It is difficult to understand the contradiction: In the north โ facing Syria and Lebanon โ we are seeing a model combination of policy, diplomacy, and military action and strategy. In the south, on the other hand โ against the Gaza Strip โ everything is chaos. The IDF has dropped the ball when it comes to the Gaza border.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu scored a lot of points when it comes to every aspect of handling the conflict to the north, and in IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Gadi Eizenkot found a brilliant partner in directing the integrated military tactics, coordination, and successes along with diplomatic moves and an attempt to achieve long-term goals when it comes to Iran. And now, the figurative hit to his exposed behind is painful, and Habayit Hayehudi leader Naftali Bennett is making the most of it.
The military's top echelon is making a two-pronged mistake. One is that Eizenkot does not see himself as part of the national leadership. So this might come as news to him, but given the history of the Jewish state and the wars it has fought for its continued existence, the status of the chief of staff is that of a partner in the country's leadership.
He is not just the head of the country's ground or air forces. He needs to speak up. He needs to communicate with the public, and especially with the residents of the western Negev. We cannot ignore the classic approach of the IDF command since its inception: when it fails to do its job, it immediately shifts the discussion to "values" or "morality." The blathering about morality is usually designed to cover up problems of execution.
The other problem that has become chronic in the defense establishment is underestimating the enemy. True, for people who are busy dealing with the threat of Shiite missiles, incendiary balloons take a back seat. But that does not mean that Hamas does not constitute a strategic threat. Those in charge of Israel's security see things correctly, for the most part: the immediate problem to be addressed is Syria, and Gaza is a distraction. However, the IDF should have realized this and not allowed a secondary distraction from Iran to "balloon" into a strategic nuisance.
Cabinet meetings,ย signs of demoralization in the south and tens of thousands of acres of Israeli land being burned to a crisp is an unnecessary security deterioration. All this public fuss is the result of a military failure, and the military leadership is responsible for it.
