This coming Wednesday is set to be a dramatic day in the history of Israel's relations with its American ally. Despite the close and ongoing political and security cooperation between Jerusalem and Washington, gaps that have recently emerged between the two in perspective, threat perception and priorities in the Iranian front have made an urgent leaders-level meeting unavoidable.
This is the case even before a dialogue dynamic has taken shape between the US administration and Iran's leadership, and before the outlines, parameters and principles under which the sides might agree to try to move forward have been formulated. From Israel's standpoint, once principles are set and the negotiating framework is channeled into a specific and narrow track focused on the nuclear issue, it will be difficult for the White House, despite the sharp disputes that are certain to cloud talks even on that front, to later reassess a "nuclear first" strategy if that indeed becomes the initial focus of the discussions.
Against this backdrop of Israeli concerns over modular diplomacy that seeks a breakthrough on one front, however important, while postponing discussion of the core issues of the ballistic missile threat and Tehran's continued support for its violent proxies in the region to a later stage, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's decision to meet President Donald Trump as early as possible is understandable.
As the son of a historian, Netanyahu is likely well aware of the legacy of former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, whose operational diplomatic code was anchored in separating problem sets. The aim was to achieve progress in one front in order to create a foundation of mutual trust, which Kissinger viewed as the key to subsequent progress on other fronts.
That diplomatic style reached its fullest and most successful expression in February 1972, when the US and China, after a gradual and complex process, chose a path of normalization and reconciliation following two decades of war and bitter rivalry. That approach has now resurfaced from the depths of oblivion and hovers like a dark and threatening shadow over the long-standing "special relationship."
Yet unlike the geostrategic circumstances of that era, when the rivalry between the US and China on one side and the Soviet Union on the other enabled Kissinger to slowly build "conditions of mutual trust" with the Chinese leadership, today, from Israel's perspective, a return through the time tunnel to Kissinger's step by step doctrine could be disastrous. This is due to the fanatical and militant nature of the ayatollahs' regime, for which honoring understandings and agreements has never been a guiding principle.
More specifically, American agreement to adopt the Iranian demand and, in effect, to base negotiations on a narrow "branch strategy" rather than a broad and comprehensive "root strategy" would grant the regime in Tehran a vital timeout to rebuild and upgrade its missile arsenal. At the same time, it would allow Iran to increase the threat to Israel through its operatives in Lebanon, the Gaza Strip and Yemen. This includes Hezbollah, the Lebanese Shiite terrorist organization, as well as Hamas, the terrorist organization controlling Gaza.
Indeed, given the emphasis currently being placed in Washington on the immediate need to dismantle Iran's nuclear project, while sidelining or downplaying the other two main components that the administration is also supposed to address in the bargaining process launched over the weekend, it is easy to understand the nightmare scenario underpinning the prime minister's imminent trip to Washington. That scenario rests on the possibility, however low it may now appear, of partial understandings regarding Iran's nuclear program, agreement to freeze the military option and deferring engagement with the other fundamental questions to a later date.
At a time when Iran's regime is at an unprecedented low point, with severe economic distress compounded by a simmering internal pressure cooker filled with bitterness and anger over the brutal suppression of protest waves, the most dangerous scenario from Israel's perspective is that Trump's administration, which last June struck Iran's nuclear facilities, would now extend a vital lifeline and breathing space that would allow the regime to recover. In doing so, it would miss a window of opportunity to deal it a crippling blow, despite the risks involved.
There is no dispute that Netanyahu is fully aware that resorting to the military option would be deeply unpopular in the American public and political front, especially though not only among the isolationist wing of the Republican camp. It is also clear that the president himself, despite his repeated threats, would prefer to advance a diplomatic track if only the ayatollahs' regime were willing to offer even a thread of cooperation in the form of some concessions.
Trump's regional allies, particularly in the Gulf, also fear the consequences of escalation in their immediate environment. Moreover, the occupant of the Oval Office does not appear particularly eager to shoulder the price tag of a possible military entanglement in the Iranian front, especially since it is clear that airstrikes alone would not be the final nail in the regime's coffin.
All of this suggests that Netanyahu's task, unless there is some alternative rationale hidden from public view for his trip, of blocking what appears to be an American inclination, championed most enthusiastically among "all the president's men" by Steve Witkoff, to settle for a narrow framework for US-Iranian bargaining and to freeze discussion of the other charged components for the time being, with the military option effectively returned to the shelf, will be anything but simple.
This is particularly true given Israel's heightened dependence on American military and diplomatic assistance since the bitter and fateful events of October 7. Against the backdrop of the close and inherently cooperative relationship between the White House and the Prime minister's Office, Netanyahu's room for maneuver in trying to prevent any softening of the American approach appears quite limited. That is unless he arrives in Washington with some kind of "smoking gun" regarding Iran's immediate intentions, its real capabilities and its hidden schemes.
Unlike his confrontational moves against President Barack Obama ahead of the signing of the 2015 nuclear deal, Netanyahu is unable this time to embark on a public campaign in the domestic American front to try to push the president toward a more hawkish course, not only rhetorically. This applies both to the diplomatic process and to the military option.
In the coming days, the picture is likely to become clearer, at least in part, and it will emerge, with or without the visit, where the US is headed and what its red lines are with regard to Iran.
