Half a year after the "Rising Lion" war, it appears that despite Israel's impressive achievements, little has fundamentally changed. Iran is rebuilding its missile array, rehabilitating its nuclear capabilities, and remains unwilling to accept an agreement that would prevent it from enriching uranium on its own soil or limit its nuclear program. Worse still, Tehran is preparing for another confrontation with Israel, seeking to implement the lessons it drew from the previous war. The Iranian regime continues to grapple with complex internal challenges, yet even now there is no opposition that appears to threaten its future.
This week, both Iran and Israel marked six months since the war, a milestone that allows for an assessment of the operation's achievements, which senior Israeli officials have described as a "victory."
There is no doubt that Israel achieved highly impressive results in this campaign. Senior figures in Iran's security leadership were eliminated, alongside leading nuclear scientists. The Israeli Air Force achieved full control of Tehran's airspace, enabling it to strike Iran's missile launch systems severely. All of this, of course, made it possible for Israel, together with the US, to inflict serious damage on the enrichment facilities at Natanz and Fordow, as well as the conversion facility in Isfahan.
However, these operational successes did not translate into a true strategic achievement, because from Tehran's perspective, Iran did not actually lose the war. In Iran's view, it not only managed to continue launching missiles until the final day of the fighting and stood firm against Israel and the US, but Israel also failed in what Tehran perceived as an attempt to topple the Iranian regime. Even if this was not the declared objective of the campaign, Iran interpreted Israel's actions, particularly the strike on Evin Prison and Basij headquarters, as moves aimed at regime change, in line with statements made by senior Israeli officials on the matter.
For Iran, this is not merely rhetoric for the record. The understanding in Tehran is that the country stood firm during the war, and the leadership's ability to present the conflict to the Iranian public as one directed against the Iranian people themselves ultimately strengthened the regime. As a result, the leadership sees no reason to change its security strategy.
This reality, together with Iran's understanding that another round with Israel is only a matter of time, is driving Tehran toward a conventional arms race, with an emphasis on rebuilding its missile array while, in its view, implementing the lessons of the previous campaign to improve its capabilities. Moreover, in the nuclear arena, despite the severe damage to nuclear sites that prevents Iran from returning to industrial-scale enrichment that brought it to the threshold of military-grade enrichment, the knowledge that exists in Iran, combined with centrifuges that were not damaged and nuclear sites such as "Mount Kolang Gaz" south of Natanz, enable it at some point in the future to resume enrichment in a way that would allow it to take the enriched material already in Iran, including 408 kilograms enriched to 60 percent, and enrich it to military grade.
It is true that the campaign against Israel exacerbated the Iranian regime's challenges, which already include a series of unprecedented difficulties such as drought and a severe economic crisis. But the regime continues to maintain firm control over the population, even easing enforcement on issues such as wearing the hijab in order to prevent the reemergence of mass protests. The regime's central problem is its dependence on sanctions relief to improve the country's economy. At present, however, it cannot reach an agreement with the US administration, which assumes that the regime's weakness will ultimately force it to agree to relinquish enrichment and limit its missile program.
The improvement of Iran's capabilities on the one hand, and Israeli threats on the other, combined with the currently low likelihood of an agreement between Washington and Tehran, significantly increase the probability of another war between Iran and Israel. Against the backdrop of Iran's proven ability to recover, particularly in the missile field, the question arises: what can actually be gained from a new round of fighting? This is especially relevant given that the ability to strike the regime itself has proven problematic, particularly in the absence of an Iranian opposition capable of taking control of the country.
Moreover, every day that passes without a diplomatic agreement that restricts Iran's force buildup significantly erodes Israeli achievements. Iran's supreme leader has appointed experienced figures to replace those who were killed, and Tehran is currently pursuing Russia and China in an effort to acquire new capabilities in air defense, missiles, and perhaps even nuclear technology.
Even if the unimaginable were to happen and the Iranian regime were to collapse, there is no certainty that this would be a positive development. On the contrary, such a scenario could prove particularly problematic, primarily because the most organized and powerful force in Iran today is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. In the event of a collapse of civilian rule, there is a real risk of a military takeover in Tehran and the establishment of an even more hardline regime, with fewer checks and balances than the current one. In any case, hope is not a strategy, and policy toward Iran cannot be based on the assumption that the regime will collapse. Despite the many challenges it faces, the regime has demonstrated impressive resilience over the years, in part due to the absence of a significant, organized opposition.
Ultimately, it is precisely the success of the "Rising Lion" war that necessitates renewed Israeli thinking on the Iranian front. If even after nearly ideal "starting conditions" Israel is effectively back to square one, it is difficult to see how a policy based on repeating the same actions while expecting different results would serve Israel's interests. Moreover, future confrontations with Iran are likely to be more complex and more difficult, and there is no certainty that they will yield achievements beyond those already attained in "Rising Lion."
