Iran
No one can predict what will happen in Iran, or when. Experts agree that what is unfolding is unprecedented and signals change, because the regime has no real solution to the root problems behind the crisis: a collapsing economy, crumbling national infrastructure, and a growing sense of alienation between citizens and their country.
In theory, the regime has four possible paths. The first is to do nothing and see what develops. That would almost certainly lead to a twilight period at the end of which Iran would cease to exist in its current form. The second is to use overwhelming force to crush the protests. The concern is that President Donald Trump would respond, as he has warned and as he did in Venezuela. The third option is to reach an agreement with the West that would include far-reaching concessions on Iran's nuclear and missile programs and ease the stranglehold on the Iranian economy. Such a move would run counter to the course Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has pursued until now. The fourth is to initiate a war against an external enemy, in the hope that it would push domestic problems aside and unite the Iranian public against a national threat. It is doubtful this would achieve the desired result, given the growing hostility toward the regime and its leader.
It is unclear what Khamenei will decide. For now, he is deciding not to decide. That forces other players, including Israel, into watching from the sidelines, even as some of them are eager to give events a push. Examples include a superfluous video posted on social media by Minister Gila Gamliel, or a tweet from the popular Mossad Farsi X account that read: "Take to the streets together. The time has come. We are with you not only from afar and verbally. We are with you on the ground as well." The tweet sparked internal controversy within the security establishment among officials who disliked what could be seen as harmful meddling at a particularly critical moment.
In the background is the growing discussion of a possible renewal of the war with Iran, raised this week from both directions. One scenario is that Iran could initiate an attack on Israel. The other is that Israel could decide to strike Iran again to slow its renewed missile buildup. Based on foreign media reports, neither scenario is theoretical. The decisive figure will be Trump, who holds the traffic light: red for Iran, green for Israel, and perhaps a flashing yellow in which discretion is left to the drivers, meaning the leaders themselves.
F-35
The Israeli Air Force's phenomenal success in the war with Iran has led to an unexpected problem. Countries around the world, especially in the Middle East, saw Israel's absolute air superiority and decided they want it too.
Such superiority is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to replicate, because it is not built on a single component. It is the product of outstanding aircraft fitted with advanced systems, some of them unique, sophisticated command and control arrays, integration among all relevant air and ground components, deep partnership between the operator, the Israeli Air Force, and the manufacturer in the US and Israel's defense industries, and above all decades of accumulated operational experience across diverse and shifting arenas at varying levels of intensity. It is also the result of rigorous selection and a culture of excellence, culminating in commanders and pilots who are markedly better than anything the other side can field.
Among all these components, one stands out as the focus of global momentum: the F-35 stealth fighter, one of the stars of the war with Iran. The Israeli Air Force leveraged the aircraft not only for stealth missions but also as force multipliers that propelled the entire fleet forward. This was reflected in faster and more precise destruction of Iran's air defense systems, real-time intelligence collection and dissemination, prioritization and allocation of missions, shorter operational timelines, and the achievement of the air superiority that resonated with everyone in the field, friends and foes alike, as well as fence-sitters.
As soon as the war ended, requests began to pour in. Numerous countries approached the US administration and the aircraft's manufacturer, Lockheed Martin, seeking to acquire it. Some were already on the list and asked to accelerate deliveries, mainly European countries such as Germany, Romania, Greece, Finland, the Czech Republic and Switzerland. Others already operate F-35s and want more aircraft, including Britain and France. Still others want to join the club, among them Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
The third group is particularly troubling for Israel, for two reasons. First, a non-Israeli air force could gain advanced capabilities that would challenge Israel's qualitative edge. Second, once those countries commit funds, they enter the production queue, which by definition pushes Israel further down the line.
That queue is not theoretical. It is a matter of national security. The Israeli Air Force currently operates 45 F-35s and is expected to receive five more in the coming months, completing its first two squadrons. Deliveries for a third squadron, already agreed upon, are scheduled to begin in 2028 and conclude in the early 2030s. At that point, the air force would operate 75 F-35s. Within the service, however, there is talk of an acute need for a fourth squadron, meaning 100 aircraft, to preserve sufficient air power to ensure the required superiority.
To acquire another squadron, Israel must secure a place on the production and delivery list. But Jerusalem is dragging its feet, and it is also unclear from which budget the additional squadron would be funded, since the current US-Israel security assistance agreement is set to expire at the end of 2028. The Israel Defense Forces had hoped for progress on the issue following the Trump-Netanyahu summit, which they expected would lead to a new assistance agreement for the following decade. For Israel, the stakes are enormous, nearly $40 billion. Without such an agreement, it would have to pay for each aircraft in shekels.
These mega-deals also bring additional dividends. As part of the F-35 program, there is industrial cooperation valued at $6.5 billion. Under this framework, Israel Aerospace Industries manufactures the aircraft's wings, and Elbit Systems produces the pilots' helmets. A similar arrangement exists with Boeing, which manufactures the F-15IA aircraft that the Israeli Air Force plans to acquire in a single squadron, alongside the third F-35 squadron. Here, too, Israel has an option to purchase an additional squadron that has not yet been exercised.
Israel should assume it will not be able to indefinitely prevent other countries in the region from acquiring advanced aircraft and cutting-edge technologies. This includes Turkey, which was among the founding members of the F-35 project, was removed from it, and is now seeking to rejoin under the auspices of the friendship between Trump and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. That prospect is deeply worrying for Israel. The solution must involve not only efforts to delay the red side's buildup but also accelerating the blue side's own procurement. This applies not just to advanced aircraft but also to additional purchases of assault and attack helicopters. The government is well aware of the need. A decision is required.
