Argentina is bracing for diplomatic drama. Selected as the first South American host of the G-20 summit – the powerful international forum of governments and central bank chiefs that aim to shape policy for the promotion of international financial stability – Buenos Aires has already become the scene of a showdown between Russia and Ukraine, after Russia opened fire on three Ukrainian Navy ships on Sunday and seized their crews in the Kerch Strait, between the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov.
The incident quickly spiraled into an international crisis that has clouded the summit's agenda. It seems that, much like in the days of the Cold War, everyone is waiting to see what the United States and Russia will do.
U.S. President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin were supposed to meet over the weekend on the sidelines of the summit, but Trump announced Thursday that he was canceling the meeting, citing his disapproval over Russia's refusal to release the Ukrainian ships and sailors.
It is doubtful whether this meeting could have changed the situation on the Russia-Ukraine border, as it is far too rife with emotion and internal politics that are now being exploited by both parties. The Russians have reinforced their troops on the border and the Ukrainians have declared a tentative, one-month state of emergency.
Putin was also less than impressed by the joint air maneuvers conducted this week by the United States, France and Britain, which for the first time included F-35 stealth fighter jets. The move sought to send a clear message to Moscow, but as far as Putin is concerned, this was just another move in the global chess game the Kremlin is playing.
Events in Buenos Aires will impact Israel. Even the accelerated development of the Israeli economy may not fully place it in the big league with other global power players, but as the focus of the G-20 has shifted from world economy to diplomacy, the issues discussed will not stop in Eastern Europe and the agenda will eventually, even if only indirectly, touch on the Middle East, with its multifaceted power struggles between the United States and Russia, Sunnis and Shiites, and Israelis and Arabs.
Israel's focus remains the developments in Syria. This tumultuous arena seems to have calmed in recent weeks. This may be a cooling effect of the Sept. 17 downing of a Russian plane by Syrian air defenses trying to counter an Israeli airstrike. Since that incident, all sides have been acting differently: Israel has been less aggressive in its operations, Iran has reduced its attempts to smuggle weapons to Hezbollah in Lebanon via Syria, and Damascus has shifted its focus to its own rehabilitation after the seven-year civil war.
Russia's bombastic statements also seem different on the ground: The S-300 anti-aircraft defense systems deployed in Syria in the wake of the Sept. 17 incident have yet to be declared operational, nor has a timetable been set for handing them over to the Syrian army's control. Add to this the immediate implications of the U.S. sanctions on Iran – especially with respect to Tehran reducing its financial aid to Hezbollah, which is suffering from severe financial distress – the situation is very different than previously assessed, even if it remains highly volatile.
This reality, the ramifications of which extend far beyond Syria, has prompted Israel is engaged in intensive efforts to form international and regional alliances that will change the regional balance of power in its favor.
Presumably, reports in the U.S. about the considerable Israeli efforts to placate American ire over Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman's alleged involvement in the murder of exiled Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi are true, and these efforts have succeeded and have contributed to the budding relationship between Jerusalem and Riyadh.
Add to that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's expected visit to Bahrain – on the heels of his Oct. 28 visit to Oman – and we see a new Middle East, one less naive than in the past, where alliances are based on strong military, economic and technological interests.
At the top of this complex pyramid is the United States. Trump told the Washington Post this week that U.S. forces remain in Syria in part "for Israel." This is a complex statement that has its bright side – the clear hint that Washington stands with Israel, which was not entirely certain in the Syrian context until now; and its lesser side, namely the possibility that Israel will now be blamed for every American casualty in the Middle East. But mostly it obscures the bigger picture, meaning that the Americans remain in the region mainly as part of their effort to prevent Iran from gaining more power, their desire to stabilize Iraq and, above all, their need to keep the balance of power against Russia.
In this respect, the Trump-Putin meeting in Buenos Aires would have been important for the Middle East. The overt Israeli dream is for a complex global deal, in which the sanctions imposed on Russia following the 2014 annexation of Crimea are eased in exchange for removing Iran from Syria and Lebanon.
It is doubtful that this will happen, certainly not immediately, but the bottom line is that adding the U.S. to this equation is good news for Israel, as it signals to all regional players that it does not stand alone in its efforts to stop Iran's regional aspirations.
Simmering tensions
Israel's focus on the tensions in the northern sector has been able to somewhat mask the agitation plaguing the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.
The past few weeks have seen a slow but disturbing increase in violent incidents in the Palestinian territories, where some 900 terrorist attacks have taken place so far in 2018, 50 of them high-profile attacks that in total have killed 10 Israelis and wounded 55.
Most of the attacks were carried out by lone-wolf terrorists but the uncovering of a Hamas cell in Hebron that planned to carry out major attacks in key locations in Israel shows that while Hamas is trying to keep Gaza Strip from imploding, it is also trying to ignite tensions in the West Bank.
The defense establishment is following these trends closely and warily. The past two years have proved that Palestinians in the West Bank have little energy for large-scale violence. But having said that, dangerous forces are at play on the ground: the constant discussions about the nearing end of the era of Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas and the nagging questions about his potential successor; the pending eviction of Khan al-Ahmar; and the disturbing rise in settler violence across Judea and Samaria.
In this context, the Shin Bet security agency is still trying to apprehend the terrorist who perpetrated the Oct. 7 shooting in the Barkan Industrial Park in which two Israelis were murdered, and to solve the Oct. 13 Samaria stoning attack that killed a Palestinian woman.
The Shin Bet is taking different approaches to these two cases: While the manhunt for the Barkan terrorist is overt, the search for the perpetrators of the Samaria stoning, who are believed to be Jewish, is covert. If the agency has learned anything from the tragic Duma arson, is that it needs to have ironclad evidence before making arrests, to avoid the need for controversial interrogation tactics that might come into question during the legal proceedings.
The increased focus on the West Bank is the result of the relative calm in Gaza since the massive flare-up two weeks ago. Arson terrorism incidents have become few and far between, the massive border riots are waning and nightly border clashes have nearly stopped. Not exactly peace and quiet, but not a war zone, either.
This means little going forward. Gaza is still facing a dire economic crisis and, in the absence of a broad solution, it will soon come full circle, meaning recurring violence is only a matter of time.
For the time being, Hamas has opted to calm the situation down: The second round of Qatari aid funds is due to be delivered to the coastal enclave soon, power supplies have nearly tripled, and negotiations with Egypt and the U.N., which are trying to broker a long-term cease-fire between Hamas and Israel, are slowly progressing. These talks have a long, landmine-filled road to go, but it seems that both parties are making an earnest effort to cement the truce.
None of this means Israel's troubles with Gaza are over. None of the core issues is close to being resolved and tensions have been exacerbated further by the botched Nov. 11 commando operation in Khan Yunis. Hamas is sparing no effort to get to the bottom of that incident, not only to understand what its true aim was, but also to embarrass Israel.
This effort is two-pronged: Hamas has released the photos of the troops in an attempt to crack the military censor's restrictions on local media and the Israeli public's self-imposed censorship, while more nefarious attempts to find out more about the troops and their mission are made via fictitious social media profiles Hamas uses for phishing information.
Israel has been investing almost unprecedented efforts in damage control. This incident has highly volatile potential and the IDF's challenge now is not only to prevent its troops' cover from being blown, but also to avoid their modus operandi from becoming public knowledge.
This is also why the IDF named a special committee to study the case. The Middle East is not going to change and Israel will be required to mount covert operations in the future, so the military needs to understand what happened in order to decide what to do next. One thing is for sure: The committee's findings are likely to rattle the entire defense establishment.
These myriad challenges are now Netanyahu's to deal with, as he is also the acting defense minister. Netanyahu is seasoned enough to know that as well as providing great photo ops while visiting military bases, this job comes with risks. If there is anything we know for sure, it is that we can leave it to the complex reality of the Middle East to constantly pose new challenges.
