The ceremonial note of thanks from President Donald Trump to Egypt shared in a celebratory post on his platform "Truth Social" to mark the anticipated return of Edan Alexander, the American-Israeli citizen held by Hamas since the terror attacks of October 7, 2023 should not distract us from the reality that Egyptian-American relations are in the midst of a deep and growing crisis, one that has intensified since the rise of Trump's administration. This crisis has now evolved into a political gamble by Cairo that runs counter to Egypt's long-term national interests, despite offering the ruling regime certain short-term advantages.
In a relatively short span of time, Cairo has delivered four unequivocal rejections to Washington what might be called Egypt's Four No's:
First: No to absorbing Gazans on Egyptian territory a strategic bargaining chip the regime is determined to retain. As I have previously argued, this card generates billions for the regime and ensures its continued presence on the international stage.
Second: No to joining the U.S.-led military coalition against the Houthis even though the request is a legitimate American one prior to recent tactical advances and partial Houthi concessions to the Americans.
Third: No to granting American vessels "deserved" free passage through the Suez Canal an unprecedented escalation.
Fourth: A direct No to President Trump himself; President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi declined Trump's invitation to visit Washington while accepting Vladimir Putin's invitation to attend the "Victory Day" celebrations in Russia. In a historic first, Egypt dispatched a unit from its military police to participate in the parade an act laden with symbolic weight.
On the sidelines of that visit, extensive discussions were held between the two delegations, focusing on the implementation of the 2018 Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement, the development of the Russian Industrial Zone in the Suez Canal area, the Dabaa nuclear power plant, and broader coordination in energy, food security, tourism, and mining. Both parties expressed high hopes for the success of the upcoming joint committee meeting scheduled for this May.
Additionally, agreements were reached to promote new Egyptian tourist destinations in the Russian market, alongside reaffirmed political coordination within blocs such as BRICS. President Putin voiced full support for the Gaza reconstruction plan adopted at the Extraordinary Arab Summit in Cairo in March 2025. He praised Egypt's role in de-escalating regional tensions particularly in Gaza and its efforts to facilitate hostage releases and the delivery of humanitarian aid.
These developments underscore the alignment of Egyptian and Russian perspectives and the growing strength of their bilateral relationship.
Militarily, Cairo has also taken additional escalatory steps regarding what Washington considers "red lines":
First: Joint military drills with China.
Egyptian armed forces conducted "Eagles of Civilization 2025" exercises with the Chinese military, involving special forces and paratrooper units from both sides. The maneuvers included counterterrorism operations and hostage rescue scenarios, reflecting an unprecedented level of military coordination between the two nations and sending a crystal-clear message to Washington.
Secondly: Military Cooperation with Turkey
In a move reflecting growing rapprochement between Cairo and Ankara, Lieutenant General Ahmed Fathi Khalifa, Chief of Staff of the Egyptian Armed Forces, paid an official visit to Turkey, where he met with his Turkish counterpart in the first high-level military meeting between the two countries since 2013. The two sides discussed ways to enhance military cooperation, including the exchange of expertise, joint training, and the development of defense industries. This visit is part of ongoing efforts to normalize relations between Egypt and Turkey, which had been strained over the past decade. Following the visit, elite Egyptian and Turkish forces carried out joint air drills at Konya Air Base an indication of the evolving bilateral military relationship. Notably, these steps have come amid increasingly hostile Turkish rhetoric against Israel, raising questions about the recalibration of Egypt's foreign policy alignments.
Adding to all the above is Egypt's notable delay in appointing a new ambassador to Israel following the end of Khaled Azmy's term, as well as Cairo's refusal to accredit Israel's proposed envoy to Egypt, Orit Rothman.
All these signals, emerging within just a few short weeks, render Egypt's message to Washington unmistakably clear: "We are on the verge of joining the other camp."
But is this path a safe one?
The recent history of Arab states that have drifted into strategic alliances with Russia or China sends a clear warning. Syria, Sudan, Libya, and Yemen stand as sobering examples of nations that have lost their security, economies, and sovereignty under the banner of the Eastern bloc without receiving any real protection or genuine independence in return. Will Cairo follow suit?
Egypt's true national interest lies in maintaining a distinguished relationship with Washington. Despite its complications, that relationship remains a more reliable guarantor of Egypt's security, economic stability, and international standing. A full pivot toward an alternative axis could prove perilously costly.
Mohamed Saad Khiralla is a political analyst specializing in Middle Eastern affairs and Islamist movements, an opinion writer and member of PEN Sweden.
