feel obliged to express their political commitment to change such a status quo, they nevertheless appear to realize that they cannot achieve their desired end-state, or alternatively, are unwilling to pay the price of forcing a change. Therefore, they consider it to be a tolerable situation.

What the Palestinians want

The PA and Hamas aspire to see the present status quo replaced by a Palestinian state over all the pre-1967 territories, with an Israeli readiness to accept a "right" of the Palestinian refugees and their descendants to return to their original homes (even if this right were only marginally implemented). However, they are unprepared to accept Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people, as they are committed to the struggle against Zionism until its demise in line with the Phases Plan adopted by the Palestinian National Council in 1974.

While they realize that they do not have the military and political power to impose such a solution on Israel, they have no intention of adapting their goal to enable an agreement that may be acceptable to Israel. Furthermore, from a domestic political point of view, they cannot afford to make such a change after propagating this narrative to their population for more than 100 years.

Maintaining the status quo, on the other hand, enables them to avoid paying the heavy price that any such move – either total confrontation with Israel or changing their narrative – may entail, and provides them with many benefits. It allows them to keep presenting themselves as eternal victims who are entitled to international attention and political and financial support. It gives them the opportunity to keep fighting a never-ending conflict with Israel while absorbing Israel's limited military response that reflects Israeli reluctance to change the status quo.

Israel, too, prefers the status quo, for several reasons. Even if Israel wanted to, it does not have the political power, whether internationally or locally, to force its conditions on the Palestinians or to convince them to change their narrative. Israel's leadership and security establishment tend to refrain from risking the stability of the PA and Hamas, which enables Israel to avoid the need to govern the Palestinian population in Judea, Samaria and Gaza.

To a large extent, such a status quo is what former Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin had in mind when he concluded the Oslo agreements in 1993-1995. His vision, as he detailed in his last address to the Knesset in October 1995, included a Palestinian entity that is less than a state, that provides the Palestinians with self-rule, Israeli military control of the Jordan Valley in the widest meaning of the term, Israeli responsibility for its own security throughout the area, an ongoing settlement presence and Jerusalem as the united capital of Israel.

Most Israelis are not troubled by any moral and psychological impact of a prolonged "occupation." Most Israelis serve in the Israel Defense Forces and they recognize it as an inevitable part of defending themselves against a permanent and ongoing threat in their own backyard. What troubles Israel is the military buildup of the Palestinian terror organizations in Gaza, the hostile actions taken by the Palestinians in the international legal and diplomatic spheres and the ongoing incitement to terror and hate by the Palestinians, manifested, among other things, by their "Pay to Slay" policy of paying handsome salaries to convicted terrorists and their families.

However, none of these Palestinian actions constitute a good enough reason for Israel to change the status quo. Instead, Israel's actions are usually intended to restore and maintain the status quo and deal with deviations from it. For example, despite the growing threat from Gaza and the repeated indiscriminate launching of rockets against Israeli civilian targets, Israel's military efforts focus on strengthening its deterrence to restore the status quo ante and not bring about a fundamental change in Gaza.

When Israel had the option of extending its sovereignty to additional territories in Judea and Samaria and the Jordan Valley in mid-2020, Israel ultimately chose to maintain the status quo and preferred to establish normal relations with several Arab states instead, because even the supportive Trump administration was hesitant to allow a unilateral extension of Israeli sovereignty.

Clearly, Israel prefers to refrain from prejudicing the existing status quo and replacing it with a worse situation for its security and interests, as suggested by those who claim to be concerned over Israel's future.

The importance of the Abraham Accords

The stability of the status quo was strengthened considerably by the Abraham Accords normalization agreements. The thesis that normalization of relations with the Arab world cannot happen until Israel makes progress towards an agreement based on the PA version of the "two-state solution" was proven wrong. That thesis, previously considered an essential condition that would require Israel to change its policy and opt for an agreement based on the Palestinian and Western/international demands, essentially evaporated.

Once the pragmatic Arab states accepted the status quo, they realized that linking normalization that serves their vital interests to a solution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that would not materialize made no sense and harmed their interests. They realized that any chance that Israel would accept a change in the status quo that harmed its interests was virtually nonexistent.

Those who are committed to changing the status quo at almost any price are mainly those who want Israel erased from the map, such as Iran and some radical Sunni players.

The American position for a long time was that a solution is necessary and possible, and consecutive administrations tried their best to bring the parties to agree on a two-state solution. It appears that the Biden administration realizes that though reaching an agreement would be an outstanding achievement, it is beyond reach, and hence it focuses its efforts on improving the status quo with a view of keeping the two-states option viable.

In this context, the US declares that it opposes any unilateral step taken by the parties that may harm the possibility of reaching a two-state solution in the future and plans to focus on improving the standard of living of the Palestinians. However, it is not clear how they are going to do that as long as the Palestinians keep promoting their struggle against Israel in international forums and supporting terror and, in so doing, materially breach the Oslo agreements.

Another problem with the false threat that Israel may lose its Jewish or democratic identity if the status quo is not changed to meet Palestinian demands is that those who make this threat believe that it is Israel's responsibility to change the situation. Quite often, as mentioned above, the proponents of this idea claim that since Israel is the stronger party to the conflict, it should make the bigger and first move, and can afford to take risks.

This approach is misleading and ignores the reality that the main obstacle to reaching a settlement to the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians is the Palestinian narrative. According to this narrative, the struggle against Zionism until its demise is the core identity of the Palestinian people.

The dangers to Israel of withdrawal from the West Bank

Accepting the premise that Israel should withdraw from Judea and Samaria and the Jordan Valley is dangerous for many reasons.

First, it would make defending the areas remaining under Israeli sovereignty considerably more difficult for obvious topographic and demographic reasons. Moreover, the new situation would be virtually irreversible, despite Israel's conventional military advantage. Any claim to the contrary is wishful thinking.

The case of Gaza is very telling in this respect, as is the case of South Lebanon and other examples worldwide (from Vietnam to Sinai). Fighting heavily armed hybrid terror organizations is not an easy task for any modern army. With Israel's current presence and freedom of action in Judea and Samaria and the Jordan Valley, its security forces manage to minimize the level of Palestinian terrorism. But as long as the Palestinian narrative of struggling against Zionism is unchanged, the threats that may emanate from these territories to Israel remain considerable.

Second, it would be counterproductive to securing a stable solution to the dispute in the future. Such a settlement could not be reached without a substantial change in the Palestinian narrative, that would reflect an abandoning of their Phases Plan of 1974.

The effort to convince the Palestinians to change their narrative is echoed in Secretary of State Blinken's references to his expectation that the Palestinians end the incitement and the payment of salaries to terrorists, but it is not central to the Biden administration approach to the conflict, "Pay to Slay," and the International Criminal Court.

Last, the entire concept of the necessity to transfer Judea and Samaria and eastern Jerusalem to Palestinian control to protect Israeli from losing its Jewish or democratic identity ignores not only Israel's justified security needs but also the historical and legal rights and aspirations that stand at the core of Zionism. For the Jewish national movement, the return of the Jewish people to their ancestral homeland is based on its historic sovereign presence in its land that extended over all of the areas that were under the British mandate of Palestine. The language of the July 24, 1922, mandate given to Britain was unequivocal, and it still constitutes an internationally legally binding document.

It states that "recognition has thereby been given to the historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine and to the grounds for reconstituting their national home in that country" and that "The Mandatory shall be responsible for seeing that no Palestine territory shall be ceded or leased to, or in any way placed under the control of the Government of any foreign Power."

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Israel does not deny that the Palestinian people have rights, and it is ready to share the land with them, but it does not regard the lands in question as "Occupied Palestinian Territory." For Israel, and according to the Oslo Accords, these are disputed lands, subject to bona fide negotiation of their permanent status, and Israel, as the nation-state of the Jewish people, has absolutely no obligation to surrender its rights to these lands voluntarily or its right to live within recognized and secure borders, as recorded in U.N. Security Council Resolution 242.

There is no reason to worry about Israel losing its Jewish or democratic identities, nor does Israel need to adopt rash and dangerous decisions to avoid such a possibility.

Those who employ such arguments to press Israel to adopt a solution to the conflict that ignores its security needs and its fundamental and inherent legal, historical and security rights are either wrong or frustrated by the lack of better arguments.

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Iran has dismissed IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Aviv Kochavi's warning against a return to the 2015 nuclear deal and his declaration he had ordered the Israel Defense Forces to come up with plans for possible offensive action against the country should Israel have to prevent the Iranians from acquiring a nuclear weapon on their own as psychological warfare

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According to Mahmoud Vaezi, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani's chief of staff, Israel is concerned by US President Joe Biden's administration's independent approach and is trying through such statements to prevent Washington from returning to the Iran nuclear deal. An Iranian army spokesman emphasized Iran would defend itself from any aggression.

Things, however, are a bit more complicated than the Iranians would like us to believe.

Even if Kochavi's statements were aimed at making Israel's fervent opposition to a return to the nuclear deal perfectly clear to the White House, the ones engaging in far more significant psychological warfare to convince the US to return to the accord are the Iranians themselves.

Iran's Foreign Minister Mohammad Zarif published an article in Foreign Affairs, the prestigious international relations and US foreign policy magazine with ties to the new administration. In his piece, Zarif laid out Iran's demands for the US return to the spokespeople for Tehran in recent days.

Moreover, the Iranians have not sufficed with words. They are backing up their psychological warfare with steps that shorten the breakout time for them to produce a nuclear weapon by announcing plans to enrich uranium to 20%, installing advanced centrifuges at the Natanz nuclear facility, and accumulating a large amount of uranium that has been enriched 4.5% to acquire uranium metal usable in nuclear warheads.

Yet these steps are not just aimed at acquiring a weapon; they are aimed at pressuring the US to return to the nuclear deal by providing justification for such a move and presenting the maximalist policies of former US President Donald Trump's administration as a failure. Iran's clear preference to return to the deal and its energetic efforts to this end are themselves proof that Kochavi was correct in his analysis that a return to the deal is good for Tehran and threatens regional and global peace as well as Israel's security.

The attempt by Tehran to present a willingness to defend the infrastructure that allows it to legitimately obtain an arsenal of 10 nuclear weapons reflects not only an ongoing effort to improve its relevant military capabilities but also the deterrent effect of the IDF chief of staff's remarks. Iran has not suddenly grown overly confident. It has been deterred from challenging the Americans following the assassination of Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani. In the past, Iran refrained from challenging either the US or Israel, out of recognition of their capabilities.

In other words, despite their claims otherwise, the Iranians are likely taking Kochavi's remarks very seriously, very seriously indeed.

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