While the attempt to kill Marwan Issa, the deputy commander of Hamas' military wing, is an important and necessary step, it is also a painful reminder of the failure of Israeli intelligence.
Follow Israel Hayom on Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram
On March 9, the IDF attacked a building in the Nuseirat Camp, where Issa was apparently staying. Israel is currently waiting for additional indications that will confirm that one of Hamas's architects was indeed killed. His death will mark an important milestone in the elimination of the terror organization's leadership. Issa is likely the third senior member of Hamas's military council to be killed after Ahmad Naji al-Ghandur and Ayman Nofal, commanders of the northern and central parts of the Gaza Strip.
Issa's significance can be demonstrated by his other job as the coordinator between Hamas's governmental body in the Gaza Strip and its military wing, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades – a position he held before Yahya Sinwar. Without him, Hamas's grip on the Gaza Strip will become even weaker.
The organization has already gone underground, and even in Rafah, it is forced to send gangs of masked men to restore order in the markets and disperse protests against it. Currently, the disconnect between the policing forces and the military wing may grow, and the chaos out in the field will become more severe – particularly about everything concerning the suppression of demonstrations and the management of the free supplies flowing into the Gaza Strip.
For years, Issa was considered one of Hamas's sharpest minds, leading its transition from terrorist cells to an organized military with a command structure and brigades. His cruelty was evident in the takeover he led of a prison in Gaza in 2005, in which three Palestinian prisoners were murdered. In addition, he was entrusted with guiding terror attacks on settlements in the Gaza Strip in the years before Israel's disengagement from Gaza, and there is no doubt about the extent of his involvement in the October 7 attack.
Yet, five months later, most of Hamas' military and political leadership remains intact, and Israel's assessments have been proven false one after the other. This appears to be another failure in the growing list since the October 7 massacre.
Initially, Israel believed that Sinwar was hiding in Gaza City and managed to escape to the southern part of the Strip. Later, it was revealed that even in the early days of the war, he walked the Khan Yunis tunnels with his family. Who knows where he is now and whether the reports of his escape to Sinai are inaccurate, as was adamantly and overconfidently claimed by Israeli sources? The failure lies not only in locating Yihya Sinwar and Mohammed Deif but also in the hunt after Ezz a-Din al-Haddad, the Gaza City Brigade commander. Even in the northern part of the Gaza Strip, where the IDF operated in full force, a senior member of the organization was somehow able to evade attempts on his life.
Moreover, Israel has not yet succeeded in hitting Hamas brigade commanders, such as Mohammad Shabana in Rafah and Rafe Salama in Khan Yunis. Nonetheless, the IDF and the Shin Bet achieved significant successes, killing many battalion and company commanders and dismantling most of Hamas' units.
Humanitarian Fattening
Blame should not only fall on the IDF. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Benny Gantz, and Gadi Eizenkot seem to think that the IDF has all the time in the world. Even a month ago, we published here that Israel and the United States are only pushing the hostage deal further away with the cumbersome outline agreed upon in Paris and the humanitarian fattening of the Gazans, who are now writing reviews for the aerial deliveries they received from the United States and are enjoying slices of red meat courtesy of Qatar.
It is no wonder that Hamas still insists on a total ceasefire and a complete withdrawal from the Gaza Strip when it is being offered more and more achievements for free. In the meantime, the war cabinet is faltering in making decisions, thinning out the troops in the Gaza Strip, and has not yet ordered the evacuation of the Gazan population from Rafah.
Due to unknown reasons, even in Dir al-Balah, the IDF has not yet carried out a ground operation, and at this rate, the United States will force a ceasefire on Israel without a hostage deal. These two incompetencies – political and military – clarify that now is the time to "refresh" the government's and the IDF's intelligence directorate.
Subscribe to Israel Hayom's daily newsletter and never miss our top stories!
