Gaza is the Archimedean point. Everything started there on October 7, and everything will continue to converge there. While Israel's attention may occasionally shift elsewhere, as it did during the Israeli Air Force strike in Yemen two days ago, Gaza remains the inflammatory focal point requiring difficult decisions.
The IDF could fight forever in Gaza without finding a Hamas replacement. The deaths of four Nachal reconnaissance unit soldiers yesterday in Gaza are another testament to the heavy, daily price of fighting in the Strip. The IDF suffered ten casualties in Gaza over the past week, most in Beit Hanoun, which sits, for those who forgot, within spitting distance of Sderot. This shows that even after a year and three months, Hamas has not only avoided defeat but is managing to rebuild its capabilities: According to initial investigations, yesterday's incident combined the use of explosives and anti-tank fire, likely carried out by a skilled cell.
Reports of narrowing gaps in negotiations can be linked to Donald Trump's threats. There will be more crises ahead, including political ones. The IDF can continue fighting this way in Gaza indefinitely. It's doubtful they can keep pace with Hamas' reconstruction, as the organization maintains its grip on the population through control of humanitarian aid and cash flow. It's uncertain whether Donald Trump's entry to the White House next week will change this trajectory, and it's unclear if Israel wants to take responsibility for feeding or starving residents. The only solution is alternative governance in Gaza that would handle civilian matters while leaving Israel with security responsibility. Israel consistently avoids this solution because of the domestic political considerations surrounding the stability of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's governing Coalition.
On Friday, Defense Minister Israel Katz announced he had instructed the IDF to "present a plan for total defeat of Hamas in Gaza" if no hostage deal is reached before Trump takes office. He added that "we must change operational methods to eliminate Hamas and end the war in Gaza." It's unclear what methods the minister envisions and why the government hasn't ordered them already to shorten the war, but Katz appears likely to be disappointed: It's doubtful the IDF has any unused tricks up its sleeve.
At IDF headquarters, some saw Katz's announcement as a trap. If no such plan is presented, or if it's deemed insufficient, IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi and senior IDF officers will be portrayed as weak and not pursuing decisive victory. Conclusion: They must be replaced. And if such a plan is presented but not implemented, Halevi and senior officers will be portrayed as weak and not pursuing decisive victory. Conclusion: They must be replaced.
Katz's announcement surely had another intended recipient: Hamas. The organization faces mounting pressure to advance a hostage deal, with Trump's threats of opening "the gates of hell" in the background. Assuming the American president won't send Marines to Gaza (he won't), he'll have two channels of influence. First, the humanitarian issue. Second, applying pressure on Qatar, Hamas's patron. Such leverage could range from expelling Hamas leaders from Doha at the lower end to imposing sanctions on Qatar itself at the upper end.
Yesterday's reports from Doha about narrowing gaps in hostage deal negotiations can be linked to these threats, and likely also to fatigue and pressures on both sides. Still, the die hasn't been cast. There will be more crises on the way – including political ones over the extended ceasefire that would accompany any agreement and the list of Palestinian prisoners to be released under it – and there will also be disappointments since even if an agreement is signed and implemented, about two-thirds of the living and deceased hostages Hamas holds will remain in Gaza.
While the agreement would include a mechanism for dialogue between sides about next stages, if Israel continues refusing to end the war it will quickly return to it with all its current problems. Therefore, Israel would do well to outline future plans now for various possible scenarios, especially for renewed intensive fighting.
Such a scenario would require large forces, including reservists. This is an issue Israel cannot escape, with forces continuing to be stationed in Lebanon and Syria, and growing concerns about violent eruption in the West Bank. With no other manpower sources – and after losing the equivalent of a division's worth of fighters – the issue of drafting ultra-Orthodox Jews, which the government tries to obscure in every way, will always return to the table.
One couldn't help but feel disgust at government officials' condemnations following the attack on Major General David Zini in Bnei Brak Thursday night. It was condemnation hiding support: those promoting mass draft-dodging that contradicts state and military needs and opposes equality and logic cannot escape the consequences of their actions.
This wasn't the only case of discomfort over the past weekend. The Ynet publication about Deputy Chief of Staff Amir Baram's intention to resign from his position next month evoked similar feelings. It's no secret that Baram and Chief of Staff Halevi don't hold each other in high regard. This isn't new: When they were parallel regional commanders (in the מorth and דouth), they didn't exchange words, and Baram's appointment wasn't intentional but rather for lack of choice after Major General Tamir Yadai refused the position.
Baram always had an image of an officer who distances himself from cliques and media, focusing on work. Now it turns out manipulations aren't foreign to him: he likely smelled hints of Halevi's dismissal wafting from the defense minister's office on the other side of the 14th floor, and decided to use them to improve his position. His statement about typical term lengths isn't relevant during wartime, and he also knew well that Halevi couldn't appoint another deputy due to the appointments freeze Katz imposed.
It seems Baram wanted to improve his position in the race for Halevi's succession. Apparently, the matter burns so urgently for him that even yesterday afternoon – during Shabbat and shortly after soldiers were killed in Gaza – he chose to convene a phone consultation about how to handle recent publications in the media.
Baram had an image of someone who distances himself from cliques and media and focuses on work. Now it turns out manipulations aren't foreign to him. It's doubtful whether Baram's chosen path will improve his chances against Eyal Zamir, who surpasses him in every metric, but it certainly signaled to the IDF that for some, personal matters burn no less urgently than war matters.
