The military campaign against Iran is not going according to plan. The longer it continues, the clearer that becomes. Rather than bringing down the regime, the campaign is, in several key respects, actually reinforcing it.
Iran is successfully maintaining control over the maritime arena and the Strait of Hormuz, demonstrating resilience in the face of pressure from Israel and the United States, preserving a stockpile of approximately 440 kilograms (970 pounds) of uranium enriched to 60% purity, continuing to strike energy infrastructure, and sustaining a steady rate of missile and drone fire – all while preventing any significant signs of internal unrest, from mass protests to military defections.
In other words, a string of operational successes by the attacking side risks producing a worse strategic outcome. This is a dangerous paradox. Continuing the campaign in its current form does not bring its objectives closer – it pushes them further away. A war of attrition is precisely the strategic environment that serves Iran's interests.
On the other side of the equation, a significant escalation – whether a broad strike on infrastructure or a ground operation – would almost certainly trigger a sharp Iranian response, dealing a severe blow to the global energy economy and to the Gulf states.
This points to the need for a diplomatic off-ramp. Not one that tries to maximize gains – because Iran, operating from a sense of achievement, will not accept that – but one that focuses on the single issue that truly matters: the nuclear file.
One reality must be acknowledged. As long as the Iranian regime exists, it cannot be prevented from building conventional military power. That process can be delayed, perhaps even significantly – but not stopped. The knowledge, the capabilities, and the determination are there. The real question, therefore, is not how to prevent Iran from growing stronger – but how to prevent it from becoming an existential threat. The answer runs through the nuclear issue.
If the enriched uranium stockpile – in particular those 449 kilograms (990 pounds) enriched to 60% – cannot be removed by force, then the goal must be an agreement focused on precisely that issue, even at the cost of accepting the regime's continued existence and even its further consolidation. The second alternative is to go all the way – a campaign aimed at toppling the regime, at enormous cost in security, economic, and diplomatic terms, and with no guarantee of success even then.
There is no third option, and you cannot hold a stick at both ends. Either a nuclear-focused agreement or a full-scale campaign with all that entails.
