A long line of mediators has been frantically shuttling back and forth between Jerusalem, Beirut, and other capitals in the West since October in a feverish effort to prevent the current confrontation between Israel and Hezbollah from escalating into a full-fledged war, which could turn into a regional conflagration.
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Among the mediators are the British foreign secretary, France's foreign and defense ministers, and the head of intelligence, as well as the personal envoy of President Emmanuel Macron. The most active among them is Amos Hochstein, the representative of US President Joe Biden, who mediated between Israel and Lebanon on the maritime border issue. He visited us this week met with officials, and will later return to Beirut.
In broad terms, the mediators are proposing an agreement that establishes a ceasefire between the parties, followed by the withdrawal of Hezbollah operatives, including elite units of the Radwan Force northward, to a distance of 10-12 km (8-10 miles) from the border, and significant strengthening and reinforcement of the UNIFIL force and the Lebanese Armed Forces in the south. In other words: the re-implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which was passed in 2006 after the Second Lebanon War.
In return, Israel would have to agree to relatively minor border adjustments at about 12 disputed points along the common border. The more complex issues are in the Mount Dov area, known as Sheba Farms, and the village of Ghajar, which was split and only recently reunited under Israel's full control.
As in Gaza, negotiations in Lebanon are not being conducted directly with the terrorist organization. Lebanon, unlike Gaza, is supposedly a sovereign state, but only supposedly. The caretaker government, just like the Qatari government, passes on proposals to Hezbollah, which is de facto in charge, and awaits its decision.
Nasrallah has declared over and over that he will not agree to a ceasefire until fighting in Gaza stops (fortunately he did not demand IDF withdrawal and lifting of the siege), but has signaled that he is open and attentive to any proposal that would stop the skirmishes on the northern border and prevent an all-out war.
There are many reasons for this. The most important one is that Hezbollah was established by the Iranians to protect Iran's (Shiite) interests and serve as an outpost in case it is attacked, but not to be destroyed in a war to save a (Sunni) Palestinian organization. For "Palestine", a few hundred operatives may be sacrificed, but there is no need to commit suicide.
Hezbollah's "willingness" to "listen" to mediators is also related to the fact that although the limited war it is waging against Israel has indeed led to the evacuation of northern settlements and extensive damage – but has also forced more than 100,000 residents, mostly Shiites, to abandon their homes in southern Lebanon.
Another reason Nasrallah has not slammed the door shut is that in any given situation he would emerge as the big winner.
One example: Israel could commit to making border adjustments, perhaps even minor territorial withdrawals, but Hezbollah's ability to start a war against Israel at any given moment would not be affected. He will be able to fire most of the missiles in its possession even from beyond the Litani River, and no force in the world – certainly not an enhanced UNIFIL and the Lebanese army – will be able to prevent the return south of Radwan Force operatives, many of whom are residents of the villages in the area.
Does this mean that Israel should reject the idea of a diplomatic settlement and insist on starting another war in the north? The answer is no. Not yet. A war in the north at some point to remove the Hezbollah threat is inevitable and may be unavoidable shortly if Hezbollah tries to add more demands – for example, an end to IAF reconnaissance flights over Lebanon.
But to launch a war in Lebanon to disarm Hezbollah, time is needed not only to soften American opposition, but also to prepare for fighting on more than two fronts, give forces more resting time, replenish stockpiles and ammunition, and above all – to prepare the Israeli home front for the scale of casualties and damage unprecedented.
And until then, it is worthwhile to talk to the Americans about Iran too, and about the day after in Lebanon – including, for example, lifting the Saudi boycott of Sunni leader in Lebanon Saad Hariri, who heads the anti-Hezbollah camp. But this is not easy to do while there is not even a hint of talks with Washington about the day after in Gaza.
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