It seems something has been happening in Saudi Arabia. Recently, the Kingdom has adopted an overly harsh tone toward Israel. Against this backdrop, a question arises: is the Kingdom we knew, as a sworn enemy of the Iranian regime and the prime candidate for normalization, going to change direction?
The answer lies primarily within the Kingdom itself. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman identifies many opportunities in Israel, but one major risk. Alongside the diplomatic, economic, and security fruits from relations with Jerusalem, he is aware that this is an explosive issue in Saudi Arabia that could damage his standing. Within the Saudi royal house exists an entire wing that strongly opposes establishing official relations with Israel. This reluctance is not only connected to the Palestinians, who serve mainly as a diplomatic excuse. It is primarily connected to their perception of Israel as a factor competing with them for regional hegemony. From their perspective, this is a zero-sum game.
The figure who symbolizes this line is former intelligence chief Prince Turki al-Faisal. The 80-year-old prince is one of King Faisal's sons. While his father opposed even the partition plan, Turki al-Faisal conditions relations with Israel on acceptance of the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative (proposing full Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories in exchange for recognition). This initiative includes Israel's withdrawal from all territories of the Golan Heights, Judea and Samaria, and east Jerusalem, and the establishment of a Palestinian state. Turki al-Faisal is the one who has raised the nuclear weapons issue over the years and complains about Israeli influence in Washington. After bin Salman's recent visit to the White House, he praised the cancellation of the bias in favor of Israel regarding trade in advanced weapons.
Normalization for the Crown Prince carries one major risk. It is not a small wing. It is enough to mention that today thousands of princes live in Saudi Arabia and abroad who are descendants or relatives of the state's founder, Ibn Saud. In this sense, the clichéd expression "a figure in the Saudi royal house" loses its value. After all, not everyone among them holds a position of influence. Some of them can be businesspeople and nothing more. Nevertheless, they constitute a power group whose mood the ruler must take into account. Since the outbreak of the regional war, Israel has been perceived by them as a power whose hand is in everything – from involvement in Syria, through recognition of Somaliland, to Lebanon and Yemen. They do not see Jerusalem as an ally, but as a competitor.
Beyond veteran princes like Faisal, there is also the religious establishment. Despite bin Salman's attempts to weaken the clerics from the conservative Wahhabi (ultra-orthodox Sunni Islamic movement) stream, while promoting reforms in women's status, opening the economy, and removing constraints from cultural life in the Kingdom – in Mecca you can still hear that same old refrain. In Friday sermons, the imams still preach against "the Jews" and for "victory for Palestine from Allah." Their traditional antisemitism has not gone anywhere. In the Kingdom, incidentally, they do not try to hide this and broadcast the speeches on television channels and social networks.
The third group bin Salman considers is the young generation – a significant power base in his view. In the social media era, Israel became a pariah state during the Gaza war. Despite attempts by Saudi channels to present a more balanced picture than Qatari channels, Israel is still perceived as the main culprit in Gaza's destruction and not Hamas and other Palestinian terrorist organizations. A poll published last summer by the Washington Institute presented disturbing results. In the months after the October 7 massacre, there was a spike in positive perception of Hamas. 95% did not believe Hamas murdered civilians, 88% supported severing contacts with Israel. If there is good news, it is that in 2025, there has been a certain reversal of this trend.
From here, the Crown Prince must navigate between his personal positions and the Kingdom's political landscape. In this environment, it is convenient for him to present himself as an adversarial factor to Israel in the diplomatic arena. A diplomatic player leading a wave of recognition of a Palestinian state in the West, and competing with Jerusalem as Washington's main ally in the Middle East. From his perspective, there is no rush regarding relations with Israel. A factor that maintains the "existing order" in Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, Somalia, and Sudan – and does not seek to change it. Moreover, he presents a model of "active conservatism."
In Syria, the Crown Prince acted to weave a warm relationship between Ahmed al-Sharaa's (also known as Abu Mohammad al-Julani) government and the Trump administration. The fruits of this connection, Damascus is now reaping with the pushing of Kurdish forces to the northeastern corner and the conquest of territories that were under their control. In southern Yemen, Riyadh went on a diplomatic and aerial operation to suppress the rise of the separatists – those who hinted at a desire for an alliance with Israel. Surprisingly, this limited intervention succeeded in curbing the rebellion for now. Even in Lebanon, the Saudis are operating levers to strengthen the army and government against Hezbollah. Accordingly, in East Africa, Saudi Arabia opposed Israeli recognition of Somaliland and supported Somalia's claims. In Sudan, it stood behind the institutional army and its commander, al-Burhan.
Currently, in the "competition for regional hegemony" against Israel, Saudi Arabia's hand is on top.
