The claim that an uprising in Iran can be "ignited" through external action sounds dramatic, but it is equally misleading. An uprising is not an event that can be manufactured from the outside, certainly not at the push of a button. Anyone familiar with how intelligence organizations operate knows that uprisings are not created but identified, amplified and at times guided.
If reports are accurate that Mossad Director David Barnea presented the overthrow of the regime as an achievable objective in the near or medium term, it is worth examining the foundations of that assessment. In my view, if Barnea indeed assessed the goal as attainable, he was referring to the medium term and beyond. Regimes do not fall because someone outside decides to topple them; they collapse when an internal crack develops, and only then can an external actor, if acting correctly, widen it. The real question, therefore, is not how to "ignite" an uprising , but how to identify the conditions for its maturation and when those conditions are still absent.
To understand this, one must start with the basics. An uprising is not the result of an anonymous crowd suddenly taking to the streets, but of cumulative processes within key groups: students, workers, labor unions, midlevel officials within state institutions, and at times opinion leaders in the cultural or religious arenas. Each of these groups operates within a narrative that explains why the current situation is preferable or at least tolerable.
Igniting an uprising, step by step
The first stage is diagnosis: identifying points of frustration, feelings of humiliation, loss of meaning and the gap between the official narrative and reality. This is a quiet, almost invisible stage, but a critical one. Without a precise understanding of the sources of pain, there is nothing to build on.
The second stage is penetration of human networks, not in the romantic sense of spy films, but through building relationships, channels of influence and familiarity with internal dynamics. This does not necessarily mean recruiting an "agent," but rather developing the ability to influence existing groups from within.
The third stage is cognitive, and this is where the real work begins: not convincing people to take to the streets, but helping them understand they are not alone. An uprising occurs when one person realizes there are 10 others who think the same way, and when those 10 realize there are already 100. At the same time, an alternative narrative is required. Not one imported from outside that sounds foreign, but one rooted in local identity: not "rebellion" but "salvation," not "collapse" but "repair." Without such a narrative, even deep frustration does not translate into action.
Yet even when all these conditions are met, there is no certainty. Above all hovers one factor: fear. Regimes such as Iran's are not merely governing mechanisms but sophisticated systems of surveillance, repression and punishment. Anyone who takes to the streets risks not only themselves but their family as well. In such a reality, even profound anger may remain suppressed.
Pressure on the West
This begs the question: why is that not happening now? The answer may lie in the gap between destabilizing the system and building an alternative one. Recent military actions, as impressive as they may be, have undermined the regime's sense of immunity, but destabilization alone is not enough. When there is no clear answer to the question of what comes next, fear outweighs frustration.
Moreover, it appears that within key groups, sufficient momentum has yet to form. An uprising is not born on the street alone, but on the intersection between the street and the elite. As long as midlevel ranks, officers, bureaucrats and managers do not signal hesitation or a crack, the public remains isolated. This is an infrastructure that requires years to build, not a momentary move. It is also possible that external pressure itself is working in the opposite direction: instead of dismantling the regime, it strengthens internal cohesion around a shared threat. In the Iranian context, this is a familiar and at times effective mechanism.
In any case, the conclusion is clear: uprisings are not ignited by slogans, and regimes are not toppled by external forces alone. Change occurs when three conditions converge: an internal crack, an alternative narrative and a collective recognition that the risk of taking to the streets is lower than the risk of staying home. Without these, even impressive military moves remain tactical achievements. When they do exist, uprisings needs no ignition, they erupt on their own.
