This Friday, key players will meet in Istanbul, each trapped. Steve Witkoff, Trump's envoy, and Jared Kushner will meet with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi. But also at the table: the foreign ministers of Turkey, Qatar, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Oman, and Pakistan. This is an arena where each player is trying to escape their own trap at the expense of the others.
In June 2025, when Trump bombed Iran's nuclear facilities, the picture was relatively simple: America in a position of strength, Iran paralyzed. Eight months later, everyone is trapped. Trump dispatched a "massive armada" to the Gulf and promised "violence if necessary." Now he must return with a result. For Trump, honor is no less structural than it is for Tehran. Returning empty-handed is not an option.
But what are his options? A symbolic strike would be worse than no strike at all. It would give Iran a narrative of "standing up to America" without degrading its capabilities. Regime change? That would require military or Guards elements willing to defect and lead under American sponsorship. That does not exist. American regime change attempts have consistently failed.
One option remains: a deal that looks like victory. The problem is that Iran needs exactly the same thing.
When honor is a matter of life and death
The Iranian regime finds itself in its most precarious position since 1979. The economy is collapsing, the rial lost a third of its value in a single month, and the January protests left thousands dead and tens of thousands detained. The European Union designated the Revolutionary Guards as a terrorist organization, further isolating Tehran.
Iran needs sanctions relief to survive. But it cannot afford to appear defeated.
In the West, "honor" is perceived as an emotional concept, almost decorative. In the Middle East, it is structural. A regime that appears to have "surrendered" loses legitimacy, not only in the eyes of its people but in the eyes of its proxies and the enemies circling it. This is why Iran insists on negotiating "nuclear issues only" and refuses to discuss missiles and proxies. Not because it is unwilling to compromise, but because overt concession equals loss of honor.
The paradox is that the weaker the regime becomes, the stronger it needs to appear. This narrows its flexibility precisely when flexibility is most needed.
This dynamic is already playing out: in recent days, Iran has demanded moving the talks from Istanbul to Oman and shifting from a multilateral format to bilateral talks with the U.S. alone. A regional summit with seven foreign ministers watching feels too much like a surrender ceremony.
Turkey, Qatar, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia present themselves as a "bridge" between Washington and Tehran. But the mediators have interests of their own.
The ideal situation from their perspective is precisely what exists now: a weakened Iran, an exhausted Shiite axis, but no total collapse that would bring chaos and refugees. They do not want a regional war. But neither do they want an Iran freed from sanctions, with oil flowing and Iranians building a competing economic empire.
There is a dangerous possibility no one discusses openly: if Iran weakens enough, who will inherit the proxies? Turkey and Qatar could become the new "ideological home" for Islamist movements, serving as both hotel and bank. This is not a scenario they wish to prevent.
The day after that no one is planning
The question over Istanbul: what happens if the Iranian regime falls? No one knows. There is no organized opposition inside Iran. Reza Pahlavi is a nostalgic symbol, not a leader with an apparatus. There is no coordination with military or Guards elements prepared to lead an orderly transition.
This is precisely why everyone, including Trump, seeks a diplomatic solution. Not because they believe a deal will solve the problem, but because they fear the alternative.
There is one player not at the table: the Iranian people. They lose in every scenario. If negotiations succeed, the regime survives. If they fail, strikes or harsher sanctions follow, hitting civilians first. If the regime collapses without planning, chaos follows.
A deal that leaves the regime in power, even without missiles and without a nuclear program, is still a bad deal for the 85 million Iranians who took to the streets in January and paid a terrible price.
What to expect from Istanbul
To understand whether Istanbul produces a real deal or just buying time, watch for several signs: Does a document of principles emerge, or merely "continued talks"? Is there a creative solution for the stockpile of enriched uranium? Does some formula appear for missiles and proxies, even if not in the agreement itself? Do oil prices remain low, a sign that markets believe in diplomacy?
And there is always the possibility that Trump, unpredictable as ever, will choose the military path after all.
Meanwhile, the armada waits in the Gulf. And everyone is trapped.
The writer is vice president of the Jerusalem Center for Foreign Affairs and Security.
