The one who declared Wednesday that IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Herzi Halevi's resignation comes too little, too late was right. Halevi, like the rest of the security leadership, should have removed their uniforms and devoted themselves to writing memoirs more than a year ago.
But the central problem isn't the resignation of one senior official or another – it's how to rid ourselves of a worldview and mental universe that has distorted the entire security leadership for more than a generation. How do we return the military's leaders and security bodies to their true role, instead of serving as consciousness engineers, diplomats, legal advisors and welfare officers? How do we restore confidence to the heads of the defense establishment?
Halevi is an excellent person, among the best we have in uniform. He failed dramatically in his situation assessment on the night between Oct. 6–7, and for this reason alone he should have laid down his baton when war broke out. But even his failure in analyzing the situation on that cursed night stemmed from the truly deep affliction that infected him and most of his predecessors, which influenced his decision and that of the other participants in that nighttime consultation.
This is the affliction that caused them to err so extremely and not understand who the enemy facing us was, what their goals were, what size threat they posed. The affliction that caused them not to properly prepare the military, to reduce and distort it, to instill in it a spirit of appeasement, cowardice and denial of reality.
This fundamental flaw isn't a disease that erupted in the current generation of commanders. It has characterized, with few exceptions, all IDF chiefs, Shin Bet heads and General Staff members of the past 40 years. Since each of these senior officers grew and was promoted by their predecessors, they became their mirror images. No wonder Benny Gantz, another excellent person who was the weak and failed chief of staff during Operation Protective Edge, is the one who appointed Halevi as chief of staff in a snap move on the eve of the previous elections. He wanted to ensure the continuation of the dynasty, which now must be severed and replaced with something different.
The dramatic turning point came during Ehud Barak's tenure as chief of staff, during Oslo. While Barak warned in private that the agreement was "full of holes like Swiss cheese," loyal only to his personal career – as was his way, he fell in line. Barak also caused the entire leadership to "change the disk," under orders from Shimon Peres and Yitzhak Rabin. The military and Shin Bet leadership has worn these reality-distorting glasses from then until today.
But the truth is that this epidemic began spreading even earlier, somewhere in the 1980s. The security leadership was gradually mentally neutered under the influence of political, legal and media factors. When every brigade commander was forced to employ considerations of a diplomat, international law advisor and social worker; and every general became a public opinion advisor dealing with leveraging, signaling and messaging, instead of defeating the enemy. This is a disruption that was imposed on the security leadership due to the weakness of leaders and loss of direction by our social leaders.
As someone who led so many chiefs of staff and Shin Bet heads with a distorted mentality, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu must also resign immediately – his successors will "return the disk" to its proper place.
The epidemic intensified when leaders went off the rails and pushed delusional adventures like Oslo, the Gaza Disengagement, the flight from Lebanon and the Second Lebanon War. At these critical junctures, the system's leaders were forced to adopt a conceptual world opposite to military DNA and basic logic. Thus, the classic role of military and security services – to defend us, took on an opposite meaning: they became marketers of appeasement, tying of hands, failures and defeats. We were left without commanders to protect us – and we saw the results on Oct. 7 and since.
Therefore, Halevi must be replaced by a chief of staff capable of revolution and installing new-old software: returning the IDF to simply being an army. An army that decisively destroys the enemy – in Gaza, Lebanon, Judea and Samaria. The same goes for the Shin Bet and Mossad.
An army whose leaders don't conduct negotiations for hostage releases. Don't share secrets with enemy leadership, in the style of Palestinian "parallels" or senior Qatari and Egyptian officials. Who leave diplomacy, law and social work to others. Who provide a counterweight of aggression and strength against the winds of appeasement and cowardice blowing from within. Commanders who will lead the army with speed, cunning and courage, exactly as all good commanders have done throughout history.
Still, the heavy responsibility of Halevi, the Shin Bet's Ronen Bar and the rest of the security leadership doesn't reduce one milligram from that of Netanyahu. The fundamental, deep blame rests on him more than anyone, as someone who led and guided so many chiefs of staff and Shin Bet heads with distorted mentality and weak performance over the years. He too must resign, immediately. His successors will be required to "return the disk" to its proper place.
