After a crazy month and a half of arduous and often bizarre coalition negotiations, it wasn't surprising that Wednesday, the final day Benjamin Netanyahu had under the president's mandate to form a government, played out the way it did. Report after report and spin after spin, it seemed that everything – absolutely everything – had spun completely out of control.
As the midnight deadline drew near, Netanyahu and his people began firing in all directions: With one hand they tried ensuring a majority vote for dissolving the Knesset; with the other they simultaneously tried assembling a coalition with Lieberman and the ultra-Orthodox parties; and with a third hand, which they had to grow especially for the occasion, they sought to scrounge partners from the opposition to replace Lieberman.
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Throughout these 24 madcap hours, Netanyahu's top priority was to salvage his mandate to form a coalition. It's true that Blue and White co-leader Benny Gantz also had no chance of forming a government, and another candidate from Likud wasn't likely to accept the mandate, but Netanyahu wasn't willing to take the risk regardless. If there was to be any gambit at all, he preferred that it take place during another election campaign.
Over the past month, Netanyahu has struggled to shed the opposition's accusation that the sole purpose of his coalition talks was to dodge an indictment by passing immunity laws. Even the judiciary reforms, which were revealed by Israel Hayom and which stood at the center of the coalition talks between Likud and the United Right, were viewed within the harsh prism of Netanyahu's bid for immunity.
But truth be told, Netanyahu didn't really try. It didn't bother him that this theme led the headlines on a daily basis. He knew the coalition he was eyeing would assure him immunity regardless – either via new legislation or the current law or by mounting his legal battle while in office, without it dismantling the government.
The embarrassing situation he found himself in on Wednesday had nothing to do with immunity or the laws of the land. In this context, the opposition swung and missed. It waged a mighty public relations battle that included demonstrations and rallies but ultimately had zero effect. In actuality, what caused and sustained the crisis was Lieberman's treachery on one hand, and Netanyahu's inability on the other to identify and neutralize it in time.
The landmine laid by Lieberman could have been diffused had it been spotted in time. Israel Hayom had already published the haredi factions' compromise proposal for the conscription law, but it was too late. Up to the very end, Netanyahu couldn't decide if bringing the haredim to their knees would indeed bring Lieberman on board, or whether doing so would lead to yet another excuse from Yisrael Beytenu not to join the coalition. Hence he constantly oscillated between attacking Lieberman – as if he had already concluded the Yisrael Beytenu leader wasn't joining – and engaging in talks with him over a compromise to the conscription law.
