The war against Hamas has now reached a strategic turning point. It can continue as a long-term war of attrition to weaken Hamas or it can also provide the platform for a far-reaching regional change. The difference between the two hinges entirely on us.
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The IDF's tactical military gain, even though it has not yet been completed, is creating a strategic opportunity that could pave the way towards an overall regional accord. Heavy hints that have been bandied about recently appear to indicate that a broad regional US initiative is to be proposed to Israel in the near future.
Such an initiative will probably incorporate the following components: a hostage release deal in return for a ceasefire and the release of Palestinian prisoners; Saudi consent to establish diplomatic relations with Israel as part of a peace accord (or normalization); Israeli agreement to the return of the PA (Palestinian Authority) to the Gaza Strip – in some or other format and as a replacement for the current Hamas rule there – and Washington's consent to a US-Saudi defense pact that also includes agreement to a uranium enrichment plant for civilian purposes on Saudi Arabian soil, as well as a large arms package deal.
This, entirely possible deal, poses a severe threat to Iran. A US-Saudi defense pact in tandem with cutting-edge weapon systems for Saudi Arabia, not to mention a Saudi nuclear program, really do constitute a severe threat to Iran. This overall move would also reduce China's influence in the Middle East and renew the US infrastructure alliance initiative from India to the port of Haifa.
For Israel, this in effect represents the end of the Arab–Israeli conflict, gift-wrapped with tremendous economic potential. This also clearly goes beyond the more important fact that all the objectives of the current war would be achieved (a precondition for any such deal is the return of the hostages, that Hamas would cease to rule over the Gaza Strip, while the military threat posed by Hamas will already have been neutralized by the ongoing IDF combat effort there).
The dilemma: a deal or the return of Hamas
One of the most volatile components inherent in such a US initiative, as far as Israel is concerned, is the return of the PA to Gaza and the commitment, however vague, to a two-state solution.
It is important to point out that this goes well beyond a pure political problem. The Israeli public, regardless of its political views, is now extremely bitter and enraged. These feelings have not dissipated despite all the successes on the battlefield and the heavy price that Gaza itself has paid to date. This anger has materialized, among others, in the recently published Channel 12 news outlet opinion poll, in which a large majority of the public is opposed to the continued flow of humanitarian aid into Gaza as long as the Israeli hostages remain captive with Hamas. This is in addition to the extremely uneasy feeling among many in apprehension of a deal that could well include the release of 'heavy' prisoners (those sentenced for murder of Israeli citizens along with figureheads of the Palestinian armed struggle). In summary, there is a clear and understandable lack of desire to gift the Palestinians any such achievement.
After all is said and done, the dilemma still remains between the various options. The current chaos in the Gaza Strip (and avoiding reaching a decision on the above options) will lead to only one outcome – the return of Hamas. As this is an untenable situation and we are not prepared to continue living alongside a Hamas-led government, we must put forward an alternative civilian governmental option in Gaza. Moreover, after it has completed dismantling the remaining Hamas battalions, the IDF will in any event pull out of the Gaza Strip, certainly if a hostage release deal is implemented. A hostage release deal without a regional framework backing it up will leave a Hamas government in place and might even bolster it. This is so as Hamas will be perceived on the Palestinian street as the one organization that has succeeded in embarrassing Israel militarily, it is Hamas that is responsible for distributing food to the Gaza population, and it is Hamas that will have brought about "the restoration of Arab pride" by emptying the prisons in Israel of its Palestinian prisoners.
In summary, in the absence of any viable alternatives, we will effectively be leaving Hamas in power and will be left with the sour taste of frustration at the release of 'heavy' prisoners. Thus, the US initiative is a much better option than a limited deal whose cons far outweigh its pros.
A war of attrition against Hamas
If so, what can we do with the all-too-familiar Palestinian Authority, an entity that is riddled with problems? The PA is not a pro-Israeli Zionist entity, it suffers from severe problems and it is engaged in an ongoing diplomatic and legal struggle against Israel. Having said that, it does enable Israel to take responsibility for the security situation in the area. This is the same PA that the Minister of Defense recently defined as an important asset to Israel's national security. Though the minister did say this in the context of Judea and Samaria, it will still be the same authority (potentially an improved one after undergoing certain reforms) that will operate in the Gaza Strip. If it is good enough for Judea and Samaria then it is apparently preferable to having Hamas rule in Gaza.
If Israel decides to turn down the US initiative and to continue with the military effort as its singular course of action, then it would have to opt for imposing military rule in the Gaza Strip. This is a much more favorable situation than the chaos that would ensue following the return of Hamas to rule the roost in the Gaza Strip.
The clear implication of martial law in the Gaza Strip is the permanent presence of IDF brigades there. This would require a tremendous number of forces to maintain military rule over a long period of time. It has underlying disadvantages in terms of the international community and ramifications on the degree of US support for the war effort. It will have a substantial impact on the Israeli economy as a result of the extended recruitment of reservists, while the constant friction with the local Palestinian population will also have an effect.
This situation is clearly not desirable and it goes against the Israeli government's policy to date. But if this alternative is to be seriously considered, the debate on the "day after" is now more pressing than ever, as such an eventuality would require adaptations to be made to the new situation right now.
If military rule is out of the question, and we do not agree to the US initiative, then in practice we will be responsible for leading the country towards a diplomatic defeat. Though we might continue to win tactical battles, it won't take long for us to become bogged down in a never-ending war of attrition against Hamas. The US initiative will begin to fade once summer arrives, as the US presidential campaign moves into top gear, and if another US president is then elected and the new administration enters office, there will be no guarantee of the initiative's future feasibility or of turning the clock back.
We are now at a critical juncture for making diplomatic decisions with potentially historic consequences. Delaying and procrastinating will only result in us missing what might have been a golden opportunity. It is worthwhile trying to identify that elusive point in time when the military strategy alone reaches the 'point of diminishing returns', and any attempt to extend this effort without an additional supporting framework would lead to failure. Let's hope that our leaders have the sense to identify that tipping point, as it approaches at great speed and will pass us by at great speed too.
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