The extremely limited conditions under which the Rafah Crossing reopened on Sunday represent a major and twofold achievement for Israel. Major, because they are vastly better than the situation that prevailed on the eve of the massacre. Twofold, because Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu managed to fend off intense international pressure to allow the facility to operate under far inferior standards.
Until October 6, 2023, the Rafah Crossing and the surrounding Philadelphi Corridor functioned as Hamas' smuggling heartland. Weapons flowed freely into the Gaza Strip, above ground and below it. Israel may not have fully grasped the implications at the time, but in any case it was powerless to act. Under the 2005 disengagement plan, and against the recommendation of the IDF, then prime minister Ariel Sharon ordered a complete withdrawal from the Gaza-Egypt border. That decision left Israel without any ability to stop the flood of weapons.
At a later stage, a European Union monitoring force ostensibly inspected those passing through the crossing. Israelis watched from afar via cameras, with no real ability to intervene. When Hamas seized control of Gaza in June 2007, the European monitors fled for their lives, and even the minimal screening that had existed came to an end. It later emerged, incidentally, that the last European ambassador to Gaza was the one who demonstrated to Hamas operatives how to use hang gliders. We know how that ended.
That era of total lawlessness is over. Yes, the Rafah Crossing has resumed operations, but this time in a completely different manner. Goods will not pass through it at this stage, only people, and that is a dramatic difference. Israel will approve the identity of every individual entering or leaving the Strip and will also determine the permitted numbers in each direction.
Everyone, in both directions, will be inspected by the European monitoring force that has returned to operate at the site. More importantly, all those entering the Gaza Strip will be required to undergo additional security screening conducted by Israel. IDF soldiers themselves will not physically scan those entering Gaza, but various technological tools will be deployed on site. If a problem arises, IDF troops are positioned in the surrounding area.
Here lies the greatest difference between the prewar reality and the present one. As a result of Netanyahu's insistence on both capturing the Philadelphi Corridor and the city of Rafah, and refusing under any circumstances to withdraw from them, the smuggling bonanza that once defined the area has come to an end.
Israeli troops on the ground are constantly probing the terrain, searching for tunnels and smuggling routes, and are also killing terrorists, as seen just two days ago. This marks a dramatic reversal and the erasure of one of the most severe damages caused by the disengagement. Israel has once again become the actor holding the key to Gaza's heavy gates. That happened because someone was willing to put in the extra hours defending Israel's security interests.
Is this perfect? No. The best option would have been to open the crossing only for outbound traffic. And of course, it would have been preferable for Israelis to physically inspect those entering, to prevent smuggling. We have already learned that technology alone is not enough.
However, Israel agreed to reopen the Rafah Crossing as part Trump's 20-point plan to end the war. This agreement was one of many concessions, made in exchange for what was meant to be the return of all the hostages.
For anyone who does not yet know, Israeli public opinion elevated the return of the hostages to the top of its list of priorities. For many in Israeli media and the opposition, it became the sole objective, to the point where expressing any other view was deemed unacceptable. Anyone who dared to argue, for example, that destroying Hamas should take precedence over the return of the hostages was metaphorically stoned in the public square. That was the fate of Southern Command Maj. Gen. Yaniv Asor, Tzvika Mor, and right-wing politicians.
In that atmosphere, after two years of war, the government was left with no choice but to concede a little. Still, what was conceded under those circumstances, in return for the enormous prize of the hostages, and compared with the situation at the Rafah Crossing before the war, pales in comparison with proposals that were floated not to enter the Philadelphi Corridor at all, or to withdraw from it in exchange for only some of the hostages. Those were the real alternatives on the table. A bit of integrity and honesty would not hurt critics.
