Betrayal (1)
Strip away the legal hair-splitting about whether Qatar qualifies as an enemy state. In practical terms, Qatar is an adversary. From a moral standpoint, working for Doha during wartime constitutes betrayal. Severe betrayal, given that Qatar bankrolls Hamas' military operations, funds the global anti-Israel propaganda campaign, and operates the Al Jazeera disinformation empire that demonizes the Jewish state.
One might charitably explain why some Israelis cooperated with Qatar before October 7. Israel itself greenlit the infamous cash-stuffed suitcases flowing into Gaza, deliberately ignoring that much of the money fueled Hamas' terrorist infrastructure. Not everyone looked away. Shin Bet officials warned repeatedly that Israel should eliminate Yahya Sinwar and his cohorts. But Benjamin Netanyahu preferred the illusion of calm, dismissing concerns as a "calculated risk" (a phrase Hamas' leader mockingly threw back at him in a personal note).
But accepting even one Qatari riyal after October 7? That crosses into betrayal. When this collaboration emanates from the Prime Minister's Office – Israel's inner sanctum – the breach becomes exponentially worse. Three reasons make that office sacred: First, everyone working there serves only Israel's interests. Second, their sole mission is to advance the nation's security. Third, they fight enemies rather than serving them.
Netanyahu and his defenders insist that Eli Feldstein, the prime minister's former spokesman for military affairs, never formally worked in the office. Anyone who dealt with Feldstein knows better. Here's an episode worth sharing now. On a Saturday night in early 2024, while driving with one of my children, Feldstein called. We'd known each other for years, since his days as IDF spokesperson and later as the spokesman for the Judea and Samaria Division. I'd always appreciated his unconventional background – an ultra-Orthodox man who enlisted, loved military service, and possessed natural charisma.
We hadn't spoken much since his brief stint as Itamar Ben-Gvir's spokesperson at the Public Security Ministry. I'd objected then to his lending credibility to a serial offender bent on dismantling the police. Fortunately, Feldstein left Ben-Gvir shortly after.
That Saturday night conversation lasted only minutes. After exchanging pleasantries, he pitched an obviously fabricated story smearing Egypt. I declined to participate and suggested we end the call amicably. At the time, I couldn't fathom why the prime minister's military spokesperson would attack Egypt. The possibility that he was acting on Qatar's behalf never occurred to me.
Egypt deserves its own discussion. Among all the betrayals, undermining Israel-Egypt relations ranks near the top. This cabal actually jeopardized peace with Egypt – one of Israel's most vital strategic assets, alongside the US alliance and technological dominance. That the Arab world's largest, most populous nation with its most powerful military has maintained peace with Israel for 46 years represents a geopolitical triumph. Yes, it's cold peace. Cold peace is far preferable to armed conflict.
The disinformation campaign run from the Prime Minister's Office sought to invert reality, casting Qatar as peacemaker and Egypt as warmonger. The lies included claims that Egypt violated the peace treaty by massing troops in Sinai, that Egyptian intelligence officials skimmed money from Hamas funding, that Cairo knew about October 7 in advance and conspired in Israel's deception, and that Egypt sabotaged hostage negotiations. Every accusation was false. Unfortunately, some journalists amplified them.
A word about journalism. Reporters thrive on leaks and should encourage sources to come forward. Journalists also rely on information from political offices, all of which have agendas. A reporter can assess motives, but the only test that matters is whether a story is significant and accurate. The fabrications peddled by the Qatar network inside the Prime Minister's Office were certainly sensational. They failed the truth test. A single call to mid-level or senior security officials would have exposed them as fiction.
Betrayal (2)
Every nation dreams of penetrating its adversary's leadership circle with operatives. The Mossad has invested enormous resources toward this goal over decades, succeeding only occasionally. So have premier Western and Eastern intelligence services. Qatar infiltrated Netanyahu's office effortlessly, and on the cheap.
Since October 7, the Shin Bet has uncovered more than 60 instances of Israeli citizens recruited to spy for Iran. No reasonable person considers it acceptable that Israelis assist Iranian intelligence operations, much less violent actions. Everyone recognizes this as betrayal – aiding the enemy during wartime. Yet many minimize Qatargate's severity. Most troubling are public officials (cabinet members, ministers, Knesset members) whose fear of Netanyahu trumps both common sense and their obligations to citizens and national security.
Imagine the uproar if this betrayal had occurred under former prime ministers Naftali Bennett or Yair Lapid. Critics would demand not only prosecuting those who took Qatari payments but also investigating the prime minister for employing advisors who turned double agents and for failing to supervise his own staff. Two scenarios exist: Either Netanyahu knew and approved, making him complicit, or he didn't know, making him negligent. His silence suggests he's hiding something or fears establishing a narrative that will later prove false.
Let's go back to Iranian espionage. Shin Bet and police are struggling to understand why so many Israelis betrayed their homeland. Initial assumptions focused on marginalized citizens – recent immigrants without family ties or military service, whose connection to Israel remained weak. As cases multiplied, that theory collapsed. Iran recruited across demographics: young and old, wealthy and struggling, urban and peripheral, religious and secular, native-born and immigrants, Mizrahi and Ashkenazi. Dozens of Israelis worked for Tehran in exchange for money.
Israel was long considered nearly impossible to penetrate with spies. Unlike neighboring states, Israel's social cohesion remained strong, built on the collective understanding that interdependence ensured survival. Historically, Israeli traitors fell into two categories: foreign-trained operatives planted in Israel (Marcus Klingberg being the most notorious) and ideologically motivated betrayers (Udi Adiv, Mordechai Vanunu).
Today's phenomenon differs fundamentally, and it's deeply troubling, not just because of the sheer numbers caught (with many more presumably undetected) but because it signals something essential has fractured. We must confront this fracture, because it's corrupting our national soul. When ordinary Israelis witness betrayal emanating from the Prime Minister's Office, they absorb the message that it's acceptable. When they watch Netanyahu and his ministers close ranks protecting cronies rather than demanding accountability, they understand it's permitted. When they learn that serving the enemy state Qatar isn't particularly serious, they conclude it's allowed.
Add to this the systematic demolition of everything once held sacred – the justice system, the security establishment, social solidarity, and ultimately the State of Israel itself. Simultaneously, ministers and legislators suspected of serious crimes skip interrogations or evade prosecution, while a prime minister transforms his trial into theater and seeks pardons (while refusing responsibility for the catastrophe that occurred on his watch and attempting to obstruct legitimate investigations). Some Israelis observe all this and conclude nothing remains sacred.If senior officials can get away with anything, why shouldn't the ordinary citizen?
Betrayal (3)
Benjamin Netanyahu must face investigation because these events occurred in his office, originated from his office, and were executed by his office personnel .The multiplicity of versions and lies regarding Feldstein could have been amusing, if it didn't teach how much this affair frightens those at the top. Initially, he was portrayed as a loyal patriot (Justice Minister Amir Ohana even compared him to Dreyfus). Suddenly, he transformed into disposable garbage that acted independently.
Make no mistake: Feldstein didn't stumble into sensitive locations by chance. I've visited the Israeli Air Force command center (known as "the pit") multiple times. Access requires official guest credentials. That's exactly what he possessed, and not just there. He operated as part of the prime minister's inner circle. That's why journalists accepted the information he peddled. He spoke with the Prime Minister's Office.
The new Shin Bet director, David Zini, should lead the demand for Netanyahu's investigation (Police Commissioner Dani Levy should be second). Among his responsibilities at the Shin Bet, Zini oversees counterespionage operations, security clearances, and safeguarding classified information at the Prime Minister's Office. All these systems failed, and accountability demands answers about whose responsibility this was and who authorized it. Only Netanyahu can provide those answers, including explanations for other matters like the classified document leaked to the German Bild.
Whether Zini will act remains doubtful. He hasn't yet developed the spine such action requires. Two days ago, his deputy, agreed to conclude his tenure and retire promptly. The two clashed from the outset. Perhaps because the deputy struggled adjusting back to deputy status after serving months as acting director. Perhaps due to Zini's habit of speaking, according to multiple sources, in exclamation points despite still being new to the job
Zini has commenced the search for the deputy's replacement. The sole natural internal candidate is currently studying abroad (N., former Operations Division head), and the organization's remaining senior leadership is exceptionally young in both age and experience. Expectations are that Zini will recruit an external deputy, someone who previously served and departed but would now return. The leading candidate is A., who headed the Southern Region in the years before October 7. Another possibility is N., formerly Gaza Division chief and currently at the National Security Council. Selecting him would constitute an Olympic-level leap over standard positions and ranks, but in contemporary Israel, anything's feasible.
Additional candidates exist, including some whose return would be welcome, though it won't materialize. For instance, E., who formerly led the Israel Region, failed to secure the deputy position solely because Netanyahu's office discovered his brother had participated in protests against the prime minister. This approaches the severity of mentioning "Ronen Bar," former chief of the Shin Bet, the two words Zini omitted from his inaugural address. Yes, Bar bears responsibility for October 7, but he also deserves credit for the Shin Bet's major wartime achievements. Zini's failure to acknowledge him registered within the Shin Bet as pandering to Netanyahu, who attended the ceremony.
Zini won't establish his legacy through Netanyahu's favor. He'll build it through rigorous work, through earning his organization's respect, and through delivering results that ordinary citizens experience. His public stance on Qatargate isn't optional. It's mandatory. This represents his sworn duty to national security. If he fails to stop betrayal at the top, he stands no chance of preventing the deluge rising from below.
