Last week, it was reported that under the IDF's new multi-year work plan, Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Aviv Kochavi decided to cancel training drills until the end of 2019, mostly for reservists and ground forces units. That included the canceling of the annual war drill the chief of staff has been holding for the past few years to prepare combat and support forces for a war and missile attacks. Reports also said that Kochavi was also considering shutting down two reserve divisions to improve the capabilities of the remaining units and use the military's budget more efficiently.
But the problem isn't a lack of resources, it lies with priorities – when he became chief of staff, Kochavi decided to transfer millions of shekels to make the IDF more "lethal," as he put it, thereby creating budget shortfalls for maneuvers and operations. The 2006 Second Lebanon War, whose end we marked last week, proved that this kind of prioritizing is faulty. Leading up to 2006, the IDF dropped the idea that any war would be won on the ground by armored forces. That idea led to steps that shut down some reserve units. The idea of shortening mandatory military service was discussed, and ground forces training was stopped almost entirely. A few months later, reserve units were thrown into the fighting after not having trained for some five years.
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In general, since the First Lebanon War, training – both among soldiers on compulsory service and reservists – has been curtailed significantly. From the mid-1980s to 2017, there was an 83% decrease in the number of reserve service days utilized by the IDF. The most significant cuts began in 2004, and their results were clearly seen in the Second Lebanon War. As part of the lessons learned from that war, the IDF increased training drills significantly, but a 2008 law on reserve service, which stated that reservists would be called up in states of emergency, calls for only limited involvement in operations. The reductions in training continued under former Chief of Staff Benny Gantz, and even in the Gideon work plan that Gantz's successor, Gadi Eizenkot, spearheaded. The plan called to reduce the IDF's reserve personnel to 100,000 soldiers.
The ramifications of the decision to cut back on training and close reserve divisions are not only military, but societal. First and foremost, it could harm society's faith in the military, which is the base of its willingness to make sacrifices, especially in light of the storm created by a report from former IDF Ombudsman Yitzhak Brik a year ago, which cast doubt on the IDF's ability to handle emergencies. In addition, the decision could also damage reservists' willingness to be called up. For reserve troops, the training and operational activity strengthen the social bond, which is why they serve in the reserves in the first place.
Reserve soldiers and officers have already sent Kochavi a harshly-worded letter in which they claimed that cutting training days for reservists was dragging the IDF back to the state it was in prior to the Second Lebanon War and urged him to reverse his decision. However, aside from keeping reservists fit for the day they receive marching orders, reserve training allows soldiers and commanders' capacity to function under pressure to be evaluated.
The Second Lebanon War was the last time that such a large number of reserve units took part in ground maneuvers, mostly because of decision-makers disinclination since the 1990s to use ground forces, fearing heavy casualties, as well as the development of new technologies.
But the scenarios with which the IDF is currently dealing include a war on multiple fronts, a situation that requires a swift victory. Despite the lack of willingness to use it, the reserve forces remain a primary element in the IDF's ability to maneuver in an emergency situation, and cutting back on training harms that ability. Moreover, unless reservists are well-trained, all the army's advanced technology will be insufficient, since history teaches us that wars can only be won by firing back at the enemy.
