Nuclear weapons can be manufactured in two ways: The first is using uranium, which requires building large enrichment facilities and installing centrifuges, similar to what Iran is doing; and the second is using plutonium, which requires building a nuclear reactor, which is what Syrian President Bashar Assad decided to do.
When setting out to destroy a nuclear reactor like the one Syria was building in 2007, one has to follow three critical steps: the first is isolating the threat, which hinges on intelligence gathering and analysis and substantiating the fact that a nuclear reactor exists; the second is deciding on the nature of the response, in this case, to destroy the reactor; and the third is executing that response, a stage that in 2007 was carried out by the Israeli Air Force.
In hindsight, we can see where Israel calculated its steps properly and where it relied on luck – something that cannot be trusted should another incident of this kind take place.
From what we know, it seems the biggest issues laid with detecting the threat. Even though there were those in Military Intelligence who suspected that Syria was pursuing a military nuclear program, the reactor in Deir ez-Zor was discovered in the 11th hour. This cannot happen in a country like Israel, which engages in constant intelligence gathering.
The main lesson here is to always question and doubt and to understand that we have no idea what it is that we don't know, meaning that the lack of information does not mean information does not exist. Intelligence is always lacking and there is always a need to gather more of it.
It is very difficult to balance the need to discover the unknown with the need to wisely allocate resources. It is easy to criticize matters in hindsight, but making decisions in real-time is very challenging because the resources are always limited.
It seems that in this case, decision-makers, led by then-Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, pursued the right course of action, including when making the decision to keep mum after the nuclear reactor was destroyed, so as to make it easier for Assad to contain the incident.
The IAF's mission was also a resounding success, but here, too, we must keep things in proportion. Given Syria's proximity to Israel, bombing the Deir ez-Zor reactor was easier than the 1981 strike on the Iraqi nuclear reactor south of Baghdad, and it was exponentially less complex and dangerous than any potential strike Israel may have to consider in the future on the nuclear facilities in Iran.
