There is probably no reasonable person who has yet to praise this week's deal with the Emirates. It's a real achievement with great potential on the one hand, with almost no price to pay on the other.
The news correspondents may have flooded Israeli's with flashy reports on boutique hotels and fancy malls, but the real bonanza hides in the infinite potential for business between Israel and the principality, and with its partners who may jump on the wagon of the new Middle East.
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An acquaintance who works in a major fund for high tech investment says that since the beginning of the week, the office's inbox is full of direct requests from businesses in the Gulf. They all read about the same: we have money, let's cooperate. "I've never seen such eagerness for doing business," he says. "I believe we'll be there in the next few weeks."
The Israeli high tech sector has been in the Gulf for years. Not from the top, meaning investments, but from the bottom: the products. There is almost no Israeli company that hasn't tried its luck in the Gulf in the past decade. Especially cyber companies – defensive, but also offensive. The Defense Ministry supervises every deal, but has only blocked a few transactions.
That allowed for companies like NSO, Verint, Checkpoint, and others to work in the Gulf with almost complete freedom, including teams that are situated there permanently. Those who understand the field know to look for the privileged terminal at Ben Gurion airport – formerly the Masada lounge and today Fattal – where all the passengers on private planes arrive. Their number has skyrocketed over the past few years, with the rise of business with Gulf states. It's a two-way street: Israelis fly there, and businessmen from the Gulf come here.
Almost all of this activity happens by private plane, to stay under the radar. Since there aren't any direct flights between Israel and the Gulf, the planes take off from Ben Gurion, land in Amman, and then immediately continue eastward. The price of a private flight like this can reach up to tens of thousands of dollars. For a businessman going for one meeting it's usually not worth it, but for a company flying a few of its employees as part of a deal worth tens or hundreds of millions of dollars this is a quiet and comfortable means of transportation.
All this will now rise above the surface. Now we'll see also the hundreds of other companies doing business in the Gulf. From security industries – all of them, without exception – that have been trying in recent years to sell various products, through companies that deal with agriculture, water, and food technologies, to other potential businesses, including the finance sector.
These seeds were planted in the mid-1990s, after the Oslo Accords. That's when the first Israelis visited Oman and the Emirates, delegations traveled to Oman, and offices were opened in Bahrain and Qatar. The Second Intifada cooled the relations, but the fundamental Islamists – the Shiites from Iran and the Sunnis of ISIS and al Qaeda – warmed them up again. In the Gulf they understood that Israel is not the problem in the Middle East, but mostly the solution: with all due respect to the recalcitrant Palestinians, the region has more serious problems, which Israel stands on the front lines of.
That led to deep, intimate, and productive cooperation. The ones responsible for it in most cases is the Mossad, the direct arm of the Prime Minister. Traditionally the Mossad conducts the covert diplomatic ties of Israel, but in the past decade, its activity broke every known norm and was used as a basis for cooperation that has considerable operational gains as well.
The Mossad overcame the crisis of the assassination in 2010 of Mahmoud al-Mabhouh in Dubai, which cast a shadow for a few years over the ties with the principality. The Emirates weren't angry about the assassination: the Hamas activist didn't interest them one bit. Their anger was over being disgraced in public, in front of the security cameras. They demanded of Israel not to carry out similar operations on their territory in the future as a condition for rehabilitating the ties. This led to much deeper cooperation.
The demand from the Emirates to receive as part of the deal the possibility to buy F-35 planes and advanced unmanned aircraft from the US was not surprising. It was also not new. It has been published in the past that the Defense Ministry did not allow Israeli companies to sell advanced attack technologies to the Emirates, fearing they would reach the wrong hands. This policy has not changed.
This is what caused the consistent objection from Israel to transfer advanced American technologies to countries in the Middle East. This objection is based on the American commitment to keep Israel's Qualitative Military Edge in the region, which began in the Yom Kippur War, through the law passed by Congress in 2018 (with help from the Jewish lobby) which calls for consulting with Israel before any decision to sell weapons to countries in the region. All US administrations observed this in the past. This administration is no different.
From the Prime Minister's announcement that the deal with the Emirates did not include any change in the consistent Israeli position, one can conclude that the issue of selling the F-35s was indeed on the table. The widespread reports on the issue this week revealed a double truth: It is doubtful that Israel can really influence the deal; and that the way the issue was managed in Israel was not good.
There is no real reason for the Prime Minister to cut off his senior ministers and heads of the security establishment from a process that all would be revealed eventually; and from someone who has already been burnt by the submarine affair, one would expect to behave in full transparency to avoid ahead of time any possible claim of ulterior motives in his decisions.
In his message this week Netanyahu detailed the discussions he held about the QME. He mentioned a discussion that the Head of the National Security Council Meir Ben Shabbat, held with Air Force Commander Maj. Gen. Amikam Norkin. It appears the discussion was held in a "by the way" manner, over the phone, without Norkin understanding the full context. He was asked if there is any change in Israel's position about selling advanced fighter jets in the region, and answered "no".
As a result, Norkin got into trouble with his commanders, when they understood the call was not pre-approved and was not later reported. The protocol calls for any discussions with army officials to be approved by and in full knowledge of the Defense Minister and Chief of Staff. Ben Shabbat circumvented them and spoke to Norkin directly. The Prime Minister's Office responded, saying that the head of NSC has the authority to call upon officials, and it is their duty to respond. This is true, albeit partially. He can do that, but in accordance with the protocol. He must not (and has no reason) to go over other people's heads.
In this case, Norkin was misled, but also was wrong to fail to report Ben Shabbat's call when it ended. This week he was in Germany for the joint exercise with the German Air Force, which included a stirring flyover over the Dachau concentration camp and the Olympic Village in Munich where the Israeli athletes were murdered. It is very probable he will be called in for a clarification with Chief of Staff Aviv Kochavi on his return.
Paradoxically, if Ben Shabbat had talked with Norkin according to the protocol, he most probably would have heard an enthusiastic partner. And not only Norkin: other IDF officials (from the Chief of Staff to Intelligence) and in the Defense Ministry (the minister, the director and departments dealing with security exports) would have shown their support.
For years, the IDF has not seen the Middle East only through the crosshairs of a rifle, but through a wider prism that takes into account that peace and its advantages more than often outweigh the dangers of war. The General Staff also understands that the geopolitical reality is complex and that there are no free meals for any side.
The US may have a deep commitment to Israel, but it has a deeper commitment to itself. Given the current financial situation, and on the eve of elections, a huge deal of fighter jets worth tens of billions of dollars and thousands of jobs for the American economy is very relevant. This should be the starting point for Israel; it would make it possible, maybe, to make lemonade from lemons, and get a valuable exchange from both the Emirates and Americans.
It's still not late to do that. Especially if along the way Saudi Arabia and other states join, who also might have demands in areas that concern Israel. It is doubtful if there is anyone who will see that as an attempt to foil the deal: it's an essential issue that demands a solution, in the Middle East that is always under threat and change.
The normalization in the region is a huge achievement for Netanyahu, whose diplomatic, economic, and security value cannot be underestimated. Correct management of the issue now can maximize these gains, at a time when the Israeli economy also needs oxygen. On the way, it will divide the Middle East clearly between Good and Evil, ahead of the fight against Iran and its emissaries – in Yemen, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Gaza – who will do everything to sink the new reality in the old and familiar swamp that is the Middle East.
Gaza reminded us this week of this bad reality. While in its imagination Israel sailed towards peace deals and economic ties, in its daily routine it was dragged into a fight in the south.
Hamas is not interested in escalation. There is no Israeli official who thinks otherwise. Hamas wants money and a horizon. The economic situation in the Strip concerns the terrorist organization greatly, mainly due to fear for the stability of its rule. It is frustrated for not being able to reach long term understandings with Israel, and furthermore, that its struggle is not garnering interest from the Arab and Western worlds. Gazans watched with concern how the world's attention moved to Beirut, and with it – the promises for aid.
The harassment that the citizens of the south are going through in recent weeks is supposed to solve the issue. Hamas is trying to transfer the responsibility to Israel: let Israel find a solution. There was an old TV show in Israel called "Chaim'll fix it". Chaim Topol made the viewers' wishes come true. Hamas has adopted the format, "Israel'll fix it". It wants Israel to make sure it has enough money if it wants things to be quiet.
As of Thursday morning, 270 fires were started by incendiary balloons in this round, which started more than two weeks ago. Up to the start of the week, there were also the "nightly harassments" near the border, and rockets were launched to Ashkelon and Sderot. Hamas wasn't responsible for all the activity, but it definitely allowed it. This is its way for signaling distress, without losing control.
Israel knows this tango, and dances accordingly. On the one hand, it responds decisively: while Gaza is not destroyed from the air, each night the air force has attacked and hits unique Hamas targets of infrastructure and weapon manufacturing. It is also being punished economically: The trade crossing at Kerem Shalom has been closed, fishing is forbidden, and gas transfer has been limited.
The Gaza streets felt the effect immediately. Prices surged, and there was less electricity. The internal pressure on Hamas grew. It was cornered: if it completely stops the violence, it will be seen as surrender. If it ratchets it up, it could lead to escalation it doesn't want. As always, Hamas tried to do both. Stop the nightly harassments and rocket fire, but keep up with the incendiary balloons.
As opposed to what people think in the center of the country, the south is not all black. Only parts of it have been burnt. The fires are annoying, but their physical damage is limited. In the beginning, there were only a few balloons, which burnt large areas. Recently there have been many balloons, which burnt small areas. The reason for this is the effective work of the fire brigade, the IDF, the police, the Homefront Command, and civilians. Each fire is located and put out quickly.
The main damage is psychological. Hamas is building on that and enjoys the fact that each fire is mentioned in media and social networks, which puts pressure on the decision-makers. As mentioned before, let Israel fix it. And if it doesn't, let it stew slowly.
Various officials are trying to solve this puzzle. An Egyptian delegation visited Gaza this week. It came to Ramallah, went for a day to the Strip, and returned to Cairo with no agreements. Simultaneously, UN delegates are at work, and constant negotiations with Qatar are being held to ensure the funding for the Strip will continue. The Qatari delegate is willing to come to Gaza to discuss this, but Israel's condition for his entrance is quiet.
The Qataris haven't decided against continuing the funding, but they have demands. They want more recognition of their efforts, and certainly now when they're not part of the new peace deals with the neighbors in the Gulf. They're willing to discuss enlarging the monthly sum from 30 to 40 million dollars. Israel will agree, as long as the money is used for civilian projects, like Gas for Gaza, moving the Gaza power plant from diesel to gas, and adding a fourth turbine that would significantly enlarge the output and electricity for the Strip's citizens.
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In Israel they will try to link this with long term understandings that will ensure that not every two or three months Hamas will have a new reason to harass the civilians around the Strip. The problem is that the road to this, as always, must include a deal for returning the bodies of IDF soldiers and of Israelis held captive in Gaza. Those aware of the issue say the price Hamas is asking for is so high that its chances are almost impossible. However, given the civilian strife in Gaza, Hamas may become flexible in exchange for other things.
It is probable that this reality in the south will remain unchanged in the upcoming days. The sides will try to reach an agreement while living under the threat of escalation. As always, every rocket from Gaza and every attack from Israel has the potential to deteriorate the situation; the IDF is prepared for this, and the Southern Command has held meetings to be prepared for any escalation. The growing belief is that a deal will be reached to bring back the quiet to the south, but with a clear caveat: Gaza is going nowhere. The new winds blowing in the region will not reach it in the foreseeable future.
