The rescue operation of four Israeli hostages from the Gaza Strip on Saturday is an intelligence and operational achievement of the highest order, the complexity of which is hard to describe. The moments of jubilation and joy are understandable and justified. However, we must remember that we cannot rely on such operations and successes as the only or primary way to release the remaining 120 hostages, both living and deceased.
The complexity of such a rescue operation includes dozens of intelligence and operational components. It's enough for just one of them to not work perfectly for the entire operation to fail.
The intelligence required for such an operation is not based on general information but must reach maximum resolution, such as The exact building, apartment, and room; who is in the apartment; how many guards; the weapons they have; nearby buildings, enemy forces in the immediate and peripheral perimeter; and dozens of other details. All intelligence components require real-time verification up until the order is given.
Operational complexities
The ability to convert intelligence into operational capability, under difficult conditions and especially in daylight, is not a given. Few units are capable of carrying out such a mission with complete success. This is the art of several special units in the IDF, Yamam, and Shin Bet. Therefore, the preparation for such an operation takes many days, sometimes even weeks and months. Until they know how to present all contingencies and responses and demonstrate "risk management and minimization," the forces will not receive approval to launch the operation.
For illustrative purposes, and without compromising information security, I'll mention some of the operational complexities: the ability to create surprise in daylight, the ability to reach the specific room where the hostages are held in zero time, in a way that prevents the guards from killing the hostages. We're talking about seconds and fractions of seconds. The ability to create an operational space that isolates resistance and intervention from surrounding forces. The ability to evacuate the freed hostages unharmed under fire and then evacuate all involved forces. In many ways (except for the flight component), the complexity of this operation is even higher than the heroic Entebbe operation in 1976.
A salute is due to many in the system, led by the IDF chief of staff, the head of the Shin Bet, the head of Military Intelligence Aharon Haliva, Major General (res.) Nitzan Alon, the commander of the Yamam, the commander of the Israeli Air Force, and the commanders of the executing units. Appreciation is due to those who approved the operation– the prime minister and the minister of defense.
Time to come to our senses
But here I want to move from the momentary and important euphoria to the magnitude of the challenge before us and the depth of the strategic failure we are in. I hope that the state's leaders will not use this uplifting moment to shore up their own political image by ignoring the depth of the crisis and the risk to the remaining hostages and Israel's security in general.
Such operations will not return all the hostages, even though every intelligence and operational opportunity should continue to be pursued. Without a deal, without leverage, without leadership courage, without vision, and with political foresight, we will not succeed in rescuing the rest of the hostages.
The refusal to introduce an alternative civilian control to Hamas perpetuates the rule of the terrorist organization in the strip. Blatant disregard for a political-strategic outlook misses an additional pressure lever and distances us from the world's nations to the point of a highly dangerous international isolation. The fear of making tough decisions due to coalition constraints could lead us to total failure.
It's time to come to our senses and move from a political strategy to a security-diplomatic strategy.
The author previously served as the head of the Military Intelligence Directorate
