Yishai Elmakies/Makor Rishon – www.israelhayom.com

IDF's digital security nightmare: Sensitive information still flows freely on social media

miriw — Tue, 20 May 2025 08:00:19 +0000

Five months after the IDF decided to implement profound changes to exposure procedures for soldiers and career service members as part of the lessons learned from October 7 and the war that followed, it appears the military is struggling to enforce its information security policy, especially on social media.

One of the Military Intelligence Directorate's lessons from investigations into October 7 and the events preceding the massacre concerns information security culture in the military. "This is an issue that urgently requires reform," said a senior official in the Military Intelligence Directorate. "Phones and social networks have dismantled the IDF. Hamas managed to understand many things without significant intelligence capabilities. We are on the verge of a necessary and inevitable revolution, and it will come at a cost."

Despite these statements and the decision to increase oversight on information exposure, the IDF has no real ability to enforce this policy on soldiers' private social media accounts, primarily relying on soldiers' responsibility and maturity. But the situation is even worse on an unexpected front – the official social media accounts of IDF units, managed by soldiers, typically education NCOs or IDF Spokesperson representatives in the unit, which have become sources of sensitive operational information leaks.

Israeli soldiers of an artillery unit near the Gaza border, southern Israel, 02 November 2023 (Photo: EPA/Abir Sultan)

Monitoring dozens of Instagram pages of regular and reserve units – divisions, brigades, and battalions – revealed a concerning picture: operational information, including troop movements, locations, dates, and capabilities, is being freely published. Images expose the faces and names of soldiers, thereby endangering their security and the security of operations. These pages receive almost no criticism or supervision, and this phenomenon raises serious questions about the IDF's ability to deal with threats in the digital era.

The concern is that these publications not only serve as a basis for complaints and arrests of soldiers worldwide – a phenomenon the military tried to address with recent policy changes – but also assist terrorist organizations like Hamas in monitoring the IDF, as the organization did – according to IDF investigations – for years in preparation for the terror attack on October 7. Military sources say the issue is being addressed and that the army is working to increase awareness and training among soldiers. However, without strict enforcement and deep cultural change, it seems the battle for information security on social media is still far from being decided in our favor.

In a previous conversation, the IDF claimed these publications are not problematic because they are "private" accounts, meaning they personally approve each follower. This claim is questionable because many accounts aren't "private" but are managed voluntarily and unofficially by soldiers who change frequently and don't personally know each follower, who sometimes number in the thousands. Additionally, in the past year, the IDF and Shin Bet have published information about fictitious Hebrew-language profiles created by Iranians or Hamas operatives who tried to contact IDF soldiers, so it's reasonable to assume that when there are many approval requests, any user with a Hebrew name will be immediately approved without any verification, including, apparently, those Hamas profiles.

For an extended period, Makor Rishon monitored dozens of IDF unit accounts on social networks, mainly Instagram, and the emerging picture is very concerning. It can be definitively stated that they represent and testify to the general situation.

On Sunday, January 19, 2025, an invitation was published on the Nahal Brigade's Instagram account for a ceremony marking the exit of the Nahal Brigade Combat Team from the Gaza Strip, to be held the next day, Monday, at 10 a.m. at the Steel Monument in the Gaza border communities. Needless to say, providing an exact location and time on social networks for an event where hundreds of fighters will be present is a serious security violation that could endanger the event participants.

The Nahal Brigade excels in operations in the Gaza Strip. Its fighters were there continuously for a year and three months, and only last week returned to it after a brief break for missions in the West Bank. The brigade's fighters' activities have been documented and published quite extensively on social media. Here are several examples.

Israeli soldiers standing in a circle take part in a briefing at a position near the Gaza border, in southern Israel, 13 December 2023 (Photo: EPA/Atef Safadi)

The 931st Battalion's account posted on May 11, "This week's achievements – initiated operational patrols in red areas, targeted arrests in hot sectors, prevention of illegal work, and preparation for maneuvering and transition from the line." On April 9, Saturday morning, a post announced the readiness of forces "just before departing for an operation in Nablus," which apparently took place Friday night, with extensive details about which force was involved in the operation, when it began, and possibly continued beyond that – and of course, this is a serious information security violation.

A post from January 19 stated that "the battalion took a central part in a complex rescue operation to free two hostages from the Gaza Strip. Battalion attacks to establish targets, continued ambushes and initiatives to blur the contact line, road clearing, detection detonations, and drone searches." Exposing code names of targets, and generally, specifying missions and emphases from which the enemy can deduce what the IDF is planning. The day before, on January 18, several posts announced that the 931st Battalion had left Gaza after a long period, "a year and three months of fighting in Gaza have come to an end," information that was published on the day the forces left, and before an official announcement from the IDF Spokesperson (which is usually published several days after the event to maintain a security buffer).

In the 932nd Battalion, the operational company's account posted a status last Friday about the "last Shabbat on the line," apparently before going back down to Gaza, with unblurred faces of the fighters. On March 21, they posted about "drone certification for the spearhead company by the 5th platoon of the support company." An update about the battalion commander change ceremony was also published, with the faces of the incoming and outgoing commanders indeed blurred according to guidelines, but their full names were published.

The 50th Battalion announced on April 9 that the first "Eitan" APC had been integrated into the battalion.

Moving to the Armored Corps. On the Instagram page of the 188th Brigade, photos were published from the brigade assembly, showing all the soldiers who participated and sat in the audience, as well as the battalion commanders who went on stage to receive awards; it showed their faces without any blurring.

The 53rd Sufa Battalion of the brigade updated on what awaits the fighters in the coming week: "Farewell evening for the battalion commander, battalion commander replacement ceremony, and Torah scroll dedication in memory of the battalion's fallen." On March 8, an evening for the replacement of Company C's commander was held with the full names of the officers.

The 74th Battalion in the brigade announced on Monday, May 5, "Entering the Gaza Strip." In another case, Company C of the 605th Battalion went for refreshment after fighting in Lebanon. In the documentation published by the brigade, the fighters' faces were blurred, but in the battalion's Instagram account, the same images remained uncensored.

Moving to infantry brigades, the Instagram account of the 13th Battalion in the Golani Brigade posted, "Gideon Battalion completed a month of fighting in the Rafah area." The 51st Battalion account posted on May 6 about a "battalion refreshment fair upon exiting a mission in Gaza," and in the next story, also about flower bouquets that fighters' families received before going home. In both cases, this involves exposing force arrangements, similar to what was known to Hamas before the October 7 attack, when half of the force on the Gaza border left for holiday leave and the weekend at home.

On the Instagram page of the Ground Forces Command, a story was posted on April 27, detailing the locations of the 12th Battalion in Rafah, 51st Battalion in the Morag Corridor, the 188th Brigade in Rafah, and the 282nd Brigade on the Gaza Strip border.

"Hollywood 162," the documentation and filming team of the162nd Division (under which the Golani and Nahal Brigades, the 401st Armored Brigade, the 215th Artillery Brigade, and the 5th Reserve Armored Brigade operate), published a post on its Instagram page on Wednesday, April 23, featuring an illustrated map of the Gaza Strip, using shared language and code names for places where the division operated. There seems to be no need to elaborate on the use Hamas operatives could make of such information.

The 401st Armored Brigade account features unblurred facial images of all soldiers and commanders, including battalion commanders, from the brigade assembly held on March 23.

The Rotem Battalion account in the Givati Brigade conducts introductory activities with the battalion units and reveals full names and positions.

Israeli soldiers walk next to their military vehicles near the border fence with the Gaza Strip, as seen from the Israeli side in southern Israel, 10 March 2024 (Photo: EPA/ Abir Sultan)

On January 17, a post summarizing activities since the beginning of the month was published: "On January 4, an explosive charge detonated on a D9 during a sniper attack. The battalion performed a drainage operation during which one of three women who passed through reported there were terrorists in the area." On January 6, "a 'Kung Fu Panda' was performed with 4 tons of explosives led by the deputy battalion commander and the operational company framework." This is a classified term, and obviously the quantity and forces involved are classified. On January 7, "a closing of the circle was performed on a terrorist who was south of our forces, by an observation force and attack cell. Terrorist elimination by Zik." On January 9, the battalion destroyed terrorist infrastructure in the northern Gaza Strip area. On January 10, "an incident of explosive activation occurred when entering a house by the operational company. 8 fighters were wounded to varying degrees and evacuated by the 6th platoon." On January 15, "the operational company went out for refreshment." Here too – exposure of operational methods, force locations, and information about troop arrangements.

Even reserve units that maintain Instagram pages commit the error of unnecessarily publishing sensitive information. The Alexandroni Brigade regularly updates on new appointments in the brigade with full names.

One of the biggest problems on social networks, which has recently worsened, is the "commander's page" of all units. On these pages, the unit commander – division, brigade, battalion, company, or equivalents in various corps – publishes his remarks for a holiday, operation, or significant event, but in the current situation, where social media publications are completely visible, no control is exercised over the content published on them. First, all these commander pages go online with the full names of the commanders. In the case of the 51st Battalion's commander's page for Passover, the battalion commander revealed the operation code name "Red Sea," in which the battalion was in the midst of. In the Jerusalem Brigade commander's page, the brigade commander detailed the brigade's return to the Netzarim Corridor, the operation to attack and capture the Turkish Hospital where Hamas government headquarters were located, "now under our operational control after we destroyed dozens of Hamas terrorists operating in the area... We are preparing to continue the mission and are ready for any development," and there are many more examples.

Hundreds of thousands of information items leaked to Hamas

The entity responsible for all publications in the IDF, and should also supervise them, is the Information Security Department (Machbam), which numbers about 1,400 soldiers. The department leads the effort to protect the sensitive information of the military and operates as a system from headquarters in the Kirya to every brigade, division, and command, dealing with various areas – from security classifications, through defining means for network and physical conduct, to tracking the enemy's intelligence capabilities. "We investigate what the enemy knows about us and how it collects information," explains a source in Machbam, "and protect the IDF's secrets daily." The system excels in protecting "top secret" classified information but encounters significant challenges in the digital space, especially on social networks.

An in-depth investigation conducted after the October 7 massacre revealed that hundreds of thousands of information items reached terrorist organizations in Gaza through platforms like Instagram, Facebook, and TikTok. Information that soldiers published, sometimes inadvertently, damaged operational plans and even endangered soldiers, even if it wasn't classified as top secret. As a result, Machbam is focusing efforts on reducing these damages by reclassifying information whose publication could cause harm – from exposing soldiers' names, which could harm them in international law, through familiarity with commanders that allows disruption of their activities, to information about IDF activities that limits the military's freedom of action.

Israeli soldiers walk past tanks parked in a field upon returning to Israel following a ceasefire with Hezbollah, in Metula, northern Israel, 28 November 2024 (Photo: EPA/Atef Safadi)

At Machbam, they say they supervise the official pages of brigades and battalions on social networks, managed with the assistance of the IDF Spokesperson. These pages, according to the Information Security Department, are subject to control by commanders, information security NCOs, and information security officers, and according to them, "most of the content on them complies with the guidelines." However, malfunctions and information leaks sometimes occur. "These platforms allow sharing soldiers' experiences and conveying unclassified messages, but they are not hermetic," the source notes.

Additionally, Machbam claims that the system monitors in real-time, both human and computerized, all content, words, and images, while constantly validating the policy – what is allowed to be published, at what timing, and which images and texts are approved. According to them, many information items that would have been published in the past are now blocked.

IDF soldiers upload 1.5 million photos daily

The main challenge lies in the private accounts of regular and reserve soldiers. Every day, approximately 350,000 soldiers upload over 1.5 million photos, each requiring supervision. Machbam works to implement guidelines, explain what is allowed and what is forbidden, and emphasize the consequences of violations. "We are developing capabilities to monitor open accounts, where the enemy can view the content," explains the source. "In case of a malfunction, we warn the soldier, and in serious cases, we deal with disciplinary measures." In classified locations, phones are prohibited, and in sensitive areas, daily briefings are given, but in combat zones, where the secret is less obvious, the challenge is greater.

Machbam also says the system identifies a decrease in the number of videos from combat zones, indicating an improvement in supervision. In cases of significant violations, such as publishing highly classified information, disciplinary measures are taken in collaboration with commanders. The system is in the process of redesigning its manpower, aiming to increase monitoring and enforcement, while using advanced technologies for more efficient monitoring.

"We work hard, even if it's not always visible," emphasizes the source. "The soldiers in Machbam and the commanders are committed to protecting information, and the exceptions, even if numerous, do not indicate a lack of motivation to maintain information security." The system says that "in an era where every post could become a weapon in the enemy's hands, Machbam continues to sharpen its tools to ensure the IDF's secrets remain protected."

IDF Spokesperson's response

"As part of the lessons learned from the investigations into the events of October 7 and the Swords of Iron War, the Information Security Department is currently undergoing a comprehensive overhaul. This includes the implementation of new protocols across all levels of the military and the establishment of stricter enforcement mechanisms. The aim is to drive a broad cultural shift, making information security a binding operational routine. Information Security personnel are dedicating significant resources to safeguarding the lives of IDF soldiers and the military's classified information, with particular attention to activity on social media platforms."

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IDF to use Vulcan cannons to intercept drones

omrif — Tue, 15 Apr 2025 12:51:20 +0000

Israel's security establishment has decided to return the decades-old Vulcan system to active duty. Originally developed for use against aircraft, the Vulcan has not been operational in the Israel Defense Forces for 20 years. Now, it's making a comeback as part of efforts to counter the growing threat posed by drones, particularly along the Lebanese border. Makor Rishon has learned that three systems have already become operational, and five more are expected to be deployed by August, bringing the total number of active Vulcans in the IDF to eight.

The Vulcan is a 20-millimeter Gatling gun, mounted on an armored personnel carrier. It has a firing rate of up to 60 rounds per second—3,600 rounds per minute. Developed in the US, the system entered service in the IDF in 1975, following lessons from the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Over the years, it was upgraded into a version dubbed "Makhbat," which included Stinger missiles and advanced surveillance systems. The Vulcan was retired in 2006 after the Second Lebanon War, as more advanced systems like the Iron Dome took precedence.

Since the start of the Swords of Iron War, which has involved extensive drone and UAV threats across nearly all fronts, the IDF has encountered a challenge that has become common globally: the difficulty of intercepting small, sophisticated drones, especially those entering from Lebanon. These drones often carry out "suicide" missions, crashing into targets and detonating on impact. They fly at low altitudes, making them hard for air defense systems to detect and intercept. The Iron Dome, for example, is designed primarily for rockets and missiles and is less effective against such targets.

Since October 2023, dozens of these UAVs have breached Israeli airspace, some penetrating dozens of kilometers inland. In some instances, they caused casualties—such as the October 2024 attack on the Golani base, in which four soldiers were killed.

Hezbollah drone (archive). Photo: EPA

The security establishment has explored several responses: modifying Iron Dome capabilities, deploying fighter jets and helicopters, and employing Rafael's "Iron Beam" laser system, which is expected to become operational soon. However, these measures either offer only partial solutions or are too costly to maintain over time.

To bring the Vulcan back online, the IDF retrieved old APCs from dusty warehouses and scrapyards - including from the Hazerim Museum - and refurbished them. The project is led by the Tamar company, which carried out repairs and modifications and is also training IDF soldiers in operating the system.

Each Vulcan round contains approximately 70 grams of explosives and is designed to detonate mid-air if it misses its target, to minimize the risk of collateral damage or harm to IDF troop assembly areas.

The military is currently working to coordinate all its aerial interception systems to achieve optimal efficiency in countering drones. However, a final decision has yet to be made on which IDF unit will operate the Vulcan systems.

In a statement, the IDF said: "The Air Force is intensifying its efforts to defend the country's skies against a range of threats. During the war, the corps has already integrated and continues to integrate additional capabilities to expand its operational response. For security reasons, we cannot provide details regarding the establishment of combat units or the integration of specific capabilities."

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Reasons for optimism and pessimism as war resumes

miriw — Tue, 18 Mar 2025 07:00:11 +0000

"Strength and Sword" – that's the name given to the operation that began at 2:00 a.m. with a wave of airstrikes on dozens of terrorist targets in the Gaza Strip: mid-level Hamas commanders, senior officials in Hamas' political wing, and terrorist infrastructure. The timing of the current operation was triggered by Hamas' refusal to accept negotiation terms for the release of hostages, as well as the organization's readiness to carry out attacks against IDF forces and the Israeli home front, and to rearm and strengthen itself.

The operation, approved by the Diplomatic-Security Cabinet over the weekend, was kept under very tight secrecy to surprise Hamas, which is why additional details are not being released and no IDF spokesman statement has been made so far, unlike in the past. Currently, it appears that Israeli Air Force strikes were the first phase, and additional means will be employed later, including extensive ground maneuvers and capturing territory.

The IDF Arabic-language spokesman has already called on residents of Beit Hanoun in northern Gaza and Khuza'a, and Greater and Lesser Abasan in the south, to evacuate to recognized humanitarian zones, which could indicate the directions from which IDF forces will enter the fighting – or perhaps hint at deception and trickery.

Smoke rises following an Israeli bombardment in the northern Gaza Strip as seen from southern Israel on March 18, 2025 (Photo: AP/Ohad Zwigenberg) AP

At present, there are reasons to be optimistic about the change in approach to returning to fighting in Gaza, but it's also best not to overdo it.

These are favorable conditions for an offensive: despite replenishing its ranks, Hamas is greatly weakened and relies on fighters who aren't particularly professional. Its rocket inventory is sparse and its food supplies are running out. Second, the backing it had from Hezbollah until October – no longer exists. Iran will also not respond in light of United States threats, and the Houthis are busy with developments in the Red Sea. And there is, of course, President Donald Trump, who has also released arms and weapons shipments to Israel, will not demand humanitarian aid be brought into Gaza, and will also act to implement his migration plan.

In recent weeks since the end of Phase 1 of the hostage deal, a ceasefire has continued to exist in practice, with only one side participating. Now it can be said that during this period, Southern Command, the Air Force, and Military Intelligence were engaged in planning the operation, which in its first phase included gathering Hamas targets, and in more advanced stages also options for ground maneuvers, population evacuation, and more. Everything will be implemented gradually until Hamas agrees to the terms for the hostage deal. Of course, any IDF strike will only be carried out if the POW and MIA headquarters definitively confirms there is no hostage presence in the location.

Palestinians inspect the site of an Israeli strike on a residential building, in Deir Al-Balah in the central Gaza Strip on March 18, 2025 (Photo: Reuters/Ramadan Abed) REUTERS

So why be pessimistic?

No reserve mobilization has yet been announced for the operation, and even when it happens, it's not clear how many reserve soldiers will come. The many rounds since the war began have worn them down to the bone, and while the coalition isn't taking any steps toward easing the burden, they face another Passover Seder in the Gaza Strip.

Until ground forces enter, I find it hard to see Hamas breaking and asking to return to negotiations. Airstrikes are not expected to defeat them. What might encourage high turnout rates is the understanding that the current ground operation will be carried out more forcefully. Reserve soldiers are tired of the stagnation and unnecessary risk to life. A change in the IDF's approach, abandoning the raid method and sticking to aggressive maneuvering, preliminary fire, and holding territory will increase the desire to fight.

Alongside the attack on Gaza, the defense minister and the IDF chief of staff conducted a situation assessment, after which it was decided to tighten guidelines for residents of Gaza border communities, so that educational activities will not take place and the train line in Sderot will not operate. This is a bad habit that has become so deeply entrenched in the system that even a new defense minister and a fresh chief of staff have not managed to get rid of it. The message of defensiveness during an offensive that you initiate after a year and a half of war – doesn't convey striking the enemy but rather Israel's weakness.

Second, all educational activities in Gaza border communities are already taking place in protected spaces, so why disrupt the children's routine and that of their parents who will have to stay home? Regarding the closure of the Sderot train, it's a disgrace. Just a few weeks ago, the line was opened for the first time since the war began, and only after concrete walls were placed at certain points along the railway, so suddenly that's not enough? The IDF spokesperson's office offered only a laconic response: "The Sderot train was closed due to maintaining residents' security and home front preparations as part of the military activity."

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How Israel could – and should – disrupt Nasrallah's funeral

ErezL — Sun, 23 Feb 2025 06:55:09 +0000

Nearly five months have passed since Israeli Air Force planes dropped 80 tons of bombs on Hezbollah's headquarters in Beirut's Dahieh suburb, and this Sunday marks the funeral of Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah, who was killed in the strike codenamed New Order.

Since early morning hours, hundreds have begun streaming into the Camille Chamoun Sports City Stadium in Beirut, which holds nearly 50,000 people, with the funeral ceremony scheduled to begin at 1 p.m. local time and last approximately one hour. Following the ceremony, the funeral procession will depart from the stadium, with Nasrallah set to be buried in a prepared area near the airport road in south Beirut. His deputy, Hashem Safieddine, who formally replaced him for several days before being eliminated, will be buried Monday in his hometown of Deir Qanoun al-Nahr in south Lebanon.

Mourners hold pictures of Lebanon's former Hezbollah leaders, Hassan Nasrallah and Hashem Safieddine, as they gather along a highway to attend their funeral procession in Beirut, Lebanon, Sunday Feb. 23, 2025 (AP/Bilal Hussein)

For any rational observer, the timing of this event is clearly meant to restore some dignity to the Shiite terror organization after recent months of humiliation. Therefore, Israel must take all possible measures to prevent or at least disrupt the funeral and ceremony to demonstrate that a New Order truly exists.

Here are six reasons why Israel should take action:

Prevent resurgence: The funeral is not merely a religious ceremony but a tool for displaying power. Hezbollah, which has suffered severe blows during the war – from the near-complete elimination of its command structure, through the degradation of its firepower and arrays in south Lebanon, to the ceasefire agreement with Israel signed over its head forcing it to move northward – sees the ceremony as an opportunity for image rehabilitation before the Lebanese public. Such a mass event proceeding undisturbed could recreate Hezbollah's sense of victory and foster their perception that Israel is once again deterred from acting in Lebanon.
Security risk and opportunity: The ceremony will be attended by Hezbollah senior officials alongside Iranian, Turkish, Yemeni and Iraqi terror operatives. Regarding the risk if Israel does not strike: The event could be utilized to plan terror operations against Israel or recruit new operatives. Regarding the opportunity: This presents a golden opportunity to eliminate numerous regional security threats, or at least demonstrate to those considering joining Hezbollah's ranks that it is highly inadvisable.
Strategic messaging: Preventing the funeral would stress to Hezbollah, Iran and all regional adversaries that Israel will not allow glorification of those responsible for hundreds of Israeli deaths. Nasrallah, similar to Osama bin Laden whose body was disposed of at sea to prevent his burial site from becoming a pilgrimage destination, does not deserve a grand, mass funeral that could be interpreted as legitimizing his crimes.

Hassan Nasrallah's and Hashem Safieddine's caskets ahead of the funeral on Sunday, February 23, 2025 (Screenshot: Social media) Social media

Potential escalation: Paradoxically, allowing the funeral to proceed as planned, rather than an Israeli strike, could lead to escalation in south Lebanon. The eulogies are expected to include condemnations of Israel and demands for the Lebanese government to act against the five Israeli outposts recently established in its territory. It is not far-fetched that attendees might take matters into their own hands and head south to act against Israel Defense Forces troops.
Israeli morale: We all remember those three weeks that began with the attack on pagers and communication devices and continued with the elimination of Radwan Force commanders and Hezbollah senior officials, including Nasrallah and his replacement. During those days, Israeli civilians walked with smiles and pride unseen since October 7. After a full year of struggling to keep our heads above water, we all remembered Israel's capabilities, especially compared to the constant fear of what might happen, and understood that everything had changed and we now set the pace. This situation has indeed been maintained since then. Disrupting the ceremony would prove to our northern neighbors that we still determine matters here, and what was in the past – will no longer be. Israel does not fear striking anywhere, even if it leads to escalation.
Northern Command chief: In recent months, I have met numerous brigade commanders who fought in the north, both regular and reserve forces. They represent the highest tactical echelon, interfacing between field commanders and troops, and those behind determining strategy. One common statement united them all: Uri Gordin, GOC Northern Command, is one of the best commanders they have had during their service. He is principled, frequently visits the troops, is connected to commanders and aggressive. He supported action after the Megiddo attack, advocated for striking Hezbollah operatives at the war's start, and primarily managed the defensive battle in the north while meticulously planning the maneuver in south Lebanon. A strike now, with limited time remaining in his Northern Command position, would leave a legacy and operational precedent for years to come, and might add merit points in the competition for IDF chief of staff in four years, after Eyal Zamir.

How to strike?

I do not believe an air strike is definitively the best approach. That is one option among others. As a start, I would suggest IDF Arabic spokesperson Colonel Avichay Adraee (who has done excellent work throughout the war, including last night) continue tweeting content that would discourage undecided Lebanese from attending the ceremony.

Leaflets could be scattered with psychological warfare messaging or unmanned aerial vehicles could simply hover above the stadium producing the buzzing noise every Lebanese recognizes. Imagine thousands of frightened Shiites fleeing the stadium when the ceremony begins – what a significant blow to Hezbollah.

Other options not requiring ammunition expenditure include supersonic booms during eulogies, electronic warfare disrupting current Hezbollah leader Naim Qassem's recorded speech or simply cutting power to the venue, and of course messaging that landings and takeoffs from Beirut to various destinations will not be permitted.

Conversely, Nasrallah's burial site could become an excellent location for identifying and targeting terrorists, as ISIS demonstrated last year at former Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani's grave. What is clear is that Israel cannot allow this event to proceed without some form of response.

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Preparing for an attack on Iran? IAF jets to be equipped with 'Defense Suits'

omrif — Mon, 27 Jan 2025 07:38:21 +0000

Elbit Systems has secured an $80 million contract for the development and installation of advanced electronic warfare (EW) self-defense suites for Israel's F-16I fleet. This contract adds to a series of defense agreements the company has secured in the past year, including deals for equipping aircraft and helicopters.

The Israeli Ministry of Defense, through MAFAT (Directorate of Defence Research & Development) and the Defense Procurement Directorate (Manhar), in collaboration with the Israeli Air Force, recently launched a project to develop and equip advanced defense systems for the F-16I "Sufa" fighter jets. Elbit Systems will lead the project, integrating cutting-edge technologies designed to maximize protection in complex combat scenarios.

IAF fighter jets on way to strikes in Lebanon. Photo: IDF Spokesperson

The defense suite will include several advanced systems:

Electronic Warfare System: Provides advanced capabilities for disrupting and neutralizing threats.
Electro-Optical Missile Warning and Launch Detection System: Enables early identification of threats, both from other aircraft and surface-to-air missiles.
Advanced Chaff and Flare Dispensing System: Adds an extra layer of protection by deceiving heat-seeking missiles.

This initiative aligns with a series of strategic deals promoted by the Ministry of Defense to strengthen Israel's defense industry autonomy and reduce reliance on external suppliers. These efforts aim to ensure the IDF maintain their qualitative edge and operational readiness under any condition.

"We are proud to have been selected once again by the Ministry of Defense and the Israeli Air Force to equip the F-16I fleet with our most advanced self-defense suites," said Oren Sabag, CEO of Elbit Systems. "In today's global landscape, safeguarding aerial platforms is a necessity. Elbit Systems has invested heavily in recent years, strengthening its position as a global leader in aerial platform defense with an extensive and advanced portfolio of solutions installed on various aircraft platforms."

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Anti-tank missiles, armored vehicles: IDF seizes cache of Syrian Army weapons

RachelG — Thu, 09 Jan 2025 07:30:09 +0000

Israeli forces have uncovered a significant Syrian Army weapons arsenal in a series of strategic raids along the Syrian border, including anti-tank missiles, anti-aircraft weapons, and an armored personnel carrier fully stocked with explosives.

The discovery comes amid an expanding Israeli military presence across five sectors of the border region, where IDF operations have already neutralized roughly 80% of Bashar Assad's army's strategic capabilities through coordinated air and naval strikes. The seized weapons stockpile, found during systematic searches, reveals extensive military hardware that could have posed a serious threat to both IDF forces and civilians in the Golan Heights region if acquired by hostile forces, including those aligned with Abu Mohammad al-Julani's emerging regime.

The IDF has established control over strategic positions within the Syrian border buffer zone as part of a dual-pronged approach to prevent military assets from falling into hostile hands, particularly those of al-Julani's emerging regime.

Combined armor, engineering, and infantry forces conduct systematic searches of key positions, resulting in significant weapons discoveries. Most notably, forces uncovered an armored personnel carrier containing an extensive weapons inventory: anti-tank missiles, anti-aircraft weapons, landmines, hand grenades, and explosive devices.

The seized materials have been transported to Israel for two purposes: preventing their potential use against IDF forces and Golan Heights residents, while enabling thorough analysis of enemy capabilities. The operation represents a significant expansion of Israeli control over strategic positions, with forces conducting tactical raids as part of an enhanced forward defense strategy.

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From battlefield to cyberspace: Inside Shin Bet's pivotal year of counter-terrorism

RachelG — Tue, 31 Dec 2024 07:40:32 +0000

As the civil year concludes, the Shin Bet security agency has published its comprehensive 2024 report detailing operations across all theaters – from Gaza, Lebanon, and Judea and Samaria, to Arab citizens of Israel, Iranian threats, technology, and wartime cybersecurity.

Gaza Operations

The war precipitated a fundamental shift in the Shin Bet's intelligence gathering and counter-terrorism strategy. After a long period of avoiding physical presence in Gaza territory, the organization revolutionized its operational approach during the southern ground campaign, implementing a "boots on the ground" strategy where Shin Bet coordinators and operatives now accompany IDF forces. Field personnel continue recruiting and running agents even during active combat, adapting their methodologies for operations within Gaza – a development unseen since the 2005 disengagement.

The enhanced ground presence has yielded significant results: over 1,350 tunnel-related arrests, including approximately 40 senior operatives and commanders, 165 close associates of high-ranking officials, 45 individuals linked to the October 7 attack, and 100 suspects with potential hostage-related intelligence.

A new southern theater interrogation division was established as the war began, specifically for processing detainees from Gaza ground operations. This unit has handled roughly 2,500 Gaza detainees, with more than 650 transferred for intensive Shin Bet interrogation. These interrogations generated crucial intelligence that saved lives during ground operations and enabled hundreds of precision strikes against terror infrastructure in Gaza. The agency developed a "from interrogation to target" system, converting real-time intelligence into actionable targets, resulting in hundreds of successful strikes based on interrogation-derived intelligence.

Palestinians celebrate by a destroyed Israeli tank at the Gaza Strip fence east of Khan Younis, Oct. 7, 2023 (AP/Hassan Eslaiah) AP/Hassan Eslaiah

The interrogations provided IDF ground forces with vital tactical intelligence, including warnings about booby-trapped buildings and Hamas operational patterns. Critical intelligence gathered during questioning led to the recovery of nine hostage bodies, enabling their return to Israel for proper burial. The intelligence operation also mapped Hamas leadership's underground network and the Shifa Hospital complex before IDF-Shin Bet operations, significantly facilitating rapid tactical entry.

Counter-terrorism operations eliminated over 30 senior Hamas military wing figures in Gaza – including 6 brigade commanders, approximately 30 battalion commanders, command and control leadership, and hundreds of company-level commanders, all identified through precise intelligence and interrogations. Notable eliminations included organization leaders Yahya Sinwar and Mohammed Deif, along with senior figures like Marwan Issa and Ruhi Mushtaha.

Following the Oct. 7 massacre, the agency established the NILI operations center, dedicated to eliminating terrorists who participated in the attack on Israel, prioritizing operational closure. Throughout the year, joint operations with the IDF eliminated dozens of attack participants. Key eliminated leaders included Jihad Kahlout, who commanded the Mefalsim curve massacre and kidnappings; Muhammad Abu Attawi, who directed Route 232 shelter attacks near Reim; Majdi Akilan, who led the Nahal Oz massacre; and Ahmed Wadiya, who paraglided into Netiv HaAsara and orchestrated the village attack.

Lebanon Operations

The agency significantly intensified its Lebanon operations during the war, focusing on intelligence gathering and Hamas activity prevention through a specialized division established two years ago to counter threats from Hamas' international command centers. The Shin Bet actively counters Palestinian terror organizations' entrenchment in Lebanon, targeting operational handlers who direct attacks against Israel, including rocket launches and infiltration attempts. The year saw the elimination of 25 senior operatives from Palestinian terror groups in Lebanon, including Hamas, Al-Jamaa Al-Islamiya, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. A notable operation was the Jan. 2 elimination of Saleh al-Arouri, Hamas political bureau deputy chief and Oct. 7 attack architect, in Beirut's Dahieh district.

Judea, Samaria and Jerusalem Activities

The agency thwarted 1,040 significant attacks throughout the year: 689 shooting attempts, 326 explosive device plots, 13 planned stabbings, 9 vehicle ramming attempts, two suicide bombing plots, and one kidnapping scheme. Despite increased prevention activities, attacks in these regions decreased by 40% compared to previous years.

The year saw dozens of joint special operations with IDF and Yamam forces, including 13 aerial strike operations and 10 ground-based arrest or prevention missions. Notable operations included sensitive missions at Jenin Hospital, Nablus, and a complex operation in Tulkarem refugee camp's center in late October.

Internal Security

The agency prioritized "internal arena containment" to maintain operational focus on Gaza and Lebanon fronts. Twenty terror cells comprising Israeli Arab citizens were exposed and neutralized, including five planning explosive or vehicle-based attacks. Investigations covered approximately 80 cases involving Arab citizens, including nine weapons-related incidents and 26 cases of ISIS-inspired activities or pledged allegiance. A concerning trend emerged with increased minor involvement in terrorism, leading to unprecedented administrative detentions of weapons traffickers to combat security-threatening criminal activities.

Special Operations and Hostage Recovery

The elite "Tequila" team, combining Shin Bet and Yamam operators, deployed 32 times for immediate threat response. Three successful hostage rescue operations were conducted: "Beginning of the Light" (Oct. 30, 2023, rescuing Ori Megidish), "Golden Hand" (Febr. 11, 2024, saving Louis Har and Fernando Marman), and "Operation Arnon" (June 8, 2024, recovering Shlomi Ziv, Andrey Kozlov, Noa Argamani, and Almog Meir Jan). Additional operations focused on recovering deceased hostages' remains.

Shin Bet Director Ronen Bar (IDF Spokesperson's Unit)

Iranian Threats and Counter-Intelligence

Iranian threat activity intensified through multiple vectors, including attempts to smuggle advanced weapons to Judea and Samaria and recruit Israeli citizens. Arrests in Iranian espionage cases increased 400% from 2023. Thirteen major espionage networks were dismantled, with 37 Israelis investigated and 27 indicted. Intelligence estimates suggest dozens of Israelis maintained contact with Iranian handlers during the war, with hundreds more targeted for recruitment.

Security and Protection Operations

The agency conducted hundreds of complex security operations in high-risk areas, including protection details for officials visiting Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria. International security operations included protecting Israel's Olympic delegation in Paris and Eurovision representatives in Sweden.

Cybersecurity Front

Cyber attacks increased fivefold during the war. Joint efforts with IDF and the National Cyber Array thwarted approximately 700 attacks from thousands of attempted breaches. Attack distribution showed 66% aimed at intelligence gathering, 32% targeting infrastructure damage, and 2% focused on influence operations.

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IDF turns scrap into anti-fortifications weapon

omrif — Mon, 30 Dec 2024 14:20:25 +0000

Over the past few decades, the nature of warfare faced by the IDF has evolved. While battles in the past involved symmetrical confrontations, such as tank-on-tank or fighter jets against one another, today's conflicts are asymmetrical. Combatants on opposing sides employ vastly different tools—such as fighter jets versus air defense systems.

The IDF has long grappled with the absence of tanks among Israel's immediate adversaries, who have shifted toward guerrilla tactics as part of this asymmetrical warfare. In response, Israel's defense establishment has continuously sought to adapt to this evolving battlefield. In the current Swords of Iron War, various adjustments and innovations have been implemented, including the introduction of robotic systems. Now, another adaptation has surfaced: a repurposed weapon designed to tackle fortified structures.

In recent years, the IDF's use of anti-tank missiles and launchers has waned. These systems have primarily been deployed against terrorists entrenched in buildings, rather than against armored vehicles. Recognizing this shift, the IDF's Technological Division began working two years ago on a solution that would be quick, cost-effective, and easy to implement without requiring extensive training or procedural changes for soldiers.

IDF operations in the Gaza Strip. Photo: IDF Spokesperson.

At the same time, many anti-tank launchers were being decommissioned and stored for eventual scrapping. But with the pressing need for new weapons to target fortifications, the Technological Division identified an opportunity. They repurposed the stored anti-tank launchers into effective, modern weapon for the battlefield, just in time for the ongoing war.

Why not stick with the LAW missile?

One may ask that the IDF already uses the LAW (Light Anti-Tank Weapon) missile. So why develop another weapon? There are two main reasons:

Boosting local production: Since the start of the war, Israel has prioritized increasing domestic production to reduce reliance on external sources, such as the US and Europe, which could halt supplies unexpectedly, as seen in the past year.
Cost efficiency: The repurposed launchers utilize materials originally slated for scrapping, significantly lowering costs.

This warrents an explanation on the make of an anti-tank launcher, having four main components:

Warhead: Contains the explosive material.
Fuse: The "brain" that determines when the warhead detonates.
Rocket Motor: Propels the munition and aids penetration the target.
Tube: A disposable cylinder through which the missile is launched.

The key modification in the repurposed weapon lies in the warhead. The IDF Technological Division removed the rocket motors from old anti-tank launchers and paired them with the warheads of 60mm mortar shells. Using a custom adapter developed at the IDF's Rehabilitation and Maintenance Center, they integrated a fuse, creating a new launcher tailored to penetrate structures.

IDF operations in the Gaza Strip. Photo: IDF Spokesperson.

Before deployment, the IDF ensured the modified weapon met its operational goals. The warhead is designed to detonate only after penetrating a building's wall, rather than on initial impact. Adjustments were also made to reduce weight, which had increased due to the addition of the new fuse and components. After successful trials, the team reduced the weight of the custom adapter without compromising soldier safety.

The IDF Ammunition Center now operates a production line for these repurposed launchers. Weapons once awaiting scrapping have been refurbished and integrated into combat units. In the past two months, the system has been actively used in operations, receiving highly positive feedback from soldiers in the field.

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First time since Oct. 7: IDF to reopen desert road for rare 'burning bush' optical illusion

RachelG — Tue, 17 Dec 2024 04:00:20 +0000

For the first time since the Oct. 7 Hamas massacre, the IDF Southern Command will reopen Route 10 to civilian traffic this weekend, allowing nature enthusiasts to witness the annual "burning bush" phenomenon at Mount Karkom. The 113-mile desert road has remained under strict military closure since the war began.

The scenic road, stretching 113 miles from Kerem Shalom to Sayarim Junction in the south, has been under military closure since the Hamas attack. Prior to that, it was last accessible during the Sukkot holiday in 2023, mere days before the assault.

This weekend's reopening coincides with the annual "burning bush" natural phenomenon at Mount Karkom. The site, typically a restricted military zone used primarily for Israeli Air Force training exercises, will welcome civilian visitors following a comprehensive military security assessment.

The phenomenon is a rare natural occurrence where December afternoon sunlight creates an optical illusion. During the shortest days of the month, particularly Dec. 21, sunlight strikes a rock formation in such a way that it produces a glowing aura resembling fire, with yellow-orange light appearing to emerge from the rock itself.

Military officials emphasize that visitors must avoid adjacent restricted areas to allow security forces to maintain their operational activities. The zones remain active military training areas, and unauthorized entry without proper clearance poses significant safety risks. The IDF instructs visitors who encounter any suspicious objects or unexploded ordnance to maintain their distance and immediately alert Southern Command.

Route 10 (Oren Ben Hakoon)

The military has designated three approved access routes:

Route 10 will open on Saturday, Dec. 21, operating from 9:00 a.m. to 3:30 p.m.

Alternatively, visitors can access the site from Route 40 via Paran Junction, following trails 19160, 19180, and 18540 to reach the Mount Karkom parking area. This route will be accessible on Friday, Dec. 20, and Saturday, Dec. 21, from 7:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. both days.

The third option provides access from Route 40 near Tzihor Junction, utilizing trails 19130, 19155, 19160, 19180, and 18540. This route will also operate on Friday, Dec. 20, and Saturday, Dec. 21, from 7:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m.

Access to all routes requires advance coordination through the IDF Southern Command's Coordination Office.

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How Israel destroyed the Syrian Army

omrif — Wed, 11 Dec 2024 07:45:01 +0000

The IDF announced last night the conclusion of the strategic phase of Operation "Arrow of Bashan" in under 72 hours. Despite this, control over the buffer zone and key positions along the Syrian border remains ongoing. The goal of these maneuvers is to prevent the rebels' empowerment – by confiscating weapons and military equipment and denying their proximity to the Israeli border, which could endanger Israeli communities and IDF forces.

The operation's significance cannot be overstated. The destruction of such a large percentage of an advanced military force like the Syrian army is an event unparalleled globally for decades.

As with all major IDF operations, this impressive achievement rests on three pillars:

1. Unprecedented coordination

For the first time during the war, there was complete consensus between the Chief of Staff, senior military leaders, the Prime Minister, and other members of the political echelon. Israel had long anticipated the collapse of Assad's regime but underestimated the speed of events. Despite the surprise, Israel was the first to act. While Iran hesitated, the IDF recommended airstrikes and entering the buffer zone, effectively convincing a receptive cabinet. Plans from Military Intelligence, the Operations Directorate, the Air Force, and the Navy were swiftly prepared over the weekend, presented to commanders and policymakers, approved, and implemented.

Syrian Navy warships reportedly bombed by the IDF. Photo: AFP.

2. Targeting strategic weaponry and military assets

Within the first 24 hours, air defense systems and numerous fighter jets were neutralized. This allowed 350 Israeli Air Force fighter jets to operate without interference in Syrian airspace, targeting 320 strategic objectives.

The targets were prioritized by their importance. Missile boats launched numerous simultaneous strikes on two Syrian naval bases – Al-Bayda and Latakia – causing significant damage and destroying 15 vessels. These vessels carried sea-to-sea missiles with ranges of 80–190 kilometers and explosive payloads of dozens of kilograms each. Anti-aircraft batteries, Syrian Air Force bases, and dozens of manufacturing facilities in Damascus, Homs, Tartus, Latakia, and Palmyra were also struck. These facilities housed Scud missiles, cruise missiles, coastal defense missiles, surface-to-air missiles, drones, fighter jets, combat helicopters, radar systems, tanks, hangars, and more.

These strikes followed years of intelligence gathering by the IDF, and the execution was described as flawless. The Defense Ministry estimates that 70-80% of the Syrian army's strategic capabilities have been destroyed.

A research center reportedly bombed by the IDF. Photo: AFP.

3. Iran's diminished role

For years, Syria served as Iran's primary base for stockpiling weapons, training countless jihadist forces, and distributing armaments across the Middle East with Assad's cooperation. Exploiting the power vacuum in Syria and Iran's lack of response to Assad's downfall, the IDF has significantly undermined Iran's foothold in the region. The scope and ambiguity of the strikes have deterred Iran from retaliating.

What Comes Next?

The buffer zone and key positions captured by the IDF will remain under Israeli control for the foreseeable future due to tactical considerations. How long this situation will persist is uncertain – weeks, months, or even years. Residents of the Golan Heights are calling for the border fence to be relocated to the far edge of the buffer zone.

The leader of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, Abu Mohammad al-Julani. Photo: AFP.

On the other side are the rebels, who, despite their attempts to project a "clean" image to the West, are unequivocally jihadist in nature. Once they are done with Damascus, their sights will turn to Al-Aqsa, following the same path as their Sunni Islamist counterparts in Hamas. It is no coincidence that the leader of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, Ahmad Hussein al-Sharaa, is nicknamed "al-Julani," a reference to his connection to the Golan Heights. Someone bearing such a name will not relinquish the area without a fight.

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