The IDF's investigations into the events of October 7 have been presented to the Israeli public all at once, a flood of information that is difficult to absorb, comprehend, and process.
These investigations comprise 77 separate reports, based on thousands of sources and conducted by 238 investigators over a total of 57,750 workdays. Over the past few days, these findings have been presented in long sessions to senior IDF officials, members of the communities surrounding Gaza, military correspondents, and other civilian representatives. Some of the reports, particularly those focusing on battles within the communities, will be released to the public next week.
After listening to and reading through dozens of hours of these reports, it is evident that they fail to provide satisfactory explanations and do not answer all the questions. The IDF failed in fulfilling its mission, offering only partial explanations for the greatest disaster to befall Israel since its establishment.
The military is attempting to present these as rigorous and critical investigations, yet at least some of them appear more like a defense argument than a truly deep and impartial inquiry.
Significant criticism has been raised in recent months regarding the identity of the investigators, some of whom are close associates or have served alongside or under the commanders they were assigned to probe for years. Some of the reserve officers conducting the investigations were themselves decision-makers on October 7 or at other critical junctures. The IDF has admitted that some of those investigated even consulted with lawyers prior to their questioning.
The IDF's response to these concerns is that this is an internal investigation process, conducted by the units themselves, as has always been the case after any operational event. The military further emphasizes that all these reports will be subject to any future external review committees, as well as the scrutiny of the State Comptroller. However, in practice, the IDF has clashed with the Comptroller's Office for months, preventing it from carrying out its work. Moreover, even within the military, substantial criticism has emerged over how the investigations were conducted and the identities of those leading them.
Another major issue is that no one was assigned to investigate the chief of staff himself. Despite bearing significant responsibility for the failure, it was the chief of staff who ultimately summarized all the investigations and, in effect, examined his own actions. It is not unlikely that the incoming chief of staff, who will assume office this Wednesday, will reopen the investigations - at least some of them - and will likely be the one to make key decisions regarding those involved in the failure.
It is worth noting that several key figures, including the chief of staff, the head of Military Intelligence, the commander of Unit 8200, the head of the Gaza Division, and others, have ostensibly taken responsibility and resigned. However, resigning or stepping down with full pension benefits hardly seems like an adequate consequence for those responsible for a catastrophic failure that led to the abduction of 251 Israelis, the deaths of hundreds of civilians and soldiers, the injury of thousands, and far-reaching consequences that will continue to affect the country for years to come.
Additionally, several high-ranking officers who previously held key positions, such as former Chief of Staff Aviv Kochavi and the former head of the Southern Command, Eliezer Toledano, who still serves on the General Staff, were not investigated at all as part of this review process.
