As we mark one year since the Iron Swords War, during which the IDF focused on fighting in the Gaza Strip, it's evident that decision-makers are abandoning the containment policy in the north.

This phase, which began with a widespread communication disruption attack, continued with intense and unprecedented airstrikes that eliminated most of Hezbollah's top leadership. In recent days, the military has begun a limited ground incursion, which has unfortunately already exacted a heavy toll. Israel's experience in the Second Lebanon War provides lessons that should be applied to the current conflict. Here is a partial list:

Unattainable goals

The war objectives defined in the government meeting on July 12, 2006, were: returning the kidnapped soldiers; achieving a complete ceasefire; deploying the Lebanese army throughout southern Lebanon; and removing Hezbollah from the area. These goals were set for the sake of internal legitimacy, even though it was clear they were not feasible given the limited patterns of action taken.

The gap between the expectations created among the public and the results on the ground is the main reason why the war is etched in collective memory as a failure.

Excessive fear of casualties

Until almost the end of the war, decision-makers refrained from executing a broad ground maneuver, despite it being clear that short-range rocket fire could not be reduced by air power alone and through limited raids. Not only did the raids fail to stop rocket fire, but this pattern of action also resulted in avoiding the opening and securing of logistical routes, creating significant supply difficulties for the fighters.

Furthermore, following the first casualties, restrictions were imposed on the forces that did not fit the reality, such as instructions to avoid fighting during the day, prohibitions on entering nature reserves, the need to receive individual approval for each border crossing, and more. Finally, although the fighting at the field levels generally excelled in professionalism and bravery, the message passed to the fighters to avoid unnecessary risks even at the cost of not completing the mission trickled down from top to bottom and impaired the value of adherence to the objective.

Over-emphasis on the cognitive dimension

During the war, several controversial actions were taken, which were sharply criticized for risking fighters to achieve a "victory image." Such were the battles in Bint Jbeil, during which ground forces were ordered to take control of the town, which did not constitute a strategic target but rather a location for Nasrallah's "Spider Web" speech.

The desire for a cognitive achievement led the IDF into Bint Jbeil no less than five times and exacted a heavy price, perceived as unjustified and affecting the motivation to fight.

Excessive media exposure

The media policy adopted by the IDF led to unprecedented exposure of the IDF, causing severe intelligence damage and aiding enemy intelligence services. Information exposure was done, among other things, in briefings given by senior military officials on air, in interviews initiated by the media with soldiers and commanders, and during commentaries in television studios.

The gap between the expectations created among the public and the results on the ground is the main reason why the war is etched in collective memory as a failure.

Duration of the war

Even in formulating the objectives, there was disregard for one of the basic foundations of Israeli security doctrine: setting timelines for an initiated war that would last for a short and defined period. Contrary to the decision throughout most of the war to adopt a pattern of limited-scope raids, there was a constant effort to expand the time window of military activity, while there was no depreciation in the scope of fire to the home front until the last day of the war.

Much of the above stemmed from a mistaken assessment of Israeli society's resilience. Back to 2024, even after a year of war and despite a deep crisis of trust between the people and their leaders following Oct. 7, most of the public is convinced of the war's righteousness and gives decision-makers generous credit for action. However, this does not mean that it grants credit for repeating past mistakes.

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Almost a week later, Hezbollah is still licking its wounds following the attack on the organization's communication infrastructure last week, which resulted in thousands of its operatives being hit. Despite the rocket barrages already launched toward the north since then, it can be assumed these are only the first swallows of response, and that along with attempts to reorganize, the organization will strive to present an unprecedented achievement, one that will rehabilitate its image as "Lebanon's defender" and prove that its strength remains intact.

Many superlatives have already been lavished on the intelligence and technological capabilities demonstrated in the "pager attack," as well as on the sophisticated planning embodied in splitting the attack into two waves, where the second wave was timed to coincide with the funerals of those killed in the first wave, thus amplifying the damage. Among the operation's results, one can count the hit to the order of battle, the disruption of the organization's command and control capabilities, and the deep moral injury among its operatives. However, despite these impressive achievements, as well as the expansion of air strikes, let's not be confused: they do not translate into a significant strategic hit to Hezbollah, one that will achieve the new war objective set by the cabinet just days ago – returning the residents of the north to their homes.

The war in Gaza has proven that toppling a terrorist organization is not an achievable goal. Still – although it's clear that even a ground war won't knock out Hezbollah, we must exploit the opportunity that has been created to exact a heavy price from it and push it as far from the border as possible.

Against the backdrop of the blurring of war objectives in Gaza, and so that the war objective in the north doesn't remain mere hollow populist rhetoric, we must harness last week's successful tactical action to achieve the strategic purpose. After almost a long year of absorption in the north, during which all means were taken to avoid expanding the war against Hezbollah, it seems that the understanding has matured among decision-makers that there's no escape from it. Examining public opinion polls shows that the public consistently demonstrates high willingness to pay the required price to bring about a change in the security reality in the north. And it's clear to all that the price will be heavy, very heavy.

Indeed, the opening conditions are far from optimal for Israel in light of the erosion of its forces in the prolonged war in Gaza, but against this, it's doubtful whether Hezbollah's opening conditions will be worse in the near future than they are now. It should also be remembered that winter is knocking at the door, which will substantially burden troop movement. It seems that the issue of American legitimacy now constitutes the main barrier, but it may be possible to overcome this if the following two conditions are met: a. Avoiding the dismissal of Gallant - beyond the major problem inherent in replacing the defense minister on the eve of expanding the war, the Americans see Gallant as a balancing factor in the political echelon, and his dismissal will intensify tensions between the Biden administration and Israel at this critical time; b. Presenting a plan for a ground incursion into southern Lebanon that is limited in time and space.

The war in Gaza has proven that toppling a terrorist organization is not an achievable goal. Still - although it's clear that even a ground war won't knock out Hezbollah, we must exploit the opportunity that has been created to exact a heavy price from it and push it as far from the border as possible. In the cost-benefit balance, the advantages inherent in expanding the war now outweigh the disadvantages: maximizing military achievements, along with minimizing casualties to our forces, in light of Hezbollah's condition. Avoiding this would be a tragic missed opportunity.

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The uptick in terrorist attacks in recent weeks has seen a growing call for another counterterrorism operation the likes of 2002's Operation Defensive Shield in Arab localities and in West Bank cities. These calls are purely populist and are disconnected from reality: in the absence of specific intelligence on the whereabouts of weapons, not only will military raids in the midst of population centers bear little fruits, but it will also lead to mass unrest.

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There is no doubt that there is a need to increase efforts to find and seize weapons in Arab society by increasing cooperation between the Israeli security forces themselves, and between them and the Arab sector's leaders, but doing that is far removed from launching a military campaign against Arab Israelis.

Even a comprehensive Defensive Shield-like operation in West Bank cities is not applicable at this time, both for reasons of international legitimacy and because it would most likely be counterproductive. The more likely possibility is to intensify military pressure on Jenin, employing both methods to isolate it, as well as dealing it as many surgical blows as possible.

Focusing on Jenin makes sense: As a known hub of terrorist activity, it represents the "snake's head": several Gilboa Prison fugitives fled to the city before being captured; a terror cell en route to carry out an attack in Israel was eliminated on the city outskirts last week, and the terrorists who gunned down Israelis in Bnei Brak and Tel Aviv both hailed from the Jenin area, and both were clearly well trained, given the damage they were able to inflict. 

In addition, the Palestinian security forces have long since withdrawn from the city, which is now under the control of the various terrorist factions and predominately the Islamic Jihad. All this makes Jenin the "smoking gun" and it should be a top priority for counterterrorism operations in terms of public opinion at home and abroad. 

Beyond the inherent efficiency of focusing such efforts on a single location, the gradual use of force is easier for the public to comprehend and it reduces the potential risk of a flare-up across the entire West Bank. 

Jenin is also considered the most challenging of the West Bank cities: during the 2002 operation, the refugee camp in the city proved a stubborn adversary and it is where the IDF sustained the largest number of casualties. Since then, decision-makers have been reluctant to order ground operations in urban centers. 

This psychological barrier seems to have been broken, and apart from the deterrent effect of a successful military operation in Jenin, it could also serve as a "pilot" in public diplomacy efforts ahead of future military action in other West Bank cities, if that proves necessary. 

This also represents an opportunity for Israel to work with the Palestinian Authority. In November 2021, Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas tried to seize weapons from the armed organizations in Jenin and failed. His security forces entered Jenin's refugee camp only to leave with their tails between their legs. Thus for Israel and the PA to combine their efforts to restore governance to Jenin, it would be more efficient in terms of sparing lives – on both sides. 

One must remember, however, that no military operation can presume to permanently uproot terrorism nest or quell the motivation to carry out terrorist attacks – neither in Jenin nor anywhere else. 

Despite the constant pressure from various security forces, terrorist organizations in the West Bank have continued to carry out terrorist attacks in Israel proper as well. Therefore, it seems that there is no alternative to mounting a wide-scale operation from time to time, to undermine the recovering capabilities of Palestinian terrorist organizations. If this buys us peace, even temporarily, it will have to do.

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With American troops withdrawing from Afghanistan, Iran surely wants to get rid of the US military presence in Syria and Iraq. too. and take its place. However, the Islamic republic must focus on rehabilitating its sanctioned economy and curbing nationwide protests.

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Its latest actions – attacking US military bases in the Middle East and targeting an Israeli-owned ship in the Gulf of Oman – were not meant to challenge the West or Israel. It was an attempt to show the world who is in charge in the Middle East and improve its bargaining position in negotiations to renew the nuclear deal.

They are most likely related to the arrival of Iran's newly-sworn in President Ebrahim Raisi, the "butcher of Tehran," whose stance regarding the West is far more hawkish than that of his "moderate" predecessor Hassan Rouhani.

And yet, it is safe to assume that Iran is not interested in starting a conflict now. Neither is Israel, even though it understands that Hezbollah's latest rocket attacks on its northern border must be met with a firm hand.

With regards to Iran's attack on the Israeli-owned ship, the Pentagon said "all options are on the table" and the British military said that "Iran made a serious mistake attacking" it. Nevertheless, Israel cannot expect a strong retaliation from these superpowers due to the Western interest in renewing the nuclear agreement.

And yet, these statements reflect a much stronger Western response than ever before, which is a sign that if Israel were to step up its efforts against Iran, it would receive international backing.

The United States and Britain clearly understand that we are talking about an escalation, and this time they did not hesitate to blame Iran, contrary to ambiguous statements in previous conflicts, where both sides had to "exhibit restraint."

Therefore, now might be the right time for Israel to take advantage of the current situation to take out Hezbollah, even at the cost of extreme escalation on the northern border.

And even though Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah warned this week that the terrorist group was ready to retaliate against any further Israeli airstrikes, most likely his response will be limited due to nationwide demonstrations against the Iranian presence in Lebanon.

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The closer the end of the 2020 presidential campaign comes, the more signs we are seeing of what appears to be blatant attempts by the American media to influence public opinion in favor of Democratic candidate Joe Biden.

It was done through consistent censorship of affairs that might make him appear dirty. Two weeks ago, for example, correspondence from Biden's son's computer was brought to light that could shed light on Biden Sr.'s part in the "Ukrainegate" scandal from a year ago and raised suspicion that in 2015, while serving as vice president, Biden worked to have the Ukrainian chief prosecutor replaced in order to prevent an investigation against his son.

Despite its potential significance, the correspondence was played down by most newspapers other than the New York Post, which brought the scoop. In effect, other media outlets not only ignored it, they tried to challenge its reliability. Twitter blocked the accounts of the White House spokeswoman and the Trump campaign, claiming that the information was unreliable, even though the FBI declared that the documents were part of an investigation into suspected money laundering by the Bidens and despite the fact that some of the recipients confirmed the authenticity of the correspondence.

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Similarly, last week businessman Tony Bobulinski, who had been responsible for handling the Biden family's assets, claimed that when Biden was vice president, charged with addressing aggression from China, he had business dealings with companies owned by China's Communist Party. Bobulinski tried to interest various media outlets in the story, but only Fox ran an interview with him.

But we can see the actual extent of the pro-Biden censorship in the resignation last week of Glenn Greenwald, editor of The Intercept. Greenwald claimed that the editors refused to publish an article he wrote about the attempts by media outlets, media giants, and intelligence communities in America to ensure Biden became president unless he agreed to delete the parts of the article that criticized Biden himself. It should be noted that Biden avoided responding to the news and rather than the media doing its job as the watchdog of democracy and demanding answers, it preferred not to confront him with difficult questions to avoid hurting his election chances.

Meanwhile, in the past few months, there have been more serious warning about attempts by Iran and Russia to intervene in the election, despite the fact that Russian intervention in the 2016 election, which has been the focus of so much attention these past few years, turned out to be a tempest in a teapot. The findings of the Muller report, according to which no direct links between Russia and Trump have been found, were played down. Even though there has been recent proof of Iranian and Russian attempts to influence the current election, they are limited and somewhat amateur, which shows yet again that while we must not dismiss its importance, the threat of foreign tampering is marginal.

While there is no doubt that foreign actors are exploiting the social chaos in the United States, which is being encouraged by the American media. But the big story is that ironically, it seems as if the biggest "influence" of all is actually being wielded by the American media and media conglomerates. In effect, this is an octopus, as the global coverage of what is happening in the US feeds off of American coverage, which leads to echo chambers that hold a biased and homogenous discourse. So ironically, this behavior by the American media, most of whose senior members say that a Trump re-election would be an "end to democracy," is the one eating away at the foundations of democracy.

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Recently, it seems as if those protests have been making waves in the rest of the world. The end of September saw student demonstrations in Indonesia, in opposition to new draconian legislation that would have curtailed the authorities of the country's anti-corruption council, as well as against bills that would criminalize sex before marriage and insulting the president.

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In Iraq, violent protests have been going on for nearly a month over the government's failure to rein in unemployment and improve public services. The Iraqis are also protesting government corruption. In Lebanon, the last two weeks have seen colorful demonstrations with slogans opposing planned new taxes, including one on the use of the WhatsApp messaging app.

In Hong Kong, the violent protests that started back in June against an extradition law and are now demanding that the Chinese government stop interfering in Hong Kong affairs, refuse to be quashed.

The protests haven't skipped Latin America: at the start of October, Ecuador saw the start of an uprising against President Lenin Moreno's decision to cut back on fuel subsidies. Two weeks later, riots began in Chile in response to increased metro fares, growing inequality, and wage freezes. Last weekend, about a million protesters took to the streets of Santiago. In neighboring Bolivia, tens of thousands gathered to cry election fraud in the re-election of President Evo Morales. To the north, in Peru, miners have been protesting for over a month.

Smaller-scale protests are still ongoing in the Netherlands, Germany, and France against those government's policies on climate change.

We can see the power of the protests in how the leaders of developing countries respond to them: In Algeria, the protests led to the resignation of President Abdelaziz Bouteflika; in Sudan, Chile, and Ecuador states of emergency were declared; and in Hong Kong China – along with violent attempts to silence the protest – is also running a widespread disinformation campaign that is designed to delegitimize the protests.

Supposedly, it should be difficult to find similarities in protests in countries that are so different from each other, especially given that most of the protest movements have no official leadership. We can attribute their rapid spread to the digital age, which as early as 2011 led to the Arab Spring, which then spread westward. But given that the protests of 2019 are not only continuing but also growing, especially in developing and Arab nations, we cannot ignore a clear pattern – that the young generation is in despair over their economic situation and sick of corruption at the government level. Aside from a desire to improve their quality of life, we can see that the protesters are also seeking deeper change and want liberal democracies.

We can see this not only in the fact that the strongest demonstrations are happening in countries that are ranked low on the Freedom House scale of freedom, as well as in the protesters' demand for less government intervention in their lives and opposition to laws that trample their basic human rights. We can see it especially in the fact that many of the protests go on even after they have achieved their initial goals. A change to the men in power isn't enough for the protesters, who realize that switching out personalities will not secure long-term change. They want a change to the regimes themselves. After a month of protests, Algerians aren't satisfied to see the elderly and corrupt President Bouteflika resign – they want to oust the commander of the army, who wants to replace him.

Similarly, we can assume that the announcements by the prime ministers of Iraq and Lebanon that they are resigning will not satisfy the protesters, and might even spur them on. Despite assessments that this is a passing phase, it appears as if the worldwide wave of popular protests is here to stay.

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But the problem isn't a lack of resources, it lies with priorities – when he became chief of staff, Kochavi decided to transfer millions of shekels to make the IDF more "lethal," as he put it, thereby creating budget shortfalls for maneuvers and operations. The 2006 Second Lebanon War, whose end we marked last week, proved that this kind of prioritizing is faulty. Leading up to 2006, the IDF dropped the idea that any war would be won on the ground by armored forces. That idea led to steps that shut down some reserve units. The idea of shortening mandatory military service was discussed, and ground forces training was stopped almost entirely. A few months later, reserve units were thrown into the fighting after not having trained for some five years.

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In general, since the First Lebanon War, training – both among soldiers on compulsory service and reservists – has been curtailed significantly. From the mid-1980s to 2017, there was an 83% decrease in the number of reserve service days utilized by the IDF. The most significant cuts began in 2004, and their results were clearly seen in the Second Lebanon War. As part of the lessons learned from that war, the IDF increased training drills significantly, but a 2008 law on reserve service, which stated that reservists would be called up in states of emergency, calls for only limited involvement in operations. The reductions in training continued under former Chief of Staff Benny Gantz, and even in the Gideon work plan that Gantz's successor, Gadi Eizenkot, spearheaded. The plan called to reduce the IDF's reserve personnel to 100,000 soldiers.

The ramifications of the decision to cut back on training and close reserve divisions are not only military, but societal. First and foremost, it could harm society's faith in the military, which is the base of its willingness to make sacrifices, especially in light of the storm created by a report from former IDF Ombudsman Yitzhak Brik a year ago, which cast doubt on the IDF's ability to handle emergencies. In addition, the decision could also damage reservists' willingness to be called up. For reserve troops, the training and operational activity strengthen the social bond, which is why they serve in the reserves in the first place.

Reserve soldiers and officers have already sent Kochavi a harshly-worded letter in which they claimed that cutting training days for reservists was dragging the IDF back to the state it was in prior to the Second Lebanon War and urged him to reverse his decision. However, aside from keeping reservists fit for the day they receive marching orders, reserve training allows soldiers and commanders' capacity to function under pressure to be evaluated.

The Second Lebanon War was the last time that such a large number of reserve units took part in ground maneuvers, mostly because of decision-makers disinclination since the 1990s to use ground forces, fearing heavy casualties, as well as the development of new technologies.

But the scenarios with which the IDF is currently dealing include a war on multiple fronts, a situation that requires a swift victory. Despite the lack of willingness to use it, the reserve forces remain a primary element in the IDF's ability to maneuver in an emergency situation, and cutting back on training harms that ability. Moreover, unless reservists are well-trained, all the army's advanced technology will be insufficient, since history teaches us that wars can only be won by firing back at the enemy.

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Only a few commemorative sites to the fallen in the War of Attrition have been erected. Only in 2003, more than three decades after it started, was a decision taken to award those who fought in it citations. Research into the war and cultural portrayals are still few, although interest in it has recently been revived.

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All this is even more astonishing given the war's unique aspects. For example, it was the first time that Israel dug long defense trenches whose purpose was not to secure a victory, but rather to prevent the enemy from gaining ground.

After the 1967 Six-Day War, Egypt wanted to restore the honor it lost in its thumping defeat and oust Israel from the territories that had been captured. Egypt began carrying out actions that were designed to force the superpowers – the US and the Soviet Union – to intervene and pressure Israel to reach a peace agreement with Egypt.

To that end, Egypt began putting direct military pressure on Israel and indirect pressure on the US through attacks launched against IDF forces in Sinai.

The name "War of Attrition" was taken from a speech by then-leader of Egypt Gamal Abdel Nasser on the day of the revolution in Egypt (July 23, 1969). He declared: "We are ready for a long-term battle of attrition against the enemy." But apart from the military tactics of repeated attacks, the war sought to exhaust civilian society. The Egyptians hoped to create a crack in Israeli public morale, which Egypt believed was unprepared to accept casualties.

The Egyptian assessment of Israel's sensitivity to losses wasn't baseless: "Nothing is worse [for Israel] than a war of attrition in which 300 Egyptians and four Jews are killed every day," then-head of the IDF Operations Directorate Maj. Gen. David Elazar said. But Israeli society proved stalwart as long as the war lasted.

The Israeli Air Force's bombings deep behind Egyptian lines, which began at the end of July 1969, took out military targets that were close to civilian population centers with the goal of securing a psychological advantage. This brought Israel to the brink of victory, but that was prevented when the Soviets stepped in and helped Egypt in January 1970.

So why hasn't this war been given the place it deserves in our national memory? Apparently, because in operational terms, it included no dramatic events. The euphoria that followed the Six-Day War was still at its peak, the number of casualties in the incidents were "acceptable," and Israel's existence was not in peril.

While the Suez front shook from artillery fire, the discotheques in Tel Aviv and Haifa shook from the loudspeakers, as playwright Hanoch Levin described in "The Queen of the Bathtub" and Shlomo Artzi portrayed in his song "July-August Heat."

But there is not enough appreciation for Israel's strategic achievements in the War of Attrition: it is usually seen as a failure because it did not end with any major operative victory. That view is mistaken.

Israel prevented the Egyptians from turning the regional conflict between the two countries into a conflict between the two superpowers, and in doing so thwarted the plan to force Israel into a treaty under pressure from those superpowers. In that sense, Israel racked up a significant military and diplomatic victory.

These achievements are attributable to the country's military and political leadership, but also to the Israeli homefront, which would go on to prove itself staunch in later wars, as well.

So we must not turn the War of Attrition into a "gray" period in Israel's strategic history.

Apart from the fact that its fallen soldiers deserve to be honored as part of the country's history, we can compare the tactics and achievements of the war to how the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is being handled. In this conflict, the main battle is for endurance; the enemy deploys "actions" that test the tolerance of the military and the homefront; and like the War of Attrition, aims to create international pressure on Israel.

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Turkey decided not to heed the US threats, and after receiving the first delivery of the Russian system in mid-July, Washington announced Ankara's official removal from the program. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan responded by saying his country would source its military equipment from other sources, a threat he appears he will make good on following Russia's offer to supply Turkey with its advanced SU-35 Sukhoi jets.

The S-400 system and the SU-35 jets were programed and manufactured in response to US stealth technology and in order to shoot down NATO planes. Turkey is one of the oldest and most important members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; its conventional forces are the second largest in the alliance after the United States. It is safe to assume that with the purchase of the Russian defense system, Ankara has officially crossed the Rubicon.

Russia seeks to undermine security and political cooperation between the US and Turkey by exacerbating mutual skepticism between the two countries, intensifying anti-American discourse, echoing government propaganda and silencing criticism. In one example of this tactic seen earlier this week, the broadcast of an interview on Sputnik Turkey with the country's former Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu was cut short after he issued sharp criticism of Erdogan's conduct.

As a rule, Russian attempts to influence Europe are largely focused on diminishing support for pro-American decisions and sowing distrust in NATO among members of the alliance. In a country like Turkey, where local disinformation already runs rampant, Moscow doesn't need to make too much of an effort. Seen in this context, Turkey's possible withdrawal from the alliance could be a prestigious achievement for Russia.

According to the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, passed by the US Senate following Russia's meddling in the 2016 presidential elections, the president must impose sanctions on any official involved in defense or intelligence deals with Russia: The S-400 deal certainly meets this criteria. If President Donald Trump makes good on his threat, it will send a firm message that could serve to bolster American deterrence in general, and toward Iran in particular, especially given the recent tensions in the Persian Gulf.

Nevertheless, it is difficult to exaggerate Turkey's geo-political importance. Furthermore, Turkey's expulsion from the F-35 program is expected to have economic repercussions for the US. In light of the sanctions imposed on India last year, following New Delhi's purchase of the S-400 system, it seems Trump will need to take an equivalent step toward Turkey. And yet we must hope that after using the stick, he will be wise enough to offer Erdogan a carrot, thereby keeping the Turkish leader from falling into Russian President Vladmir Putin's arms and keeping him out of the Russian bear's embrace. Such a development, were it to transpire, could plunge the Middle East into chaos.

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But studies conducted in recent years indicate that this view doesn't exactly reflect the reality. An analysis of the IDF's major military operations in the 2000s – the Second Intifada, the Second Lebanon War, Operation Cast Lead, and Operation Protective Edge – indicates all of them enjoyed strong public support across all sectors from the time they started until they were over. Consensus about a given operation depends on how long it lasts and how many are killed or wounded. But findings show that even after people rally around the flag when an operation begins, support remains strong if the public feels that the war is just, that its goals are vital, and it has a chance of succeeding. So it appears that Israeli society will be more willing to make sacrifices than the decision-makers think, and for a longer period.

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Nevertheless, the people in charge aren't using the credit extended to them and are trying to avoid calling a spade a spade by sticking to a policy of "containment" and delaying inevitable action. A disinclination for a ground operation that would come with a high casualty count is the prevailing sentiment. In the face of the rocket threat, for example, there is a clear preference to use targeted counter-fire, a method seen as carrying a low body count, even though it clearly cannot curtail the threat to the homefront itself. Even when a decision is made to launch a military campaign, it is hampered by limitations and stopped before it achieves its goals.

The hesitation and idling in neutral are making Israel's warfare less effective, not to mention affecting the motivation of combat soldiers. It is also causing the public to feel embittered, as if the price it has paid so far was all for nothing. What's more, it isn't only casualties that are difficult for Israel – military losses are, too.

Since Operation Protective Edge in the summer of 2014, we have experienced a series of escalations in the ongoing violence with Hamas, during which the idea of launching another ground operation in Gaza was floated. This is clearly not an easy question for the decision-makers to handle but history teaches us that putting off a confrontation with a military threat only makes a future conflict harder, with a heavier cost in terms of human life.

If the scales are tipped in favor of a ground operation, the decision-makers must remember that protecting civilian lives takes precedence over protecting the lives of soldiers and that Israeli society is both rational and stalwart, as it has proven in the past. While there is no doubt that we must strive to minimize casualties, doing so cannot become a goal of the war in and of itself.

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