The senior delegates Iran and Lebanon sent to the Munich Security Conference found themselves obliged to respond to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's address at the conference after he presented the audience with parts of the Iranian drone that breached Israeli airspace on Feb. 10.
Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif made do with a laconic response, and Lebanese Defense Minister Yacoub Sarraf sounded worried when he said, "We will defend ourselves if we are attacked, but we don't want war."
It seems the most important response, however – that of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah – was not heard. Nasrallah, who uses every speech to threaten Israel with salvos of deadly missiles aimed at strategic targets, has been keeping mum. He said nothing of the Iranian drone's downing by Israel and only praised Syrian air defenses for downing an Israeli jet.
The reason for Nasrallah's silence is simple. He understands that as the incidents on the border grow more severe, the circumstances spell a security escalation in the area. For the first time since the 1979 Iranian Revolution, Israel struck Iranian targets in Syria in broad daylight, and for the first time ever, Netanyahu has threatened to strike Iran directly if it continues to entrench itself militarily in Syria and come any closer to the Golan Heights border.
This means that a military confrontation between Israel and Iran on Syria soil is no longer an imaginary scenario, despite the fact neither side really wants it, at least not right now. Any confrontation of this kind will inevitably spell extensive Hezbollah involvement.
Hezbollah was founded by Iran in Lebanon in 1982, as its proxy in the war against Israel. Iran has spent billions of dollars to prepare Hezbollah for its role as the first line of defense against any threat to Iranian interests in the region, as well as on "exporting" the Islamic revolution outside its own borders.
But for years, Nasrallah and his predecessor, Abbas al-Musawi, tried to blur the fact that they were receiving orders from Tehran and presented themselves as Lebanese patriots, concerned only with what is best for Lebanon.
This is where Nasrallah's dilemma ostensibly lies: He knows that involving Hezbollah in any future conflict between Iran and Israel will have devastating results not only for his organization but for Lebanon as well. Sitting on the fence will serve him best, but that is not really an option for him. Nasrallah's religious loyalty to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in Tehran supersedes any loyalty to Lebanon, no matter how heavy the price it exacts.
The events of recent years are a good example for that. Hezbollah stepped into the Syrian civil war over Khamenei's desire to save the regime of his longtime ally, President Bashar Assad. As a result, Assad was spared, but Hezbollah, the "spearhead of the revolution," paid twice the price of its Iranian patrons: Some 1,200 to 1,800 Hezbollah operatives were killed in the Syrian civil war, including at least 75 senior commanders, compared to 535 Iranian fighters.
This appears to be the main reason why Nasrallah has so far refrained from weighing in on a potential clash between Iran and Israel. This is also why Sarraf is worried: He understands that Hezbollah would be unable to defend Lebanon, let alone its army, which at best allows Hezbollah a free hand in southern Lebanon, and at worse is colluding with the Shiite terrorist group.
