The Houthi military has just graduated its third cohort of elite fighters, who are being trained to launch raids on Israel proper.
The name given to this group, "Tufan al-Aqsa" (Al-Aqsa Flood), is the same as the one Hamas used for its October 7 massacre. This choice only solidifies the deep connection the Houthis maintain with Gaza, in whose name they continue to launch missile attacks on Israel. One might be tempted to dismiss their vision of unleashing another round of devastation as pure fantasy: the distance alone presents a formidable obstacle even for elite fighters showcased in slickly produced YouTube videos.
Yet their declaration serves as a warning: this invasion plan very much exists, albeit currently in a nascent stage. But it could resurface, unexpectedly and dangerously, at any time. The Houthi threat demands continuous monitoring to ensure they don't stage a surprise maritime or land assault, potentially targeting the critical port of Eilat or a vulnerable kibbutz.
It is essential, however, to assess this situation from a broader strategic perspective, one that should guide how Israel reinforces its borders in the years to come. On at least three of these borders - Lebanon, Syria and Jordan - Israel faces likely instability at best, and serious threats at worst. Events in Syria last week provided a stark reminder. Fantasies of sipping hummus in Damascus have evaporated, replaced by brutal realities reminiscent of the Islamic State's bloodiest chapters.
Horror in Sweida
The horrific images emerging from Sweida were unbearable: systematic executions by gunfire and defenestration, rapes (including of minors in front of their parents), and looting. The bloodshed there is unlikely to be resolved soon, if ever.
A responsible Israeli response to these events would involve two key actions. First, an honest assessment of whether it was possible to foresee what happened, and whether its consequences could have been mitigated.
If there was any miscommunication with Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa in alleged recent talks with Israeli officials, or if Israeli representatives were deceived by his seeming charm, those gaps must be acknowledged.
Secondly, it's crucial to consider whether Israel responded appropriately on the ground: tactically, in handling Druze movement across the border with Syria; and strategically, in avoiding a quagmire that nearly ensnared Israel, thanks in large part to the prime minister's military secretary, Maj. Gen. Roman Gofman, whose proposed actions could have drawn Israel into a major ground operation deep inside Syria.
