Iran. The debate began the moment the war ended. As always in our part of the world, it is being conducted politically, not professionally. Those who support Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared a great victory. Those who oppose him declared a resounding defeat.
In a properly functioning country, this debate would be conducted differently. It would soberly examine what was achieved and what was not, and seek to understand why, and how Israel could do better next time, assuming there is a next time. Sadly, there probably will be. Of course, this debate also has political elements, partly because everything is political in Israel, and partly because the main decision-maker on the Israeli side, Netanyahu, for political reasons surrounded himself with people too small for the moment and incapable of managing it. This was expressed mainly on the home front: the disgraceful handling of northern Israel, the failed compensation framework, the problematic unpaid leave framework, the lack of an answer for education, the transportation problems and more. But the weakness of the collective thinking in the cabinet Netanyahu appointed, and the deliberate weakening of the diplomatic-security systems around him, also formed the incubator from which some of the problems exposed during the war emerged and were reflected in its results.
To the substance. On the credit side, Netanyahu is right that Iran was struck hard and in an unprecedented manner. Entire systems were pulverized, above all those tied to the industrial production capability for weapons: missiles, air defense systems, drones, the nuclear sphere, space and much more. The list also includes national capabilities such as steel plants and petrochemical facilities. Military Intelligence prepared the target bank for months and ranked it by importance, and the Israeli Air Force pounded it for weeks. The advantage is that Iran was pushed back significantly in all these fields. The disadvantage is that it is unclear for how long. After Operation Rising Lion, it recovered faster than expected. Given the resources and motivation, that could happen again.
Next. Israel killed the supreme leader, eliminated Iran's top security leadership yet again, and eliminated experts, again, including in the nuclear field. That permanently neutralized many of its bitterest enemies, including professionals who had held their posts for many years and were considered repositories of critical knowledge. It was dismayed to discover that all those positions were filled quickly, during the war itself, and worse, that in most cases the replacements are functioning well and have turned out to be even more bitter enemies than their predecessors. There is an important footnote here for the future: assassinations matter, but they are not a substitute for policy. At times, and this now seems to be the case, the outcome may prove far worse than the intention.
Israel also notched significant achievements in the sphere of direct threats. Iran's air defense array was almost completely neutralized, and air superiority was achieved quickly and maintained throughout the war. There were several incidents, the American ones were publicized, the Israeli ones will no doubt become public later, but none that changed the overall picture. And here too there is a caveat: Iran failed to recover as it had hoped between June 2025 and February 2026. It will now invest twice the effort to be better prepared for the next round. And as noted, there will be a next round.
The missile array was only partially neutralized. The number of launches fell dramatically after the first two days of the war, but Iran managed to maintain a nearly steady pace of launches, about 10 on average, throughout the war. As in the world of air defense, it will work to improve. But another point should be added here: in the sphere of missiles and launchers, the success was only partial. According to IDF data, about one-third were destroyed, one-third were not destroyed, and one-third were trapped in tunnels that the Air Force struck and blocked. The Iranians will surely free them now, and they will maintain a ready stockpile of missiles in case the campaign resumes before they manage to return to industrial production.
Israel also killed thousands of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Basij personnel. The real number is unclear, but is probably between 3,000 and 6,000. Its hope that this would be the final push that would send the masses into the streets was dashed. In a country with about 1 million Basij members and hundreds of thousands of Revolutionary Guards troops, the threat apparently remained greater than the temptation, especially after the massacre of protesters last January. Netanyahu's and President Donald Trump's calls for the masses to take to the streets also went unanswered, despite extensive behind-the-scenes activity. It remains to be seen whether they will answer now, although the regime appears drunk on power and likely to respond accordingly.
In statements during and after the war, Netanyahu said Israel had proven itself to be a regional power. He is right, of course, and this is certainly not new: Israel was such a power on the eve of the war, and remained one at its end. Its capabilities were once again shown to be phenomenal in intelligence and execution, particularly aerial execution. The deep cooperation with the US military was also impressive and unprecedented. And again, a caveat: Israel did not achieve any of the goals it set for itself at the outset. Not the toppling of the regime, not the removal of enriched uranium from Iran, not the crippling of the missile program, and not the halting of support for the proxies. It is worth asking whether this strengthened Israel's standing as a regional power, or in fact weakened it, especially as the entire region has fallen into a complex strategic entanglement in which Israel's overt and covert allies in the Gulf have been weakened and may turn their anger against it.
Which brings us to the negative side. A power is not measured only by its ability to close sensor-to-shooter loops. It is measured by a range of other components that are part of its national security and the projection of its strength. Since October 7, Israel has projected military power in every direction, but its other strengths have been shrinking in alarming fashion. This is true of the continuing erosion of its international standing, especially in Europe, reflected in multiple fields from trade and the economy to academia and sports. It is also true of the erosion of its standing in the US, where Israel is at an unprecedented low point in public opinion in both parties. And it is also true of the ongoing wear on internal national resilience: the unequal sharing of the burden in the military and the economy, the allocation of funds that prioritizes sectors based on coalition politics rather than national need, the continuing harm to democracy and more. In this context, it is enough to look at the number of Israelis who have left the country in recent years compared with those who immigrated to it, and at the characteristics of those leaving in terms of education, income and military service, to understand that this is not a light blow to the wing but a national challenge threatening to become a danger.
Next. As noted, Israel did not achieve its objectives in the war. The boasting over the opening of the Strait of Hormuz was ridiculous. It was open before the war, and for free. Now it is open at the whim of the Iranians, who are demanding payment for its use. The main parties harmed by this are the Gulf states, Israel's friends, whose standing was certainly weakened by the war because they were both attacked and are now exposed to retaliation. This will necessarily lead them toward one of three solutions, and perhaps all three at once: drawing closer to Iran to protect themselves, bad for Israel; accelerated military buildup, including efforts to obtain nuclear weapons, bad for Israel; and an overt distancing from Israel, which is seen as the source of all the damage, bad for Israel. In that context, hopes for the establishment of an overt regional defense alliance appear, for now, to have been disappointed. Cooperation will presumably continue, but behind the scenes.
Israel also did not push the Iranian threat as far away as it had hoped. The lesson from the June campaign was learned, and this time Israelis no longer speak in terms of generations but of many long years. Still, those years could contract into months, and certainly the threat as a whole was not removed, contrary to what Israelis were misled into believing when they were asked to remain in protected spaces "as long as required until the mission is completed." Well, the public did its part, went without sleep for 40 days, and paid a physical, economic and educational price, but the mission was not completed.
Above all, Israel remains with the same headache it entered the campaign with. It justified the war on the grounds that the nuclear program was an existential threat, and it emerged with the same nuclear program and the same existential threat. It justified the war on the grounds of the missiles, and it emerged with fewer missiles, but with the threat very much alive. It justified it on the grounds of severing the link to the proxies, and it emerged with a regional campaign in which Iran activates Hezbollah, the Houthis and the Shiite militias in Iraq. It justified it on the need for regime change in Iran, and ended up with a regime that is far more extreme, dangerous and vengeful, one whose conduct over the past 48 hours suggests it is doubtful it will agree to far-reaching compromises.
Two more notes. First, the IDF displayed, as noted, an impressive capability that may have no parallel in the world. But there were also those within it, and within the Mossad, who planted illusions about the possible collapse of the regime. It would be advisable for the military to show greater humility in this field of predicting the behavior of peoples and regimes, in which it has never excelled. Second, regarding interceptors: anyone entering a planned campaign ought to be far better prepared.
