The war in Lebanon is causing deep public concern in Israel. Against a backdrop of mistrust, many are asking: If Hezbollah was in fact defeated, as they were told, how was it able to recover so quickly?
The professional assessment is that Hezbollah did indeed sustain a succession of severe blows during that period of fighting, to the point of internalizing a sense of defeat. Between September and November 2024, the organization's command structure and senior leadership were significantly damaged. Its firepower assets were also hit, including medium-range missiles and tens of thousands of short-range rockets that had threatened Haifa and Tiberias. During the ground maneuver, the positions prepared by the Radwan force in the border villages were also destroyed. Those positions had been intended to serve as a base for a surprise assault into the Galilee.
These achievements were significant, and together they undermined the war concept Hezbollah had built since the IDF's withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000. At the same time, this is where the explanation for the current situation lies: The scale of the weaponry at Hezbollah's disposal when it entered the war was so vast that even after the heavy damage, it still retained substantial quantities. What was mainly struck was the organization's concept of war, not necessarily its military capability itself.
For that reason, in the months following the ceasefire agreement, the organization's leadership chose to hold back in the face of IDF strikes. Even in Operation Rising Lion, this was not because it lacked the ability to respond, but because it lacked an updated doctrine for managing the fighting.
As Hezbollah Secretary-General Naim Qassem declared, the restraint was a calculated move. The organization had not abandoned the idea of returning to combat. Rather, it used the time to formulate a new war doctrine, based in part on lessons from the war in Ukraine, including expanded use of drones and unmanned aerial vehicles.
The war against Iran gave Hezbollah the opportunity it had been waiting for. Some, among them Maj. Gen. (res.) Giora Eiland, have argued that the organization confined itself to symbolic rocket fire as an expression of solidarity, while Israel was the side that chose escalation. In practice, however, the speed with which thousands of Radwan fighters were moved south of the Litani River, alongside the deployment of firepower and anti-tank arrays, points to an orderly plan prepared long in advance.
Hezbollah entered the campaign guided by a war doctrine tailored to its limitations. Its central objective, as it has taken shape so far, is to erase the IDF's gains from November 2024 and restore the situation along the border to what it was before Oct. 7, 2023. In that context, the organization is demanding an end to Israel's hold on Lebanese territory, an end to the IDF's freedom of action, and the removal of the constraints imposed on it under UN Security Council Resolution 1701.
Hezbollah's ability to fire into the Galilee remains its main lever, especially since most of its formations are located north of the Litani River in any case. That capability is expected to remain intact even if the IDF deepens its operations in southern Lebanon.
Seen in this light, it is easier to understand why Hezbollah rejected the Egyptian mediation proposal for a ceasefire, arguing that the time was not yet ripe and that the war should be allowed to realize its gains.
Hezbollah's move did not catch the IDF by surprise, but after more than a month of fighting and significant achievements, a renewed assessment is required regarding the continuation of the campaign. While Hezbollah is acting מתוך willingness to pay a heavy price in order to restore its image after its 2024 defeat, the State of Israel is required to restore security to the residents of the north.
In this reality, in which Hezbollah is exploiting the gaps between the two sides, there is concern that the fighting will continue for a prolonged period. Ending the campaign on terms desirable for Israel may require more intense offensive operations.
