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Have the events of October 7 really forced us to re-examine our perception of reality? Talk of an "arrangement" in Lebanon before decisive victory over our enemy echoes the outdated Oslo mindset that led us here in the first place. This mindset assumes that Arabs approach signed agreements with the same commitment as the West in general and Israel in particular. The Oslo Accords rested on the belief that others would fight on our behalf – the Palestinian Authority in Judea and Samaria and Gaza, UNIFIL in southern Lebanon, Egypt controlling arms smuggling through the Philadelphi Corridor, and the Americans would guard us from Iran's nuclear ambitions and prevent them from ever dropping an atomic bomb on us. Now, there is talk of the Lebanese Army cleaning out Hezbollah from southern Lebanon – the same old conceptions are apparently still in place.
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In Western culture, the concept of peace – derived from the biblical prophets – implies recognizing the existence of the other. For many in the Arab world, however, an agreement – especially with non-Muslims – is no more than a temporary compromise made when the Arab side is unable to defeat and destroy its enemy.
For groups like Hezbollah, Hamas, and Iran, an "arrangement" merely restores the pre-conflict situation, where the Jews feared confrontation, and thus allowed them to build their terror networks. Without decisive victory, any arrangement Israel agrees to will be viewed as an Israeli capitulation, resulting from weakness and a desire to gain quiet at all costs – even if that quiet is only temporary. Any such arrangement will also boost the enemy's desire to rebuild for the next round of conflict.
An arrangement manages the threat but preserves the enemy's capacity and allows it to recover. In contrast, "decisive action" means eliminating the enemy's military and political power entirely, ensuring it cannot rebuild. In Arab culture, there is no true concept of a lasting arrangement with a non-Muslim enemy. Instead, terms like sulha or hudna signify a temporary ceasefire, rooted in a need to regroup due to the inability to defeat the Jewish enemy. This pause serves as a period for force buildup and preparing for renewed conflict. To achieve this, they may sign any document the adversary presents, using vague terms like "peace" and "calm," dimming the enemy's vigilance. The esteemed Islamic scholar Professor Moshe Sharon often quotes the ninth-century thinker Ibn Qutayba, who wrote: "We are Arabs. We advance and delay, add and subtract, but never with intent to deceive." The message is clear.
3
On May 10, 1994, about six months after signing the first Oslo Accords, Yasser Arafat visited Johannesburg. During a speech at a mosque, he explained his reasoning for signing the accord: "I see this agreement as being no more than the agreement signed between our Prophet Muhammad and the Quraysh in Mecca… Just as Muhammad accepted that treaty, we accept this one. But to continue the path to Jerusalem, we must go together… I cannot do this alone, without the help of the Islamic nation… You must come and fight, and begin the jihad to liberate Jerusalem…"
This declaration should have been enough to remove Arafat and his terrorists from our land. Yet, we were blinded by empty words and refused to see the truth. Yigal Carmon, founder of MEMRI – the Middle East Media Research Institute – recalled that after Arafat's speech, he received a recording of it. He tried to give it to journalist Nahum Barnea, who declined. "Listen to the truth of what Arafat is saying publicly," Carmon urged. Barnea replied, "There is no truth; every piece of information must be evaluated by whom it serves, and you serve the enemies of peace."
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The agreement Arafat referenced was the Treaty of Hudaybiyyah, an accord the Prophet Muhammad made with the Quraysh tribe in 628 CE and a model for all treaties with non-Muslims. Six years earlier, Muhammad fled from Mecca and the Quraysh to Medina, and the treaty secured a ten-year truce with the tribe, allowing him and his followers to make a pilgrimage to Mecca for three days each year. Freed from any immediate threat on that front, Muhammad soon turned to confront the large Jewish community of Khaybar. Muhammad laid siege to the Jews of Khaybar, and their surrender and subsequent status established a precedent for the treatment of non-Muslims under Islamic rule. Non-Muslims had to live as dhimmi (protected persons) required to pay a humiliating poll tax and remain in a position of submission and loyalty, which became the standard for Jews under Islam.
After two years, Muhammad had grown in strength and felt ready to capture Mecca. In 630, he returned with a force of 10,000, conquering the city and nullifying the treaty. War had become the better option for him.
It was this historical model that guided Arafat's approach to the Oslo Accords. He started action in that direction as soon as he set foot in Gaza. Shamefully, Israelis failed to recognize this cultural aspect. At the time, Arafat's terror group was in a weakened state. Following his expulsion from Beirut to Tunis after the First Lebanon War, and with the first intifada losing steam towards the end of the 1980s, the PLO had become internationally isolated, especially after its support of Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War. Yet the architects of Oslo revived the PLO, conferring upon it global legitimacy. Through the agreement, thousands of militants, sworn to Israel's destruction, were allowed into Gaza and the West Bank, and armed by Israel, which expected them to help ensure its security. This "stroke of genius" won its architects three Nobel Peace Prizes.
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If we recognize the vast cultural gap between two entirely distinct value systems, we can better manage the region's risk dynamics. We see "peace" in a way that is completely different to the way the other nations of the region see it. For them, peace in the sense we see it, is not part and parcel of their values. The notion that our enemies could negotiate true peace is misleading, exploiting our desire for quiet, even if temporary and imaginary.
The only currency valued by our adversaries is land. They demand land in exchange for nothing, or rather for "peace," a promise they will break as soon as they are able. Professor Sharon recounted that during negotiations between Israel and Egypt, President Sadat told him to relay to Prime Minister Begin that "this is a bazaar, and the goods are expensive." Sharon understood that Sadat expected that Israel would negotiate firmly rather than cede all of Sinai. Historically, the defeated party in war has always paid in land.
While we missed that opportunity, now, in the aftermath of the horrific massacre perpetrated by the Arabs of Gaza and the long war that has ensued, they must pay in the only currency they understand - land. This will sear defeat in their collective consciousness. A similar approach should be taken against Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, delivering a crushing blow to the Iranian snake's head. This is how true victory is achieved.
