It is too early to tell whether what has been dubbed "the first kite war" is over. This goes beyond the necessary caution, as the distrust between Israel and Hamas is still very high and all it would take is one border or arson terrorism incident to provoke a rapid escalation that could quickly spiral out of control. Still, for now, it seems the flames that have been scorching the Gaza-vicinity communities daily since late April are subsiding and normalcy is back within reach.
This will take days, perhaps weeks, as incendiary kites and balloons will not become a thing of the past overnight. Even on Wednesday, when Palestinian media reported that Hamas had made a strategic decision to scale back its arson terrorism campaign, dozens of fires raged in Israeli border towns, devouring more and more forest and agricultural lands on top of the some 9,000 acres that have already fallen prey to the flames.
If and when the dust settles, we will have to review what made so many politicians, generals and pundits demand the military launch a war Israel has no interest in waging and from which it could gain only questionable achievements. It seems circumstances gave way to a rare combination of irresponsible ministers, a ridiculous opposition trying to be more right-wing than the government, bored media outlets, a military whose captains thought they have to prove they remember how to fight, and an enemy that for a minute was confused enough to think it had the upper hand.
These elements combined resulted in a situation in which even the most optimistic individuals among top government and defense officials nearly gave up, saying that unless something drastically changed, the next full-fledged war between Israel and Hamas was mere days away.
It is highly likely that what prevented this war was Hamas leaders' understanding – late as it was – that Israel means business and that its warnings are not for show.
It is doubtful, however, that Hamas knew how serious Israel was in its warning that if need be, it will launch another military campaign in the Gaza Strip. Over the past two weeks, various IDF units in the Gaza sector were preparing and training for a potential ground incursion of the coastal enclave; orders were upgraded and revised; reservist officers were called in for briefings; the Artillery and Intelligence corps were placed on high alert, and the General Staff was pouring over plans for a potential assault, all while Israel was sparing no effort to defuse the highly volatile situation.
Logic prevailed
The kite terrorism campaign was born somewhere in late April, on the fourth week of the Hamas-orchestrated border riot campaign that was launched a month earlier.
Trying to disguise violent demonstrations as innocent civilian protests, Hamas sent hundreds of teenagers and children to fly kites just outside the rioting area. But wind conditions changed unexpectedly and some of the kites flu east, heading toward Israeli border towns.
Hamas realized it had a new instrument with which to challenge Israel and its logistical branch began manufacturing thousands of kites rigged with small baskets carrying burning coals and other combustible materials. The kites were sent over the border at noon, when the winds traditionally blow east and once they crashed in Israeli fields, fires were sparked and with them – hysteria.
The IDF took its time in devising a response, which is something that should be investigated. First, the military tried intercepting incendiary kites using various methods – mostly drone technology – but to limited success.
Then came an effort to deter kite terrorist cells, which proved tactically problematic: As the kites were being launched hundreds of yards away from the border, they were out of effective sniper range. This prompted the IDF to use aircraft to target kite terrorist cells, making sure to fire near them and not directly at them because for the most part, the cells comprised teenagers.
Education Minister Naftali Bennett's assertion in cabinet meetings that the IDF should have targeted these cells directly may be logical, but it is also illegal. The IDF cannot order the targeted killing of an individual based on the mere suspicion that he was flying incendiary kites, and senior officers were and remain adamantly against targeting a group of teens over the actions of one individual.
This goes beyond international optics and the potential for rapid escalation – this is a purely legal matter pertaining to the rules of war, which the government has debated through and through numerous times. It is also a question of morals and ethics.
The argument that the IDF sought to avoid another military campaign in Gaza is not unfounded, but not because of the ridiculous motives some have been peddling to the public.
It is not fear that made the IDF wary of another military campaign in Gaza – after all, we are talking about Hamas, which is a medium-sized enemy at best. If anything, the IDF was driven by logic as at this time, no one knows what the objectives of another war in Gaza are or how the fighting could end.
Hesitation likely also stemmed from the Diplomatic-Security Cabinet's strategic decision to focus on the northern sector, where Israel is sparing no effort to prevent Iran from entrenching itself militarily in Syria.
One must also remember that military officials have already stated that the next full-fledged conflict in Gaza is inevitable, especially given last weekend's flare-up in hostilities, during which terrorist groups fired 200 projectiles at Israeli border towns.
The IDF mounted a forceful response, targeting dozens of Hamas assets in Gaza, while the Islamist terrorist group changed its tactics, replacing many of the kites with incendiary balloons that proved easier to handle and ever more complicated for the IDF to neutralize.
Meanwhile, Israel significantly improved its ability to handle fires sparked by these airborne firebombs. The fact that the data on this issue was manipulated to say otherwise and create the wrong public perception should also be investigated.
No one disputes the fact that arson attacks are acts of terror, nor does anyone dispute the harm they can inflict on property and lives. But the fact of the matter is that, fortunately, the fires sparked by Palestinian arson terrorism – now exceeding 1,000 in numbers – did not claim any lives.
Moreover, contrary to media reports, nearly 80% of the area reduced to ash by these fires was not farmlands but rather forest and nature reserves.
This is not something to make light of, as environmental experts say it will take at least 15 years to rehabilitate the damage these fires have caused to the area's flora and fauna, but one thing has to be made clear – Gaza vicinity communities are nowhere near the end of their rope.
Stoking public hysteria did have one positive result: Israel Fire and Rescue Services and the Homefront Command teamed to form a designated firefighting unit to oversee Gaza-vicinity communities and extinguish these fires before they get out of hand. Many of these incidents involved brush fires that were doused with little effort, but the move still helped calm residents down and also sent a clear message to Hamas, namely that it was unable to cause any real damage.
Gaza's rulers, for their part, refused to acknowledge they were engaging in arson terrorism until this week. As far as they were concerned, flying incendiary devices over the border was an innocent, legitimate, popular activity, which is why it retaliated with rocket fire when Israeli aircraft fired warning shots at kite cells. As Gaza logic goes, if Israel violates the "rules of the games" and targets civilians, Hamas can do the same.
Still, Hamas military leader Yahya Sinwar made sure his operatives followed the known parameters of those rules: Hamas fired only at Gaza-vicinity communities, mostly overnight, and made a concerted effort to avoid casualties, so as not to provoke a security escalation.
Here, too, there is a big difference between the "war" – as depicted in media reports and politicians' statements – and the situation on the ground. The fact of the matter is that since Operation Protective Edge in 2014, nine soldiers have been wounded near the Israel Gaza border (one seriously, one moderately and seven lightly) and five civilians sustained minor wounds, four of them this week.
Tactics versus strategy
Israel's declared objective is to restore the calm that was prevalent on the Gaza border until last December, when unrest erupted following U.S. President Donald Trump's decision to recognize Jerusalem as Israel's capital and move his embassy there. Achieving this objective, however, cannot be done using purely military means. Hamas understands the language of "sticks" very well but it also requires the occasional carrot.
The most effective step taken over the past few days was not kinetic but rather civilian, namely shuttering the Kerem Shalom cargo crossing as a warning prior to launching a wide-scale military campaign.
Israel closed the crossing to commercial activity last week and also reduced the fishing zone off Gaza's shores, and this week it temporarily suspended the deliveries of petroleum fuels and natural gas into Gaza. The latter was far more dramatic as it affected not only Gazans, but Hamas itself, as much of what is in its coffers comprises tax revenue.
Israel's move was echoed by Egypt, which shuttered the Rafah crossing. Hamas felt cornered and understood it was time to make a strategic decision between going to war and agreeing to a cease-fire. It chose the latter, but not without getting assurances that compensation was underway: Egypt, in collaboration with U.N. envoy to the Middle East Nickolay Mladenov, is formulating an extensive civilian aid package for Gaza Strip.
Israel will back this move not just to keep war at arm's length – Gaza is on the brink of a humanitarian catastrophe and Israel will be the one that ends up being held responsible for it.
The problem is that so far, all the solutions that have been discussed are tactical, not strategic. As such, they may, at best, defer further escalation, but they will not bring about an actual resolution. The Gaza Strip is in need of a thorough, lengthy rehabilitation process and Israel must, therefore, decide whether to pursue this move with Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas knowing it would require it to crush Hamas; or will it try to promote this process with Hamas, knowing that right now, it is the only Palestinian entity able to deliver.
Anyone who believes that restoring peace and quiet to the southern border will defer this debate is deluding themselves. Israel may have disengaged from Gaza, but the coastal enclave has never disengaged from Israel – and it is about time it did.
Part of this disengagement is physical, via the 3 billion shekels ($860 million) underground barrier currently being built to foil the threat posed by Hamas' grid of terror tunnels.
Once completed, the subterranean barrier being constructed some 820 feet from the border will stretch for 37 miles and be 30 inches wide. It will include a system of advanced sensor and monitoring devices, while above ground there will be a fence 20 feet high, similar to the one which runs along the Israeli-Egyptian border.
The IDF has neutralized 12 cross-border terror tunnels over the past seven months. To illustrate the magnitude of this threat, one of the tunnels, dug under Kibbutz Nirim, about 1.5 miles from Gaza, was wide enough to fit an entire platoon – 30 to 50 people – undiscovered.
Another tunnel discovered recently was U-shaped and was dug from southern Gaza under Egyptian territory and from there into Israel. The IDF destroyed the Israeli end and this week, Egyptian forces began doing the same on their side of the border.
The IDF's premise is that it is highly likely that there are many tunnels that are still undetected, which is another reason why it would prefer to avoid war before the underground barrier is complete.
Work on the subterranean fence is carried out in 25 areas simultaneously and so far nearly 11 miles have been completed, with the barrier slated to become operational in mid-2019. Until then, the IDF will continue searching for terror tunnels using existing technology, so as not to be surprised by a Hamas incursion.
This is one of the most complex and challenging projects currently underway and it combines operational intelligence and technology efforts that demand countless man hours.
Patience is key
As most of us go about our daily routine uninterrupted, the Southern Command's Gaza Brigade is on alert, ready to march to the beat of war drums if necessary.
Those who do not live, work or serve in the Gaza sector will find it difficult to understand how thin the line really is between routine and emergency situations. Local residents are all-too-familiar with the shift from calm routine to a frenzied emergency, as they only have between 10 and 15 seconds to find shelter once the incoming rocket fire alert sounds in the area. The Gaza Brigade is on parallel alert, ready to scramble into action at a moment's notice.
Tensions on the Israel-Gaza border are likely to simmer for the foreseeable future, as it will take time for arson terrorism to wane completely.
Israel has also demanded – and rightfully so – the cessation of the border riots and all subsequent terrorist activity. Hamas, for its part, wants Israel and Egypt to deliver the goods – literally – not just make potentially empty promises. Some of these processes have yet to mature and until they do, every incident on the border has extremely volatile potential that could push the entire sector from sporadic fighting to an all-out war almost instantly. Neither Israel nor Gaza want that, each for its own reasons.
At the end of the week when things almost spiraled out of control, both sides would be wise to go back to operating solely according to their own interests. The alternative is war, and it is doubtful that kite terrorism justifies sacrificing Israeli soldiers' lives.
Israel has been wise in sparing no effort and exhausting all options before embarking on the slippery slope of war, despite the prodding of several politicians and pundits. Another military campaign in Gaza may be inevitable, and it may take place sooner rather than later, but if it does, Israel would be able to honestly assert, domestically and internationally, that it did everything possible to avoid it.
