Were it not for the U.S. midterm elections, the public and media's interest would likely have remained focused exclusively on the American sanctions that were reimposed on Iran this week. Both Washington and Tehran are still at the initial stage of trying to understand what this means, what changes will follow, and what impact these changes will have.
This uncertainty was evident in the Twitter blows Washington and Tehran exchanged this week, as the sanctions were about to come into force on Nov. 5.
U.S. President Donald Trump tweeted a meme with the caption "Sanctions are Coming" – playing off the catchphrase "Winter is Coming" from the popular TV show "Game of Thrones" and even using the same font used in the series – and Iran quickly responded, tweeting a meme of Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani, commander of the Quds Force, the black-ops arm of the country's formidable Revolutionary Guard Corps, featuring the similar font, reading, "I will stand against you."
The sarcastic exchanges provided the desired social media buzz, but real life soon took over and winter has come to Iran. Those who follow Iranian media and its proxies could see a great deal of concern, at the very least, over what the future may bring, especially with respect to what the sanctions mean for ordinary Iranians, and in the larger sense, for Iran's regional interests.
Domestically, Iran has been under pressure for a long time. Hopes that the 2015 nuclear agreement would significantly improve the dire economic situation have long shattered, and present sanctions have and will only make things worse.
This has yet to be expressed in a mass revolt, but the Iranian regime has had to face alarming sites this year: mass demonstrations in almost every city and district, with explicit social slogans that raise clear questions about the regime's priorities, such as "Iran for Iranians" and "Enough interfering in Syria and Lebanon."
Jerusalem and Washington's express hope, as explicitly stated by U.S. National Security Adviser John Bolton, is that the sanctions will deepen this internal crisis to the point of actually threatening the ayatollahs' regime. That, however, is doubtful: the regime in Tehran is strong and over the past decade it has succeeded in crushing larger waves of resistance, using demonstrative and deliberate violence aimed at generating deterrence.
Still, the dilemma will present itself quickly enough, as a clash between President Hassan Rouhani and Soleimani is only a matter of time.
Ideologically, they two are not too far apart as even moderates like Rouhani are still radical and support Iran's aspirations to possess nuclear capabilities and expand its international influence. The difference is in their strategies: Rouhani believes that the regime needs to invest at home, bolster the foundations and venture outward only after the situation stabilizes, while Soleimani wants to continue as before, and as far as he is concerned, establishing Iran's overseas interests is more important than the suffering of the Iranian people.
In the meantime, Iran is trying to have it both ways, postponing what is an inevitable decision. The pressure is felt not only on the Iranian street but also by its proxies, namely in Yemen, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and the Gaza Strip. Lebanon's Hezbollah, for example, has had to enact something of a "crisis economy" in recent months over the Iranian cuts to its budget. Hamas in Gaza, which is always in dire economic straits, also fears that the little Iranian aid it receives will soon dry up.
Soleimani is the one facing this external pressure and he is finding it increasingly more difficult to dispel the concerns expressed by Iran's proxies. Domestically, he will soon have to explain not only where the money is going, but also what are the returns on Iran's sizeable investments.
The Islamic republic has poured billions into its attempts to establish itself militarily in Syria and in arming Hezbollah, to partial success at best. Israel's strategy in Syria has painted Iran into a corner that is very different from where it hoped to be at this point, and in an age of economic crunch, the logic of continuing to invest in expensive weapons shipments that time and again fail to reach their destination is bound to be questioned.
This does not mean that Iran will cease exporting hostilities and terrorism – that goes against its rationale and against the current domestic balance of power. The moderates may have the public's ear, but they wield little political power, especially compared to Soleimani, who is ideologically and personally close to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Nevertheless, Soleimani will also have to rethink his steps, even if only tactically, until such time as things improve.
These processes will take time and nothing will happen tomorrow morning. All parties will try to understand and prepare for what will happen next. The American sanctions in their final form are different than first estimated and are more far-reaching on some issues than on others. Iran still hopes that a mechanism can be devised to circumvent them, but that is doubtful given the speed in which Western companies doubled back on their desire to do business with Tehran so as not to lose their business with the U.S. If anything, this proved what we have always known – when money talks, bullshit walks.
Anyone who wants to know what will happen in the next systems needs to follow the money. Iran, which understands this, is searching for detours. For example, to have Russia sell its oil and transfer the proceeds to Tehran in cash. The main benefit here will be declarative, in the sense of defying the U.S. administration, even if it is not as pragmatic, as it is doubtful whether this money will save the Iranian economy. After all, Iran will need more than the support of China, Russia and Western European countries to weather the storm.
This means that sooner or later Iran will seek a solution. One option, which is not so subtly being hinted at is that Tehran will decide to go for broke and make a mad dash for nuclear weapons or launch a war against Israel in the north. The odds of these scenarios are very low, simply because the regime in Tehran may be radical, but it is not suicidal. The ayatollahs know that such moves would legitimize a stronger strike against them, both militarily and economically, and that they will alienate the few supporters Iran has.
It is more likely that Iran will try to be flexible and pursue some sort of negotiations with the United States, in hope of reaching a new agreement. In fact, rumors of such informal talks have been swirling for quite some time.
In such a case, Iran will have to compromise, accept additional restrictions on its nuclear and ballistic missiles program, as well as on its export of terrorism, in the hope that at some point in the future, this, too, shall pass.
For Israel, every alternative is good news, because it pushes Iran further away from going nuclear, even if only temporarily, all while diminishing the threat it poses from Syria and Lebanon, which in turn spells lower chances of a war in the northern sector.
