Prof. Asher Cohen

Prof. Asher Cohen is dean of the School of Communication at Bar Ilan University.

Israel gets it, the US does not 

Israel learned, at a terrible and unusually painful price, that the question of identity is central here. Hamas, and with it a decisive majority of Palestinians, will not relinquish their core identity.

Shortly after the US command center in Kiryat Gat was established, a debate began over the meaning of its creation and its role. Optimists speak in terms of close coordination and cooperation between the US and Israel, as close partners who see the complex reality in the Middle East eye to eye and who share policy goals.

But there are, increasingly, many signs of the pessimistic view: that Israel is subordinate to US directives, with the command center appearing to supervise Israeli operations and even to constrain them according to the American perspective. At this stage it is impossible to assess the full significance and outcomes of the command center's activity, but it should be remembered that it operates against the backdrop of stark structural gaps between US and Israeli points of view.

The US perspective is that of a global power looking at the world holistically, commonly described in public media discourse as the big picture. Israel's perspective, by contrast, is that of a country trying to cement its status as a regional power that exists in an extremely hostile environment; therefore deterring that environment from harming Israel is an existential imperative.

Moreover, the US views global reality through a lens that emphasizes the creation of a new global economic order, to which President Trump's business background contributes substantially. Israel, by contrast, views regional reality through the lens of culture and identity, especially after it grasped the cultural and identity roots of the October 7 massacre and the worldwide surge in antisemitism that followed.

From an American viewpoint, Gaza is a nuisance and perhaps something that can be worked around in the broader campaign against Hamas. That view can overlook the fact that Hamas still stands as a governing authority, so long as it only nominally yields control or relinquishes weapons. According to that approach, the Arab "partners" would supposedly ensure that a weakened Hamas does not morph back into the real monster it is from a cultural-identity perspective.

That reasoning overlooks the fact that those partners often share views similar to Hamas's toward Israel. This helps explain coordination with Hamas over the sham of a technocratic government that is purportedly about to be formed. The economy will supposedly do its part in the American-favored direction.

From an identity standpoint, Israel understood, at a terrible cost, that identity is the central issue here. Hamas, the terrorist organization, and a decisive majority of Palestinians will not give up their basic identity, which centers on the destruction of Israel. Repeated polls show broad support for the October 7 attack. They are only waiting and preparing to create the conditions that will allow it to happen.

In Israel, people increasingly understand that the supposed "partners" never abandoned their core beliefs. Hence their enduring view of Gaza's future: a permanent evil that will harass Israel, challenge it politically and militarily, and weaken it en route to its "destruction".

One component of the Oslo trap was the assumption that the economy and better living standards would change a culture of hatred centered on the destruction of Israel. Even if the Americans frame it differently now, Israel must guard against repeating that mistake.

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