The Iranian regime has finished crushing protests in what was the most brutal repression in its history, killing and imprisoning tens of thousands of its own citizens. It now finds itself confronting an unprecedented concentration of American military power and a president openly threatening the regime's survival. Unlike Bashar Assad, however, the supreme leader and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps have no plan B. They have no safe exile and no alternative future outside Iran.
This poses an intellectual challenge even for those who have studied Iran for decades, not only because of the Iranian system's complexity, but because of the potentially dramatic consequences for the Middle East and possibly the international system as a whole.
It also helps explain both the regime's extreme violence in suppressing the protests and the absence of a genuine internal opposition. The regime is unwilling to compromise, retreat, or negotiate over its own demise. Under these circumstances, Tehran views the current moment as an existential struggle for the revolution's survival.
During the 12-day war, Iran was careful to present its responses as a limited "operation." This time, the signals are different. One can dismiss this as rhetoric, but developments suggest the regime is approaching the current confrontation with a different mindset. Senior officials, including the supreme leader, now see a real threat to their survival and directly link the protests that shook their rule to American involvement. From their perspective, the arrival of the aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln and the buildup of US forces are a direct continuation of the same effort to overthrow the regime.
This perception could significantly expand Iran's range of responses. During the 12-day war, Iran did not deploy all the capabilities at its disposal, particularly its naval assets. That does not imply parity with American power, far from it. But it does underscore Iran's ability to absorb blows and still exact a meaningful price from its adversaries. This combination, an existential outlook and an assessment that Donald Trump would not want a prolonged war, increases the risk of sharper and less predictable Iranian actions than in previous crises, aimed at deterring the administration.
In practice, this could take the form of closing the Strait of Hormuz or inflicting severe and less predictable damage on American bases in the Gulf. Such moves would undoubtedly endanger the regime itself, but consciously or not, it may opt for this Samson option, driven by the belief that it has nothing left to lose.
On the American side stands a president who, unlike many of his predecessors, has adopted a clear moral stance toward the Iranian regime and shown a willingness to use force to punish it. At the same time, he is deeply skeptical of prolonged and costly wars and strongly inclined toward quick, decisive victories. The situation in Iran is unlikely to offer such a clear option.
The prevailing assumption in Washington is that even a limited military strike, including targeting senior leadership, would not be enough to topple the regime or fundamentally change its behavior. In other words, even if Trump authorizes military action, there is no guarantee it would produce the desired strategic shift or reignite mass protests capable of challenging the system. Compounding this is the administration's lack of confidence in the Iranian opposition in exile. Many policymakers are unconvinced that groups abroad, including those led by Prince Reza Pahlavi, can organize a credible governing alternative inside Iran.
This helps explain why some voices in the US administration argue that the current vulnerability of the regime should be leveraged not for regime change, but for a clearly defined strategic goal: an agreement that would severely constrain Iran's nuclear ambitions, backed by a credible and immediate threat of force, as has been reported, for example, regarding the position of Steve Witkoff.
The bottom line is that there is no guaranteed path to success, and the risk of escalation into a broad regional conflict is higher than at any point in decades. One can hope for a strategy that would bring about the collapse of the Islamic Republic and set it on a path toward democracy and rapprochement with the West. But in the absence of such an option, policymakers appear unwilling to rule out non-kinetic alternatives.
Khamenei, however, is trapped in his own dilemma. He may believe he can still hold both ends of the stick, but Iran has no option of simply maintaining the status quo. If he does not yield, the regime will collapse economically. If he yields and strengthens the economy, it will ultimately collapse ideologically. The end has already been determined. The only question is how they get there.
